# China Politics – Umich 7 Week Seniors

BFHLR Lab

### Notes

A lot of the cards are good enough to be 1nc cards – choose cards based on what you think the block/2nr will go for – there are a lot of combinations that can make separate and interesting disad combinations or that could become new disads in the block.

Several ways to turn the DA – be careful not to doubleturn yourself and look out for aff mistakes

The aff answers are organized, but also note that the other Xi disad contains many of the aff answers because they are consistent with that disad.

Thanks to Samyak, Clara, Alana, Rosie, Kaplan, Jonah, Jax, Fiona, Hannah, Schuler and Liam.

# ---Xi good DA---

## Xi reform DA

### 1nc – da

#### Xi’s built PC from his anti-western and nationalist stance --- will use pc to push and implement reforms, but reforms can be de-railed

**Sheehan 15** --- covers China for The WorldPost and Huffington Post (Matt Sheehan, 9-20-2015, "What You Need To Know About China's Strongman President" Huffington Post, 6-20-2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chinese-president-xi-jinping\_us\_55fed862e4b08820d918ff14)//jonah

This week President Barack Obama will host one of the other serious contenders for most powerful person on Earth: President Xi Jinping of China (pronounced “she jean-ping”). Just three years after taking the reins of power, Xi has already placed his stamp firmly on his country, his region and China’s relationship with the rest of the world. The United States and China have been butting heads for years over everything from cyberattacks to territorial disputes in the South China Sea. With Xi almost guaranteed another seven more years in power, Obama and his successor will both need to wrestle with China-U.S. relations in the age of Xi. Here’s what you need to know about him. XINHUA NEWS AGENCY VIA GETTY IMAGES Chinese President Xi Jinping has built a huge personal brand by employing strongman tactics at home and abroad. Strongman Xi has quickly emerged as maybe the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. China’s previous leaders largely shunned the spotlight, portraying themselves as part of a group ruling by consensus. Xi has instead built a huge personal brand by employing strongman tactics at home and abroad. In China, Xi has consolidated enormous personal power through a blistering crackdown on both corrupt officials and civil society activists. The prosecution of powerful officials (many who happen to be Xi’s political rivals) and the detention of civil rights lawyers have shocked China-watchers in their audacity and depth. Some scholars argue that the twin crackdowns reveal Xi’s vision for China’s future: not a liberal, electoral democracy, but an efficient authoritarian state with a strong leader at the helm. Abroad, Xi has asserted China’s contentious territorial claims by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Over the objection of the United States and its allies, China has managed to build airstrips and outposts in waters also claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam. Xi has also expanded Chinese influence in Southeast and Central Asia by founding new international organizations and pledging huge money for infrastructure investments abroad. NG HAN GUAN/AP President Xi Jinping has earned popularity and political capital that he may spend on broad-ranging economic and environmental reforms. Reformer? Those stances have built popularity and political capital that Xi may spend on broad-ranging economic and environmental reforms. In 2013 the Chinese leadership announced its intention to kick-start sputtering economic reforms, shrinking the role of the state by giving market forces a “decisive role” in the economy. Those reforms are meant to power the Chinese economy through a tough transition: away from traditional sources of growth (cheap exports and heavy industry) and toward a new economy built on services, consumption and innovation. That’s a monumental task, and so far the record on reform is mixed. Early progress was made on thorny issues of restructuring local government debt and wrenching the Chinese economy away from high-polluting industries such as steel and cement. Sudden drops in Chinese coal consumption also laid the groundwork for last fall’s landmark climate change agreement with the U.S. But this summer, the government fumbled on several fronts. When a politically expedient stock market bubble began to burst, the leadership pumped in money in a desperate attempt to keep the party going. That move and a sudden devaluation of the RMB fueled speculation that Xi may sacrifice deep reform in hopes of propping up short-term growth. Xi has branded his administration with the trademark phrases “the Chinese dream” and “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” That branding reinforces a narrative that the Chinese Communist Party has been preaching for decades: after a “century of humiliation” characterized by foreign invasion and domestic strife, China is finally returning to its rightful place of prominence in the world. Xi is striving to take ownership of that revival narrative by pushing reforms at home and asserting Chinese preeminence in the Asia-Pacific. He has appealed to nationalism with an enormous military parade, and to hopes for clean governance by cracking down on lavish official expenditures and corrupt officials. Taken together, Xi has attempted to build a public image as a strong leader devoted to the people. While there are few reliable gauges of public opinion, surveys and anecdotal evidence suggest Xi remains immensely popular at home. Dangerous Road Ahead But ahead lie enormous challenges for China as a whole and Xi in particular. Can he transform the Chinese economy without generating massive unemployment? Can he truly root out corruption while also quashing the sprouts of independent civil society? Can he crack down on official perks without provoking a mutiny within the Chinese Communist Party? Can China expand its influence abroad without driving other countries into the arms of the United States? We won’t know the full answer for years, but when two of the most powerful people in the world sit down next week, these are the questions and currents that will be driving the conversation.

#### Caving into western pressure allows political opponents to take advantage of Xi and undermine his agenda

BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 (“China, US to benefit Chinese leader's nationalism - Hong Kong paper,” pg lexis//um-ef)

Xi holds China's three top positions, and is set to lead China for a decade. Just after becoming party chief late last year, Xi announced what would become the hallmark of his administration. "The Chinese Dream", he said, is "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." Xi's Chinese Dream is described as achieving the "Two 100s": first, the material goal of China becoming a "moderately well-off society" by about 2020, around the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party; second, the modernisation goal of China becoming a fully developed nation by about 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Dream has four parts: Strong China (economically, politically, scientifically, militarily); Civilised China (equity and fairness, rich culture, high morals); Harmonious China (amity among social classes); Beautiful China (healthy environment, low pollution). "A moderately well-off society" is where all citizens, rural and urban, enjoy high standards of living. This includes doubling the 2010 per capita gross domestic product (approaching US$10,000) by about 2020 and completing urbanisation (roughly 1 billion people, 70 per cent of China's population) by about 2030. "Modernisation" means China regaining its position as a world leader in science and technology as well as in economics and business; the resurgence of Chinese civilisation, culture and military might; and China participating actively in all areas of human endeavour. What about Xi's nationalism? If it seems at odds with these grand goals, it is not. Here are six reasons why. Consolidate power. Xi was not selected by Deng Xiaoping , the architect of reform, as were his predecessors - Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao . Neither was Xi elected by the people. Conventional wisdom had it that he would be a weak leader. In order to realise his Chinese Dream, Xi needs to assert strength and assure control. So far, he has exceeded expectations. Enable reform. Xi and Premier Li Keqiang are determined to enact far-reaching economic reforms, the most extensive in 15 years, but there is stiff resistance from those whose dominance would be diminished and benefits cut. This resistance appeals to nationalistic aspirations by accusing reformers of "worshipping Western ways", "glorifying Western models", "caving in to Western pressures". Xi's proactive nationalism is a strategy of "offence is the best defence" - an inoculation, as it were, against the political virus of being labelled "soft" or "pro-Western". Reformers in China are generally associated with pro-American attitudes and thus subject to fierce public criticism, even ridicule. By establishing himself as a strong-willed nationalist, operating independently of the US, Xi secures economic reforms by distinguishing them from serving Western/American interests. It is no coincidence that Xi's first China-US summit follows his multifarious and emphatic exemplars of nationalism. When Xi now enacts reforms, how can he be accused of bowing down to Western/American ideals, when his international actions and assertions are so assured and decisive?

#### Xi’s economic reforms are critical to both the US’s and China’s economic stability

**Paulson, 15** – [Henry M. Paulson Jr., was U.S. treasury secretary from 2006 to 2009, and is chairman of the Paulson Institute, The Washington Post, “Why China’s economic reforms are critical to the United States”, 9/18/15, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-chinas-economic-reforms-are-critical-to-the-united-states/2015/09/18/b2227c9c-5bc5-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story.html>, 6/24/16]JRO

How serious are China’s economic problems, and how big an impact will they have on the United States and world economies? Beijing and Washington, separately and jointly, will determine the answers. First, both countries are essential to global growth, and both must carry out structural reforms to move their economies onto a growth-conducive footing for the long term. One byproduct of China’s recent stock market volatility has been the emergence of a veritable army of “perma-bears” who believe the Chinese economy is essentially falling off a cliff. Growth in China is slowing and will continue to do so in years to come. But the stock market drop in itself tells us little about China’s real economy. All markets, of course, incubate asset bubbles. In that sense, the summer’s collapse, while a tragic and painful experience for many Chinese investors, has brought equity values back to earth in Shanghai and Shenzhen. We need to focus squarely on Beijing’s underlying structural challenge: the need to transition to a new economic model while restructuring local debt resulting from its flawed current model. The biggest risks for China — and, by extension, for the world — can be avoided if China does the right things now to deal with its immediate challenges while accelerating President Xi Jinping’s economic reform agenda. It has the necessary tools and financial capacity to do so. In recent years, China has made two principal contributions to global growth: It sustained its own growth in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and served as a demand driver for the commodity and industrial exports of other countries — consuming about half the world’s copper, nickel, tin and iron. Both of these contributions are now in jeopardy. China’s growth, which was premised on an unsustainable model, was bound to slow as its economy matured. But if there is a silver lining to the slowdown, it is that it reinforces the urgency of reforms that will establish the foundation for slower, but higher-quality, growth. China’s leaders understand this. That is why, in November 2013, they committed to ambitious structural reforms. But implementation has stalled in some areas, including on the fiscal and state-owned enterprise reforms essential to the new model. Frankly, Xi inherited a bad hand after a decade in which Beijing kicked the most difficult reforms down the road. And the sheer scope of his challenges is exacerbated by powerful vested interests resisting reforms. This presents a staggering challenge of political will, sequencing and execution that will take years, not months. Reforms have consequences: Reforming state-owned enterprises, for example, will mean laying off millions. Such reforms will also require complex labor-market and competition reforms to bolster job creation. There is no playbook for rebooting a slowing $10 trillion hybrid economy still in a tug of war between state control and markets. Mistakes will be made. Even under the best of circumstances, global markets will be shaken by periodic bouts of instability until the Chinese economy works its way toward a new normal of slower, more balanced, market-determined growth. The United States, for all its differences with Beijing, should be rooting for China’s economic reformers to succeed. And as a large holder of Treasury securities and a major funder of U.S. structural deficits, China has a lot at stake in whether the United States undertakes urgent fiscal, tax and structural reforms that will allow our economy to grow faster. Second, U.S. and Chinese companies need expanded opportunities in each other’s markets. From agribusiness to medical devices, the U.S. and Chinese economies are increasingly complementary. What is missing are policies to better enable direct investment and to provide companies a level playing field. This is a particular problem for China, which badly needs competition to remove economic inefficiencies and distortions. The private sector is China’s principal job creator, but Beijing has yet to open many high-growth sectors to it. And policies such as subsidized land and energy and regulatory protection shield state-owned firms from market discipline.

#### Chinese economic collapse leads to multiple scenarios for war – miscalculation and lash out

**Carpenter, 15** – [Ted Galen, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at The National Interest, The National Interest, “Could China's Economic Troubles Spark a War?”, 9/6/15, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war-13784?page=2>, 6/24/16]JRO

Global attention has focused on the plunge in the Shanghai stock market and mounting evidence that China’s economic growth is slowing dramatically. Moreover, the contagion appears to be spreading, characterized by extreme volatility and alarming declines in America’s own equity markets. Those worries are compounded because there always have been doubts about the accuracy of Beijing’s official economic statistics. Even before the current downturn, some outside experts believed that Chinese officials padded the results, making the country’s performance appear stronger than it actually was. If China is now teetering on the brink of recession, the political incentives for officials to conceal the extent of the damage would be quite powerful. The focus on the possible wider economic consequences of a severe Chinese economic slowdown is understandable, since the ramifications could be extremely unpleasant for the U.S. and global economies. But we should also be vigilant about how such economic stress might affect Beijing’s diplomatic and military behavior. It is not unprecedented for a government that feels besieged to attempt to distract a discontented public by fomenting a foreign policy crisis. In Henry IV, Shakespeare pithily described that process as the temptation to “busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.” China’s leaders likely feel increasingly uncomfortable. The implicit bargain that has been in place since the onset of market-oriented reforms in the late 1970s has been that if the public does not challenge the Communist Party’s dominant political position, the Party will deliver an ever-rising standard of living for the people. The bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 was a graphic reminder of what happens if the Party’s position is challenged. However, until now, the economic portion of the bargain seemed secure, characterized by breathtaking, often double digit, rates of growth. It is uncertain what happens if the Party can no longer maintain its part of the implicit bargain, but it is likely that a dangerous degree of public discontent will surface. Beijing might refrain from deliberately provoking a major foreign policy crisis, since the Chinese economy depends heavily on export markets, and access to those markets would be jeopardized by war. However, the need to preserve and strengthen national unity and distract the public from mounting economic troubles is likely to impel Chinese leaders to adopt very hardline policies in at least three areas. And all of those situations entail the danger of miscalculations that could lead to war. One issue is the South China Sea. Beijing has made extraordinarily broad territorial claims that encompass some 90 percent of that body of water. China is pressing its claims with air and naval patrols and the building of artificial islands. Those policies have brought Beijing into acrimonious disputes with neighbors such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which have rival territorial claims, and with the world’s leading maritime power, the United States, which resists any manifestation of Chinese control over the South China Sea and the crucial commercial lanes that pass through it. The conditions are in place for a nasty confrontation. Chinese leaders have already stressed the country’s alleged historical claims to the area, and made it clear that it will not tolerate being subjected to humiliation by outside powers. Such arguments are designed to gain domestic support by reminding the Chinese people of the country’s long period of weakness and humiliation in the 1800s and early 1900s. A second issue is Taiwan. Beijing has long argued that Taiwan is rightfully part of China and was stolen from the country in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Although Chinese leaders have exhibited patience regarding the issue of reunification, relying in large measure on growing cross-strait economic ties to entice Taiwan to eventually accept that outcome, Beijing has also reacted very sharply whenever Taiwanese officials have pushed an agenda of independence, as during the administration of Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008. The danger or renewed confrontation is rising, since public opinion polls indicate that the nominee of Chen’s old party, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, will be Taiwan’s next leader. A new crisis in the Taiwan Strait would be extremely serious, since the United States has obligated itself to consider any Chinese efforts at coercion as a “grave breach of the peace” of East Asia. Yet there is little doubt that there would be widespread domestic support on the mainland for a stern response by the Beijing government to a Taiwanese attempt to enhance its de-facto independence. Indeed, there might be more political danger to the regime if it did not take a strong stance on that issue. The third possible arena for crisis is the East China Sea. China is increasingly adamant about its claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, which are under Japanese control. From China’s perspective, those islands were stolen by Imperial Japan at the same time that Tokyo took possession of Taiwan following the 1895 war. And ginning up public anger against Japan is never difficult. China just finished celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, which is touted in China as “the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.” Recalling Japan’s invasion of China, and the resulting atrocities, was a prominent theme of the various commemorative events. But the animosity is not based solely on historical grievances. Anger at Japan over the ongoing East China Sea dispute and other matters has already produced anti-Japanese riots in Chinese cities, characterized by attacks on Japanese businesses and automobiles. There is a powerful incentive for Chinese leaders to take an uncompromising stance on the Diaoyu/Senkaku feud, confident that the Chinese people will back such a stance. All of this suggests that the United States and its allies need to proceed cautiously about dealing with China, especially on these three issues. Now is not the time to press a Chinese leadership that likely feels beleaguered by the country’s economic woes. The last thing we should do is give those leaders further temptation to distract the Chinese people with a foreign policy confrontation. Such a strategy entails the grave risk of miscalculation and escalation, and that would be a tragedy for all concerned.

### 2nc – nationalism module

#### The plan triggers a wave of nationalist backlash

**Wong 14** --- reporter for the New York Times (Edward Wong, 11-11-2014, "In New China, ‘Hostile’ West Is Still Derided" New York Times, 6-24-2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/china-turns-up-the-rhetoric-against-the-west.html?_r=0)//jonah>

Even as his government was making red-carpet plans to host President Obama this week, the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, praised a young blogger whose writing is best known here for its anti-American vitriol. In one widely circulated essay published by state news outlets titled “Nine Knockout Blows in America’s Cold War Against China,” the blogger, Zhou Xiaoping, argued that American culture was “eroding the moral foundation and self-confidence of the Chinese people.” He compared unfavorable American news coverage of China to Hitler’s treatment of the Jews. In another essay, he said the West had “slaughtered and robbed” China and other civilizations since the 17th century, and was now “brainwashing” it. Mr. Xi, at a forum last month aimed at tightening political control of the arts, said the blogger exhibited “positive energy.” His embrace of Mr. Zhou, who has been hailed by propaganda officials but widely mocked by scholars here, is just the latest sign of rising anti-Western sentiment, bordering on xenophobia, that has emanated from the highest levels of the Communist Party and sent a chill through Chinese civil society and academia. Using ideological language reminiscent of the Cold War, Chinese officials have voiced conspiracy theories with relish, accusing foreigners, their companies, government agencies and nongovernmental organizations of plotting to weaken or overthrow the party. Chinese institutions with ties to Western entities, no matter how benign, have also come under attack. And state-run newspapers have taken to blaming “hostile foreign forces” for any major disturbance, whether it is ethnic violence in western China or student-led pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong. The vilification of foreigners as enemies of China has been a staple of propaganda by the Communist Party since before its rise to power, and analysts say the leadership tends to ramp up such rhetoric when it feels under pressure at home. “Historically, during every period with many deep conflicts within the country, there has been a surge of antiforeign sentiments from the party,” said Zhang Lifan, a historian, pointing to Mao Zedong’s disastrous Cultural Revolution as an example. At the moment, he said, “the political establishment needs the public to turn their rage toward foreign countries” because anger over the widening gap between rich and poor in China has reached “crisis levels.” Continue reading the main story But unlike earlier campaigns targeting the West, the current wave of nationalism comes as China is ascendant. Mr. Xi presides over a country that is on the verge of overtaking the United States as the world’s largest economy and that enjoys influence around the world, especially in Asia, where it has sought to expand its territorial footprint. In speeches, Mr. Xi has openly called on other nations to push back against the United States on specific issues. In July, for example, he told Brazil’s National Congress that developing nations must “challenge U.S. hegemony on the Internet.” Two months earlier, Mr. Xi suggested at a conference in Shanghai that the United States should cede power in Asia, saying, “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia.” The surge in anti-Americanism extends beyond speeches. Over the summer, for example, the Chinese government began a security review of foreign nongovernmental agencies operating in China, as well as Chinese nongovernmental agencies that receive foreign support, scrutinizing their finances and freezing bank accounts. A 100-minute anti-American propaganda film made by the People’s Liberation Army last year laid out the case that American nongovernmental agencies were out to undermine the party. (It used the martial theme music from the HBO series “Game of Thrones.”) In Guangdong, the province adjacent to Hong Kong that has long been more open to foreign influence and investment, officials have considered shutting down Chinese nongovernmental agencies that depend on foreign funds, the state-run newspaper Global Times reported last week. Wang Jiangsong, a professor of labor relations at the China Institute of Industrial Relations, was quoted in the newspaper as saying that the authorities had secretly tracked transfers of overseas money to the Chinese organizations and were worried that “some NGOs would be manipulated by overseas forces and conduct activities that may endanger national security and undermine social stability.” The campaign has reached into academia as well. An employee of an American organization that promotes dialogue among scholars said some Chinese professors who work on international relations were no longer writing or saying anything in public that cast the United States in a positive light, for fear of being accused of spying. The employee, who spoke on the condition of anonymity so as not to antagonize Chinese partners, added that one Chinese university had barred visiting American scholars from lecturing if their research did not conform to the party line. Casting blame on the “black hand” of foreign forces has become more common in the state news media as well. The People’s Daily has published 42 articles this year blaming “Western,” “foreign” or “overseas” forces for China’s domestic problems. That total is nearly triple the number of similar pieces from the first 10 months of last year, according to a count by The Christian Science Monitor. The pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong have been a favorite target. Last Friday, Ta Kung Pao, a Hong Kong newspaper close to the party, ran a front-page article under a headline that said the newspaper had found “ironclad evidence” that the United States had been secretly plotting the local Occupy movement since 2006. The government has also targeted major Western companies with high-profile investigations and imposed record fines for what officials call monopolistic practices. Some foreign businesspeople and officials say the investigations are a form of protectionism. At the same time, the Chinese government has maintained restrictions on foreign investment, ownership and market access in many industries. As a result, American executives have tempered their optimism about doing business here, said John Frisbie, president of the U.S.-China Business Council, a trade group in Washington. “It should be more than a $350 billion market in China for U.S. companies,” he said. “Many sectors are still closed. There has generally been a lack of movement forward on further openings.”

#### The impact is nuclear war

**Copley 5**

(Copley News Service, “Daily Editorials Bombs and Butter”, pg Lexis)

As China gains economic clout, its government's brand of touchy, saber-rattling nationalism becomes more worrisome. That touchiness is rooted in the memory of humiliation inflicted by foreigners, from the Western colonial concessions of the 19th century, and it is rooted in the more recent memory of Japanese atrocities during the World War II occupation. That wounded pride explains the orchestrated national spleen-venting over Japanese textbooks, the 2001 U.S. spy plane collision and the mistaken U.S. bombing of China's embassy during the Kosovo campaign. It has much to do with China's oft-repeated threats to attack Taiwan, which seem extreme to everyone except the Chinese. As China gains power, that nationalism becomes more worrisome. China's authoritarian government lacks the natural restraint of voters or of dissenters free to challenge government assumptions that can lead to war. The Pentagon recently reported that China is rapidly building its military with a goal of extending its influence across Asia. In the future, its leaders "may be tempted to resort to force or coercion more quickly to press diplomatic advantage, advance security interests or resolve disputes," the report concluded. If more muscle combined with nationalist passions tempt Chinese leaders to attack Taiwan, the United States and the world would be faced with a crisis more serious than any since at least the 1962 Cuban missile crisis with the Soviet Union. The United States would feel compelled to come to Taiwan's aid, resulting in a war between heavily armed countries that possess nuclear arsenals.

#### Unchecked nationalism threatens global stability – extinction

**Cookson, 15** – [John Richard, senior editor at The National Interest, The National Interest, “The Real Threat of Chinese Nationalism”, 8/28/15, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-threat-chinese-nationalism-13729?page=2>, 6/20/16]JRO

On Monday, China’s Shanghai Composite Index dropped 8.5 percent, the largest percentage fall since the financial crisis hit in 2007. Hours earlier it was reported that Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, would not attend a ceremony in China on September 3 marking the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War Two. So far, China’s economic slowdown has been seen as separate from the country’s antagonisms with Japan. Both domestic and antiforeign discontent might concern China watchers, and both might be simmering at the moment, but each registers as its own threat, requiring its own policy response. This is wrong. What connects these issues is the worrying role popular nationalism has taken on in China in the era after Mao Zedong and, more recently, after Deng Xiaoping. All of this comes on the eve of a state visit by Chinese president Xi Jinping to the United States in September. Xi lands in Washington as the leader who has, according to President Obama, “consolidated power faster and more comprehensively than probably anybody since Deng Xiaoping." No force has been more important in Xi’s power grab than nationalism. He has presided over a country that has stoked patriotic fervor as well as antagonized its neighbors and the United States. The most immediate result of stirring up national sentiment has been to strengthen Xi’s power within the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee. With this backstop of popular support, Xi has steadfastly pursued a set of programs, even amid some opposition. For example, his anticorruption purge has continued even after an authority as prominent as former president Jiang Zemin warned against it becoming too ambitious. Nationalism has worked for Xi. So far, patriotic, mass support has protected him from a strong, public challenge by the military or the party. But nationalism in China has an uncertain and at times combustible relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leaders in Beijing. In China, street-level, unchecked nationalism—nationalism en masse—is a precarious threat both to the CCP and to regional and global stability overall. In 2012, Xi took control of a China unthinkable without Deng Xiaoping. By opening up its economy and jettisoning Mao-era programs, China created an average of 10 percent growth per year over the thirty years beginning with 1980. Millions were brought from subsistence living to a point where median income now approaches a “middle-income trap.” As if to acknowledge this change, Xi reiterated his commitment to Deng’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” shortly after coming to power. But this phrase, “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” is by now, of course, “nonsense,” China scholar Roderick MacFarquhar said at the time. Communism no longer connects the nation; it is no longer a unifying ideology. Instead, China now has over the last two-and-a-half decades, and with the strict tenets of communism shed as a unifying ideology, nationalism has been paired with robust economic growth in China to legitimize the country’s leadership. Both contributed to an “authoritarian resilience,” as China scholar Jessica Chen Weiss describes it. Now, nationalism and economics have begun to decouple as growth has slowed and stocks have tumbled. Comparisons with Deng have turned from complimentary of Xi to concerning for China as a whole. “The country is now going through a crisis of transition, unparalleled since Deng Xiaoping set out to put clear water between China’s future and the Mao era,” writes George Magnus, an associate at Oxford University’s China Centre and senior advisor to UBS, in the Financial Times. What connects the faltering economy with the animosity between China and Japan is that antiforeign protests are some of the only forms of mass, organized protest that have been permitted to take place in China. As Weiss points out, while anti-Japanese demonstrations were repressed in the 1990s and 2000s, they nonetheless flared up in 1985, 2005, 2010 and 2012. Moreover, she notes, the 1985 anti-Japanese protests were early precursors of the pro-democracy protests of 1986 and 1989, giving participants much needed experience in mass mobilization. Weiss explains what the CCP knows well, that “[e]ven strong authoritarian governments may have difficulty reining in protests that are widely seen as patriotic and legitimate." History shows that Chinese officials quickly repress demonstrations about domestic issues. This is less the case with antiforeign protests, which not only can have an intrinsic, patriotic legitimacy leaders find difficult to counter, but also, as Weiss argues, can have a value for China’s leaders to signal resolve in diplomacy. In a statement released for the anniversary of the end of World War II on August 15, Japanese prime minister Abe said that his “heart is rent with the utmost grief” about the damage done by his country. But he also emphasized that “[w]e must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize.” This statement joins a list of recent perceived slights, including a row this summer over the treatment of the war in Japanese textbooks, that irk many Chinese. Chinese-Japanese tensions have eased somewhat since the worst days of 2012, which Weiss says saw the largest anti-Japanese demonstrations since relations were normalized in 1972. Of the 287 prefecture cities Weiss and a colleague studied in 2012, nearly three-quarters saw street protests. Should Xi tolerate another spate of anti-Japanese protests, he would be using popular sentiment to signal to Japanese officials that China’s avenues for compromise are few. Importantly, this wish to signal resolve in diplomacy is weighed against the threat that such protests will spiral out of control, turning to domestic grievances and turning against Beijing. In this way, any anti-Japanese protests ostensibly about the Second World War are a potential rallying point for discontent about the present. “In current American usage,” the scholar Bernard Lewis noted, “the phrase ‘that’s history’ is commonly used to dismiss something as unimportant, of no relevance to current concerns.” Not so in much of the world, and not so in China now. China’s leaders, Xi chief among them, can wield nationalism for their own ends. And now, leaders may wish to double down on nationalism as both the economy and the legitimacy the government has gained in the post-Deng era from a strong economy weaken. But nationalism isn’t an easy tool to control. As Weiss points out, "the past two Chinese governments fell to nationalist movements that accused them of failing to defend the country from foreign encroachments: the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and the Manchu leaders of the Qing dynasty." Going into this autumn, policy makers should be mindful of what is happening in China’s streets, as well as what Xi does and says before and during his trip to Washington.

# UNIQUENESS

## uq – econ reforms

### uq – passing now

#### Economic reform will pass now but it’s a fight --- only strong Xi leadership can get it across

**Wang 6/6**/16 --- Editor in Chief of the South China Morning Post (Wang Xiangwei, 6-6-2016, "Xi Jinping’s supply-side plan now the genuine article of economic reform for China" South China Morning Post, 6-20-2016, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1945530/xi-jinpings-supply-side-plan-now-genuine-article)//jonah>

Who is in charge of the Chinese economy? If there were still any lingering doubts over this key question among overseas investors, they should have been removed after the publication of two significant long pieces in People’s Daily last week. On Monday, the mouthpiece controlled by the Communist Party’s Central Committee carried a long question and answer “interview” with an unnamed “authoritative” source, repudiating the country’s debt-fuelled growth policies. On Tuesday, it published the text of a long speech by President Xi Jinping expounding his hallmark economic policy which focused on supply-side structural reforms – 20,000 words in all that occupied two pages in the newspaper. Xi gave the speech to top Chinese officials back in January, but the timing of the publication sent an unmistakable message. Taken together, the articles signal that Xi has decided to take the driver’s seat to steer China’s economy at a time when there are intense internal debates among officials over its overall direction – namely whether to continue to resort to the old ways of deploying massive stimulus resulting in overproduction and high debt levels, or to undertake painful restructuring to reduce overcapacity and close down “zombie” enterprises. The Monday interview was particularly pointed as it urged officials to dispense with the fantasy of stimulating the economy through monetary easing and warned that the country’s soaring debt levels could lead to “systemic financial risks” and negative growth. This largely repudiated what Premier Li Keqiang and his cabinet have been doing over the past two years – using high leverage to boost the real estate and stock markets to support economic growth. The article is thought to have been initiated by Liu He, one of Xi’s top economic advisors, and approved by the president himself. The decision to publish it appeared to be prompted by ­first-quarter economic data which showed the country released a record 4.6 trillion yuan (HK$5.5 trillion) worth of bank credit, exceeding even the ­4 trillion yuan released in early 2009 during the financial crisis. At that time, then-premier Wen Jiabao turned on the money tap to support economic growth but that greatly worsened China’s industrial overcapacity. Although Li has repeatedly said his cabinet will not resort to a massive stimulus plan to support growth, the soaring bank lending and debt levels have heightened worries. The dangerous cost of China’s debt-fuelled growth: delays to much-needed structural reforms More importantly, the escalating lending threatens to derail Xi’s supply-side reforms which are aimed at forcing closures and mergers of enterprises in the steel, coal and metals industries with huge overcapacity. Indeed, recent reports have suggested that since the significant increase in money supply, many of the steel and iron enterprises targeted for closure have restarted production and some have even announced expansion plans following the rebound in steel and iron ore prices. The two articles suggested that Xi appeared determined to bet on painful restructuring instead of seeking short but unsustainable growth, something that Chinese leaders have said repeatedly over the past few decades but have made little progress in achieving. As some economists have pointed out, Xi’s emphasis on supply-side reforms is part of a global trend and also reflects his political aim to put more pressure on vested interest groups, including local officials and state-owned enterprises after his harsh crackdown on rampant official corruption. Indeed, to push through Xi’s reforms means that many “zombie” enterprises will be forced to close down, which could contribute to unemployment and social instability. The admission that the trajectory of China’s economic growth will continue to be “L-shaped” in the next few years validated the fears of many international investors including George Soros and will heighten international pessimism over the Chinese economy. All those factors mean that China’s economic growth could slow further and even fall below the government-set annual growth rate of 6.5 per cent. The Monday interview seems to suggest Xi is not worried, as the “authoritative source” said the economy would not plunge even without stimulus as it still enjoyed huge potential, was highly resilient and had ample leeway. But it also means that he is prepared to accept lower growth in exchange for notable progress in restructuring, even if the risk of social instability rises significantly. Despite the staggering odds, Xi’s strong leadership style displayed in his unprecedented anti-corruption campaign and rapid consolidation of power means he stands a good chance of succeeding.

#### XI’s economic reform attempts are solidifying – eliminating perception of inaction and complacency

Naughton 15, Chair of Chinese International Affairs at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, (Barry, 2015, Is There a “Xi Model” of Economic Reform? Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014, http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46bn.pdf)//kap

China’s economic reform took major steps forward beginning in the fourth quarter of 2014. Major policy initiatives were launched on consolidation of local government finances and debt, agricultural land property rights, and preparations for commitment to more rigorous free-trade agreements. The period of slow reform progress after the Third Plenum has now ended. We can now start to see the outlines of a distinctive “Xi Model” of economic reforms. Xi Jinping’s policy agenda continues to be marked by abundant contradictory components. Ideological repression, great power aspirations, and great leader propaganda coexist with an ongoing campaign against corruption and significant measures of economic reform. Some pundits argue that these contradictory elements can be explained by one or another simple formula: Xi is “really” a reformer, or really a leftist, or really just a dictator. These overly simple approaches should be ignored. Those who advance them are merely inventing plausible stories to reconcile apparent contradictions. Although all these simple characterizations of Xi Jinping may contain elements of truth, no simple formula comes anywhere close to explaining the disparate, shifting, and sometimes massively contradictory elements of Xi’s agenda. It is enough right now if we can clearly describe the elements of the Xi agenda, and perhaps assess the relative weight and possible trajectory of some of these elements. In fact, within the jumble of disparate policy elements in the Xi agenda, in the latter part of 2014 there was a substantial shift in relative importance. The importance of economic reforms increased palpably as, for the first time, Xi began to put considerable political muscle behind specific strands of the economic reform agenda. The economic reform program has now moved out of the earlier stages of preparation and the creation of specialized institutions to manage the reform process (as described in earlier CLMs). Earlier assessments, even when positive, have inevitably been cautious, because implementation has been slow, relative to the bold and broad declarations of the November 2013 Third Plenum.1 Today, however, we can start to see important areas where economic reforms have moved beyond rhetoric into important efforts of practical implementation. This does not necessarily mean that Xi has found an effective or reasonable “model” of reform, but it certainly changes the terms of the conversation we should be having about economic policy. Xi’s economic reforms are now serious and real, and deserve serious and careful attention.2 Oddly, so far the important measures discussed here have been presented in a somewhat understated way in the Chinese press, and have received very little press attention outside China. This shortcoming should be rectified as soon as possible. Naughton, China Leadership Monitor, no. 46 2 In the following, I survey three key elements of economic reform that moved into serious implementation in the October–November 2014 time frame. Each of these three is complex, and a full analysis, or even a complete description, cannot really be achieved in this short format. The first section lists all three policy areas. Sections two through four describe the policy content for each of the measures. In Section five, I present an extremely preliminary set of observations about the nature of the emerging “Xi model” of economic reform.

#### Xi is using PC to implement his economic reforms

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China is again at crossroads in its domestic politics. After becoming party boss in 2013, President Xi Jinping surprised many people in China and around the world with his bold and vigorous anti-corruption campaign and his impressively quick consolidation of power. Within two years, Xi’s administration purged about 60 ministerial-, provincial- and senior military-level leaders on corruption charges, including ten members of the newly-formed 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 2013 alone the authorities handled 172,000 corruption cases and investigated 182,000 officials –– the highest annual number of cases in 30 years. In an even bolder move Xi purged three heavyweight politicians: former police czar Zhou Yongkang, who controlled the security and law enforcement apparatus for ten years; former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou, who was in charge of military personnel affairs for a decade; and Ling Jihua, who was head of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee and oversaw all of the activities and document flow of the top leadership during the era of President Hu Jintao. These moves to clean up corruption in the party leadership have greatly bolstered public confidence and support for Xi. Equally significant is the consolidation of Xi’s personal power: he holds the top position in many leading central groups, including important areas such as foreign affairs, financial and economic work, cyber security and information technology, and military reforms. Altogether, Xi occupies a total of 11 top posts in the country’s most powerful leadership bodies. Xi’s ascent to the top leadership rung raises a critical question: will his ongoing concentration of power reverse the trend of collective leadership, which has been a defining characteristic of Chinese elite politics over the past two decades? In post-Deng China the party’s top leaders, beginning with Jiang Zemin of the so-called third generation of leadership and followed by Hu Jintao of the fourth generation, were merely seen as “first among equals” in the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the supreme decision-making body in the country. Many observers argue that Xi’s leadership –– his style, decision-making process, and public outreach –– represents the “reemergence of strongman politics.” But it is one thing to recognize Xi Jinping’s remarkable achievements in consolidating power in just two years as top CCP leader and quite another to conclude that he has become a paramount and charismatic leader in the manner of Mao Tse-Tung or Deng Xiaoping. The power and charisma of Mao grew out of his extraordinary leadership in revolution and war. On the other hand, despite his influence, Deng did not hold any leadership positions in the final ten years of his life except for the post of honorary chairman of the China Bridge Association. Therefore, the fact that Xi holds 11 leadership posts is not necessarily a sign of strength. Moreover, Xi’s concentration of power and strong political moves has more to do with the factional makeup of the PSC than with his authority and command. In the post-Deng era, two major political coalitions associated with former party bosses Jiang and Hu (who both still wield considerable influence) have been competing for power and influence. The former coalition was born in the Jiang era and is currently led by Xi. Its core membership consists of “princelings” –– leaders born into the families of revolutionaries or other high-ranking officials. Both Jiang and Xi are princelings themselves. The latter coalition, known as the Hu-Li camp, was previously led by Hu Jintao and is now headed by Premier Li Keqiang. Its core faction consists of leaders who advanced their political career primarily through the Chinese Communist Youth League, as did both Hu and Li. Leaders in this faction, known as tuanpai, usually have humble family backgrounds and leadership experience in less developed inland regions. During the 2012 leadership transition, the Jiang-Xi camp won an overwhelming majority of seats on the PSC. It secured six of the seven spots, while only Li Keqiang now represents the Hu-Li camp on the PSC. This six-to-one ratio in favor of the Jiang-Xi camp is a very important political factor in the present-day Chinese leadership. It gives Xi tremendous power. It explains why he can implement new initiatives so quickly. Yet, the five members of the PSC who are Xi’s political allies are expected to retire, as a result of age limits, at the 19th National Party Congress in 2017. It will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the Jiang-Xi camp to maintain such an overwhelming majority in the next leadership transition because the Hu-Li protégés are far better represented in the current Central Committee –– the pool from which members of the next Politburo and PSC are selected. The Hu-Li camp will not remain silent if Chinese elite politics returns to the Mao era of zero-sum games where the winner takes all. In fact, Xi’s strong anti-corruption campaigns have already been widely perceived, rightly or wrongly, as being driven primarily by factional politics; thus he has created many false friends and real enemies and an unpredictable and dangerous political situation for the country. Though this relentless anti-corruption campaign has already changed the behavior of officials (the sale of l uqurious cars and watches has dropped dramatically, for example), it risks alienating the officialdom—the very people on whom the system relies for effective functioning. Xi’s actions also undermine vested interests in monopolized state-owned business sectors such as the oil industry, utilities, railways, telecommunication, and banking –– the “pillar industries” of state power. As of 2015, China’s flagship state-owned enterprises were required to cut the salaries of senior executives by as much as 40 percent. Meanwhile, a large scale reshuffling and retirement of senior military officers has been underway and this political move could be potentially very costly to Xi. His politically conservative approach, relying on tight political control and media censorship, has also alienated the country’s intellectuals. At the same time, Xi is very popular among three important groups in China. First, the general public applauds Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, his decisive and effective leadership role, and his “Chinese dream” vision—defined as the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the opportunity to realize a middle-class lifestyle. Second, private entrepreneurs are beneficiaries of Xi’s economic reform agenda, as he defines the private sector as the “decisive driver” of the Chinese economy. The ongoing financial reforms now give more loans to small and medium size private firms. And third, members of the military, particularly younger and lower level officers, are inspired not only by Xi’s global feistiness and his nationalist spirit in confronting Japan and others but also by the new opportunities for promotion and prestige. Apart from political elite infighting, there are many serious problems within China that could trigger a major international crisis: slowing economic growth, widespread social unrest, cyber system outage, and heightened Chinese nationalism particularly in the wake of escalating tensions over territorial disputes with Japan, some Southeast Asian countries and India. Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election, in which the pro-independence party will likely win, might also instigate strong reactions on the mainland. This does not necessarily mean that Xi intends to distract from domestic tensions with an international conflict; contemporary Chinese history shows that trying to distract the public from domestic problems by playing up foreign conflicts has often ended in regime change. Yet, Xi may be cornered into taking a confrontational approach in order to deflect criticism. The broad public support that Xi has recently earned should allow him to concentrate on a domestic economic reform agenda and avoid being distracted by foreign disputes and tensions that could otherwise accompany the rise of ultra-nationalism. But one can also reasonably argue that Xi may use his political capital on foreign affairs, including a possible military conflict, which may help him build a Mao-like image and legacy.

### uq – Xi pushing econ reforms

#### Xi’s sheer political will is the only way he can pass meaningful economic

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Return of the Strongman Leader Mr Xi has lost no time stamping his authority on the country and the Party since he took over last year, accumulating more power faster than any Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping and assiduously cultivating a "strongman" image. In so doing, he has confounded the wisdom of those foreign pundits who, not long ago, were proclaiming that China's governance had evolved irreversibly from a system dominated by one individual into a more amorphous, consensus-based, style of collective leadership. Mr Xi's first priority has been to tighten his grip on the Party, imposing strict disciplines and meting out tough penalties on those who flout them. Self-criticism sessions, loyalty oaths and rhetoric intended to evoke the Mao era have all made a comeback, both in government and in state-owned enterprises. Those measures have been powerfully reinforced by one of the most ferocious crackdowns on corruption in recent Chinese history, involving the arrest, trial and predictable conviction of officials at almost every level. By one estimate, some 1 80,000 people have been apprehended so far, and rumours swirl constantly in Beij ing about whose heads will be next to fall. Anti-corruption campaigns have long been favoured by China's rulers as a method of eliminating political enemies or rivals. Given the prevalence of corruption among Party officials, not to mention the political malleability of the judicial system, it is not difficult to come up with charges against almost anyone in a position of authority that can be made to stick. In addition, the current crackdown appears to have at least two other motives. One is to try win back popular support by attacking a prime source of public resentment and disenchantment with the Party - though at the risk of inadvertently encouraging the belief that every senior official is lining his or her pockets at the country's expense. The other objective is to break down political and economic "vested interests" in government and industry that oppose reforms because they profit so handsomely from the status quo. The drive appears to have been particularly effective in bringing to heel the powerful energy SOEs, which have long been used to doing as they pleased and have been more important than the government in shaping energy policy - always to their own advantage, of course. Meanwhile, the Party has clipped the wings of the National Development and Reform Commission, architect of China's legendary five-year plans and a once-powerful voice in the making of many kinds of economic policy. The central government's regulatory business approvals process is being streamlined and rules for starting new businesses simplified. Plans are also afoot to sell minority stakes in some non-bank SOEs, though these are likely for the foreseeable future to remain ultimately under firm political control. Some commentators detect signs of an embryonic personality cult in the energetic promotion and projection of Mr Xi's image. There are also suggestions of grumblings by party elders, including former President Jiang Zemin, still an influential figure behind the scenes. Mr Jiang, a number of whose own followers have been targeted by the anticorruption campaign, is reported to have urged Mr Xi to rein it in, arguing that it risked tearing the Party apart. Yet the six other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the Party's supreme decision-making body, appear willingly to have endorsed the glorification of Mr Xi. One reason may be that many of them will be required to step down in 201 7 on grounds of age, so presumably harbour few unfulfilled ambitions for career advancement. Another is that they have come to accept that only a leader perceived to be an unstoppable human bulldozer is capable of driving through change and sweeping away entrenched obstacles to reform. 3.What Kind of Reforms? But can Mr Xi actually deliver? And what, precisely, will he be delivering? By any standards, he appears to be taking a giant gamble. If it pays off, he - and China - will reap rich rewards. But if it fails, there will be no obvious fall-guys onto whom to shiftthe blame, since all the most likely candidates have been nudged into the sidelines, including Li Keqiang, the prime minister, who is nominally responsible for overall supervision of economic policy. And the agenda to be tackled looks daunting. The programme endorsed by the Plenum calls for a broad swathe of policy measures. They include opening to market forces sectors long dominated by SOE monopolies, such as telecommunications, water, energy and transport; changing the laws on rural land ownership and accelerating liberalization of the financial system and achieving capital account convertibility. Apparently in an effort to make structural changes more palatable to the public, there are also plans to reform some deeply unpopular policies by loosening the one-child policy and the hukou household registration system and by abolishing correctional labour camps. Though steps are being taken to implement some of these proposals, at this stage much of the reform programme is still a work in progress, not a done deal. Some proposals will unavoidably require a long time to be put into effect: for instance, because land sales provide a growing source of funds for cash-strapped local governments, new systems of local government financing will need to be put in place before the planned rural land reforms take effect. However, there are other reasons for being cautious about how far and how fast China's rulers are prepared to go in implementing the programme. First of all, the reforms are being imposed top-down by an ironfisted leadership that seems even more determined than its predecessor to suppress public debate and expressions of dissent. Yet history, in China and elsewhere, tells us that effective market-based reforms usually are often propelled by strong and direct pressure from the bottom up - and/or a manifest crisis of some kind. Since China's leaders will go to great lengths to avoid both developments, much is likely to depend on whether Mr Xi and his colleagues can generate the necessary momentum for change through the exercise of sheer political will. Second, the Plenum identified giving a "decisive" role to the market as a centrepiece of the planned reforms. But if that pledge is genuinely to be fulfilled, two conditions must be met. One is that the state, or the Party, must scale back the extensive intervention and micro-management long practised in many sectors of the economy. The other is that China needs to develop the sound institutional frameworks, clear rules and effective supervision and regulation that markets require in order to function efficiently. However, in China today, property rights are still ill-defined; the rule of law is applied unevenly; the courts are subject to political control; market regulation is haphazard and subject to political manipulation; and, crucially, every institution is constitutionally subordinated to the will of the Party, whose decision-making is opaque, unaccountable and often unpredictable. Even if Beij ing is committed to changing all those things - itself a highly questionable assumption - they will not be changed quickly. Third, successful implementation of the reforms will rely heavily on enlisting the cooperation and commitment of authorities at provincial, municipal and local level, which Beij ing has not always been able to secure in the past. In recent years, its efforts to moderate the rate of growth and curb debt and inflation have often been frustrated by lowerlevel officials in different parts of the country who have not only seen themselves as in competition to maximize economic expansion but in many cases have profited personally from it. In post-imperial China, the old adage that "the mountain is high and the emperor is far away" remains as relevant as ever. The leadership appears to be counting heavily on the anticorruption drive and mooted reforms of local government financing to bring lower levels of the Party into line. But much more may be needed: in particular, the creation of a structure of incentives that encourages officials to behave differently - in other words, a change in the political and institutional culture. As anyone who has ever attempted that knows, it is not easy to achieve.

#### Xi’s regime is pushing massive economic reform – key to prevent overall collapse of Chinese competitiveness

Davis 13, senior editor of the Wall Street Journal, (Bob, 11/12/13, Beijing Endorses Market Role in Economy, http://prasad.dyson.cornell.edu/doc/WSJ\_12November2013\_2.pdf)//kap

BEIJING—The first policy blueprint from President Xi Jinping a year into his reign said market forces would play a "decisive" role in the economy, but also said the Communist Party's hand needs to stay strong, contradictions that instead of giving a clear direction signaled a difficult road ahead for economic reforms. A four-day session of top Communist officials had been touted for months as a make-or-break moment for reform, expected to produce a plan for how to revamp the Chinese economy so it depends more on domestic demand and less on exports abroad and heavy government spending back home. But instead of a departure from the usual party jargon, the meeting ended with a vaguely worded communiqué, short on specifics and long on slogans which left both economists and ordinary Chinese wondering about the leadership's commitment to change—and ability to make good on reform. As China's top leaders end the meeting where they laid out economic and political priorities, the country's growth is at risk from a potential property bubble. Professor Li Wei of Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business tells us what the Chinese government must do to keep the economy on track. some highlights of the communiqué, take a look back at reforms and the read more about new leaders. The communiqué called for fewer investment restrictions, greater rights for farmers and a more transparent system for local and national government taxing and spending—all areas where economists say China badly needs reform. But in lieu of specific plans it ambiguously emphasized the need to "encourage, support and guide" the private sector, while at the same time reaffirming "the leading role of the stateowned economy." In a small acknowledgment of the clamor for better protection of individual rights, the communiqué noted the need to establish an independent judiciary. But again it reaffirmed the leading role of the party, which has the power to trump China's constitution. A fuller policy document is likely to be released in the coming days, which may help to erase some of the ambiguity. The stakes are high: China faces a maturing economy, an aging population, mounting debt problems and endemic corruption that even top leaders admit could threaten their hold on power. Those factors could hobble an economy that has been an engine of global growth while the U.S. and Europe have sputtered. China's officials have said for years that change is necessary to ensure that China can continue to grow at a healthy clip and spread the benefits more equitably. For now, the communiqué provides a glimpse into the leadership's top priorities—and the challenges it faces carrying out its will. The document shows "an intention on the part of the new leadership to accelerate reform, and that is good," said David Dollar, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. "However, the headlines also suggest there have been a number of key compromises among interest groups. Hence there is some inconsistency in the message." The communiqué reflects months of work by ministries, think tanks and academics to put together a plan to remake the Chinese economy under the direction of one of Mr. Xi's most senior advisers, Liu He, raising expectations that the party was ready to tackle some of China's most nettlesome problems. Leaders have also suggested that China's economic slowdown provides an opportunity to rebalance the economy so that it depends more on consumers and less on exports and big government spending. But over the past four months, the economy has picked up somewhat, erasing fears that the economy would crash land soon and reducing pressure on leaders to take on tough political challenges. Any significant policy change also faces resistance from institutions that benefit from the current system. Add to that, Beijing's tradition of ruling by consensus among elites and the result, say some analysts, was a timid call, thus far, for change. "This was an opportunity for the party to lay out a clear vision for where the country is heading," said Mark Williams, an economist with Capital Economics. "If they had been able to do that successfully I think it would have had a big impact on the behavior of officials, but I don't think they have been given a clear steer." Among the priorities: giving a boost to private enterprise, giving farmers greater property rights and fairer access to public services, and relying more on fiscal policy and transparent actions of government than behind-the-scenes orders from top party leaders to carry out policies. "The key issue is handling the relationship between the government and the market, allowing the market to play a decisive role in allocating resources," the communiqué said. But even here, the communiqué was hardly unambiguous. More than 30 years after China began its shift away from a planned economy, the document didn't once use the word "private sector."

#### Xi’s administration pushing for open economic system

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In the space of a few months, and with little fanfare, Beijing policy-makers introduced the following three economic reform policy packages: a) A program was adopted to divorce local government finances from the corporate “local government funding vehicles” that have been piling up debt since the global financial crisis. This policy includes capping local debt and reclassifying and restructuring debt into public debt (essentially “municipal bonds”) and corporate debt (including for companies that produce public services). This is a bold and aggressive program that seeks to fundamentally shift the relationship between local governments and debt markets. At the same time, it will lead to a major short-term reduction in local government financial resources. b) A new system of property rights was introduced for agricultural land that provides protection to farmers and a clear system to support renting, leasing, and mortgaging land. c) At the APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing (November 9–12, 2014), China undertook new commitments in a range of international negotiations, substantively completing freetrade agreements with Korea and Australia, and moved forward in agreements with the United States. While no individual step was a game-changer, cumulatively these moves amounted to an important shift toward a more open economic regime, particularly since complementary domestic policy steps were also taken. Each of these policy initiatives addresses fundamental aspects of the economic system. In some cases—such as land rights—the new measures address contentious political or theoretical issues that have defeated efforts at resolution for a decade or more. Each of the policy initiatives has opposition, so the top political leadership must have expended political capital, either in overwhelming the opponents, or in working out political deals that would bring them on board. Let us consider each of these initiatives in turn.

### at: non uq – party fragmentation

#### Despite factionalism, common goals among all CCP officials drive political will for certain protections

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Like all large political parties in the world, the CCP has been riven with factions or what Mao used to call “mountain strongholds” since the days when the guerrilla leaders schemed and plotted in the eaves ofYan’an. Shaanxi Province. Factionalism almost led to the ruin of the Party—and China—during the violent clashes of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Until Deng’s death in 1997, rivalry among the CCP’s disparate camarillas was in large measure predicated upon ideological differences. There was the “struggle between two lines” between Chairman Mao. on the one hand, and “capitalist roaders" such as State President Liu Shaoqi and Deng, on the other. For much of the 1980s and 1990s. Deng fought numerous battles with the conservative patriarch Chen Yun—a keen advocate of “reform within a birdcage"—over the pace and orientation of economic liberalization."1 After the Tiananmen Square crisis in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet and East European Communist parties in the early 1990s, however, a solid consensus has emerged among all CCP factions that they must preserve a high degree of unity on a range of “core interests” in the ideological and policy arenas, including maintaining the Parly’s monopoly on power; cracking down on dissent and foreign “conspiracies" to turn China into a capitalist country: taking tough measures against secessionist or “anti-Beijing" activities in Tibet. Xinjiang. Hong Kong, and Taiwan; maintaining economic growth of at least 7 percent a year, which is seen as essential for preventing social instability; and. equally importantly, preserving the vested interests of existing power blocs and stakeholders, which include the major clans of the Party."2 Thus, until about the time of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. the question of whether or not to reform belonged in the realm of ideology and world-views. But alter the June 4. 1989. massacre, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, holders of vested interests—including the heads of major Party factions—came to an agreement that preserving the status quo was of the utmost priority. An unprecedented number of spouses and children of top cadres of different political stripes have gone into business. Some have become senior managers of SOE conglomerates. Even more have used their sterling political connections to start private firms in lucrative areas such as finance and real estate. Critics of the government do not seem to be exaggerating when they say that 1(X) or so of the biggest clans within the country’s “red aristocracy” control the largest chunk of economic pic. According to the China Daily, the top 1 percent of Chinese families control 41.4 percent of the country’s wealth. Other official media reported in the late 2000s that 91 percent of Chinese citizens who owned more than RMB 100 million came from “high-cadre families.”

## uq – mil reform

### uq – Xi pushing mil reforms

#### Xi’s recent visit to a base demonstrates his modernization practices—that modernization will substantially increase the PLA’s fighting capabilities

Cheng 5/3/16 What PRC President Is Really Doing; What The Uniform Means By Dean Cheng on May 03, 2016 at 4:01 AM Dean Cheng worked for 13 years as a senior analyst with the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses. He is currently the Heritage Foundation’s research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs and has written extensively on China’s military doctrine. <http://breakingdefense.com/2016/05/what-prc-president-is-really-doing-what-the-uniform-means/> //LKJ

Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s recent appearance in a military uniform while touring a military command center and the attendant description of him as “commander in chief” of the facility, drew extensive Chinese and foreign media attention. Was his appearance in uniform a reflection of a militarizing China? Was the description of him as “commander in chief” of this new entity a reflection of ongoing political tensions with the military? Unfortunately, those discussions have tended to miss the bigger picture. In the first place, while Xi appeared in a camouflage uniform during this visit, video footage taken aboard a Chinese submarine in 2013 and accompanying a story in 2014 show him in other uniform attire. So, this is not exactly setting a precedent. Similarly, the term “zong zhihui” means overall commander. The phrase, as used here, has been applied to other persons in other situations. For example, in stories about the Shenzhou space program, the person in charge has been termed “zong zhihui.” It is important to remember that Xi Jinping, in his role as Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) is already essentially commander-in-chief of the military. Indeed, the Chinese coverage describes him as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, national president, and chairman of the Central Military Commission, before appending “overall commander.” So, whether that title was added or not, there is no more question that Xi commands the military, including this facility, than whether Barack Obama is overall commander of an aircraft carrier since he is commander-in-chief of the US armed forces. What is significant, and merits far more attention and discussion, is the nature of the facility that Xi visited. This Military Commission Joint Command Center (junwei lianzhi zhongxin; 军委联指中心) is a reflection of the increasing emphasis placed upon joint operations in the PLA, and is a physical reflection of one of the major reorganizations that the PLA is currently undertaking. CSBA graphicPLA Modernization: Getting Ready to Fight “Informationized Wars” Since the end of the first Gulf War (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) in 1990, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been striving to become more joint. Careful observations and analyses of other peoples’ wars has led the PLA leadership to conclude that future warfare will be waged through the joint efforts of multiple services, employing a variety of high technology weapons. These efforts led to what some have termed the “year of regulations” in 1999, when the PLA thoroughly overhauled its warfighting regulations and doctrine. This was followed by the steady modernization of PLA equipment and revisions of PLA training procedures and regulations. Having witnessed the NATO intervention in the Balkans, the American invasion of Afghanistan, the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, as well as gaining experience in joint operations through its own exercises and efforts, the PLA view of future warfare has evolved further. Where it previously viewed future wars as “local wars under modern, high-technology conditions,” it is now focused on “local wars under informationized conditions.” This latter element reflects not only the growing importance of information and information technology for supporting operations in future wars, but as important, the belief that information itself will be a key resource in those wars. The ability to establish “information dominance” will be a decisive factor in these future conflicts.

## PC uniqueness

### PC high – general

#### Xi is consolidating power and increasing nationalism to maintain authority in the wake of economic downturn

Blackwill and Campbell, 16 – (Robert D., senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Kurt M., Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, CEO of the Asia Group LLC., “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage: Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader”Council Special report No. 74, Feb 2016, Council of Foreign Relations,//BR/)

The impact of this situation on Xi’s political position is evolving. For now, Xi remains strong, his opposition is divided, and nothing indicates that his leadership is in jeopardy. Media reports suggest, however, that senior party members were alarmed by the gyrations of the stock market in the summer of 2015 and the country’s sputtering growth and are holding Xi accountable. They are encouraging him to focus more on the economic situation than the anticorruption campaign, which some contend slows growth by paralyzing rank-and-file officials who fear that action on new projects could land them in jail.30 If the economy continues to weaken, party elites who have suffered under the anticorruption campaign may seek to exploit the situation to undermine Xi, who now has the dubious distinction of presiding over the slowest growth in thirty years and whose agenda and image are underwritten by public support that could wane. Xi will need to take clear steps to strengthen his position against rival elites, fortify his public image, and shield the party from the economic downturn. To that end, he will probably intensify his personality cult, crack down even harder on dissent, and grow bolder in using the anticorruption campaign against elites who oppose him. Above all, he will almost certainly choose to intensify and stimulate Chinese nationalism in response to slower growth. Ever since Deng dispatched communist ideology in favor of pragmatic capitalist reforms, the party’s legitimacy has been built on two pillars: economic growth and nationalist ideology. Because the former is fading, the latter may be the primary tool to support the edifice of the party and Xi’s strongman image. The foundations for a turn to nationalism have been laid for decades. After Tiananmen Square, the party inculcated nationalist sentiment through relentless propaganda, a barrage of chauvinistic television shows and movies, and a “patriotic education campaign” in the country’s schools.31 According to the government’s nationalist narrative, which downplays the party’s failures and communist ideology, China is a country whose “century of humiliation” began with the Opium Wars and ended with the party’s assumption of power in 1949. The party’s primary mission has not been to bring about a communist utopia but to extricate China from the predations of Western and Japanese imperialists and to put it on a path to becoming the world’s largest economy. China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors and Taiwan’s ambiguous status are seen as wounds from this humiliating past that only the party can heal. This slanted view of history has been successful in building a deep reserve of grievance and victimhood among ordinary Chinese citizens that dominates their worldview and can be harnessed by the leadership. It was no accident that Xi, when he assumed power, declared that his main objective was to bring about the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” That slogan was an attempt to position Xi’s leadership within the arc of a larger narrative that portrays the party as responsible for restoring China’s historic place in the world. In December 2015, the Communist Party Central Committee held a group study of Chinese patriotism and Xi himself called for further “promoting patriotism to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”32 By connecting patriotism to Xi’s mission to restore Chinese greatness, that link is being made even more concrete. Although these themes have long been an important part of Chinese politics, Xi will choose to strengthen them in coming years. By stoking Chinese nationalism, Xi will seek to protect himself and the party from the worst of the economic downturn. His control over policymaking will be an advantage in that effort, and his policies will reflect and support his domestic political agenda.

#### Xi is consolidating influence --- the people that oppose his reforms are powerless

---at: “army controls agenda” args --- Xi fragmented its authority

---at: anti-corruption reforms unpopular --- the people that oppose those reforms oppose them *because they were the ones kicked out of power* or because their power was significantly reduced which means their resentment doesn’t have much of an impact

**Page, 4/25**/16 – specialist in Chinese domestic politics and international relations in the Beijing bureau of the Wall Street Journal (Jeremy, Wall Street Journal, “President Xi Jinping’s Most Dangerous Venture Yet: Remaking China’s Military”, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/president-xi-jinpings-most-dangerous-venture-yet-remaking-chinas-military-1461608795>, //11)

Mr. Xi, son of a famous revolutionary commander, came to power in 2012 making clear he was determined to clean up the PLA and reaffirm Mao’s maxim, “The Party commands the gun.”

His main weapon has been a nationwide anticorruption drive. At least 41 serving generals have been detained or convicted since 2013. So widespread was corruption that evidence from investigations now acts as a “Sword of Damocles hanging over any officer foolish enough to question” Mr. Xi’s plans, said James Mulvenon, a Chinese military expert at Defense Group Inc., a Virginia-based research firm.

As part of his plan, Mr. Xi on Jan. 11 dissolved the four main PLA General Departments—political, general staff, armaments, logistics—that top generals ran like personal fiefs. Replacing them are 15 less-powerful offices under the Central Military Commission’s direct control, letting Mr. Xi oversee everything from procurement to intelligence.

On Feb. 1, he scrapped China’s seven Military Regions, which the PLA operated like mini-states with their own schools, hospitals, hotels and newspapers, many of them moneymaking. The regions resisted central supervision and focused more on internal management than preparing for combat.

He moved to cut noncombat roles, shutting the newspapers in January. Several acrobatic, operatic, theatrical and song-and-dance troupes the PLA established in the 1930s to spread propaganda—and which have been a source of corruption—are being merged and reduced in size.

The seven regions were replaced with five new “Theater Commands,” designed to have more fluid boundaries and focus more on projecting power outward, according to military insiders. Each command’s head will have more-direct operational control of all air, naval, ground and conventional missile forces in its area, much like heads of U.S. regional commands, experts said.

“This should improve response time and effectiveness,” said Phillip Saunders, a PLA expert at the U.S. National Defense University. “They’ve looked at how the U.S. has fought and see a lot of advantages to this ‘joint’ kind of concept,” adding that it took the U.S. 15 to 20 years “to really get it right.”

Mr. Xi appears to have made some compromises, appointing Army officers to head all the new Theater Commands, although further personnel changes are likely in the coming months.

To reduce the Army’s authority, Mr. Xi has established a new Army General Command handling only ground forces, a Rocket Force overseeing missiles, and a Strategic Support Force combining capabilities in space, cyber and electronic warfare. Most of those areas were previously under Army control.

That puts the Army, which had higher status than other services, on more-equal footing, giving the others more say over budgets and operations. Ground forces are expected to account for many of the troop reductions.

Some officers support Mr. Xi’s changes, especially combat-operations leaders frustrated by graft, said people who have spoken to senior PLA figures.

Resentment, they said, comes from generals who controlled large budgets and are reduced to running relatively lowly offices. Senior officers find it harder to supplement salaries with other, sometimes illicit, activities and have lost perks such as l uqury cars.

“Some senior officers might feel: ‘I used to be a commander, I’m a general, I controlled a military region,’ ” said Gen. Xu Guangyu, a former vice president of the PLA Defense Institute who held a senior post in the general staff department, “ ‘but after these cuts, I don’t command anyone.’ ”

#### Stronger than past leaders --- he’s fully in charge

**EAF, 4/25**/16 – East Asian Forum (“The limits to Chinese political power”, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/04/25/the-limits-to-chinese-political-power/>, //11)

Xi Jinping is undoubtedly a stronger and more high-profile leader than his predecessor Hu Jintao. He came to the leadership with the Party in some disarray over major scandals such as the Bo Xilai affair and facing a tide of concern about flagrant corruption across all levels of government. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has been more thorough and far-reaching than the one Hu launched when he came to power. Xi has broken previous norms — specifically, don’t target Politburo Standing Committee members and don’t snatch people from overseas (or if you do, definitely don’t smirk about it). The committees that coordinate China’s diverse interests and make policy are now often reporting directly to Xi rather than to the nominal head of that policy area.

#### Xi has used party control and out competed Li to push his reforms

Amighini and Berkofsky, 15 – Alessia Amighini is Senior Associate Research Fellow at ISPI. She is Assistant Professor of Economics and International Economics at the Department of Economic and Business Studies (DiSEI) at Università del Piemonte Orientale. Professor Axel Berkofsky is Gianni Mazzocchi Fellow at the University of Pavia, Italy and Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI). [3/23/15, Xi's Policy Gambles: The Bumpy Road Ahead, ISPI]//Yak

Contrary to scholars’ expectations, Xi Jinping took over full control of the Party and the military from the beginning, while Hu Jintao immediately retired, downgrading his public appearances to a few visits, mainly within the borders of his home province, Anhui. In addition, Hu’s protégé Li Keqiang, after a start in which he was given a great deal of attention, subsequently gradually left political centrality to Xi Jinping alone5. For example, in 2013 the Chinese media extensively dealt with so-called ‘Likonomics’ making a comparison between economic policies proposed by Li Keqiang and those implemented by other leaders in history. However, after little more than a year Likonomics has been almost forgotten and Li Keqiang is overshadowed by Xi Jinping. Furthermore the 18th Party Congress was still shocked by the Bo Xilai affair: the then-Party Chief in Chongqing, one of the most popular politicians in China and one of the possible members of the to-be-elected Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) was at the center of a ‘spy story’ begun in spring 2012 that eventually ended with his expulsion from the Party and with his and his wife’s conviction for, among other things, corruption and abuse of power. This case is considered the first step in the subsequent antigraft campaign and led to a confrontation between radical leftists (close to Bo) and those accused of being rightists.

### PC high – momentum

#### Xi’s reforms have momentum now

**Xiang, 5/31**/16

(Li, financial reporter at China Daily, chinawatch.washingtonpost.com/2016/05/soe-reform-momentum-to-set-tone-for-a-share-market/)//cb

When investors place their bets in the A-share market this week, one of the key factors they would weigh is the progress of the reform and restructuring of the country's loss-making State-owned enterprises, analysts said. Investors have been taking note of the stronger willingness recently expressed by the top leadership in Beijing to reform the SOEs, a top priority of the country's supply-side reform, as President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang repeatedly stressed the significance of such reform over the past two weeks. "Domestic reform is progressing more quickly, since the government seems to be exhibiting a stronger willingness to let go of loss-making SOEs," said Yao Wei, chief China economist at French bank Societe Generale in a recent research note. "The more affirmative attitude towards capacity reduction is a sign of such reform, while the recent defaults of bonds issued by SOEs are the consequence of positive reform－whether it was intended or not," Yao said.

### PC high – power consolidation

#### Xi is currently consolidating power

**Rudd, 15** – Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Former Prime Minister of Australia (Kevin, Belfer Center, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping”, April 2015, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf>, //11)

After two years in office, and substantial engagement with American interlocutors, the American perception is that Xi Jinping is significantly different, some say radically different, to his predecessors. He is seen as significantly more powerful. As a product of the power of his intellect, his political experience and the force of his personality, Americans conclude unprecedented power consolidation has taken place in a short span of time.3 Americans have found him to be self-confident, well read, well briefed, and rarely reliant on official written notes to argue, explain, and defend the Chinese position. Not since Deng have Americans encountered a Chinese leader able to range across wide subject areas and to engage spontaneously on most matters raised with him. While Xi is seen as polite, as required by the normal conventions of Chinese diplomatic discourse, he is also seen as capable of being direct. And while Americans may not appreciate the answers they may receive, they do not feel that they are left having to decipher multiple layers of Chinese “diplomatese” to understand the bottom line of what is being communicated. This has led many American officials to conclude that at least at a personal level, including his style, manner, and method of personal communication, Xi Jinping is someone with whom you can do business.

### PC high – China dream

#### Xi has used the “Chinese dream” campaign to accumulate political power and implement economic and corruption reform

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1.2 Xi Jinping is in charge

As soon as Xi Jinping became China’s most powerful man, he presented a simple and catchy idea that has filled the Chinese media and covered the walls of Chinese towns till now: the Chinese Dream. This political campaign was informally presented in October 2012 during a visit of the newly established Politburo Standing Committee to China’s National Museum in Beijing. The occasion was an exhibition titled “The Road to Renewal” dedicated to China’s history since the first Opium War7. The exhibition’s theme might help better understand the Chinese Dream, sometimes simply mistaken for an “American Dream with Chinese characteristics”. The Chinese Dream, in fact, is related to a national collective effort to make China regain its outstanding position in the world after a long term of humiliation. The Chinese Dream is thus much more about patriotism than personal success and stresses collectivism over individualism8. With the Chinese Dream, Xi Jinping immediately characterized his term as a longterm promise of a better future. The collective Chinese Dream was intended as a tool to improve common peoples’ livelihoods, setting goals to be achieved in the following decades. The New York Times’s Robert Lawrence Kuhn reported9 that the Chinese Dream is seen as achieving specific goals named the “Two 100’s” with reference to the double anniversary of the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021 and of the People’s Republic of China in 2049. For 2021 China’s aim is to become a “moderately well-off society” in which every citizen enjoys a higher standard of living, which in practice means doubling the approximately $10000 of 2010 per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) by 2020 and completing urbanization by about 2030 with almost 1 billion people living in urban areas. The goal for 2049 is to make China a fully developed nation, completing the rejuvenation process with China finally restored to its role as world leader in science and technology, culture, economy and diplomacy.

Defining a long-term goal with such an impact was in line with both Chinese and communist traditions of setting long-term, utopian objectives and allowed Xi Jinping to immediately mark the start of a new era. Xi Jinping could thus focus on important reforms and political campaigns among which the anti-graft campaign holds a special position. Xi Jinping launched his war on corruption within the Party soon after the 18th Congress and as of spring 2015 more than 300,000 party cadres had been put under investigation with a 30 per cent increase in 2014 over 2013. In addition, Xi Jinping’s anti-graft campaign not only targeted more Party members than previous years’ campaigns, but it also has hit prominent members of the Party. As his slogan promises10, Xi Jinping throughout this campaign has excluded from political life dozens of high-level officials even at the provincial and ministerial level. There is no doubt that the biggest quarry for the Chinese Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) led by Xi’s close ally Wang Qishan 11 has been Zhou Yongkang. The former security czar of China is the highest member of the CCP to be put on trial since the Gang of Four in the late 1970s. Zhou is accused of having created a strong personal power group, thanks to his career in the national oil sector and as Minister of Land and Resources that permitted him to divert money from the oil business; as Party Chief in Sichuan Province; and in security-related positions like Minister of Public Security and Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the CCP. Xi Jinping’s action against corruption weakened political factions within the party and created a feeling of fear among party cadre members. Even though the anti-graft campaign has gradually expanded its hunting territory from Zhou’s and Bo’s circles to main sectors of Chinese business and political life such as the People’s Liberation Army and, later, state-owned enterprises, Xi Jinping has not avoided the accusation of simply conducting a huge purge within the Party. Apparently such criticism has not affected the CCP Secretary General, who paralleled his crackdown on corruption with significant power centralization.

In November 2013, in fact, the Third Plenum of the CCP’s Central Committee was held. This political event has traditionally been a reform cornerstone in China’s past thirty year of politics. As the Chinese media extensively stated, Deng Xiaoping launched and re-launched economic reforms during Third Plenums in 1979 and 1993. Along with social and economic reforms, the establishment of a Central Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (Clgcdr) deserves great attention. This inter-departmental office is chaired by Xi Jinping himself and covers any issue to be reformed, from the credit system to Chinese Football Association. With this decision, Xi Jinping put himself at the center of the Chinese decision-making process, reducing the political space of his supposed-to-be-twin-leader Li Keqiang.

### PC high – nationalism

#### Xi is using nationalism to gain party and public consensus – only strengthened party ideology allows Xi to implement his agenda

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In order to implement such a radical agenda, which is aimed at eradicating power groups within the party, Xi Jinping had to look for consensus both within the Party and among the Chinese population. If the first step on this path has been the launch of China Dream, the second move consists of strengthening ideology. Xi Jinping put much emphasis on defending Mao’s legacy as legitimising the Party’s rule. During New Year’s celebrations in February 2015, he made a heavily publicised trip to Yan’an, Communist headquarters from the late 1930s till the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. By recalling the Yan’an experience, Xi intended to recall the origin of the Chinese Communist Party and strengthening ideological links with Mao. In addition, he launched a campaign against ‘Western values’ in Chinese universities and raised the level of media control. Those decisions might be seen as a way to control the Party in a sensitive period for reforms. Some observers are also suggesting that lifting restrictions on freedom of speech is an attempt to hide dissatisfaction with Xi’s political and economic agenda.

### PC high – anti corruption

#### Anti-corruption reforms making Xi highly popular – boosting the economy and inspiring faith in government.

Tatlow 14 (Didi Kirsten Tatlow, Correspondent for the International Herald Tribune with BA from the University of London in Chinese and Politics, “In Fighting Tigers, Xi Inspires the Masses,” The New York Times, <http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/in-fighting-tigers-xi-inspires-the-masses/>, \**fc*)

How those cheering moments came about is an answer to why China’s president is genuinely popular among many Chinese. His anticorruption drive is reducing the cost of doing ordinary things like getting your child into school or your nephew into the army, the prices of which had been soaring because of demands from civil servants for extra ‘‘fees’’ — in reality, bribes. Traveling in China in recent months, or just even traversing giant Beijing with its 21 million people, there is a refrain that has perhaps gone unheard abroad: Mr. Xi is inspiring support among ordinary people sick of corruption, especially those struggling economically, as the continuing anticorruption campaign to ‘‘strike against tigers and flies,’’ or officials high and low, lowers the cost of living. And this despite the fact that cynicism about any Communist Party official, including a leader, runs deep among ‘‘the masses,’’ as nonparty members and the grass roots are called. How popular is Mr. Xi? There are no reliable figures, but long-term residents say support is high. ‘‘I’d say about 90 percent’’ of people support him, Jörg Wuttke, the president of the European Chamber of Commerce and representative of the chemical company BASF, who has lived in China for more than 20 years, said in a recent interview. Those people would include the 40- something worker I met last week in Zhuhai, a flourishing city across the border from Macau in China’s south. Seven years ago, when his nephew joined the army as an ordinary soldier, ‘‘We had to pay 30,000 renminbi to buy him a place,’’ the worker said in Mandarin heavily accented with Cantonese, the local dialect. We were chatting in the city’s outskirts near the headquarters of one of China’s biggest companies, Gree, the air-conditioner maker. My interlocutor declined to give his name, even though the subject matter could hardly be construed as critical of the government, reflecting a common caution. Selling posts in the government or military is illegal but has been common for decades. A “tiger” taken down by the campaign, Gen. Xu Caihou, a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, which Mr. Xi now heads, was said to be involved in such activities, among other misdeeds. ‘‘This summer, to get my other nephew in,’’ the worker continued, ‘‘guess what we paid? Nothing at all! ‘‘Before we had to buy everything,’’ he said. ‘‘Too, too many officials charged money for doing things for you that they were supposed to do. Now they don’t dare.’’ It is part of the party iconography of Mr. Xi that, in 1988, after becoming party secretary in Ningde, a poor area in the southeastern province of Fujian, he went after local officials who had built for themselves villas that could not have been paid for from their salaries. Many officials were investigated, according to the party publication ‘‘Collected Writings on Party Building.’’

### PC high – populism

#### Xi is crafting a “man of the people” image that is crucial to maintain his popularity and legacy

Lam 15, Adjunct Professor in the Centre for China Studies and the Department of History of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, (Willy Wo-Lap, 2015, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping, available via Google Books)//kap

Xi's publicists have gone into overdrive in meticulously constructing a virtual personality cult around the putative “man of the people” In late 2013, Xi lined up for thirty minutes at the Qingfeng Steamed Stuffed Bun Shop in Beijing. He paid RMB 21 out of his own pocket for a nondescript meal of pork and onion buns and vegetables. Qingfeng immediately became a new tourist attraction for visitors to the capital. A few months later, Xi braved the heavy smog enveloping the capital when he visited Nanluog uqiang, a popular shopping district, without wearing a mask. The next day, one local paper ran this headline: “Breathing the same air, sharing the same fate.” One of the most memorable pictures of Xi was taken when he visited Wuhan in mid-2013. It was raining heavily and the general secretary, with his trouser legs rolled up, was holding his own umbrella. Moments later, he came across some young factory workers, whereupon he was heard to say: “Hello, good-looking ladies.” Another captivating snapshot was Xi kicking a soccer ball with gusto in Dublin's Croke Park while on a state visit to Ireland in 2012. During tours to the provinces in China, he likes to talk soccer, China's most popular sport, with ordinary people. Known in cyberspace as Xi Dada (Big Xi), the president has his own Weibo microblog site, called the “Learning from Xi Fan Club,” which regularly feeds his fans with exclusive pictures of Xi particularly during foreign or domestic trips.16 Xi's excuse for his self-aggrandizing gamesmanship is that he needs the extra clout to untie the Gordian knot of reform. However, the princeling's preoccupation is clearly preservationist—not reformist—in nature—that is, upholding socialism with Chinese characteristics and safeguarding the CCP's status as the “perennial ruling Party.” It is therefore difficult not to reach the conclusion that Xi is grabbing power for power's sake, to ensure his unquestioned supremacy and to protect his legacy. The self-serving nature of Xi’s statecraft becomes clearer in light of the fact that the creation of superagencies such as the CLGCDR and the CNSC could delay—not speed up—reform of the economy and other sectors. As we shall see below and in Chapter 4, the president's obsession with “top-level design” and a hierarchical top-down chain of command could exacerbate the already serious degree of bureaucratism in the polity. As Jiang Zhiyong, an expert at the State Information Center, pointed out, “the momentum for reform this time is coming from the very top [of the Party].” “Initiatives from the top are being implemented layer by layer by central and regional [administrations],” he added. Jiang expressed fears that since midlevel and local cadres were already very familiar with this top-down approach, new reforms could be adulterated by the delaying tactics of various officials. He cited “going through the motions and putting on shows” as typical strategies adopted by regional cadres to water down orders from on high.17

## PC key

### PC key – top level

#### PC key to reforms

Noi, 3/28 (Goh Sui Noi, East Asia Editor, Straits Times, “Why is Xi Jinping the reformer resorting to rule by fear?,” pg online at http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/why-is-xi-jinping-the-reformer-resorting-to-rule-by-fear //um-ef)

But the contradictory signals could well be because he is not in full control of things despite having concentrated power very quickly. Chinese politics is also entering a sensitive period, with the looming 19th party congress, due late next year, and the beginning of jostling for key positions in the party, particularly the five in the apex seven-member Politburo Standing Committee that are up for grabs. At a Chinese New Year celebration last month of princelings (the children of revolutionaries, like Xi), one of their number warned that China was facing a "complex and fluctuating situation" and that the CCP was facing ideological "chaos" and a graft problem that would need more time to fix. On March 4, an anonymous letter with the byline "loyal Communist Party supporters" appeared on the government-backed website, Watching, calling for Xi to resign and accusing him of gaining excessive power and creating a personality cult. The letter was quickly taken down. A Beijing-based freelance journalist in his 30s, Jia Jia, was taken away on March 15 by police at a Beijing airport while on his way to Hong Kong. This came after he warned a Watching editor about the letter. Reports last week indicated that he had been released. In all, some 20 people were reported to have been arrested in connection with the letter. As early as 2013, independent scholar Wu Jiaxiang in an interview with the Yazhou Zhoukan magazine said Xi was forced to change direction because of a conservative backlash against his early reformist moves. These included the detention of Sichuan deputy party secretary Li Chuncheng for graft in 2012, right after Xi took power as general secretary of the party. At the same time, he faces pressure from liberals to push ahead with reform, in particular, political reform. However, Wu and some other Chinese scholars have little doubt that Xi is a reformer - perhaps not going far enough for the West, but a reformer nonetheless. Soon after coming to power, he launched an anti-graft and austerity drive to tackle the deep corruption and profligacy among party cadres that were alienating the people and threatening the party's legitimacy. He has said that corruption poses a life and death threat to both the party and the nation. In November 2013 at the Third Plenum of the current party congress, sweeping social and economic reforms were announced, including relaxation of the one-child policy, loosening control of the markets, opening up some sectors monopolised by the state-owned enterprises to the private sector, land reforms and social welfare reforms. The following year, the Fourth Plenum outlined important legal reforms aimed at strengthening rule of law and governance, including the setting up of circuit courts to bolster judicial independence and professional training of lawmakers, judges and lawyers. The strengthening of institutions such as the judiciary, while not going far enough for liberals wanting to see democratic change, is a political reform in the right direction. Such reforms, undoubtedly, are also aimed at strengthening the CCP, which princelings like Xi would see as their mission. The other objective is to rejuvenate China after its so-called century of humiliation. Xi in his "southern tour" speech in December 2012 made it clear that China would not go the way of the Soviet Union and the CPP that of the Soviet Communist Party, which were undone by too-fast political reform. But Xi's reforms have come up against the strong headwinds of a slowing economy, massive layoffs and a weakening global economy. They are also meeting strong resistance from vested interest groups trying to protect their turf. Lively social media tamed In the face of dissent, the lively social media scene was tamed by shutting up bloggers with huge followings, such as retired real estate tycoon Ren Zhiqiang, who have been vocal in criticising the government and demanding change. To marshal the mainstream media's support of the government, Xi last month visited three key state media bodies - Central China TV, the Xinhua news agency and the People's Daily - and reminded them of their duty to "serve the Party". The tightening of control of the media has moved even the editor of the nationalistic Global Times, Hu Xijin, to call for "greater tolerance" of criticism. While Xi may not have pleased the elites, some of whom think he has gone too far and others that he has not gone far enough, his anti-graft drive has made him popular with the masses. It does not hurt that Xi and his attractive wife, Peng Liyuan, make a charming First Couple and that attempts to present him as down to earth and close to the people - queuing up for pork buns and holding his own umbrella - have worked. Xi has done a lot to clean up the party and draw up his reform agenda. It is perhaps time to use some of the political capital he has accumulated to loosen up a little and give the people the room to get that agenda going - to be able to debate and to take action with less fear.

#### Empirics prove Xi’s political power determines his ability to implement his reforms

Wang, 12/31/15 – Zheng Wang is currently a Carnegie Fellow at New America. He is the Director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies and an Associate Professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University in New Jersey. He is also a Global Fellow at the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Senior Visiting Fellow at China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China [The Diplomat, “Between Bullying and Flattery: A Theory on Chinese Politics”, 12/31/15, http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/between-bullying-and-flattery-a-theory-on-chinese-politics/]//Yak

There is a special phenomenon in Chinese politics that characterizes the interactions of the country’s top leaders and the bureaucrats. I call it theory because it has occurred repeatedly throughout China’s long history. In China, when the top leader is weak, the bureaucrats—especially the senior officials—would take advantage of the weak leadership and create supplementary difficulties for the leader to carry out his policies. They would steal his power and make him a mere figurehead. Very often powerful warlords, and/or eunuchs, emerged as the real controllers of the country. On the other hand, when the leader is strong and powerful, the bureaucrats will do anything to flatter, praise, and adore their leader and to make him happy—through god-making campaigns and hero worship.

In either scenario the bureaucrats are trying to influence the leader, and protect and maximize their own interests. China’s bureaucratic hierarchic system has a longer history than anywhere else in the world, and China also has the largest number of government officials. It is this group of people that perform the day-to-day governance; they are the ones that are actually running this big country. From the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC) until today, this basic scenario hasn’t changed.

The two recent administrations in China have proved this theory correct once again. Hu Jintao was a weak leader, and during his term (2002-2012) his power was very limited and he was a figurehead to some extent. Several Politburo members such as Zhou Yongkang, Guo Boxiong, and Xu Caihou became very powerful, and Hu’s top assistant and chief of his office, Ling Jihua, was to some extant the real person in charge of many of China’s political affairs. Hu’s retirement paved the way for the emergence of a new strong leader. Xi Jinping is now generally considered China’s most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping. The history repeating itself now is that China’s bureaucrats have begun a new campaign of “praising our great leader.”

For example, a recent video produced by the People’s Daily has been widely circulated on Internet. Through interviews of foreign students in China, this video makes Xi out to be an ideal leader. However, for many people outside China this is mere flattery. During my visit to China several months ago, I found every room in one of the hotels that I stayed contained a copy of Xi’s book The Governance of China, much like many Western hotels have a copy of the Bible. I also noticed that whenever there are any news or reports regarding Xi Jinping on China’s major Internet websites, all social commentary and reader remarks following these articles are full of nothing but praise-worthy feedback and opinions about China’s president. The only explanation for this complete blanket of positive opinions regarding Xi is that the propaganda department hires online writers to praise the great leader and at the same time delete all the negative postings.

A popular misunderstanding about Xi holds that he is trying to consolidate power to the level of Mao Zedong as a dictator. However, people who make these kinds of comments don’t fully understand the real dynamics of Chinese politics. Xi was appointed, and most of his Politburo Committee members were chosen by his predecessors, not him. If he doesn’t have authority and power, he can do nothing. And if he wants to avoid the same fate as Hu Jintao, he needs to consolidate power. Actually many Chinese scholars I have talked with consider it as a positive sign that Xi is taking the responsibility and initiative to make changes. They understand that he needs more power to implement his reform plans.

When speaking about China’s past dictators, such as Chairman Mao, we often overlook the important question of how Mao became a dictator. When he became a powerful leader, his followers and officials lavished praise upon him, creating a cult of hero worship centered on Mao, and in doing so they hid from him the truth and realities that existed beyond the veil of his built-up persona. It was the bureaucrats that made him a dictator. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, one of the important lessons the Party drew from the tragedy was the dangers of a cult of personality. But the role of bureaucracy in creating that problem remained unaddressed.

### PC key – general

#### Political arm-twisting and horse-trading drive power relations in the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee – Xi maintains control over numerous political elites

Lam 15, Adjunct Professor in the Centre for China Studies and the Department of History of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, (Willy Wo-Lap, 2015, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping, available via Google Books)//kap

Xi was officially selected as general secretary and CMC chairman at the first session of the Eighteenth Central Committee, which look place on November 15. 2012. a day after the conclusion of the Eighteenth Party Congress. During the week-long conclave, the 2,270 delegates representing the CCP’s 85 million members met for their quinquennial convention to pick the 205 full members of the ruling Central Committee, as well as 171 alternate, or nonvoting Central Committee members.10 At least in theory. Xi (b. 1953) should have been very happy with the results because of the political identities and traits of the six other members of the supreme Politburo Standing Committc (PBSC): Premier Li Kcqiang (b. 1955). NPC chairman Zhang Dejiang (b. 1946): chairman of the top consultative organ, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Yu Zhengsheng (b. 1945); executive secretary of the Central Committee Secretariat Liu Yunshan (b. 1947); secretary of the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI) Wang Qishan (b. 1948): and Executive Vice-Premier Zhang Dejiang (b. 1946). Except for Premier Li. who is a senior representative of the CYL Faction led by ex-president Hu. all six PBSC members have tics to either ex-president Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai Faction or Xi’s Gang of Princelings.11 While the Eighteenth Party Congress was billed as one of the CCP’s most momentous events in the twenty-first century, it was also swathed in the patriarchal—and undemocratic—traditions of the ninety-one-year-old party. As with past practice, the composition of the new ruling organ—the sewn PBSC members—was determined by the outgoing PBSC members as well as party elders, especially ex-president Jiang (b. 1926). who effectively ran China from 1989 to 2004.12 Three of the seven members of the new PBSC arc deemed Jiang proteges. Apart from Xi. NPC chairman Zhang Dejiang and ideology and propaganda tsar Liu Yunshan owed their elevation to Jiang’s recommendation. Jiang and former Premier Li Peng (bom in 1928) were instrumental in preventing two of Hu’s loyalists—Li Yuanchao (b. 1950) and Wang Yang (b. 1955)— from making it to the PBSC. Both Li and Wang, who have reformist reputations, have managed to hang on to their Politburo scats. Wang, who established a reformist reputation when he was Guangdong Parly secretary from 2007 to 2012. became vice-premier in charge of foreign trade alter the congress. Li. a former head of the CCP Organization Department, was given the consolation prize of vice-president—a post that docs not have substantial powers.13 Xi’s apparent ability to get his way at the congress, however, was a function of several developments that illustrated the efficacy of the rule of man—not the rule of law or of institutions. First, there was a resurgence of geriatric politics. Jiang, who was instrumental in Xi’s promotion to the PBSC at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 2(X)7 (see Chapter 2). again played the role of kingmaker in 2012. Jiang’s preeminent position was illustrated by protocol arrangements at the opening session of the Eighteenth Party Congress on November 8. The first to greet the delegates at the Great Hall of the People was outgoing general secretary Hu. who was closely followed by Jiang. A distance of several meters separated the two potentates from the other eight soon-to-rclirc PBSC members and Party elders including former PBSC member Song Ping (b. 1917).14 Moreover, the choice of the seven-member PBSC and the twenty-fve-member full Politburo was also influenced by three political incidents, none of which were handled according to the spirit of “intra-Parly democracy." The first was the fall of the ambitious Chongqing Parly secretary Bo Xilai (b. 1949). This became inevitable owing to revelations about the murder of British businessman Neil Heywood by his wife, Gu Kailai. in late 2011 and efforts by Wang Lijun. Bo’s police chief and right-hand man, to seek political asylum at the U.S. consulate in Chengdu in February 2012. Before his downfall. Bo. the charismatic son of Party elder Bo Yibo. had catapulted himself to center stage through his campaign of changhong dahe (singing |Maoist] red songs and combating criminal gangs). Bo also told intimates that he was a more qualified person to lead the country than fellow' princeling Xi.15 In the wake of the Heywood and Wang scandals. Hu, Wen, and Xi pooled their resources to ensure the end of Bo’s career. Bo was relieved of all his Party positions in March 2012 and given a life sentence for corruption and abuse of power in September 2013. Gu received a suspended death sentence the same year. The entire handling of the Bo scandal, however, reeked of old-style skullduggery and back-stabbing. There was little “democratic” discussion of the Bo affair within the Party. And the punishment meted out to Bo and Gu was based on political, not judicial, considerations (see Chapter 3).,fc For a brief period, the downfall of Bo the bad-apple princeling gave the CYL Faction some momentum. Given the widespread public perception that princeling-cadres had abused their special privileges—particularly in accumulating massive wealth and laundering their ill-gotten gains—Bo and Gu’s shenanigans brought disrepute to cadres with “revolutionary bloodlines.” Several princeling cadres and military officers suffered collateral damage due to their chummy tics with Bo. They included Generals Liu Yuan and Zhang Haiyang, who arc the sons, respectively, of State President Liu Shaoqi and former general and Politburo member Zhang Zhen. Immediately after the announcement on March 15 that Bo’s Politburo membership had been suspended, there were wild stories of an aborted coup in Beijing. While these rumors turned out to be untrue, the Bo affair adversely affected the careers of Generals Liu and Zhang.17 Yet the so-called Ling Gu affair of March 2012 turned out to be even more of a disaster for the CYL Faction, particularly ex-president Hu. Ling Gu. the only son of Ling Jihua. who was then director of the CCP General Office and a close adviser to Hu. was killed in a traffic accident in Beijing. The twcnty-thrcc-ycar-old Ling was driving a Ferrari sports car that was worth more than RMB 1 million. Two of Ling’s girlfriends, who were students at Central University for Nationalities (or Minzu University), were severely injured in the incident.11' There was no evidence that other CYL Faction members such as then-director of the Organization Department Li Yuanchao. had tried to cover up the embarrassing incident. However, the Ling Gu episode exposed the huge personal assets of both Ling Gu and his mother. Gu Li ping. For example, she ran a big charity organization that was believed to be a front for a lucrative business consultancy, and Ling Gu was the proud owner of several high-priced imported cars. Hu’s enemies, led by expresident Jiang, launched a ferocious attack not only on Ling Jihua but also other members of the CYL Faction. In August the same year Ling Jihua was transferred to the less important position of director of the United Front Department, and he failed to win a spot in the Politburo at the Eighteenth Party Congress. Even more significant was the fact that Jiang severely criticized Hu for failing to keep an eye on his underlings. In response. Hu reportedly noted that Ling worked twelve-hour days and that he did not have time to keep an eye on his family members. However, the damage had been done. Hu’s moral authority had been dealt a big blow—and his influence over personnel arrangements at the Eighteenth Party Congress was severely affected.19 The third incident that raised questions about institutions and processes in the Party revolved around the mysterious “disappearance" of Xi from September 1 to September 15. At a time when world media were pulling out all the stops to find out more about the top leader-in-waiting. Xi was nowhere to be found. All sorts of unofficial explanations were given. CPPCC vice-chairman Tung Chee-hwa told CNN that Xi had injured his back while swimming. The real reason, however, could he that Xi did something unprecedented: He was using his silence as a protest against what he perceived to he irregularities in the preparations for the Eighteenth Party Congress, particularly personnel arrangements that were not to his liking. One of Xi’s gripes was President Hu’s apparent intention of hanging on to the CMC chairmanship after his retirement from the posts of general secretary and PBSC member.20 Given Xi’s advocacy of unity at all costs and his reputation as a team player, the “silent protest” conducted by the princeling was singularly out of character. However, his strategy worked to some extent. Hu finally agreed to perform a “naked"—that is. total—retirement. The price Hu asked for was that he would he in charge of the upcoming round of personnel changes at the CMC’s upper echelons. Thus, two Hu proteges in the PLA. General Fang Fenghui. then commander of the Beijing Military Region, and General Zhang Yang, political commissar of the Guang/hou Military Region, were promoted respectively to chief of the General Staff Department and director of the General Political Department at the seventh and last plenum of the Seventeenth Central Committee, which ended just four days before the opening of the Eighteenth Parly Congress. If the top leadership had followed long-standing convention, the composition of the new CMC should have been unveiled at the first plenum of the Eighteenth Central Committee held on November 15, the same day that the PBSC lineup was announced.11

#### Xi is condensing power and its high now, but there is still opposition to overcome for reforms to happen

Huang, 16 – (Cary, reporter for the South China Morning Post, "Xi Jinping’s ambitious power play ," 1-27-2016, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1911987/xi-jinpings-ambitious-power-play,//BR/>)

A subtle but significant change seems to be underway in Chinese politics – one that involves President Xi Jinping further cementing his position as a strongman leader. He broke with precedent in diplomatic protocol last year when he sent his chief of staff, Li Zhanshu, to Moscow – rather than another diplomat – for talks with the Kremlin, including a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Last month, another of his aides, Liu He, chatted by phone to US Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew about China’s exchange rate policies – a duty usually carried out by China’s Vice-Premier Wang Yang. Wang is more senior than Liu in the ruling Communist Party’s hierarchy, and, as Lew’s counterpart, has represented the mainland in the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue over the past three years. The unusual move to grant enhanced powers to both Li and Liu suggests an important change in China’s dynastic-style of elite politics; the long-standing collective, consensus-driven form of leadership that has existed since the era of Deng Xiaoping (from 1978 until the late 1990s) is now giving way to a centralised system dominated by a strongman leader – Xi himself. In recent weeks, the party propaganda machine has geared itself up to promote such a change, with a push to designate Xi as being at the “core of the party’s leadership”, and a nationwide campaign calling for all officials to declare their “absolute loyalty” to his presidential position. China’s President Xi Jinping is expected to make the reshuffle of Communist Party officials his priority in the next 12 months. Analysts believe the campaign plans to strengthen Xi’s hand over the next 12 months – a time of political manoeuvring before the semi-leadership transition at next year’s 19th Party Congress when a large number of top officials are expected to retire. Zhang said since the end of the rule of the late chairman Mao Zedong, the centralisation of power in China had never reached the level now seen under Xi’s stewardship, with the president and party chief having acquired all the control that was possible. Analysts expect Xi to make the reshuffle of party officials his priority in the next 12 months because the next congress will see five of the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) – everyone except the president and Premier Li Keqiang – have to retire because of their age. Another six members in the 25-strong Politburo, the party’s second most powerful body, will also step down by then as they will all have passed the compulsory retirement age of 68 in 2017. Li Zhanshu, the chief of staff of President Xi Jinping, called for all Communist Party agencies of ministerial level and above to have absolutely loyalty to the party. The remaining 12 Politburo members, apart from Xi and Premier Li, will then vie for the five vacant seats on the PSC, the party’s innermost cabinet, while about 250 Central Committee members will compete for one of 11 Politburo seats. Xi recently issued a rallying cry for his party colleagues in both the Politburo and the PSC to unite behind him in “thought and action”. He told a Politburo meeting on December 29 and 30: “Politburo members should stay in line with the Central Committee and stick to the correct political direction and remain loyal to the party.” At a meeting of the PSC on January 8, Xi also told party leaders that they should ensure that remained politically aware and safeguard the central authority of the party. In a report of the meeting, the Xinhua new agency quoted Mao to emphasise the point. “Within the party, the government, the army, the people, academics, and east, west, south, north, centre – the party leads everything,” Mao said. In the post-Mao era there has been an established rule that the division of power in the so-called four major branches of government – the party, the government, the legislature and political consultative body – is shared between different PSC members. Xi heads the party, state, and army, Premier Li is in charge of the State Council and the cabinet, Zhang Dejiang heads the National People’s Congress and Yu Zhengsheng heads the top advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. In the past few weeks – in response to Xi’s call – regional officials have been scrambling to make public pledges swearing their political allegiance to Xi, reviving a common practice during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, the final decade of Mao’s rule. Up to now, at least half of nation’s provincial party chiefs have made public pledges to “voluntarily safeguard the core position of General Secretary Xi”. Peidong Yang, a postdoctoral fellow in sociology at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, described the move by provincial party leaders as “acts of swearing loyalty to Xi”. Yang said: “This seems quite clear, given that they almost unanimously stressed their staunch support and their overall sense of ’allegiance’ for Xi at the ‘core’ of the party.” Analysts believe such statements are tantamount to suggesting Xi’s superior status among the nation’s seven most senior leaders. Some said Xi’s two recent calls to party members were part of his concerted effort to secure the political loyalty of his colleagues in both of the highest-ruling bodies. One problem facing President Xi Jinping is China’s slowing economy. Last year’s 6.9 per cent growth in the nation’s annual gross domestic product, the lowest recorded since 1990, led billionaire investor George Soros (above) to suggest the mainland’s economy might be headed for a hard landing. They said the rare departure from party protocol by reporting on a PSC meeting was an attempt by Xi to publicise his absolute authority within the party’s inner-most cabinet. In the years since he came to office in late 2012, Xi has succeeded in projecting himself as the most powerful leader since Deng – and even since Mao – as well as one of the world’s most powerful international leaders. He has assumed more important positions than any of his predecessors, having acquired leading roles in the seven most powerful central leading groups spanning the party, state, economy and military. The powers of these leading groups supersedes the powers of all of the most important party and government establishments, headed respectively by Xi’s other Politburo or PSC colleagues. Xi is now able to rely on his small circle of loyal aides and advisers to run the country, while sidelining many of his colleagues in the other branches of government. Li Zhanshu, head of the general office of the party’s Central Committee, has no government title to suggest he should be involved in diplomacy. Yet he has an explicit role in foreign policy as head of the general office of the party’s National Security Commission, which was established by Xi in 2013. Liu is chief of the General Office serving the Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs, a group that was once headed by the premier, but is now headed by Xi. However, Xi, who is the son of a revolutionary, apparently lacks the necessary mandate to make his leadership unquestionable and as authoritative as that of Mao – credited for founding the communist republic – and Deng – hailed as the architect of China’s reform, which helped transform the mainland from being an economic backwater into the world’s second largest economy. Analysts say the campaign is also part of renewed efforts by Xi to further consolidate his power amid increasing challenges home and abroad. “The current call for party members to align themselves with the party’s central core authority is part of efforts by Xi and his team to regain power in a political regime that governs all aspects of China, and also a warning to those that want to deviate from the guiding principles of the central government,” said Xigen Li, an associate professor at Hong Kong’s City University. Steve Tsang, professor of contemporary Chinese studies at Britain’s University of Nottingham, said: “Xi is building up his power through party rectification, and is going further than any of his predecessors since Mao, arguably even further than Deng.” He said moving to ‘unify the thinking’ of leaders and others in the party was “going quite far”– something that former president Hu Jintao had certainly never done, while Hu’s predecessor, Jiang Zemin had not been successful in achieving. Chinese paramilitary police stand guard in front of a large portrait of late Chinese leader Mao Zedong near Tiananmen Square in Beijing. “Xi is pushing, and is using the enhanced might of the party machine and the state security apparatus to do that,” Tsang said, adding that some resistance remained and was probably still well entrenched. “The unrelenting push made by Xi reveals to me that he has not yet succeeded in his aims, and also the strength of resistance that exists.” Tsang said if Xi had already achieved his aim of asserting his control, then by now he would be focusing on pushing his agenda forward and ensuring he achieved his goals. “Instead, he is still focusing on consolidating his power and position.” Xigen Li said that within any political group, there was a centrifugal force that resulted in thoughts and practices moving away from the mainstream. “Such deviation occurs more frequently when society is undergoing significant changes, which is what China currently faces, with regard to the current economic and political challenges,” Li said.

#### Blows to Xi’s authority kill his reform agenda

Bremmer, 4-7-16 – (Ian, journalist "Xi Jinping's Thin Skin Makes Him Look Weak," TIME, 4-7-2016, http://time.com/4284795/panama-papers-xi-jinping//BR/)

Chinese President Xi Jinping takes a zero-tolerance approach to bad press. Maybe he believes that the complexity and historic stakes involved in his sweeping economic-reform plan demand the assertion of absolute moral authority. Or maybe he’s just very sensitive. Either way, the Panama Papers, which detail allegations that senior Chinese leaders, including a member of Xi’s family, have engaged in offshore deals worth millions, were bound to provoke fury in Beijing. Xi has never welcomed criticism. In 2012, a Bloomberg story on his family’s wealth and business connections led to China’s denying all visa requests from Bloomberg, just as it would do to the New York Times after a story on the wealth of those close to ex-Premier Wen Jiabao. Every news group outside China must weigh the risk that an unflattering story about the leadership, particularly one that involves ill-gotten gains, will end its access to the world’s soon-to-be largest economy. The President has also faced criticism inside China. Last month, an anonymous letter calling for his resignation was somehow published on a government-affiliated website. Official media have complained openly of censorship. Recently, stories have emerged of disappearing journalists and their intimidated families. This is all at a time when critics warn that Xi has amassed too much power and is building a cult of personality. China’s latest embarrassment comes as other emerging world leaders are fending off corruption charges and fighting for their political lives. Fallout from a massive bribery scandal will probably force Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff from power. Malaysia’s Najib Razak has tried to explain that hundreds of millions deposited into his bank account by a Saudi royal were merely a gift. South Africa’s Jacob Zuma says a swimming pool and millions of dollars in other upgrades to his home were intended to enhance its security. The Panama Papers appear to show that current and former members of Britain’s Conservative Party, including Prime Minister David Cameron’s late father, have shielded wealth in offshore accounts. They also suggest that some of Vladimir Putin’s closest friends have become filthy rich in murky ways. But China is different because of its growing importance for the entire global economy. Any public blow to Xi’s authority will make it more difficult for him to sweep away corruption and advance much-needed economic reforms. Draconian retaliation against unflattering press or internal critics, however, doesn’t project self-confidence. Attempts to exempt top leaders from criticism make the regime look brittle. China’s growth and the party’s grip are strong enough that it won’t matter in 2016, but a sharper slowdown in the future will test Xi’s authority as never before.

#### Xi’s popularity is key to overcoming senior leadership resistance and creating enduring reforms

**Leung 15** [James - pseudonym for an economist with extensive experience in China, Europe, and the United States. “Xi's Corruption Crackdown: How Bribery and Graft Threaten the Chinese Dream”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2015, Proquest] bjs

THE POLITICS OF ANTICORRUPTION Since the anticorruption campaign is just one of a number of major changes taking place in the Xi era, it's difficult to forecast what path it might take. In a pessimistic scenario, the campaign would end in failure after strong resistance within the top party leadership and the bureaucratic system forces Xi to back down. That outcome would be a catastrophe. Corruption would likely rise to pre-2012 levels (at the very least), destabilizing the economy, reducing investor confidence, and seriously eroding Xi's authority, making it difficult for him to lead. In a more optimistic scenario, Xi would manage to overcome internal resistance and move on to broader economic, legal, and political reforms. Ideally, the campaign will strengthen Xi's power base enough and win him the support necessary to reduce the party's tight grip on policy and regulatory and administrative power, creating a favorable environment for the growth of a more independent private sector. Xi has no interest in creating a Westernstyle democratic system, but he does think that China could produce a cleaner and more effective form of authoritarianism. To better serve that goal, Xi should consider adding a number of more ambitious elements to the anticorruption crusade, including a step that both Transparency International and the G-20 have called for: improving public registers to clarify who owns and controls which companies and land, which would make it harder for corrupt officials and businesspeople to hide their illicit profits. At the moment, there is more reason for optimism than pessimism. Xi has already consolidated a great deal of control over the state's power structures and is determined and able to remove anyone who might resist or challenge his authority or policies. So far, within the senior leadership and the wider bureaucratic system, resistance to the anticorruption campaign has been passive rather than active: some bureaucrats have reportedly slowed down their work in a rather limited form of silent protest. Meanwhile, the anticorruption campaign continues to enjoy strong public support, especially from low- and middle-income Chinese who resent the way that corruption makes the Chinese system even more unfair than it already is. Anticorruption thus represents a way for the party to ease the social tensions and polarization that might otherwise emerge as the economy slows, even as dramatic economic inequalities persist. To maintain this public support, the trick for Xi will be calibrating the scope and intensity of the campaign: not so narrow or moderate as to seem halfhearted, but not so broad or severe as to seem like a form of abuse itself.

### PC key – econ reform

#### Xi’s political capital is key to economic reforms

BMI 16 --- (Business Monitor International, 1-1-2016, Scenarios For Economic And Political Evolution, 2015-2030, 6-20-2016, Lexis)//jonah

In our second scenario, Xi proves to be more sympathetic to economic reform, as evidenced by the setting up of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms in 2013 to advise him on reform initiatives. Recognizing the importance of a strong economy (and the crucial role of reforms), Xi's primary aim is to ensure the country has a strong enough economy to solidify his legacy (i.e. achieving steady if inevitably slower economic growth). Lacking the technical expertise and track record required to enact reforms, Xi would thus use his power to remove vested interests that are hindering reforms to ensure the ground is fertile for changes. This would provide the environment needed for Premier Li (who has considerably more reform experience) to implement deep-reaching economic reforms. As reform momentum within the CPC has often been hindered by various factions with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, leaders with a reform bent have often faced significant opposition when trying to enact changes to the economy. Such was the case for former premier Zhu Rongji (1998-2003), who found himself facing stiff opposition from then-president Jiang Zemin's Shanghai clique. Similarly, the lack of broad-based support from various factions meant that former president Hu Jintao (2003-2013) was unable to carry out significant reforms despite being a well-known reformer. Having inherited the reform mantle (if not the position) from Hu, it is therefore likely that Li will face the same difficulties in overcoming entrenched positions. However, with Xi having removed the major impediments to reform, Li will be able to proceed with the restructuring of SOEs in their second term. As such, in this scenario we would expect to see a pickup in reform momentum in Xi and Li's second term (2017-2022) as the path has been cleared for the reformers to go about implementing economic liberalization policies. In this case, we would expect to see a more thorough and in-depth restructuring of SOEs and greater flexibility in the yuan currency.

#### Xi’s muscle and popularity is key to effective corruption reform – the alternative is weak economic growth

**The Atlantic 14** [“Xi who must be obeyed”, The Atlantic, September 22, 2014, <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21618780-most-powerful-and-popular-leader-china-has-had-decades-must-use-these-assets-wisely-xi>] bjs

Taking on the party It may well be that the decision to promote Mr Xi as a single personality at the expense of the group was itself a collective one. Some in China have been hankering for a strongman; a politician who would stamp out corruption, reverse growing inequalities and make the country stand tall abroad (a task Mr Xi has been taking up with relish—see article). So have many foreign businessfolk, who want a leader who would smash the monopolies of a bloated state sector and end years of dithering over economic reforms. However the decision came about, Mr Xi has grabbed it and run with it. He has taken charge of secretive committees responsible for reforming government, overhauling the armed forces, finance and cyber-security. His campaign against corruption is the most sweeping in decades. It has snared the former second-in-command of the People’s Liberation Army and targeted the retired chief of China’s massive security apparatus—the highest-ranking official to be investigated for corruption since Mao came to power. The generals, wisely, bow to him: earlier this year state newspapers published pages of expressions of loyalty to him by military commanders. He is the first leader to employ a big team to build his public profile. But he also has a flair for it—thanks to his stature (in a height-obsessed country he would tower over all his predecessors except Mao), his toughness and his common touch. One moment he is dumpling-eating with the masses, the next riding in a minibus instead of the presidential limousine. He is now more popular than any leader since Mao (see article). All of this helps Mr Xi in his twofold mission. His first aim is to keep the economy growing fast enough to stave off unrest, while weaning it off an over-dependence on investment in property and infrastructure that threatens to mire it in debt. Mr Xi made a promising start last November, when he declared that market forces would play a decisive role (not even Deng had the courage to say that). There have since been encouraging moves, such as giving private companies bigger stakes in sectors that were once the exclusive preserve of state-owned enterprises, and selling shares in firms owned by local governments to private investors. Mr Xi has also started to overhaul the household-registration system, a legacy of the Mao era that makes it difficult for migrants from the countryside to settle permanently in cities. He has relaxed the one-child-per-couple policy, a Deng-era legacy that has led to widespread abuses. More muscle needed It is still far from clear whether Mr Xi’s economic policies will succeed in preventing a sharp slowdown in growth. The latest data suggest the economy is cooling more rapidly than the government had hoped (see article). Much will depend on how far he gets with the second, harder, part of his mission: establishing the rule of law. This will be a central theme of the annual meeting next month of the Communist Party’s Central Committee. The question is whether Mr Xi is prepared for the law to apply to everyone, without fear or favour. His drive against corruption suggests that the answer is a qualified no. The campaign is characterised by a Maoist neglect of institutions. It has succeeded in instilling fear among officials, but has done little to deal with the causes of graft: an investigative mechanism that is controlled entirely by the party itself, a secret system of appointments to official positions in which loyalty often trumps honesty and controls on free speech that allow the crooked to silence their critics. Mr Xi needs to set up an independent body to fight corruption, instead of leaving the job to party investigators and the feuding factions they serve. He should also require officials to declare all sources of income, property and other assets. Instead, he has been rounding up activists calling for such changes almost as vigorously as he has been confronting corruption. In the absence of legal reform, he risks becoming a leader of the old stripe, who pursues vendettas in the name of fighting wrongdoers. That will have two consequences: there will be a new wave of corruption, and resentments among the party elite will, at some point, erupt. Mr Xi is making some of the right noises. He says he wants courts to help him “lock power in a cage”. Reforms are being tinkered with to make local courts less beholden to local governments. But he needs to go further by abolishing the party’s shadowy “political-legal committees”, which decide sensitive cases. The party should stop meddling in the appointment of judges (and, indeed, of legislators). The effect of such reforms would be huge. They would signal a willingness by the party to begin loosening its monopoly of power and accepting checks and balances. Deng once said that economic reform would fail without political reform. Mr Xi last month urged foot-dragging officials to “dare to break through and try” reform. China’s leader should heed his own words and those of Deng. He should use his enormous power for the greatest good, and change the system

#### Xi is using Chinese media to repudiate Li’s economic platform and advocate structural reforms – PC is key to overcome the rift in Chinese economic policy

Tak Ho, 5/29/16 – Fong Tak Ho is a longtime Hong Kong journalist who has worked for the Hong Kong Standard, the South China Morning Post, Ming Pao, Asia Times Online and other publications [Asia Times, “Are Xi and Li feuding over China’s economy?”, 5/29/16, http://atimes.com/2016/05/are-xi-and-li-feuding-over-chinas-economy/]//Yak

HONG KONG–An anonymous and pungent criticism of China’s credit-fueled economic growth is triggering anxiety that dissension has broken out at the pinnacle of Chinese politics. The opaque maneuverings at the Chinese Communist Party’s Zhongnanhai HQ in Beijing have done nothing to soothe investors, forcing them to wait with bated breath until a clearer picture emerges.

At the center of the alleged feud is a May 9 article on the front page of the flagship People’s Daily. It cited an “authoritative person” in an unusual commentary that cautioned against the use of generous credit lines to fuel China’s economy. The mysterious source warned that mounting local and corporate debt in China is “at the verge of spiraling out of control” and can ricochet to harm the Chinese economy. The source argued that structural reform, rather than buoying short-term economic performance, is the better prescription for healing China’s ailing economy.

It’s widely held that an ongoing stimulus package with credit taps at its core is Chinese PM Li Keqiang’s signature policy. If this assumption is correct, the “authoritative person” quoted in the People’s Daily piece is practically repudiating Li’s economic platform. This, in turn, is fanning speculation that a rift over economic policy has taken place among China’s top leaders.

Further lending weight to the rumor, the People’s Daily ran another report on May 10, citing a speech made by President Xi Jinping last December. Xi’s words echoed the above rebuke on expanding China’s debt burden, albeit in much more diplomatic rhetoric.

The anonymous source also gave a dim outlook for the Chinese economy in years to come, flatly rebuffing a claims by other Chinese officials that the Chinese economy is “having a tremendous start” this year. CCP watchers are astounded by the bluntness of the the source’s criticism since the “having a tremendous start” remark under question was made in March by Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli, who is also a member of the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee.

School buddy politics?

Many are guessing that the “authoritative person” quoted in the People’s Daily is Xi’s close advisor Liu He, who received a Master’s degree in Public Administration from Harvard University in the 1980s and was Xi’s school mate in the 1960s. Xi has said publicly that“he (Liu) is very important to me.”

Compounding the speculation is the fact that comments on the Chinese economy by a mysterious “authoritative person” have been published in People’s Daily no less than three times in the last 12 months (including the May 9 piece). China watchers, nonetheless, are still trying to figure out what these signals mean in political and economic terms.

Theories about the the People’s Daily commentaries abound. But none can be independently confirmed for accuracy.

The “power struggle” theory is one of the most popular. It holds that Xi and Premier Li agree on major structural measures such as deleveraging and destocking to revive the Chinese economy. But it questions whether they have a consensus on other key economic issue.

Debt bomb worries

Among the controversies noted is Li’s “debt-for-equity” swaps initiative proposal. The proposal is aimed at preventing nonperforming loans from piling up. The 1,600-word People’s Daily article on May 9 says such debt-for-equity swaps, mandated by the state, will make it hard for bad borrowers to learn from their mistakes.

However, some pundits insist that such assertions must come with an asterisk. They are unconvinced that airing such differences of opinion in public is in line with Xi’s best interests. They note that breaking ranks in public, especially at the top echelon, will stoke questions about Xi’s leadership ability.

Other analysts believe that the ongoing drama reflects disparity at the policy implementation level instead of a policy disagreement. They note that the source articles were published after a keynote Politburo meeting on April 29, which reiterates the importance of the “healthy development of stock market” in China. Yet even this simple statement can be subject to different interpretations by officials. It can also result in a huge discrepancy in execution.

China State Bureau of Statistics, for example, has expressed an optimistic view of the nation’s economy. Their experts have predicted a “U-shape rebound.” These analysts say the bullish assessment has prompted the “authoritative person” to publicly rebuke the view. Instead, the source is telling the Chinese people to brace for a gloomy “L-shape” projection for the economy.

By these lights, the People’s Daily commentary has a two-pronged approach in dealing with the problem’s of China’s economy. The first is to fire a warning shot across the bow of officials who fail to adhere to Xi’s official line. The second is to exercise early-stage expectation management about the future direction of China’s economy with the general public.

### PC key – defeat Li

#### Xi using political clout to consolidate control and oust Li – that’s key to pass Xi’s economic reforms

Asia Times, 5/27/16 [Asia Unhedged, Times, “Xi visit to China rust belt hints squeakier view of economy than Li”, 5/27/16, http://atimes.com/2016/05/xi-visit-to-china-rust-belt-hints-squeakier-view-of-economy-than-li/]//Yak

There have been more than a few murmurs in China recently about an alleged rift between President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang over economic policy.

Some analysts say a disagreement may have emerged about how to grapple with a mounting debt problem and how to kick-start future growth. More fuel may be thrown on the speculative fire after state news agency Xinhua reported Friday that Xi pledged action on economic restructuring during a tour of Heilongjiang Province, once a flourishing heavy industrial center.

“If we hesitate in making decisions and take half measures, we will lose this rare opportunity,” Xi said during the visit as he urged local authorities to be fully committed to upgrading old industries and nurturing new ones.

Xi appears to be taking a hands-on approach in overseeing China’s economy, a role that predecessors left mostly to top technocrats. But recent commentaries in state mouth piece People’s Daily hints some party honchos disagree with Li’s relatively upbeat view of the Chinese economy’s prospects.

Specifically, some say Xi wants to curb debt-fueled growth before it destroys the economy, while Li feels the best way to spark growth is through debt-fueled stimulus. Some even speculate that Xi is moving to consolidate control of the economic engines and oust Li.

Xi’s visit to the northeast, could be a sign that he wants get behind the wheel. This area of the country includes the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, and was among the first regions in China to become industrialized with the industries of steel, automobiles, shipbuilding, aircraft manufacturing and petroleum refining.

Against the backdrop of the Chinese economy settling into a “new normal” featuring lower growth rates, the northeast is experiencing a more acute slowdown than other areas of the country.

Known as the Chinese rust belt, the area has seen economic growth slowing as its industrial base loses steam. Revitalizing this area has been a crucial part of the country’s modernization drive, reported Xinhua.

Xi’s visit was an investigation to determine a way to revitalize the area, said Xin Ming from the Party School of the Communist Party of China Central Committee.

Xi told a meeting of senior officials in Heilongjiang that only supply-side reform could strengthen industrial structure and productivity, said Xinhua.

Since 2013, Xi has made three tours to the northeast and visited a number of technology companies, urging deeper integration of information technology and industrialization in the region.

This latest inspection comes one month after the country issued a policy document on the revival of old industrial bases. China is determined to transform the northeast into the manufacturing base for advanced equipment and a strategic base for technological equipment by 2030, said the document.

#### Li and Xi disagree over economic reform – Xi is using political clout to implement structural reform and replace Li

Phillips, 5/25/16 – Tom Phillips is the Beijing correspondent for the Guardian [“China's 'feud' over economic reform reveals depth of Xi Jinping's secret state”, The Guardian, 4/25/16, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/26/chinas-feud-over-economic-reform-reveals-depth-of-xi-jinpings-secret-state]

Yet this headline – and the accompanying 6,000-word article attacking debt-fuelled growth – has sparked weeks of speculation over an alleged political feud at the pinnacle of Chinese politics between the president, Xi Jinping, and the prime minister, Li Keqiang, the supposed steward of the Chinese economy.

“The recent People’s Daily interview … not only exposes a deep rift between [Xi and Li] … it also shows the power struggle has got so bitter that the president had to resort to the media to push his agenda,” one commentator said in the South China Morning Post.

“Clear divisions have emerged within the Chinese leadership,” wrote Nikkei’s Harada Issaku, claiming the two camps were “locking horns” over whether to prioritise economic stability or structural reforms.

The 9 May article – penned by an unnamed yet supposedly “authoritative” scribe – warned excessive credit growth could plunge China into financial turmoil, even wiping out the savings of the ordinary citizens.

As if to hammer that point home, a second, even longer article followed 24 hours later – this time a speech by Xi Jinping – in which the president laid out his vision for the Chinese economy and what he called supply-side structural reform.

“Taken together, the articles signal that Xi has decided to take the driver’s seat to steer China’s economy at a time when there are intense internal debates among officials over its overall direction,” Wang Xiangwei argued in the South China Morning Post. Like many observers, he described the front page interview as a “repudiation” of Li Keqiang-backed efforts to prop up economic growth by turning on the credit taps.

China’s economy stabilised in the first quarter of this year as a record 4.6 trillion yuan (£477.3bn) of credit was released, leading some to question Beijing’s commitment to structural reforms.

China watchers have been left bamboozled at the mystifying way in which top-level policy making debates have played out in the pages of the party newspaper.

Some read the articles as a sign relations between Xi and Li are breaking down and predict the latter could be replaced next year by the president’s current anti-corruption tsar Wang Qishan.

#### Xi is putting pressure on Li’s economic solutions to push his reforms – only discrediting Li’s reforms allows Xi to replace him with Wang Qishan in 2017

Phillips, 5/25/16 – Tom Phillips is the Beijing correspondent for the Guardian [“China's 'feud' over economic reform reveals depth of Xi Jinping's secret state”, The Guardian, 4/25/16, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/26/chinas-feud-over-economic-reform-reveals-depth-of-xi-jinpings-secret-state]

Bishop said one plausible scenario was that Li would be sidelined from economic affairs at next year’s 19th Communist party congress and replaced by Wang Qishan in a bid to advance painful but necessary economic reforms. “From the perspective of reform, Wang has got a great reputation and in many ways would be much more effective within the bureaucracy. Certainly people are afraid of him.” During a tour of China’s northeastern rust belt this week, Xi reaffirmed his commitment to reforms. “If we hesitate in making decisions and do things halfway, we will lose this rare opportunity,” he said, according to China’s official news agency. Howie said he saw the battles over economic policy less as a boxing match, in which red and blue teams traded punches, and more as a raging forest fire where police officers and fire fighters were tripping over each other as they tried different techniques to extinguish the flames of a rapidly fading economy. “There is this mismatch of endeavours. They all understand they need to solve the problem. I just don’t think they fully appreciate the coordination that is needed to solve it,” the financial markets expert said. Howie said Li could not have been thrilled about having his policies rubbished so publicly by the president’s team. “Clearly… [Xi] is saying: ‘What’s gone before isn’t working. We can’t continue to do it.’ This is hardly rousing support for Li Keqiang and what has gone before.”

#### Xi is breaking up Leading Small Groups to reduce party fragmentation

Amighini and Berkofsky, 15 – Alessia Amighini is Senior Associate Research Fellow at ISPI. She is Assistant Professor of Economics and International Economics at the Department of Economic and Business Studies (DiSEI) at Università del Piemonte Orientale. Professor Axel Berkofsky is Gianni Mazzocchi Fellow at the University of Pavia, Italy and Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI). [3/23/15, Xi's Policy Gambles: The Bumpy Road Ahead, ISPI]//Yak

The evolution of Leading Small Groups (LSG) has shaped Chinese politics since the start of the reform period and their number has expanded and contracted according to different political circumstances. Those groups are informal coordination mechanisms to implement policies set up by the LSG leader and supervisor and can be permanent, term-oriented or task-oriented. They cover all the most important issues and during Hu-Wen’s era a power decentralization process assigned a leading group to each member of the Politburo Standing Committee12. This led to the creation of several fragmented political areas, guided by different leaders who cultivated their own circles, affecting the reach of Party decisions so much that some used to say “policies stop at the gate of Zhongnanhai (Party headquarters)”13. In addition, LSG composition has always been surrounded by mystery and secrecy, while recently official media have even started to report on LSG regular meetings. This budding of LSG’s gradual institutionalization is connected to Xi’s decision to create the Clgcdr. Membership in the new Reform Commission is given, among others, to 4 out of 7 members of the PBSC (including Xi and Li Keqiang), 14 out of 25 members of the Politburo and outstanding figures from the CDIC, National People’s Congress (NPC), State Council (government), Chinese Political Consultative Conference (CPCC), army, Supreme Court and Supreme Procuratoriat. It covers the functions of designing, planning, coordinating and implementing reforms, especially at the national, long term, cross-sectorial and cross-regional levels. In addition, the Clgcdr supervises six subgroups dealing with issues like economics, the legal system and inspections that were previously dealt with by ad hoc LSG. With this decision Xi Jinping thus ensured himself an institutional instrument that can help him to bypass power group interests, fighting against excessive fragmentation and pushing toward power centralization.

### PC key – consensus

#### PC key --- consensus is crucial

CRS 13

Congressional Research Service March 20, 2013 Understanding China’s Political System//LKJ

China has had no supreme leader since the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997. The seven men who sit on the country’s most senior decision-making body, the Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), form a collective leadership in which each man has a rank, from one to seven, and shoulders primary responsibility for a specific portfolio. (See Ta b l e 1) for the names and offices of all seven members.) Party General Secretary Xi Jinping is ranked first among the seven and has responsibility for convening PSC and larger Politburo meetings. He also controls some of the most consequential portfolios, including military and foreign affairs. Unlike his predecessor, who had to wait two years after beco ming head of Party to be named head of the military, Xi was awarded the top military post immediately upon taking over leadership of the Party, a development that has enhanced his author ity. Like all his colleagues, however, Xi must still win consensus from the rest of the group for major decisions. Forging agreement can be difficult, in part because members of the PSC owe their jobs to horse trading among different constituencies, interest groups, and influential retired Party elders, whose interests they represent informally on the PSC.

### PC key – anti-corruption

#### Xi’s power is high now and he’s using it for anti-corruption reform

Rachman, 5-30-2016 - (Gideon, chief foreign affairs commentator for the Financial Times, recipient of Orwell prize for journalism, "Xi Jinping has changed China’s winning formula," Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/56c87262-2423-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d.html,//BR/)

When it comes to politics, in the post-Mao era the Communist party has sought a middle path between dictatorship and democracy. The idea was to embrace a collective style of government, with smooth transitions of leadership managed by the party itself. Hu Jintao, Mr Xi’s colourless predecessor, epitomised this system. He never encouraged a cult of personality, served two terms in office, and then left power. Mr Xi has broken with this model. He is now widely said to be the most powerful leader of China since Mao. A sycophantic official media is encouraged, literally, to sing his praises. (The most noted ditty is called “Uncle Xi Loves Mama Peng”, a saccharine reference to the president’s wife, Peng Liyuan.) At the same time, Mr Xi has launched a crackdown on corruption that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of convictions, terrifying much of China’s business and political elite. The result is fevered speculation in Beijing — including rumours of purges, attempted coups and assassination attempts. Many pundits believe that Mr Xi is now determined to serve more than two terms in office — a development that would overturn the model of collective leadership.

#### Xi is pressing for corruption reform now but party cohesion is key

Keliher and Wu, 5/27/16 - (Macabe, historian of modern China. He is currently a Jerome Hall Fellow at Indiana University Maurer School of Law, and Hsinchao, cultural sociologis, adjunct assistant professor at Indiana U, "Cleaning up China’s corruption," Policy Forum, <http://www.policyforum.net/cleaning-chinas-corruption/,//BR/>)

President Xi Jinping is using a mix of anti-corruption measures, administrative reform, and moral discipline to try and crackdown on a culture of corruption, write Macabe Keliher and Hsinchao Wu. In his rise as the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, President Xi Jinping has made cleaning up government corruption one of his greatest tasks. Unlike previous anti-corruption campaigns, Xi’s is coupled with a systematic effort to not only crackdown on endemic graft and malfeasance, but also target the culture that enables it to fester. This is being done on three fronts: a highly public anti-corruption drive, formalising anti-corruption administrative practices, and instilling moral discipline into the rank and file. Although many of Xi’s initiatives were also undertaken by his predecessors, the current systemisation and formalisation of measures make up a comprehensive program that creates the possibility not only of stamping out corruption, but also of transforming the political culture. Such measures are necessary, because public office in China today has become a place for profiteering, where political despotism and private greed conspire. Party officials divide themselves into factions and develop networks required for promotion, profit, and protection. To fail to partake in the gift-giving, banqueting, and nepotism could mean the end of one’s political career, exclusion, and persecution. Furthermore, the rampant abuse of authority by state functionaries for private interest at the expense of the public good limits the capacity of the central government to operate. The current leaders appear intent on changing this. Under the direction of Xi Jinping and anti-corruption czar Wang Qishan, the Party has engaged in an extensive and uncompromising anti-corruption campaign. This is the first of the three fronts to fight corruption, and it has taken down some of the most powerful civil and military officials in China, including former security chief and retired Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang and the top aide to former president Hu Jintao, Ling Jihua. In addition to widespread arrests, there are two key proposals being discussed: anti-corruption zones and amnesty. The first of these would create special zones modeled on special economic zones, but rather than marketisation, the anti-corruption zones would pilot political reform and be run by new officials, and their assets made transparent. Similarly, an amnesty might be forthcoming. Rather than attempt the impossible of investigating and arresting all corrupt officials, a conditional amnesty would forgive all offenders of past crimes on the condition they return their ill-gotten gains. The second front in the anti-corruption fight is administrative reform. Three key reforms aim to give anti-corruption agencies greater autonomy to investigate and arrest. The first is an increase in the number of inspection offices, so that an entire team can monitor provincial-level officials rather than a single individual, who often becomes coopted by local Party leaders. Moreover, these teams of investigators have been given legal powers, such as interrogation and intercepting communications. Second, the anti-corruption agency has taken control over the appointment of local anti-corruption heads, thereby detaching the position from local Party Committee control. Third, Central Inspection Groups have been revived, whereby irregular and unannounced inspections are sent out to the provinces and ministries. In addition, Beijing has moved to codify certain administrative adjustments. Rules and regulations are being articulated for many practices, some of which have been in effect since Hu Jintao’s term in office. A formalisation will almost certainly happen in appointments and promotions, most likely beginning at the provincial level. From the data at hand, all provincial- and ministerial-level appointments in 2013 and 2014 were done systematically and in accordance with an official’s bureaucratic rank and position—that is, none of the appointments indicate patronage or special favor. It is expected that this informal practice will be formalised in regulations. Standardising and restructuring salaries are also major initiatives. Currently, official salaries are not made known, even internally, and to the extent that they are known, salaries for a similar-level post can vary widely. Transparency will help clarify how much officials make legally, and should be making. Such a measure is also discussed in concert with the complete elimination of perks, such as housing and transportation. The third front is moral discipline. Xi speaks frequently of the need to combat excessive bureaucratisation, hedonism, and use of public funds and position for personal advancement. Rather than laying out clear guidelines and rules, however, he tells officials to examine themselves and act righteously. Less amorphous are the guidelines set for the proper livelihood of officials. An internal Party regulation circulated has standardised the number of cars for officials of various ranks and position, who can have secretaries, the size and value of residences, and which officials can have a security detail. Furthermore, regulations require officials to report if they remarry or divorce, and to give reasons and justifications for the decision. Together, these three initiatives—anti-corruption, administrative reform, and moral discipline—aim to instill discipline in an increasingly deviant bureaucracy. More than just centralising power, the overarching trend of this program aims to force a shift in norms and behaviours, thereby changing the shared assumptions and practices that inform the political dealings of the society—from the approval of permits to the promotion of judges. Seen in this way, the Party leadership is trying to do nothing less than transform China’s political culture. Success may depend on how well these various elements and initiatives remain focused in a cohesive program.

### PC key – econ/military reform

#### Xi is pushing for economic and military reforms – new year statements prove

Reuters, 2-4-2016 - (Ben Blanchard and Michael Perry, "Ahead of Chinese New Year, Xi pushes economic, military reform," Yahoo News, https://www.yahoo.com/news/ahead-chinese-xi-pushes-economic-military-reform-022629103.html?ref=gs,//BR/)

BEIJING (Reuters) - Chinese President Xi Jinping has used a traditional pre-Lunar New Year visit to outlying regions to call for more effort to be made in economic and military reform, two causes of key importance to his administration. Chinese leaders generally use the time around the festival to make inspection trips around the country where they flag important policy initiatives or areas of concern for the year ahead.The week-long holiday, starting on Sunday, is the most important in the Chinese calendar, when millions of people travel home, many for the only time in the year. Visiting an old revolutionary base in the southern province of Jiangxi, Xi said that backward production facilities should be shut and resources focused on new industries, in remarks carried in all major state newspapers on Thursday. Xi urged Jiangxi to make reforms and use innovation and entrepreneurship to drive development as the economy has entered a "new normal" phase, an expression Xi coined two years ago to refer to China's slowing growth. Officials need to apply "new development concepts" in promoting supply-side structural reform, boosting strong and emerging industries, upgrading traditional industries and developing a modern service sector, he added. China's economic growth cooled to 6.9 percent in 2015, the slowest pace in 25 years. The ruling Communist Party is keen to ensure that slowing growth neither brings social upheaval in the form of mass lay-offs, nor affects too badly the rise in living standards that three decades of economic boom and reform have bought. Xi told villagers, in what is a relatively poor and backward part of the country, that the party was there to serve the Chinese people "wholeheartedly". "We are committed to supporting development of the old revolutionary base areas and making your life better day by day. Not a single family living in poverty is to be left behind on our path to combating poverty," he said. Xi also met members of the military, which is undergoing its own painful reform process to modernize the world's largest armed forces, including letting go of 300,000 service personnel. He said China was committed to building a strong army, and all units must be loyal and do their part for the reforms.

# LINKS

## Links --- Generic

### L – anti west/nationalism

#### Xi taking hard line on US now, shift signals weakness and undermines his political base of support

Buckley, 14 (Chris, “Xi Jinping’s Rapid Rise in China Presents Challenges to the U.S.,” pg online at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/president-xi-jinping-makes-it-his-mission-to-empower-china.html?\_r=0 //um-ef)

President Xi Jinping has amassed power faster than any Chinese leader in decades, and his officials have cast his talks with Mr. Obama and other regional leaders this week in Beijing as another affirmation of the ascendance of China and of Mr. Xi. For over 20 years, the Chinese Communist Party elite largely made decisions by consensus, seeking to avoid a repeat of the turbulence under Mao and Deng Xiaoping. But less than two years after assuming power, Mr. Xi has emerged as more than the “first among equals” in the ruling Politburo Standing Committee, shaking the longstanding assumption that China would be steered by steady, if often ponderous, collective leadership. The implications of his rise for the United States, and for Mr. Obama, are two-sided. When the two leaders meet, Mr. Obama may have a surer sense that his counterpart has the power to make good on his promises. On Wednesday, they unveiled a deal on curbing greenhouse gases, including a landmark agreement by China to reach a peak in carbon dioxide emissions by about 2030. On Tuesday, China also said it would eliminate tariffs on many information technology products. But so much now depends on Mr. Xi’s political calculations, and he has shown himself to be wary of the West and disinclined to make concessions under pressure. “Xi portrays himself in some ways not unlike Putin,” said Dali Yang, a political science professor at the University of Chicago. “He’s basically saying that ‘I am here to defend the party, to defend the national interests in terms of national territorial sovereignty.’ ” Signs of Mr. Xi’s ascendancy are everywhere, from the collections of his speeches selling in bookstores to the intense, often adulatory, news coverage of his busy routine. In lighter moments, the state-run news media have taken to calling him “Xi Dada”: roughly, Big Papa Xi. Mr. Xi, 61, has shaken up party ranks with an extended campaign against official corruption and pursued a crackdown on dissent that has dismayed liberal intellectuals. Rather than distribute portfolios among his colleagues, he has hoarded control of the party’s most important policy committees, known as “leading small groups,” and established several new ones under his command: on national security, military overhauls, economic restructuring and control of the Internet. “Xi has been more vigorous than anyone probably had imagined he would be,” Professor Yang said. “We did anticipate some strong moves on his part, but not the scale, the breadth and the scope of his initiatives.” Mr. Xi has overseen a muscular foreign policy, pressing China’s claims to disputed seas and islands, deepening rifts with Japan and neighbors in Southeast Asia. Those tensions have been tempered, for now, by an agreement with Japan on Friday acknowledging their differences and a trade agreement with South Korea announced Monday. He has said he wants to build a new “great power” relationship with Washington to avoid confrontation that could tip into armed conflict, but also to win greater recognition for China’s demands and interests. In June last year, he sought to build trust with Mr. Obama during two days of talks at the Sunnylands retreat in California. At the same time, Mr. Xi’s administration has resurrected and amplified traditional party themes that China’s woes have been exacerbated, even instigated, by “hostile forces” controlled by Western governments. Chinese officials accuse the United States of seeking to topple Communist Party rule, most recently by supporting pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong, a charge the United States government denies. “There is this contradiction between this Cold War ideological thinking about hostile foreign forces and U.S. subversion, but at the same time saying that they want to have this new type of great power relationship,” said Susan L. Shirk, a professor at the University of California, San Diego, who was a deputy assistant secretary of state in the Clinton administration. “It’s the domestic insecurity of the Chinese Communist Party.” Gnawing fear and anxiety, Professor Shirk and other China experts say, are the flip side of China’s new strength and assertiveness, and may go a long way toward explaining what can appear to be dissonant positions. The sources of China’s insecurities are many: public discontent over smog, graft and land seizures; a bureaucracy and military rotted by corruption; tumult in Hong Kong; ethnic strife in Tibet and Xinjiang; and the uncertain effects of slowing economic growth. “The tasks our party faces in reform, development and stability are more onerous than ever,” Mr. Xi said in late October, “and the conflicts, dangers and challenges are more numerous than ever.” That calculus applies to domestic policies as well. Mr. Xi has already overseen the most intense and extended crackdown on political dissent in China in years, as well as a sweeping campaign against corruption whose targets have included retired senior security and military officials once thought of as immune to scrutiny. He has also vowed to overhaul the economy and give businesses more room to grow, and party leaders at a meeting last month endorsed proposals to give citizens fairer treatment at the hands of the police and in court. Several China scholars said Mr. Xi was likely to defy early expectations that he might shift to a more moderate course after consolidating power. Such a shift could be seen as a sign of dangerous weakness, they said. “If over the next year or two, there is a significant slowdown in the Chinese economy, the air quality fails to improve in major cities such as Beijing, or the violence spreads from Xinjiang to other parts of the country, then Xi may well take a serious hit to his political authority,” Elizabeth C. Economy, director for Asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, said in emailed answers to questions. “The motivation behind his tough approach may well include fear that it will all come crashing down otherwise.”

#### Caving into western pressure allows political opponents to take advantage of Xi and undermine his agenda

BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 (“China, US to benefit Chinese leader's nationalism - Hong Kong paper,” pg lexis//um-ef)

Xi holds China's three top positions, and is set to lead China for a decade. Just after becoming party chief late last year, Xi announced what would become the hallmark of his administration. "The Chinese Dream", he said, is "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." Xi's Chinese Dream is described as achieving the "Two 100s": first, the material goal of China becoming a "moderately well-off society" by about 2020, around the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party; second, the modernisation goal of China becoming a fully developed nation by about 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Dream has four parts: Strong China (economically, politically, scientifically, militarily); Civilised China (equity and fairness, rich culture, high morals); Harmonious China (amity among social classes); Beautiful China (healthy environment, low pollution). "A moderately well-off society" is where all citizens, rural and urban, enjoy high standards of living. This includes doubling the 2010 per capita gross domestic product (approaching US$10,000) by about 2020 and completing urbanisation (roughly 1 billion people, 70 per cent of China's population) by about 2030. "Modernisation" means China regaining its position as a world leader in science and technology as well as in economics and business; the resurgence of Chinese civilisation, culture and military might; and China participating actively in all areas of human endeavour. What about Xi's nationalism? If it seems at odds with these grand goals, it is not. Here are six reasons why. Consolidate power. Xi was not selected by Deng Xiaoping , the architect of reform, as were his predecessors - Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao . Neither was Xi elected by the people. Conventional wisdom had it that he would be a weak leader. In order to realise his Chinese Dream, Xi needs to assert strength and assure control. So far, he has exceeded expectations. Enable reform. Xi and Premier Li Keqiang are determined to enact far-reaching economic reforms, the most extensive in 15 years, but there is stiff resistance from those whose dominance would be diminished and benefits cut. This resistance appeals to nationalistic aspirations by accusing reformers of "worshipping Western ways", "glorifying Western models", "caving in to Western pressures". Xi's proactive nationalism is a strategy of "offence is the best defence" - an inoculation, as it were, against the political virus of being labelled "soft" or "pro-Western". Reformers in China are generally associated with pro-American attitudes and thus subject to fierce public criticism, even ridicule. By establishing himself as a strong-willed nationalist, operating independently of the US, Xi secures economic reforms by distinguishing them from serving Western/American interests. It is no coincidence that Xi's first China-US summit follows his multifarious and emphatic exemplars of nationalism. When Xi now enacts reforms, how can he be accused of bowing down to Western/American ideals, when his international actions and assertions are so assured and decisive?

#### Xi uses an anti-western platform to boost political support --- the plan devastates that

**Su, 15** --- Program Director at US-Asia Institute, Deputy Director of Duke-UNC China Leadership Summit, (Joycelyn Su, 12-8-2015, "The Battlefield of Ideology" China Hands Magazine, 6-24-2016, <https://chinahandsmagazine.org/2015/12/08/the-battlefield-of-ideology-2/)//jonah>

This summer, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the sweeping National Security Law. The scope of the new legislation is broad, addressing not only traditional security concerns but also including threats to “cultural security.” According to the new law, the country must defend against malignant culture by “deepening the education of socialist ideology and increasing propaganda efforts.” Passage of the new national security law contributes to a broader ideological campaign President Xi Jinping launched upon taking office in 2012 and also raises questions among American government officials, business leaders, and China scholars about rising anti-Western sentiments in China. Xi Jinping’s concern with the nation’s ideological climate first attracted Western media’s attention when an internal Chinese Communist Party (CCP) document, commonly known as Document 9, was leaked to the public in April 2013. In it, the Party identifies seven problematic ideological trends and activities that warrant greater attention, including advocating for Western democracy, rule of law, civil society, and freedom of press. The document urged Party members to be vigilant in identifying these threats and to maintain full control over the direction of China’s ideological development. While control of ideology is not necessarily new to the Chinese public, warnings against Western values have certainly surged under Xi Jinping. At an education conference in March 2011 before Xi took power, Education Minister Yuan Guiren dismissed any concerns with importing Western education materials. He argued that since Chinese abroad are not influenced in capitalist countries, they therefore would be influenced by Western ideals in their homeland. Shortly after his statement, however, the Party and the State Council issued a joint document urging universities to strengthen propaganda thought work. Minister Yuan shifted his attitude in response to the new document and warned against allowing education materials that propagate Western ideology into Chinese classrooms. In this past year alone, Chinese civil society, identified in Document 9 as a problematic ideological trend, has endured harsh crackdowns. The detainment of five women’s rights activists in March, the interrogation of dozens of human rights lawyers this summer, and the arrests of Chinese Christians who refused to take down church crosses have all drawn condemnation from international watchdogs. The 2015 Human Rights Watch report on China noted the ideological campaign, stating that the authorities have cracked down on civil society “with a ferocity unseen in recent years.” Tim Cheek, a historian on Chinese intellectual life, in an interview with The Guardian, noted that in Chinese academia, liberal scholars are “going into campaign mode, which is to keep your head down, keep out of the way, don’t let stuff get into writing.” These concerning developments contrast starkly with the government’s official rhetoric. Two weeks prior to the passage of the new national security law, at this year’s annual China-US High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange in Washington, Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong encouraged more American students to study abroad in China. Chinese state media lauded cultural ties that bind the United States and China and hoped “the tree of people-to-people exchanges between our two countries will grow bigger and bear even larger fruits.” People-to-people exchanges certainly serve as a more effective instrument to influence ideology than education materials. Beijing’s continued call for greater people-to-people exchange at a time of tightening ideological control mirrors its inconsistent attitude toward American and a greater Western influence. The ideological campaign, however, is not aimed to be an anti-Western effort but a defensive measure to help the Party maintain political stability. Buttressed by its promise of economic welfare, the CCP is increasingly at risk for losing its legitimacy as China’s economy undergoes tumultuous times. The influence of foreign ideas—or any idea that seeks to change the society’s status quo—is a potent political threat at a time when the population is restless and discontent. Thus, controlling the direction of Chinese ideological development helps the Party identify early signs of cracks in the system. In a speech that Xi Jinping gave on his trip to the southern China in 2013, he asked, “Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Soviet Communist Party collapse? An important reason was that their ideals and beliefs had been shaken.” Given this understanding of the Soviet dissolution, Xi has made great efforts in correcting the nation’s ideological climate to avoid becoming China’s Gorbachev. On the offensive front in the battle of ideology, Xi Jinping engenders nationalism and cultural identity among the people as a mechanism to garner greater political support. Instead of simply aligning Chinese ideology with Marxist-Leninist thought, Xi uses national pride as a counterforce strategy to counter the influence of foreign ideology. It is evident in Xi Jinping’s emphasis on the idea of the “Chinese Dream” since he rose to power in 2012, a term that has spread like wildfire over Party documents. It refers to prosperity and improvement in people’s livelihood but places greater emphasis on national rejuvenation. This rhetoric has both been successful in contributing to the rising nationalist sentiments within China and helping Xi gain popularity among the Chinese people. A 2014 Harvard polling report reflects the effectiveness of this strategy: Chinese respondents rated Xi Jinping a nine out of ten on his performance, more favorable than the rating other domestic constituents gave their heads of states. By elucidating what needs to be protected, the National Security Law is yet another step to define state sovereignty and strengthen nationalism at home. It is not surprising, then, to find Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream, “realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” embedded in the first clause as one of the many goals of the new legislation.

#### Getting friendly with the US hurts Xi’s agenda—puts him on the wrong side of CCP’s ardent nationalism

Woodruff and Lieberthal, 13 “Examining U.S. Concerns on Trade, Security as China Welcomes New President” March 14, 2013 at 12:00 AM EDT <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia-jan-june13-china_03-14/> Judy Woodruff is an award-winning journalist. Kenneth Lieberthal is senior fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. He served as the National Security Council’s senior director for Asia during U.S. President Bill Clinton's administration. //LKJ

And let me start with you, Ken Lieberthal. What do we need to know about Xi Jinping? Tell us something about him. KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, Brookings Institution: The most important thing we need to know is that he’s going to govern China for the next decade. And the next decade is going to be enormously important for U.S. interests, for China, for Asia and globally. He’s worked his way up through every level of the Chinese political system, so he’s a very experienced politician and administrator. He’s come in on a program of saying he’s going to clean up corruption, he’s going to revitalize the Communist Party and keep it in power and use his capabilities to reform the Chinese economic system while maintaining and building military strength. JUDY WOODRUFF: Gordon Chang, is there something about his background, though, that we should know? GORDON CHANG, Author: Well, his father was a comrade of Mao Zedong, which makes him a princeling. He’s the first Chinese leader to be born after the Communist Party came to power. But I think we focus too much on Xi Jinping, because we have got to remember that he’s in a collective political system and the Politburo Standing Committee, which is the apex of political power in China, at least four, maybe five of those seven-member bodies are so-called conservatives, the hard line anti-reformers. Xi Jinping, whatever he thinks, has got to work with those people. JUDY WOODRUFF: Ken Lieberthal, what do we look for from him that will be different? What will change from China? KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: Well, he’s already tried to change the style by being much more of a kind of lively politician than his predecessor was. But I think Gordon is right. We have to look to see whether he can forge the kind of consensus to make deep structural reforms in China that the country deeply needs if it’s going to move forward. JUDY WOODRUFF: For example? KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: For example, they need to shift from an export-oriented and investment-focused economy to one that’s much more focused on domestic consumption as a driver of economic development, which requires expanding the services sector, increasing incomes and so forth. That runs against huge vested interests in China. So the question is whether he’s going to be able to really rework incentives through this system so that he can build the services sector, build incomes, reduce huge capital-intensive infrastructure projects and reduce dependence on exports. JUDY WOODRUFF: So, looking at him, Gordon Chang, from the United States, what will we see that looks different, do you think? GORDON CHANG: I think the one thing we have been concerned about is all that, although he’s been in power for only a few months, since last November, when he became general-secretary of the party, China has engaged on some very provocative maneuvers against the Japanese, because the Chinese claim sovereignty over the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. People say that Xi Jinping is actually leading China’s foreign policy on this issue, and if so, we’re in trouble, because this is a very troubled area. JUDY WOODRUFF: And do you believe, Ken Lieberthal, that that’s a primary priority of his? KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: I think his real priority is domestic. What he needs is stability abroad in order to undertake reform domestically. But his big problem is that he — that the Communist Party has really nurtured very ardent nationalism domestically, and he can’t allow himself to get on the wrong side of that or he won’t have the political capital to carry out reforms. So he’s trying to walk a tightrope. He has to be seen as strong in international affairs. But I don’t think he’s looking for trouble internationally. He’d rather avoid if it if he can. JUDY WOODRUFF: Do you see that the same way? GORDON CHANG: Well, I think that he would like to avoid trouble.

#### Nationalism is widespread in China—hardline perception key to Xi’s popularity.

Sutter 15 “Grading Xi Jinping’s America Policy: C-” Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Relations Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University October 15,2015 <http://www.theasanforum.org/grading-xi-jinpings-america-policy-c/> //LKJ

President Xi Jinping has dealt with the United States for almost three years as relations have declined. His bold and assertive actions in areas sensitive to US interests departed sharply from past restraint and put an aroused America on guard. It is hard to give these results a passing grade. As they did in Washington on September 24-25, the two leaders continue to meet and achieve agreements in limited areas of mutual interest, but rising American debate over China policy is fed by Xi’s repeated affronts and seemingly cavalier treatment of US concerns. Americans seek means to get Xi Jinping’s China to stop taking actions seen as offensive in the East and South China Seas, in cyber economic espionage, in state-backed intervention in currency and Chinese domestic markets that disadvantage US companies; in using China’s large foreign exchange reserves and other means to support self-serving Chinese-backed development institutions at odds with those backed by America; in continued rapid development of military forces aimed at Americans; and in stronger repression of Chinese peoples’ political freedom and related human rights. Xi Jinping continues to see advantage in undermining American interests in these areas. This plays well with domestic audiences in China. Approaching the end of his term and reluctant to apply American power in foreign affairs, President Barack Obama complains but seems passive and weak in dealing with Chinese challenges. Current trends forecast trouble ahead with hardening American attitudes running up against self-absorbed and self-righteous Chinese assertiveness. Current Troubles in Perspective Veteran observers of Sino-US relations would likely argue for some grading leniency for Xi as his assignment is difficult; Chinese and American leaders long have had difficulty managing differences while trying to advance common ground. President Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong set strategic understanding between the two powers focused on an expanding Soviet Union. US-China relations were often troubled, but common concern with the USSR kept disputes in check. The end of the Cold War coincided with the Tiananmen crackdown and the end of the Soviet Union. These developments shattered the foundation of Sino-American cooperation. Subsequently, officials and prominent experts in the United States and China at different times argued in favor of new overall frameworks for the relationship that would allow the two powers to cooperate more closely and manage their differences more effectively. These frameworks failed. The Clinton administration sought a strategic partnership with China that was abandoned by the Bush administration, whose later appeal to China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in international affairs met an unfavorable response. Calls within the Obama administration to establish a closer “G-2” relationship with China prompted another unfavorable response, reverberating in the US side’s rejection of this notion too. Most recently, Xi Jinping’s framework to establish a “new type of major power relations” with the United States is failing as Americans increasingly distrust what they perceive as a double game of encouraging high-level bilateral discourse while undermining American interests in key regional, economic, and political areas.1 These failures come from strong and enduring Sino-American differences, which are deeply rooted in both countries’ views of their history, interests, and values. Heading the list for China is opposition to US international leadership, explicitly favoring a multipolar world; Beijing opposes US support for Taiwan and others who disagree with China, and it guards against alleged US schemes to undermine the Chinese one-party political system. Beijing also works against the United States in Asia, endeavoring to weaken the alliances and strong security presence along China’s periphery, which is seen as a strategic threat to the country. The American differences with China focus on US determination to sustain global and regional leadership; China’s sovereignty and security ambitions as well as its employment of coercive means against neighbors, many of which are allies or close partners of the United States; China’s state-directed economic manipulations that result in substantial US economic losses; and China’s negative human rights record. The state-fostered Chinese elite and public view of foreign affairs highlights a particularly negative perspective of the United States. China’s strong self-righteous exceptionalism in foreign affairs will not change easily. The United States also is known for exceptionalism in international affairs. And both countries are big—the world’s most powerful; their approaches to each other will not be easily changed by smaller powers or other outside forces.2 Under these circumstances, aspirations for major breakthrough in relations seem unrealistic. Practice shows wisdom in seeking more modest expectations based on pragmatism influencing both sides. Such behavior emerged at the start of the twenty-first century after a decade of repeated turmoil and periodic dangerous confrontation. China at this time broadened efforts to reassure neighbors that its rise was not a threat. Officials put aside strident criticism of the United States in favor of a focused effort to reassure it. They said that the alternative risked the United States and other concerned powers working together to resist China’s rise, noting that such experience of rising powers in the twentieth century had led to their destruction. On the US side, the initial toughness of the George W. Bush administration subsided beginning with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on America. As the United States became preoccupied with conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, constructive interaction with China became more important. There followed several years of generally cooperative relations. The two sides dealt with differences in a burgeoning array of official dialogues and addressed such sensitive issues as North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and Taiwan’s moves toward independence from China. The Obama government strove to preserve the overall positive momentum in US-Chinese relations seen in the latter Bush years.3 The pragmatic cooperation in this decade was based on circumstances. Both administrations benefitted from positive engagement in various areas. It supported stability in the Asia-Pacific, a peaceful Korean Peninsula, and peace in the Taiwan Strait. US and Chinese leaders also cooperated in varying degrees to foster global peace and prosperity and to deal with climate change, terrorism, and nonproliferation. Both administrations saw that the two powers had become so interdependent that emphasizing the negatives in their relationship would hurt the other side but also would hurt them. Such interdependence was particularly strong in Sino-American economic relations. Both leaderships were preoccupied with a long list of urgent domestic and foreign priorities; in this situation, one of the last things they sought was a serious confrontation in relations with one another. From the end of 2009 to the end of 2010, Sino-US relations were troubled, notably by security issues with differences over North Korea in the forefront. Yet, by early 2011, the two sides were again focusing on common interests on the Korean Peninsula, keeping alive hopes that no fundamental change had occurred from the prior cooperative mood. Relations deteriorated over economic disputes during the US presidential campaign in 2012. China became more assertive in support of its interests at odds with the United States, notably claims to disputed territory in the East and South China Seas. The Obama government focused on a new approach known as the “rebalance” in the broad Asia-Pacific region that had military, economic, and diplomatic dimensions at odds with Chinese interests. Relations became more overtly competitive.4 Nevertheless, given its many preoccupations at home and abroad, the Obama government seemed disinclined for the rest of its term to depart from the path of pragmatic engagement with China. It was up to Xi Jinping to determine whether or not relations would deteriorate further. Xi Jinping’s New Priorities and Impact on America Unfortunately, Xi’s record shows repeated choices that place other foreign and domestic priorities above his avowed but increasingly hollow claims to seek a positive relationship with the United States. These actions make it increasingly clear that in Xi’s view, positive US ties will come on condition of America avoiding opposition to new priorities in Chinese foreign relations under him.5 By putting the United States “on notice” that it is the United States that has to give way to China’s practices at odds with US interests, the Xi government has prompted Obama and his government to be much more vocal in issuing often strident complaints. Xi has ignored them, leaving it to underlings to rebuff them. The frustration within and outside the US government grows in the face of Xi’s actions; there has been a toughening of behavior in some areas. A significant debate has emerged inside and outside the government with those favoring a tougher policy toward China in the ascendance.6 Xi Jinping began the process of changing Chinese policies with major implications for the United States as he prepared to take control of the Communist Party of China (CCP) and state power in late 2012. The caution and low profile of the previous leaders were viewed with disfavor. Chinese policies and practices became much more assertive. Xi received enormous publicity from Chinese propaganda and media outlets; his image as a decisive leader prepared to act strongly in the face of American and other criticism was welcomed by Chinese public opinion and elite opinion. Chinese reassurance and restraint in dealing with the United States and others were played down; officials in China said they had conveyed Chinese weakness to Asian rivals and the United States. The string of Chinese actions and initiatives shook many out of their complacency:7 The government orchestrated the largest mass demonstration against a foreign target ever seen in Chinese history (against Japan over disputed islands in September 2012). It followed with intense political, economic, and security pressure on Japan unseen since World War II. China used coercive and intimidating means to extend control of disputed territory at neighbors’ expense. Chinese officials dismissed and rebuffed US and other complaints that their actions upset regional stability. Despite increasing US complaints, the new Chinese government continued manipulative economic practices, cyber theft, and reluctance to contribute regional and global common goods. China used its large foreign exchange reserves and trading capacity to develop international banks and to support often grandiose Chinese plans for Asian and global investments, loans, and trade areas that excluded the United States and countered American initiatives and support for existing international economic institutions. Xi Jinping tightened political control domestically in ways grossly offensive to American representatives seeking political liberalization and better human rights conditions in China. The Chinese advances were supported by ever expanding Chinese capabilities backed by the impressive and growing economic and military power of China. The Chinese military capabilities were arrayed against and focused on the American forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Official Chinese media highlighted Xi’s leadership; he was depicted in glowing accounts directing multifaceted Chinese initiatives abroad with confidence and authority in pursuit of his broad vision of a unified, powerful, and internationally respected China—what Xi and the Chinese publicists called the “China Dream.” Complaints by neighbors, the United States, and other powers concerned with the negative impacts of Xi’s actions were rebuked or scorned

### L uq – Xi anti west now

#### Xi has used anti-Western propaganda to generate popular support – US engagement causes party and public backlash and sends an inconsistent message

Feuerberg, 15 – Gary Feuerberg is a writer for the Epoch Times [4/06/15, “Managing Speech and Thought in China”, The Epoch Times, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1309218-managing-speech-and-thought-in-china/]//Yak

Chinese leader Xi Jinping's campaign for ideological orthodoxy against Western values is intended to shore up faith in the Communist Party

WASHINGTON—Chinese Communist Party Secretary Xi Jinping began an anti-corruption campaign soon after he assumed power in Nov. 2012 that has received much media attention, both within and outside China. It appears to have helped him consolidate his power.

Less well known is Xi’s campaign against the malignant influences of “Western values” that is affecting his policies toward the Internet, the university, Chinese media, arts and entertainment, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations.

At the Wilson Center on April 2, Xi’s renewed emphasis on propaganda and ideology was the subject of a forum, “Do Western Values Threaten China? The Motives and Methods of Xi Jinping’s Ideology Campaign.”

Robert Daly, director, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, and host of the discussion, said the threat of Western values must be important to Xi. The new national security commission, which he heads, is taking it up, and it is getting the same level of attention as the topics of terrorism and separatism.

This ideological campaign has its origins in the Chinese communiqué, called Document No. 9, issued in April 2013, which spoke about the dangers of Western thought. It enumerated “seven unmentionable topics,” said Daly, which were “not to be freely addressed in the media or the academy.”

The general idea was to tell party members to become vigilant regarding alien ideas, institutions, and people that threaten Party rule.

The first “unmentionable” is Western constitutional democracy. Other subversive anti-China thoughts discussed were: universal values, civil society, neo-liberal economics, and Western concepts of journalism. Also, one should not question socialism in China or the official history of the communist party.

Ideology Campaign

Across China, Communist Party cadres attended meetings to hear the secret edicts warning them that the Party’s grip on power could be wrestled away if they were not mindful of the dangers. Document 9 was issued by the central Party office, but was not openly published, according to the New York Times.

Without doubt, the statement must have had the approval of the communist leader Xi Jinping, who ascended to power just five months before.

Consequences flowed from the seven edicts immediately. In 2013, the Times reported,” Since the circular was issued, party-run publications and Web sites have vehemently denounced constitutionalism and civil society, notions that were not considered off limits in recent years. Officials have intensified efforts to block access to critical views on the Internet.”

ChinaFile, which translated the document into English, states that a “harsh crackdown against human rights lawyers, media outlets, academics, and other such independent thinkers” ensued following its dissemination.

‘Tightening Up’

Anne-Marie Brady said at the forum that it’s important “to look past the rhetoric and look at the [regime’s] actions.” Brady is the foremost Western expert on Chinese communist propaganda. She is the author of two books on this subject—”Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China” (2007), and “China’s Thought Management” (2014).

Brady said that as Xi Jinping has assumed political power, “there is a new broom here, need to do some tightening up, but it’s not anti-West.”

Brady emphasized that when Xi and senior officials make strong statements warning against the pernicious influence of the “ideology of Western anti-China forces,” it is not a new concept and has been said before. Brady said one major difference from the Mao era is that the people haven’t had to memorize their leader’s official statements.

She quoted extensively from a paper she wrote for the Financial Times that was published March 30. Xi is more likely to get results compared to his predecessors Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin because he has much more control over the political system in China, she said.

Xi referred to the breakup of the Soviet Union in a secret speech in December 2012 in which he attributed the cause to a crisis in belief—”the people had lost faith in the Communist Party,” Brady said. Xi invoked the lesson of Mikhail Gorbachev whose policies disintegrated the Soviet bloc, he said. Brady said that the lesson according to Xi is to be guarded in unleashing the power of the masses, the mistake that Gorbachev made.

Xi’s objective is to strengthen “popular support for Party rule” and “reset the boundaries of public expression,” she said. The activists might have to pull back a bit. … clearly this is a time that is not as free and open as before.”

#### Rising anti-Western sentiment in the CCP and anti-US propaganda causes party AND public backlash to the plan, especially during times of internal crises

Taipei Times, 14 – NY Times News Service, BEIJING [Taipei Times, 9/13/14, “With China’s ascent, anti-West talk also on the rise”, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2014/11/13/2003604344/2]//Yak

His embrace of Zhou, who has been hailed by propaganda officials, but widely mocked by academics, is just the latest sign of rising anti-Western sentiment, bordering on xenophobia, that has emanated from the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and sent a chill through Chinese civil society and academia.

Using ideological language reminiscent of the Cold War, Chinese officials have voiced conspiracy theories with relish, accusing foreigners, their companies, government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of plotting to weaken or overthrow the party. Chinese institutions with ties to Western entities, no matter how benign, have also come under attack.

Meanwhile, state-run papers have taken to blaming “hostile foreign forces” for any major disturbance, whether it is ethnic violence in western China or student-led pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong.

The vilification of foreigners as enemies of China has been a staple of CCP propaganda since before the party’s rise to power, and analysts say the leadership tends to ramp up such rhetoric when it feels under pressure at home.

“Historically, during every period with many deep conflicts within the country, there has been a surge of antiforeign sentiments from the party,” historian Zhang Lifan (章立凡) said, pointing to Mao Zedong’s (毛澤東) disastrous Cultural Revolution as an example.

At the moment, he said, “the political establishment needs the public to turn their rage toward foreign countries” because anger over the widening gap between rich and poor in China has reached “crisis levels.”

However, unlike earlier campaigns targeting the West, the current wave of nationalism comes as China is ascendant.

Xi presides over a country that is on the verge of overtaking the US as the world’s largest economy and that enjoys influence around the world, especially in Asia, where it has sought to expand its territorial footprint.

In speeches, Xi has openly called on other nations to push back against the US on specific issues. In July, for example, he told Brazil’s National Congress that developing nations must “challenge US hegemony on the Internet.”

Two months earlier, Xi suggested at a conference in Shanghai that the US should cede power in Asia, saying: “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia.”

The surge in anti-Americanism extends beyond speeches. Over the summer, for example, the Chinese government began a security review of foreign NGOs operating in China, as well as Chinese NGOs that receive foreign support, scrutinizing their finances and freezing bank accounts.

A strident, 100-minute anti-US propaganda film made by the People’s Liberation Army last year laid out the case that US NGOs were out to undermine the party. (It used the martial theme music from the HBO series Game of Thrones.)

The campaign has reached into academia as well. An employee of a US organization that promotes dialogue among academics said that some Chinese professors who work on international relations were no longer writing or saying anything in public that casts the US in a positive light, for fear of being accused of spying.

The employee, who spoke on condition of anonymity so as not to antagonize Chinese partners, added that one Chinese university had barred visiting US academics from lecturing if their research did not conform to the party line.

Casting blame on the “black hand” of foreign forces has become more common in the state news media as well.

The People’s Daily has published 42 articles this year blaming China’s domestic problems on “Western,” “foreign” or “overseas” forces, nearly triple the number of similar pieces from the first 10 months of last year, according to a count by the Christian Science Monitor.

The pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong have been a favorite target. On Friday last week, Hong Kong’s Ta Kung Pao seen as close to the CCP, ran a front-page article under a headline that said the newspaper had found “ironclad evidence” that the US had been secretly plotting the local Occupy movement since 2006.

The government has also targeted major Western companies with high-profile investigations and imposed record fines for what officials call monopolistic practices. Some foreign businesspeople and officials say the investigations are a form of protectionism.

#### Chinese leaders are investing more pc in nationalistic policies now – hostile posturing and Sino primacy causes hostile relations

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For reasons very similar to those that led the Party to cultivate nationalist ardor and to Sinicize its domestic legitimacy discourse in the first place, therefore, demonization of (and oppositional postures toward) the West and the United States in particular may seem more necessary and appropriate than ever. Even after the tarnishing effects of the ongoing U.S. economic crisis, the United States remains, for good and for ill, an icon of democracy in Chinese eyes—and not just of democracy but of nongradual democratic evolution. (Europeans live in democracies too, but their development of this form of governance is perceived as having been in most cases more of a top-down and gradualist affair. The oncerevolutionary Americans, however, have a special resonance as a symbol of nonincrementalism in the development of democratic institutions.)6 As Yu Maochun of the U.S. Naval Academy has noted, to the extent that Chinese leaders still—or perhaps increasingly—fear “gradually losing control over their constituency,” the Party-state may feel it has to invest ever more in intensifying “the oppositional view” of America.7 It is also possible that, as the CCP invests more political capital in re-Sinicized legitimacy narratives, Party decisionmakers may actually come to believe their own propaganda narratives of virtuocratic civilizational superiority and global destiny, especially if their experience of international relations gives them the seeming positive reinforcement of international success. Either way, however, one can probably expect Beijing in the future to show less ability to modulate or less interest in modulating America narratives than in the past. With the default now being set at a degree of hostility and oppositional posturing unprecedented since Mao’s day—and with modern China apparently feeling more free than ever to express and even act on lingering dreams of Sinocentric primacy—this bodes ill for smooth Sino-American relations.

#### Xi’s focus is on maintaining nationalist popularity – contrary reform positions would be perceived as hypocritical and a sign of weakness

Lam 15, Adjunct Professor in the Centre for China Studies and the Department of History of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, (Willy Wo-Lap, 2015, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping, available via Google Books)//kap

Shortly after taking power. Xi indicated that Party authorities would do whatever it takes to firm up Chinese citizens’ “self-confidence in the road” (daolu zixin) of socialism with Chinese characteristics. There was no bigger threat to the CCP’s status as China’s "perennial ruling Party” than a "calcium deficiency of the spirit” among certain Party members, which. Xi warned in his lively language, could result in a kind of "soft bone disease.”\*’ It is therefore not surprising that ideologues and commissars in CCP offices such as the Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Education are pushing through draconian measures to prevent Chinese intellectuals. especially college students, from going down what Xi calls "the deviant path” of Westernization. In the unpublished Central Party Document no. 9. titled "Concerning the Situation in the Ideological Sphere.” the CCP Central Committee General Office called upon Party and government agencies handling education. ideology, and the media to tackle "seven serious problems in the ideological sphere that merit attention.” The circular added that these problems reflected "the sharpness and complexity of the struggle in the ideological sphere.” The nature of these challenges was revealed by the fact that the document asked teaching staff at universities nationwide to steer clear of "seven unmentionable topics” (qige buyaojiang): universal values, press freedom, civil society, citizens’ rights, the Party's historical aberrations, the quangui zichanjieji (privileged capitalist class), and independence of the judiciary.41 Xi is not the first leader to establish "forbidden zones” for Chinese intellectuals. In his speech in December 2008 commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the era of reform, then-general secretary Hu Jintao warned that the CCP would never "go down paths that involve altering the Party’s flags and standards.” Former PBSC member and chairman of the NPC Wu Bangguo raised eyebrows in 2011 when he issued the "Five No’s”: "no to multiparty politics: no to diversification of [the Party’s) guiding thought: no to the separation of powers: no to a federal model: and no to privatization.”42 Xi, however, has gone further. First, specific instructions have been given to college teachers all over China not to discuss the "seven unmentionables” in class. As the newly appointed deputy Party secretary of Chongqing. Zhang Guoqing. pointed out. "enemy forces inside and outside China are joining hands [to infiltrate) universities, and the struggle in ideology has intensified." Zhang, who used to head Norinco. China’s largest arms trader, urged Party cells at colleges to boost students' education in the "three self-confidences.’’4' Similar strictures regarding "seizing control of the lectern” were laid dow n and enforced only during the first year or so after the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. A number of leading liberal intellectuals have criticized the new edict as a stunning retrogression. The Beijing Institute of Technology economist Wu Xingdou argued that "this move to bring the weiwen [upholding stability] campaign to the colleges indicates that the Party is going down a blind alley.” For the respected Party historian Zhang Lifan. the "seven unmentionables” represented "a return to the days of [Mao’s chosen successor] Hua Guofeng. who said that whatever Mao said and did was correct.”\*\* Much more so than previous leaders such as Deng Xiaoping. Hu Yaobang. Zhao Ziyang. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Xi has refused to let Party members or ordinary intellectuals talk publicly about mistakes by the CCP. especially those committed by Chairman Mao and his close allies. That Xi is as deferential to Mao as the disgraced Politburo member Bo Xilai became evident just days after he rose to become Party chief. In a late November 2012 speech on the "spirit of the Eighteenth Party Congress.” Xi proclaimed that "we must never give up Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.” Otherwise, he warned, "we will lose the foundation [of Party rule].”\*5 It is significant that Xi attributed the collapse of the CPSU to the deStalinization campaign. "The wholesale negation of the history of the Soviet Union and the CPSU. the negation of Lenin and Stalin . . . spawned historical nihilism and confusion of thoughts." Xi said in an internal speech in late 2012. "Various levels of Party organizations [in the Soviet Union] almost lost all their functions.”\*'’ In January 2013. Xi put forward his now -famous theory that the Party should "not differentiate [post-1949 CCP] history into the pre-reform period and the post-reform period.” "While socialism with Chinese characteristics was initiated during the period of the reform and open door, this [creed] was established on the basis of more than twenty years of [socialist] construction [after 1949]." he said. "These two periods should not be [arbitrarily] cut off from each other—and one period should not be used to negate the other.”\*7 Xi’s instructions—which have come to be know n as "the theory of the two cannot negates” (liangge bunengfouding}—amounted to an unreserved defense of the stature and contributions of Chairman Mao despite the horrific catastrophes of the Anti-Rightist movement (1957-59). the Great Leap Forward (1958-61). the Three Years of Famine (1958-61). and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). In a mid-2013 commentary in the official Guangming Daily. Party theorist Qi Biao lauded Xi for "correctly upholding and defending Party history and consolidating the foundation of Party rule.” Qi. who is a senior staffer in the Party History Research Office of the CCP. contended that the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were "minor tributaries in the river of time" that did not detract from "the CCP’s great attainments" during that epoch. Other articles by conservative ideologues have accused intellectuals who have vilified Mao of indulging in "historical nihilism.” The problem with this politically motivated interpretation of history is that, while the CCP propaganda machinery for the past two decades or so has prevented academics from holding conferences and other commemorative events to learn from the mistakes of the Mao period, well-documented books about the disastrous blunders of Mao and his ultraleftist colleagues have appeared regularly in Hong Kong and elsewhere. For example, the retired Xinhua editor Yang Jisheng published in Hong Kong the much-acclaimed Tombstone, which has been translated into English and other languages. This book records the horrendous famine of 1959-61. which killed an estimated 36 million people (see Chapter 6).\*\* It is perhaps for this reason that the Xi administration has begun a large-scale campaign to whitewash history. In an article in the Party’s theoretical journal Seeking Truth, the vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Li Shenming. heaped praise on Mao's myriad “political and economic accomplishments.” Li blamed "unbalanced media reports” on supposed misperceptions of historical events, such as the Anti-Rightist movement. Professor Li wrote: "During the Anti-Rightist movement. 550.000 [intellectuals] were labeled rightists, but not a single person was sentenced to death. However, the [campaign] was described as a bloody one by [biased] media.” Li also claimed that estimates that more than 30 million Chinese starved to death during that period were “gross exaggerations.”

#### Xi’s assurances of maintaining traditional CCP Communist values and avoiding capitulation or assimilation to Western values shores up nationalist support and prevents resentment – a reversal of these promises would be disastrous

Lam 15, Adjunct Professor in the Centre for China Studies and the Department of History of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, (Willy Wo-Lap, 2015, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping, available via Google Books)//kap

A heavy dosage of patriotism—and nationalism—is integral to the Chinese Dream mantra. While every leader since Mao Zedong has played up nationalism, Xi has done so in a way that is more overt and aggressive than that of his two predecessors.31 “Realizing the Chinese Dream means propagating the Chinese spirit,” he said. “This means the spirit of the Chinese people, whose core is patriotism. This is also the spirit of making the country prosperous and strong." Xi indicated that “patriotism is a spiritual force that can resolutely unify all Chinese.” Xi added that a prime responsibility of the CCP was to “take up the baton of history and continue to assiduously fight for the great renaissance of the Chinese people, so that they can stand up in the community of nations with more strength and resoluteness.’’32 As a proud nationalist, Xi is adamant that the CCP administration never tailor China's governance and its value systems to suit foreign models. In speaking with visiting Serbian president Tomislav Nikolic in mid-2013, Xi reiterated that “we will neither change the shape of our feet to suit a [foreign] pair of shoes nor will we copy wholesale [foreign experiences]" He reiterated that socialism with Chinese characteristics was “firmly implanted in China’s deep culture and tradition and that it is solidly anchored in Chinese conditions.”33 Xi is smart enough to realize that dwelling too much on nationalism could stoke fears of a “Chinese threat." So he is also at pains to underscore the internationalist dimensions of the Chinese Dream. In March 2013 while on his first trip overseas since becoming state president, “Chinese put a lot of store by patriotism,” Xi said in Russia and Africa. “Yet we also have a global outlook and global perspective.”” Xi made it clear that the ideal of the Chinese Dream was not confined to the PRC and its citizens. In an interview with journalists from the BRICS (Brazil. Russia. India. China, and South Africa) countries. Xi pointed out that “because China is the world’s second-largest economy, the Chinese Dream will also bring opportunities to the world” and that “the Chinese Dream will be realized by means of a road of peace.”” While speaking at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. he reiterated that “the Chinese Dream will bring blessings and benefits not only to the Chinese people but also to peoples in other countries.” While touring Tanzania the new Chinese head of state gave the clearest indication of the global significance of the Chinese Dream. While w axing eloquent on the "African dream” and the “world dream.” Xi said: "Together with the international community, the Chinese and African peoples will work toward realizing the global dream of sustained peace and joint prosperity.” Xi even touched on the similarities between the Chinese Dream and the American Dream when he met for an informal summit with President Barack Obama in California in June 2013. These statements, which were tailor-made for a global audience, seemed indicative of Xi’s desire to highlight Beijing's commitment to "peaceful development.” However, there is clearly a military—and globally assertive—aspect to the Chinese Dream and pursuit of “the renaissance of the Chinese people." While inspecting PLA divisions in late 2012. Xi reiterated that the Chinese Dream comprised "the dream of a strong China” and “the dream of a strong military'.” “To attain the great renaissance of the Chinese people, we must uphold [the principle of[ the synthesis of a prosperous country and a strong army, and we must assiduously build up and consolidate national defense and a strong military.” Xi noted. On numerous occasions. Xi also called upon PLA officers and soldiers to “get ready to fight and to win wars” (see Chapter 5).” Moreover, the PLA top brass seems keen on interpreting the Chinese Dream so as to justify its lobbying for more economic resources and a greater say in national affairs. In a 2013 editorial called "The Whole Army Must Provide Resolute and Strong Support to Guarantee the Realization of the Chinese Dream.” Liberation Army Daily indicated that the defense forces would "struggle hard for the fulfillment of the dream of a strong China and a strong army.” "Only when national defense construction is up to scratch will there be a strong guarantee for economic construction.” the PLA mouthpiece added. "Boosting national defense construction also will give a significant push to economic and social development."” Compared to the “Theory of the Three Represents” and the “Scientific Outlook on Development." the Chinese Dream is much more easily understood by ordinary Chinese. This slogan can also be interpreted in a self-serving fashion by different sociopolitical groups. It cannot, however, be denied that while Xi’s mantra can be regarded as representative of the lowest common denominator of Chinese politics, it is basically an affirmation of the status quo. rather than a clarion call for ringing in the new. The Chinese Dream says very little about the administration's commitment to either political or economic reform.\*\* The putative head of the Gang of Princelings has yet to prove to both Chinese and foreign audiences that he is at least as capable as his father of thinking outside the box and offering unconventional yet effective solutions to China’s myriad problems.

#### Xi will cling to Communist values no matter what

Lam 15, Adjunct Professor in the Centre for China Studies and the Department of History of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, (Willy Wo-Lap, 2015, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping, available via Google Books)//kap

On the one hand, Xi (b. 1953) has expressed confidence that the Fifth-Generation leadership can build on achievements in the economy to realize bigger triumphs, which will in turn confer extra legitimacy on the CCP as the country's “perennial ruling Party." On the other, Xi has betrayed nervousness that China—and the Party—may go the same way as the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). This was revealed in an internal speech that Xi gave while touring southern Guangdong Province immediately after the Eighteenth Party Congress. Like many other members of the CCP's conservative wing, Xi blamed the demise of the CPSU, which was considered the CCP's “big brother" in the 1950s, on efforts by “traitors" such as Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin to repudiate Soviet-style communism. “How come the Soviet Party collapsed overnight?” Xi asked. “An important reason is that [Soviet Party members'] beliefs and ideals were not firm enough." Equally important was the fact that the Soviet defense forces failed to defend the Party against the challenges of the West. “The Soviet army was depoliticized. divorced from the Party, and turned into a national army,” said Xi, adding that the CCP must never give up its monopoly of “the tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat." He indicated that Party members and intellectuals who lacked strong beliefs in the Party were suffering from “calcium deficiency of the spirit." “Party members should aim to achieve communism," he pointed out, adding that it was wrong to assume that “communism is something ethereal and cannot be attained.”5

#### The CCP is cultivating Chinese nationalism using its education campaign

Hicks, 2/10/16 – Brady Hicks is a journalist at the Inquisitr [Inquisitr, “China Issues Patriotic Education Plan to Encourage Nationalism also Targets Increased Masculinity in Schools”, 2/10/16, http://www.inquisitr.com/2783514/china-issues-patriotic-educationplan-to-encourage-nationalism-also-targets-increased-masculinity-in-schools/]//Yak

China has issued a new directive, in which it is calling for an improved system of “Patriotic Education” in its schools.

This edict — which was issued by the country’s Ministry of Education and its Communist Party organization and officially approved in January — has been relayed to “education officials,” reported upon by China’s state-run news agency, Xinhua, and re-posted by the New York Times. It also comes at a tenuous time in the country’s history as, also per the New York Times, debate continues to rage regarding potential de-masculinization within its overall school system.

According to the Ministry of Education’s memorandum, students in China need to be better molded to become “even more patriotic and devoted to the party,” even in cases where they are, in fact, cracking books in universities abroad.

This plan — which is part of President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” for national revival — focuses on creating in-classroom curricula that work to “guide youthful students to establish and maintain correct views of history, the nation, state, and culture” in addition to helping “constantly enhance their sense of belonging to the Chinese nation.”

Key tenets of China’s Ministry of Education “Patriotic Education” plan include the following.

Assembling students abroad in a “positive patriotic energy.”

Building a contact network linking home and abroad.

Conveying to students an overall feeling that “the motherland cares.”

“[We need to] organically instill the patriotic spirit into all subjects, curriculums and standards for primary, secondary and higher education in morals, language, history, geography, sports, arts and so on,” noted the memorandum, which China hopes will particularly help improve today’s youth’s respect for Chinese culture and tradition. In particular, the New York Times noted that officials want to instill support for China’s “authoritarian values” by having educators better highlight the government’s virtues.

Per China’s “Patriotic Education” plan, college-age students specifically need to be thoroughly “inoculated against liberal” stances, taught to “always follow the party,” and actively learn “about the dangers of negativity about the history of the party, nation, revolution and reform and opening up, as well as the vilifying heroic figures.”

In other words, China is looking to dissuade future generations from questioning the country’s own questionable past.

### L uq – pushing US away

#### Xi is pushing US influence away – Carter and Obama prove

Chin, 14 - (Josh, politics reporter, Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau, covers cybersecurity, law, human rights, "Beijing Aims to Blunt Western Influence in China," WSJ, 11-11-2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-aims-to-blunt-western-influence-in-china-1415756626,//BR/)

BEIJING—For decades, Jimmy Carter has been celebrated in Beijing for normalizing U.S. relations with China. The accolade helped the former president’s think tank win access to work on potentially sensitive issues like village democracy. On recent trips, he has received a different message: Steer clear of China’s internal affairs. Mr. Carter’s think tank, the Carter Center, has mothballed its domestic China programs over the past two years to concentrate on U.S.-China relations. The change came as a result of a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, people briefed on the meeting said. As President Barack Obama attends a summit in China this week, Mr. Xi is pressing a broad campaign to blunt Western, especially U.S., influence on society, academia and the media, with potentially significant consequences for the way America engages the world’s second-largest economy and new major power. Authorities have stepped up monitoring of foreign public-interest groups, and ordered some Chinese scholars to report foreign contacts and funding over the past year. Alongside has come the detention of dozens of rule-of-law activists and the intensified blocking of foreign news websites, including The Wall Street Journal. At the same time, state media have sounded repeated warnings about “hostile foreign forces” it says are trying to undermine the country’s rise. A new front line in the campaign is Hong Kong. With protesters calling for free elections encamped along major streets in the Chinese territory, China’s state media and some Communist Party officials have said that foreign governments, not popular democratic aspirations, were behind the protests. The cumulative effect is to make many Chinese suspicious of Western intentions, some analysts said. It also undermines a staple tenet of U.S. China policy—that broad American engagement in business, education and government would ultimately increase U.S. influence and prime China for democracy.

### L – trades off

#### Unpopularity trades-off

**Economy 14** --- C. V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, (Elizabeth C. Economy, 2014, "China's Imperial President" Foreign Affairs, 6-20-2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-10-20/chinas-imperial-president)//jonah

Chinese President Xi Jinping has articulated a simple but powerful vision: the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. It is a patriotic call to arms, drawing inspiration from the glories of China’s imperial past and the ideals of its socialist present to promote political unity at home and influence abroad. After just two years in office, Xi has advanced himself as a transformative leader, adopting an agenda that proposes to reform, if not revolutionize, political and economic relations not only within China but also with the rest of the world. Underlying Xi’s vision is a growing sense of urgency. Xi assumed power at a moment when China, despite its economic success, was politically adrift. The Chinese Communist Party, plagued by corruption and lacking a compelling ideology, had lost credibility among the public, and social unrest was on the rise. The Chinese economy, still growing at an impressive clip, had begun to show signs of strain and uncertainty. And on the international front, despite its position as a global economic power, China was punching well below its weight. Beijing had failed to respond effectively to the crises in Libya and Syria and had stood by as political change rocked two of its closest partners, Myanmar (also known as Burma) and North Korea. To many observers, it appeared as though China had no overarching foreign policy strategy. Xi has reacted to this sense of malaise with a power grab -- for himself, for the Communist Party, and for China. He has rejected the communist tradition of collective leadership, instead establishing himself as the paramount leader within a tightly centralized political system. At home, his proposed economic reforms will bolster the role of the market but nonetheless allow the state to retain significant control. Abroad, Xi has sought to elevate China by expanding trade and investment, creating new international institutions, and strengthening the military. His vision contains an implicit fear: that an open door to Western political and economic ideas will undermine the power of the Chinese state. If successful, Xi’s reforms could yield a corruption-free, politically cohesive, and economically powerful one-party state with global reach: a Singapore on steroids. But there is no guarantee that the reforms will be as transformative as Xi hopes. His policies have created deep pockets of domestic discontent and provoked an international backlash. To silence dissent, Xi has launched a political crackdown, alienating many of the talented and resourceful Chinese citizens his reforms are intended to encourage. His tentative economic steps have raised questions about the country’s prospects for continued growth. And his winner-take-all mentality has undermined his efforts to become a global leader. The United States and the rest of the world cannot afford to wait and see how his reforms play out. The United States should be ready to embrace some of Xi’s initiatives as opportunities for international collaboration while treating others as worrisome trends that must be stopped before they are solidified.

### L – nationalism

#### Xi will resist western pressure to maintain power and increase his credibility – downturn in credibility results in lashout and collapses U.S.-China Relations

Blackwill, 5/26/16 --- Henry A. Kissinger Ssenior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning under President George W. Bush as well as U.S. Ambassador to India (Robert D., “China's Strategy for Asia: Maximize Power, Replace America,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-strategy-asia-maximize-power-replace-america-16359, article downloaded 5/27/16, JMP)

Diplomacy After the Downturn Economic growth and nationalism have for decades been the two founts of legitimacy for the Communist Party, and as the former wanes, Xi will likely rely increasingly on the latter. As a powerful but exposed leader, Xi will tap into this potent nationalist vein through foreign policy, burnishing his nationalist credentials and securing his domestic position from elite and popular criticism, all while pursuing various Chinese national interests. In the future, Xi could become more hostile to the West, using it as a foil to boost his approval ratings the way Putin has in Russia. Already, major Chinese newspapers are running articles blaming the country’s economic slump on efforts undertaken by insidious “foreign forces” that seek to sabotage the country’s rise. On territorial matters, Xi will be unwilling or unable to make concessions that could harm his domestic position, and may even seek to escalate territorial disputes against Japan or South China Sea claimants as a way of redirecting domestic attention away from the economic situation and burnishing his nationalist record. Globally, in order to demonstrate at home that China is taken seriously abroad, Xi will maintain a proactive and assertive Chinese foreign policy that involves institution-building and occasional provocation, while remaining firm in the face of external pressure on the South and East China Seas, human rights, conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang, and diplomatic visits by the Dalai Lama. Finally, Xi’s resistance to Western culture and values may intensify. Because China’s economy is now slowing, Xi’s fear of political instability may push him to adopt even sterner measures, and new violations of human rights and the emerging challenges that Western NGOs and businesses face will likely cause renewed friction in China’s relationships with the West.

#### The plan causes nationalist backlash --- decks Xi cred

**Zhang 16** --- Associate Professor at the Duke University School of Law, (Taisu Zhang, 3-28-2016, "China’s Coming Ideological Wars" Foreign Policy, 6-20-2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/01/chinas-coming-ideological-wars-new-left-confucius-mao-xi/)//jonah

For most Chinese, the 1990s were a period of intense material pragmatism. Economic development was the paramount social and political concern, while the various state ideologies that had guided policy during the initial decades of the People’s Republic faded into the background. The severe ideological struggles that had marked the end of both the 1970s and the 1980s had exhausted the population, leaving it more than eager to focus single-mindedly on an unprecedented bevy of economic opportunities. Now the tide is changing yet again. Chinese society is apparently rediscovering, or at least re-prioritizing, its moral and ideological cravings. Over the past several years, ideological forces and divisions have moved back to the center of Chinese political and social life, and ideological tensions among Chinese elite are now arguably higher than at any point since the immediate aftermath of the 1989 protests. The image of a “post-ideological” China has become increasingly outdated. Relatively few observers or policymakers, however, seem to entertain the possibility that Chinese elites are ideological creatures, or even that they may be dealing with an ideological population. This is a remarkable sea change with profound implications for policymaking. Just a decade or two ago, many commentators had trouble accepting that Chinese statesmen — or even educated Chinese — were anything but Communist ideologues. In the early 2000s, the notion that Chinese elites no longer believed in Communism was still a novel one that sometimes triggered incredulity and backlash. By contrast, anyone today who insists that Communist ideals still hold sway over Chinese policymaking does so at considerable risk to his or her reputation as a serious China hand. How did the idea of a post-ideological China arise? The charitable — and possibly correct — interpretation for this change is that it simply reflected a general shift in Chinese social attitudes. Chinese political and social discourse turned away from ideologically charged arguments in favor of the kind of flexible pragmatism that the former Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin regularly advocated. There is also a less charitable interpretation: that China’s economic rise, and particularly its sustained growth during the global economic crisis, generated a sense of vulnerability and, consequently, an alarmist mentality among many Western analysts, who rushed to — and continue to believe in — the conclusion that Chinese policymakers were ruthless and efficient utility maximizers preying upon the softer, more idealistic, and democratically constrained developed world. Whatever the reason, the stereotype of Chinese pragmatism is probably past its expiration date. Whatever the reason, the stereotype of Chinese pragmatism is probably past its expiration date. In China today, the signs of an ideological revival are everywhere. Most visibly, a number of icons, long thought dead, have made prominent and in some cases highly successful resurrections in national political rhetoric. First is long-deceased Party Chairman Mao Zedong’s rehabilitation as arguably the core element of the party’s founding myth and its historical legitimacy. As a number of scholars and commentators have noted, in several recent speeches Chinese President Xi Jinping has enthusiastically embraced Mao not only as the party’s founding father, but also as a symbol of its commitment to nationalism and populism. This marks a significant departure from the subdued and almost reluctant treatment of Mao that Xi’s predecessors, particularly Hu Jintao, seemed to display. Curiously, while Xi’s rhetorical signals drew immediate commentary, their potential policy implications have gone largely unstudied, if not outright dismissed as insignificant. Mao has not been the only person to receive ideological rehabilitation. Confucius, too, has become an increasingly prominent figure in Chinese political rhetoric. And party leaders have frequently quoted ancient philosophers, including Mencius, Zhuangzi, and Han Fei. Xi himself has repeatedly argued that, “to solve China’s problems … [China needs] to fully make use of the great wisdom accumulated by the Chinese nation over the last 5,000 years.” State support for projects such as the new Confucius Academy in the provincial capital of Guiyang, opened in 2013, lends such rhetoric an element of seriousness that has buoyed neo-Confucian activists. Yet the attempts to breathe new life into ancient Chinese thought has also drawn alarm and disdain in other, more liberal, parts of the Chinese internet, which tend to see Confucian social ethics as backwards and bigoted. It is easy, and perhaps tempting, to dismiss these initiatives as cynical ideological propaganda by an authoritarian state facing unprecedented socioeconomic and political tension. There is undeniably some truth to this, but it is far too simplistic. In fact, one could just as plausibly argue that the party has played a reactive role, rather than a proactive one: its ideological campaigns to revive figures such as Mao and Confucius reflect intellectual and cultural currents that have rapidly gained force among highly educated Chinese over the past five to seven years. Compared to the depth and momentum of these currents, the party may simply be trying to catch up. Xi himself seemed to admit as much in a famous August 19, 2013 speech, in which he argued that the party was facing a new wave of serious ideological challenges, and needed to issue a more robust response. The two most significant Chinese intellectual developments since the late 1990s are probably the rise of a powerful “New Left” and the reemergence of a disorganized but increasingly influential neo-Confucian movement. The New Left combines nationalist sentiments — as a January 2010 editorial in the Global Times declared, “we do not want to become a Western intellectual colony” — and widespread dissatisfaction with economic inequality into a potent call for a “reconstruction of socialism,” one that would both reinstate many of the planned economy policies of the 1980s, and further strengthen ideological control over the Internet and media. If one surveyed the current Chinese intellectual world, the most influential figures — and those that enjoy the closest ties to the party leadership — tend to be leftists. This includes the prominent economists Wang Shaoguang and Justin Yifu Lin, the political scientist Cui Zhiyuan, and the philosopher Liu Xiaofeng. Neo-Confucian figures, on the other hand, generally support both the revival of Confucian ethics such as filial piety and the reinstatement of certain traditional political institutions, particularly the civil service examinations. Although they tend to be less mainstream, the sheer combustibility of the term “Confucianism” in Chinese political and intellectual discourse has nonetheless given them an outsized media presence. Since the late 1990s, calls for a Confucian revival have steadily gained in volume and popularity, evolving from a much-mocked fringe movement to a still-mocked but certainly powerful national trend, particularly at the level of elementary education. For example, Jiang Qing, an early leader of the movement who now runs the well-known Yangming Confucian Academy, has become almost a household name in intellectual circles. Both developments have their roots in anti-Western nationalism. Both developments have their roots in anti-Western nationalism. From the early 1980s to the 2000s, democracy, the rule of law, and free market reform were the political lingua franca not merely of most Chinese intellectuals, but also of most business leaders, and even some officials, who paid at least regular lip service — and probably more than that — to these aspirational ideals. During this period, Chinese elites appeared to share the consensus that China should, in a word, Westernize. To a large extent, both the New Left and neo-Confucianism were intellectual backlashes against this consensus, driven partly by perceived incompatibilities between Western thought and Chinese socioeconomic and political realities; partly by frustration at (perceived) Western hostility and ideological discrimination towards China; and partly by the nationalist urges that came naturally with economic takeoff. More recently, these movements have shown signs of convergence. Neo-Confucianism appears to be latching on to New Leftism, and not without reciprocity from the leftist camp. Several prominent scholars, particularly Sun Yat-sen University’s Gan Yang, now self-identify as both leftist and Confucian. The linchpin of that joint-identity is the strong nationalism shared by both ideological camps, which allows these scholars to argue that resources from “traditional culture” should play a prominent role in the crusade against Western liberalism — if not as a necessary component of national identity, then at least as an ideological alternative to Western intellectual hegemony. Recent statistical studies suggest that these trends go well beyond the sheltered confines of China’s top universities and halls of power. An oft-quoted 2015 paper by Harvard and MIT researchers, for example, found that Chinese Internet users have largely coalesced around two poles: a “Leftist-Confucian” pole that advocates an expansive socialist state, limited civil rights, aggressive foreign policy, and some rehabilitation of traditional culture; and a “Western liberal” — or “rightist,” if one prefers that term — pole that supports free market principles, constitutional democracy, civil rights, international cooperation, and some hostility towards traditional culture. The high levels of homogeneity within these camps suggest, moreover, that ideological awareness and commitment is already quite deep, and deepening, across the board. Liberal-leftist conflicts now seem to color and shape the online population’s consumption of almost any popular news itemLiberal-leftist conflicts now seem to color and shape the online population’s consumption of almost any popular news item, ranging from major geopolitical issues–such as China’s newly assertive foreign policy in the South China Sea — to minor public scandals, such as a recent administrative conflict at Sun Yat-sen University, in which a junior faculty member accused Gan Yang of blocking his promotion path, and physically assaulted him. Of course, there are other possible explanations for why these nationalist movements gained force. Some might argue that they simply took advantage of China’s growing social and economic problems over the past decade, in particular skyrocketing inequality. A more sympathetic take might be that they actually offer potential solutions to some of these problems – by promoting, for example, a group-oriented social morality that helps alleviate the urban economy’s apparent lack of social trust. Others might argue that they represent the kind of intellectual self-reflection and anxiety that comes naturally after societies reach a basic level of economic prosperity, and are therefore a kind of middle income nationalism. Whatever its causes, the current ideological landscape likely has serious consequences for Chinese policymaking: ideological resurgence dramatically alters the social and political landscape in which the party-state operates. The sources of legitimacy are very different in a pragmatically materialist society than in an ideologically charged and polarized one. Whereas robust economic growth was the key to popular support in the former, it is probably insufficient, and perhaps not even necessary, in the latter. At the moment, it’s profoundly uncertain which side — liberals, leftists, or cultural conservatives — will eventually gain the upper hand in these ideological wars. If one side does emerge on top, the government may find itself forced, or at least strongly incentivized, to seek sociopolitical legitimacy via redistributionist policies, civil rights reform, or perhaps a full-scale swing towards some reconstructed notion of traditional cultural values. This could be either a curse or a blessing: it might force the party-state into uncomfortable ideological positions, but it could also provide alternative sources of social support in times of economic or geopolitical turmoil. Take, for example, the party’s reaction to the 2014 Occupy Central movement in Hong Kong, during which a largely student-led movement called for democratic elections and greater political independence from Beijing. Despite some early suggestions that it should be moderately conciliatory towards the protestors for various pragmatic reasons — to minimize financial disruption, loss of international reputation, and damage done to Mainland-Taiwan relations — it soon became clear that the party was far more concerned with the domestic reaction to its Hong Kong strategy than with the international one. That domestic reaction, however, was at times almost militantly nationalist. Fueled by a few incidents of anti-Mainland discrimination by Hong Kong residents, many, perhaps most, educated Mainlanders fervently supported a hardline policy against the protestors. This empowered the party to take a non-conciliatory position. But at the same time, it might also have severely limited the party’s options, pushing it into a harsher stance than some policymakers were comfortable with. Nationalism, like any distinctive political ideology, is a double-edged sword.Nationalism, like any distinctive political ideology, is a double-edged sword. Over the short term, and particularly during economic downturns, the party leadership may find it convenient to tap the leftist or neo-Confucian movements for social support — which recent rhetoric suggests the party is attempting to do. But this is not necessarily a comfortable long-term solution. One need only look back at the spectacular rise and fall of Chinese politician Bo Xilai to find a major example where the party leadership was profoundly uncomfortable with the ideological zealotry of some self-identified Maoist intellectuals. Leftist ideologies are not always more reliable allies than liberal ones. In the end, are Chinese policymakers themselves deeply ideological, or at least becoming more so? It’s true that Xi’s recent positions on Mao, Chinese cultural traditions, and the need for a culture change among government employees are broadly consistent with those of a pragmatic autocrat. But they are also broadly consistent with the behavior of a bona fide socialist and cultural conservative pursuing his ideological goals in a measured and cautious fashion. Regardless of what one thinks of the current leadership, with any luck, the Western notion that Chinese politics are simply rooted in pragmatism will soon die out.

#### The plan incites nationalist backlash --- Xi will say no, but provides nationalist ammunition to derail reform

**Drezner 16** --- American professor of international politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (Daniel W. Drezner, 1-7-2016, “What does a nervous China do about the global order?” Washington Post, 6-20-2016, Lexis)//jonah

If you were to look up "experienced China hand" in some cool, futuristic diplomatic dictionary, you probably would find a picture of CSIS's Bonnie Glaser. So this tweet of hers from yesterday pretty much sums up the problems that Xi Jinping is facing right now: Xi Jinping's plate is full: anti-corruption, military reform, econ slowdown, regional backlash to SCS, Taiwan elections, NK nuclear test I guess one could include "stock market meltdown" in the economic slowdown category (although the connection between Chinese equities and the Chinese economy is pretty loose), but that slow-motion implosion is another headache as well. The point is, China has a lot of balls in the air right now. So I was surprised to read Fu Ying's op-ed in the Financial Times on Wednesday, which, in the face of a lot of bad news for China ... ignored all of it and attacked the U.S.-led international system: The western-centered world order dominated by the US has made great contributions to human progress and economic growth. But those contributions lie in the past. Now that same order is like an adult in children's clothes. It is failing to adjust. I'm not sure that specific ideas from China really will reassure that many people, but the more interesting question is: Why, given China's myriad difficulties, is this coming up now? This could very well be just a random op-ed. Fu is the chairman of the National People's Congress's foreign affairs committee, which as I understand means she isn't exactly a nobody, but she isn't exactly a somebody either. So maybe this should be interpreted the same way one would interpret a Rand Paul op-ed at this point - interesting but ultimately inconsequential. But it also got me thinking: What if Xi Jinping decided that the best way to deal with its problems was to tack in a more aggressive, revisionist manner? Objectively, such a move would not be all that great for China. As I argued in "The System Worked," China has acted like a responsible stakeholder in the current system because of the benefits it derives from that system. And the hard-working staff here at Spoiler Alerts has argued consistently that the benefits of less revisionist behavior for China were obvious compared to Russia. But if Vladimir Putin has managed to do one thing in the past few years, it has been to get his citizens to ignore the objective worsening of the Russian economy. It turns out that for many countries, nationalism does a much better job of inspiring the masses than other ideologies. And as China's problems mount and its economy slows, one has to wonder if, at some point, Xi decided to adopt a more revisionist take on the international system. I don't think this is going to happen anytime soon. I suspect Fu's op-ed is more noise than signal. But I also wanted to put these concerns in print. Because as rough as the first week of 2016 looks, that's nothing compared to what the rest of this year would look like if Xi Jinping decided to become a full-throated nationalist.

### L – US-China Engagement

#### Xi’s inner circle opposes US involvement

Wong, 15 – Edward Wong is an American journalist and a foreign correspondent for The New York Times. Wong served as one of the Times' main correspondents covering the Iraq War from November 2003 through June 2007 [“Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle Offers Cold Shoulder to Western Officials”, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-president-inner-circle-western-officials.html]//Yak

As President Xi Jinping made his first state visit to the United States, including a day of pageantry and diplomacy at the White House on Friday, Mr. Wang was among a small group of advisers at his side.

A member of the Communist Party’s elite Politburo, Mr. Wang, 59, studied American society as a politics professor in Shanghai and an adviser to Mr. Xi’s two predecessors. In the process, he got to know American scholars and officials.

Yet, people who knew Mr. Wang back then say he has become unapproachable and ignores invitations for conversations. American officials find it difficult to talk to him casually on the sidelines of international forums.

They and other Western officials say that this icy remove is true not only of Mr. Wang, but also of other advisers with whom Mr. Xi travels, including Li Zhanshu, essentially Mr. Xi’s chief of staff, and Liu He, his top economic adviser.

The problem presents a huge challenge for the United States and other nations. By some standards, Mr. Xi’s administration is the most secretive in 66 years of Communist rule.

In past decades, foreign officials could speak with senior Chinese officials or aides and trust that those people were proxies for their leaders. The most famous example is Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier under Mao, with whom Henry A. Kissinger secretly negotiated the United States-China rapprochement.

With Mr. Xi, those channels do not exist.

“One of the problems we have in U.S.-China relations now is that we basically don’t know these people,” said David M. Lampton, director of China Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. “I don’t think we have a very good understanding of who below Xi Jinping speaks for him.”

The refusal of Mr. Xi’s inner circle to develop ties with Western officials is consistent with a fundamental belief that has become widespread in the system here — namely that Western ideas and influences will undermine the Communist Party and lead to a “color revolution.”

“If the party thinks it’s besieged by external and internal forces, the natural human reaction is to bring your organization more tightly together to reduce the flow of information to the outside,” Mr. Lampton said.

There is also broad agreement that Mr. Xi keeps colleagues and advisers — especially technocrats in state ministries — at more of a distance than other Chinese leaders did and that he relies mainly on his own knowledge and instincts in making decisions.

He is the head of seven of 22 “leading small groups,” opaque policy councils that weigh in on matters ranging from economics to cybersecurity. And he created the National Security Commission, another secretive group that aims to coordinate security policy to defend the party against internal and external threats.

“We’re seeing something new with Xi,” said John Delury, an author of “Wealth and Power,” a book on modern Chinese history. “Never has the gap been bigger between No. 1 and everyone else.”

#### Engagement link --- must balance excluding western values and engagement --- key to CCP stability

**Denyer 15** --- the Washington Post, (Simon Denyer, 3-6-2015, "How Xi Jinping’s presidency was shaped by traumas of Mao and Gorbachev" Guardian, 6-25-2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/06/xi-jinping-china-reform-gorbachev-mao)//jonah>

\*\*we don’t endorse this piece of evidence’s gendered language

To mark China’s Spring Festival last month, Xi Jinping made a visit to the small northern village of Liangjiahe, where he was banished in 1969 as a raw 15-year-old during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, where he worked for seven years and where the future president of China joined the Communist party. His father had been persecuted and jailed in one of Mao Zedong’s purges, and Xi suffered humiliation, hunger and homelessness, sleeping in a cave, carrying manure and building roads, according to official accounts. “Perplexed” when he was sent to the countryside, Xi emerged as if remoulded by the painful years he spent there. He learned enough in the village to be able to cast himself as a man of the people. The lessons also made him profoundly distrust those same people. Xi told villagers that he had left his heart in Liangjiahe, but it was clear that the experience has stayed with him in ways both spoken and unspoken, and has helped shape the sort of president he has become – possibly the strongest Chinese leader since Mao. In September, Xi will pay a state visit to the United States, as a president who has ruthlessly centralized power while embarking on an ambitious project to revitalize Communist rule and to secure the party’s future. He is also a president whose worldview, and vision for China, were shaped by two historic traumas. The first was the trauma of the Cultural Revolution, when Mao used the people to tear his own party to shreds, and Xi was caught up in the chaos. The second was the trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, as the public was invited to rise up and the Communist party there was consigned to oblivion. For if Xi casts himself as the man to save the Communist party from its demons, he is also a man obsessively determined to retain full control of any reform process, in ways that Mao and Gorbachev did not do. Advertisement The twin traumas help explain why he won’t allow the people to drive any process of change. His determination to crack down on corruption, for example, is matched by an equal resolve to exclude the public from participating in that campaign, lest the forces he unleashes spin out of control. “The combination of that domestic trauma, experienced as a young person, and the trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union, those two traumas, one domestic and one foreign, have really shaped him,” said Roderick MacFarquhar, a leading expert in Chinese politics at Harvard University. “He has seen what happens if you allow too much criticism of the party and the establishment.” Gorbachev and Mao both struggled against opposition and factionalism within their own parties, although they pursued far different remedies. Xi is determined to consolidate power and eliminate rivals. He has experienced firsthand the chaos that ensues when the party disintegrates, and that helps explain his desire to reinvigorate the Chinese Communist party and reassert its primacy. One of his major themes is a war on “western values”, including a free press, democracy and the constitutional separation of powers, all of which he believes pose an insidious threat to one-party rule. In this and in the growing ideological controls on sectors ranging from the news media to the military, Xi is resisting forces that he thinks brought the Soviet regime to its knees. Paradoxically, though, he also has seen the dangers of international isolation and an inward focus, factors that helped weaken Mao’s China and the Soviet Union. That paradox, between “reform and opening” on the one hand and excluding western values on the other, has created an unresolved tension in his presidency. Cheng Enfu, the director of the Institute of Marxism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, predicted that the president’s efforts to combat this “infiltration” of western values could become as intense as his anti-corruption campaign. Advertisement Xi considers himself the antithesis of the “weak [person] man” who turned out the light on the Soviet empire. “Proportionally, the Soviet Communist party had more members than we do, but nobody was man enough to stand up and resist,” Xi reportedly said in an important speech shortly after taking over leadership of the Communist party in late 2012. Today, Xi presents himself as a down-to-earth leader who rolled up his sleeves and learned the hard way during those years working with peasants in the countryside. In that sense, he casts himself as a worthy successor to Mao. But, although he would never admit it, he has learned from Mao’s mistakes as well. While Mao’s Cultural Revolution almost destroyed China, Xi’s war on corruption is a masterpiece in controlled destruction. More than 100,000 party members have been disciplined since the campaign began, but through a process that is entirely managed from within the party. The public is simply not invited to join in, while anti-corruption activists have received long prison sentences. There are to be no mass denunciations of corrupt and arrogant officials, because Xi remembers only too well where that path leads. “He needs to fully control the anti-corruption movement, because they are afraid that the participation of the public will lead to another cultural revolution and bring more chaos,” historian Zhang Lifan said. The Soviet collapse – blamed in part in China on corruption – still haunts the Chinese Communist party, said David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University. An entire industry has grown up to pore over the reasons for the collapse and ask what lessons can be drawn from it. Initially, China mostly faulted Gorbachev himself as a weak and foolish leader. But in the years that followed, Shambaugh says, Chinese party scholars eventually pegged the Soviet collapse on the rot within – not only corruption but also economic and political stagnation and international isolation. Gorbachev was stymied by opposition from within the Soviet bureaucracy; the strength of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is that it reforms the party while asserting his supremacy over it. Xi also has tried to counter the party’s ideological loss of direction with a new narrative: that the party should be proud of itself and have confidence in its historical right to rule. Mao, consigned to the bookshelf of history since the era of Deng Xiaoping and China’s great opening to the world, has to be dusted off and revered again as the victor of the revolution and the unifier of the nation. “Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Soviet Communist party collapse?” Xi asked in that December 2012 speech. “It’s a profound lesson for us. To dismiss the history of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist party, to dismiss Lenin and Stalin, and to dismiss everything else is to engage in historic nihilism, and it confuses our thoughts and undermines the party’s organisations on all levels.” The problem, MacFarquhar says, is that Xi has no coherent or convincing new ideology to offer. “He has got no positive weapon against the western infiltration of ideas, so he has to be negative about it,” he said. “It’s a tremendous contradiction he faces, to keep western ideas out while building a creative, technological and developed society.” Shambaugh said the Chinese Communist party used to believe that the Soviet Union’s collapse meant it had to adapt and reform, to become dynamic and responsive. But it began to abandon that strategy from 2008, as it faced another series of small traumas: riots in Tibet and Xinjiang, popular uprisings, including the “colour revolutions” and the Arab Spring, and internal dissent as the internet empowered citizens and intellectuals demanded democracy. Once again, the conservatives dug in and laid their bets not on adaptation but on repression. Xi, Shambaugh said, has intensified the repression begun under his predecessor, Hu Jintao. So when a new video series about the fall of the Soviet Union became compulsory viewing for Communist party cadres in 2013, its focus was not on the flaws in the Soviet system but – once again – on the sins of Gorbachev. “Western values played a leading role in the failure of Gorbachev’s reform effort, and the documentary aims to warn cadres not to make the same mistake as Gorbachev,” said Cheng. “Gorbachev introduced outside forces to help him to turn over the Soviet Communist party. Xi believes the Communist party can self-correct. The party is able to hunt the problem and fix it itself. Communist reform is controllable.”

#### Xi’s power is rising, but any negatively perceived confrontation with the US derails his agenda

Blackwill and Campbell, 16 – (Robert D., senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Kurt M., Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, CEO of the Asia Group LLC., “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage: Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader”Council Special report No. 74, Feb 2016, Council of Foreign Relations,//BR/)

The U.S.-China bilateral relationship is the most important in the world. No other two countries under foreseeable circumstances could disrupt the international system. Thus, Xi Jinping’s rise, his dominance of China’s policymaking process, and the increasing influence of his domestic political concerns will have crucial consequences for the United States and for American policies in Asia and beyond. Although China’s relationship with the United States has long been a priority for Chinese leaders, Xi has increasingly been willing to test it and it occupies less of his attention than it did of his predecessors’. He has not only criticized U.S. alliances, questioned the role of nonAsian powers in Asian affairs, and built alternative institutional structures excluding the United States, but has also continued China’s rapid military modernization even as the Chinese economy slows. As China asserts its vital national interests, one of which is limiting the U.S. role in Asian affairs and related power projection capabilities, Beijing’s positions on matters ranging from the U.S. alliance system in Asia, to freedom of navigation, to human rights, to the territorial integrity of Japan, to the rise of India, to the future of Taiwan will come into sustained tension with U.S. national interests, policies, commitments, and values. Nevertheless, China’s growing geopolitical ambitions are tempered by the reality of its economic relationship with the United States and a variety of shared international interests between the two countries. China will continue to seek to expand its influence and in some instances will compete directly with the United States, and Xi may criticize Washington to score points at home, but bilateral economic interdependence will, in most cases, provide a floor for the relationship. This is, of course, different from the longtime U.S. objective of constraining and ultimately moderating Chinese behavior by broadly integrating China into the international system, a strategy that appears not to have substantially shaped China’s more assertive external policies. In sum, Xi does not want to trigger a confrontation with the United States, especially during a period of economic uncertainty in China. Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers will likely face a growing challenge in Xi, particularly because he can coordinate a variety of different instruments of statecraft in service of enduring Chinese strategic objectives and to bolster his nationalist credentials. By contrast, U.S. policymakers are burdened by a slower, more divided, and more public interagency process. Xi will exploit the relative opacity and speed of his system to keep U.S. officials off balance with new initiatives or provocations. These Chinese advantages are serious, but they are not necessarily decisive, especially if the United States remains resolved, strengthens its alliances, and forges a bipartisan domestic consensus on Asia policy. To deal with Xi’s more assertive foreign and defense policies, the United States should devise a grand strategy for Asia at least as coherent and coordinated as the one that has been formulated in Beijing, which appears designed to maximize China’s power while challenging the long-standing role of the United States in the region.49 What we have in mind is not containment, which in any case is a U.S.-Soviet concept that has no relevant application in East Asia today. Instead, the United States should use a variety of instruments of statecraft to incentivize China to commit to a rules-based order but impose costs that are in excess of the gains Beijing would reap if it fails to do so. This American grand strategy should account for the fact that the decades-long endeavor to integrate China into the global order has not significantly tempered China’s strategic objective to become the most powerful and influential country in Asia. This being the case, the United States needs a long-term approach that demonstrates U.S. internal strength, external resolve, and steadiness of policy.

#### China perceives any engagement as containment—angers them because they feel like Junior Partners. They’re busy pushing their own Free Trade Agendas

Backer 14 Larry CatA Backer is Professor of Law at the Dickinson School of Law at the Pennsylvania State University. Previously he served as Executive Director of the Comparative and International Law Center at the University of Tulsa. Larry Catá Backer, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: J pan, China, the U .S., and the Emerging Shape of a New World Trade Regulatory Or der , 13 W ash . U. Global Stud . L. Rev . 049 (2014), http://ope nscholarship.wustl.edu/law\_glo balstudies/vol13/iss1/6 //LKJ

Indeed, Wen Jin Yuan notes the sense among Chinese academic and policy circles that “the main reason behind the Obama Administration’s support for the TPP agenda is the US’s desire to use the TPP as a tool to economically contain China’s rise.” 128 Wen notes, for example, reports published in the People’s Daily , the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, that refer to TPP as “superficially an economic agreement but contain[ing] an obvious political purpose to constrain China’s rise.” 129 More importantly, a successfully negotiated TPP would result, according to other Chinese scholars, in trade diversion to the detriment of Chinese economic interests. 130 Yet, according to Wen’s research, United States officials insist that the ultimate goal of the United States was not containment, but incorporation. The “U.S.’s ultimate goal is to integrate China into this regional trade system, rather than keeping China out, and the TPP initiative is actually similar to the strategy led by several U.S. agencies to incorporate China into the WTO system.” 131 Yet incorporation can be understood from the Chinese side as another form of containment. Rather than have China lead a new effort at refining the rules and culture of trade in the Pacific, it would be forced to participate as a Junior partner in a regulatory exercise directed by the United States and its principal ally, Japan. For the Chinese, the substantial effect might well be understood as containment, though that view/perception is lost on the United States. 132 As a consequence, Wen argues, Chinese policy will continue to push its own trade agenda as a means of countering the perceived political and economic effects of TPP on its interests. First among its strategies will be an acceleration of its efforts to secure free trade agreements with its neighbors. 133 To the extent that these then hamper further TPP negotiations, all the better. 134 A possible consequence would be trade and regulatory system competition, as the United States and China fight for control of the discourse of trade rules, with the objective measured by the participation of the Pacific Basin’s most important economies. A March 21, 2013, report noted, Following Japan’s recent announcement that it will join in negotiations of the US-led Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP), the US and China are picking up the pace in staking their claims on Asian economic territory. The US is encouraging South Korea to join in the TPP, which has pressured China into spurring discussions of a trilateral free trade agreement (FTA) between China, Japan, and South Korea. 135 More importantly, China will accelerate the creation of its own enhanced free trade area, one in which it will play the dominant role. China is “also putting work into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA), which would include not only China, Japan, and South Korea but also the ten countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), along with India, Australia, and New Zealand.” 136 There is irony here: the Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (“CEPEA”) is a Japanese-led proposal for trade cooperation and free trade agreement among the sixteen present member countries of the East Asia Summit.

### L – Chinese econ liberalization

#### Perception of an economic paradigm shift discredits Xi’s attempt to modernize ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ – makes Xi look weak on economic reform

Lam 15, Adjunct Professor in the Centre for China Studies and the Department of History of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, (Willy Wo-Lap, 2015, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping, available via Google Books)//kap

Xi Jinping established his reputation as an orthodox Marxist when the helmsman-in-waiting was vice-president and then president of the CPS from 2007 to 2012. He is a keen proponent of the principle—seconded by ex-president Hu Jintao as well as most senior members of the Party establishment—of “Sinicizing” and “modernizing” Marxism and socialism by ensuring that these beliefs will be suitably adapted to twenty-first-century China. These arguments were spelled out in detail in Xi’s speeches and articles in theoretical journals such as Seeking Truth and Study Times. In a 2010 article in Seeking Truth, Xi quoted Friedrich Engels to the effect that “Marxism is a worldview and methodology but not [a set of) orthodox precepts.” Paraphrasing Mao. Xi noted that “Marxist methodology amounts to a telescope and a microscope that we use in politics as well as the art of war: it is a fundamental method for guiding us in knowing our world and changing the world.” Xi was convinced that “the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics"—which the CCP is implementing—was the newest and best possible way to "Sinicize Marxism.” This had been achieved through "using Marxist principles, viewpoints, and methods to study and solve practical questions that have emerged in the course of China’s evolution, construction, and reform." Xi argued with typical verbosity. Only through Marxist and socialist methodology, he added, could Party members "boost the systematic nature, perspicacity, and creativity in their work and avoid irresoluteness, superficiality, and myopia.”\*6 In various speeches. Xi has adduced plenty of evidence to show how Mao Zedong and his successors have adopted the right strategies for waging a successful revolution. Not surprisingly. Xi referred to the “economic miracle" that the country had attained in the past two to three decades. “In the past thirty years, our country has developed in a sustained and speedy fashion with a clip that is rarely seen in the world.” Xi wrote in a long article in the April I. 2008. issue of Seeking Truth. “Socialism and Marxism have manifested robust liveliness on Chinese soil.”67 Xi also heaped praise on the ke.xue fazhanguan (scientific outlook on development), which was the main mantra of the Hu Jintao era. The then-vice-president asserted that ke.xuefazJianguan, which was characterized by “a rich ideological content and a formidable innate logic.” was able to fulfill the goals of “putting people first" and attaining “comprehensive, well-coordinated, and sustainable development.” No wonder he called this the "newest"—and most successful—instance of the Sinicization of Marxism.6" Yet an intriguing paradox has emerged. If, as Xi and his orthodox colleagues have maintained, the superiority of socialism with Chinese characteristics is so self-evident, how come the CCP leadership has to pull out all the stops to defend the canon—and to crush the voices of dissent? Xi has reiterated the importance of “popularizing” Marxism and socialism, that is, making them relevant and palatable to twenty-first-century Chinese. This has betrayed the fear of Xi and his colleagues that many Chinese have found the fossilized creed woefully obsolete. Moreover, there is a nagging suspicion that what Xi is upholding is not so much Chinese-style socialism as the CCP’s monopoly on power. It is perhaps in this context that the leadership’s frequent warnings about cadres having to ju 'an siwei (have a sense of danger in the midst of comfort and plenty) is best understood. Xi counseled in a speech to the CPS in 2008 that the Party’s ability to retain absolute power should not be taken for granted. “The Party’s ruling status did not come about as a matter of course, and this status is not [automatically] guaranteed.” Xi argued. "Whatever [power] we possessed in the past we might not have now: and whatever we have now we may not possess forever.”69 The sense of crisis in the midst of plenty was also revealed when PBSC member and fellow princeling Wang Qishan asked his underlings to read Alexis de Toc-queville's The Old Regime and the RevolutionThe famous treatise is a morality tale about how Louis XVI. the last king of France, lost his legitimacy because the apparent prosperity of the "old regime" had bred inequality and other social malaise. Xi himself picked up on the well-known theme of "dynastic cycles”: that in the past, dynasties rose and fell in accordance with whether the emperors could satisfy the people's demands. “The more advanced and developed our [socialist] enterprise, the more new situations and problems will arise—and we face more risks and challenges.” he said. “We will have to contend with even more circumstances that we cannot predict.’’” Despite the fact that Marxism and socialism—or at least the authoritarian versions developed in China and the Soviet Union—were discarded by the entire Soviet bloc in the early 1990, Xi is adamant that "Chinese-style socialism” is right for China. “(The creed] is deeply implanted all over China and is suitable to China’s conditions.” he indicated not long after the Eighteenth Party Congress. “It has tremendous strength and vitality. In contemporary China, only Chinese-style socialism can develop China, create happiness for the people, and bring forth the renaissance of the Chinese people.” Moreover, he argued that Chinese-style socialism was geared toward the future. “We must uphold Marxism and socialism from the point of view of [further] developing it.” Xi pledged. “It is a great canvas that Communists of our generation must continue to enrich and expand.”’- The idea that Beijing might consider options and solutions other than orthodox socialism has been totally ruled out by the Fifth-Generation titan.

### L – concessions for China

#### Concessions to China gives hard-lines credit – disrupt Xi’s momentum

Friedberg, 12 - (Aaron L., Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and the author of A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, “Bucking Beijing," Foreign Affairs, International Institutions and Global Governance Program, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2012-08-18/bucking-beijing,//BR/)

STAND YOUR GROUND The primary objection to recalibrating U.S. policy along the lines suggested here is that it would create a self-fulfilling prophecy, strengthening the hand of Beijing's so-called hard-liners while undercutting its reform-minded liberals. The notion that there are good guys among those contending for power in China and that a nonconfrontational approach would favor them has intuitive appeal. At this point, however, the opposite is at least equally plausible. If Washington reverts to a softer stance, Beijing's hard-liners could try to take the credit. They might argue that the change was a direct result of their tough policies, including the sustained military buildup they have long championed. It would be dangerous for American policymakers to try to shape an intraparty competition that they do not fully understand. This does not mean that China's political evolution is a matter of indifference; far from it. But any outside power's influence over the outcome will be indirect and long term. Democratic countries should continue to support the growth of civil society in China, promote the freest possible flow of ideas into and inside China, and speak out in defense of those who take risks for real reform.

### L – democracy/court modelling

#### Diplomacy link --- nationalism --- democracy/court model affs

**Bodeen 16** --- Honolulu Star Adviser (Christopher Bodeen, 6-24-2016, "China state media seen stepping-up anti-Western rhetoric" Honolulu Star-Advertiser, 6-24-2016, http://www.staradvertiser.com/breaking-news/china-state-media-seen-stepping-up-anti-western-rhetoric/)//jonah

Western values are a “ticket to hell,” a newspaper published by China’s Communist Party said in a recent editorial that held up Ukraine and some Arab countries as examples of outside ideas causing turmoil. It was the latest colorful example of a rising level of invective targeting critics of the authoritarian government. In the two-plus years since President Xi Jinping took the helm of the ruling Communist Party, state media have become more strident in defending the one-party system and stoking nationalism. Events of recent months have accelerated the trend. Last fall’s pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong opened floodgates of disdain against “anti-China” forces. Last week, the party tabloid Global Times laid into well-known blogger Ren Zhiqiang for questioning official warnings against Western values infiltrating Chinese college classrooms. The newspaper pointed to turmoil in Ukraine and the Arab world to show how any adoption of Western models by non-Western countries “basically amounts to the copying of failure.” “No matter how beautiful they appear on the surface, they are in fact a ticket to hell, and can only bring disaster to the Chinese nation,” the newspaper said. While Cold War brickbats such as “running dogs of the American imperialists” have yet to return, there’s been an overall revival of tough language laying down the party’s bottom line and seeking to undermine opposing arguments. Some critics fear a reversion to the extreme intolerance of the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, and will scrutinize the speeches at China’s annual ceremonial legislature opening Thursday for more signs of the trend. “Over the last two years or so, the propaganda has become less refined. There’s a big market for this kind of crude nationalism,” said Willy Lam, a Chinese politics expert at Hong Kong’s Chinese University. The exchange involving the blogger followed a stern warning in January by Education Minister Yuan Guiren against threats to communist ideological purity in higher education. His comments, in turn, reflected an internal party document, leaked in 2013, that warned against Western values such as constitutionalism, respect for civil society and press freedom. A further echo was heard last week, when the president of the Supreme People’s Court, Zhou Qiang, demanded that judges stand strong against Western concepts of judicial independence and division of powers. “Resolutely resist the influence of erroneous Western thought,” Zhou said. Such pronouncements are clearly being dictated from the highest party echelons, said Li Datong, a political commentator who has been removed from a state media senior editing job for broaching sensitive subjects. “These people talking so harshly now were only recently espousing greater openness, not less. Clearly things have changed,” Li said. Foreign countries and leaders are also frequent targets.

### L – FoPo Concessions/QPQ

#### Chinese foreign policy concessions cause domestic nationalistic backlash – protests undermine CCP stability/authority

\*Couple functions –

1. China ptx link – foreign policy QPQ affs force Chinese concessions that undermine exploitation of nationalist sentiment
2. CCP stability turn – nationalist protests threat regime stability and authority
3. No China drawdown/China says no – nationalism is too strong
4. Specific FONOP link

Wu, 5/06/16 [NICHOLAS WU explores the effect of domestic politics on China’s strategy in the South China Sea, The Huffington Post, “Fighting History: Domestic Politics in the South China Sea”, 5/06/16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/china-hands/fighting-history-domestic\_b\_9856776.html]//Yak

Amidst withering criticism of China’s actions in the region, American commentators have generally overlooked the potential effect of China’s domestic politics on its foreign policy. Much of the Chinese government’s rhetoric regarding the South China Sea has been targeted at domestic consumption. In early January, between the first and second FONOPs, the Chinese government landed civilian airliners on the Fiery Cross Reef airstrip, conducted a photoshoot with the stewardesses aboard the airliner, and then welcomed Chinese citizens to the reef as a demonstration of Chinese authority. This episode was well-documented and then posted on 163.com, a major online news source. China clearly intends to resolve this crisis as a domestic matter, and the FONOPs have not caused China to remove its installations or revoke its claims to the South China Sea islands.

American policymakers and commentators must consider China’s domestic political landscape and resist the urge to caricature the Chinese government as a monolithic body that can pass policy by fiat regardless of public opinion. American officials cannot afford to make that mistake, given the volatility of the South China Sea situation. If planners miscalculate in their strategy, it could provoke a huge domestic backlash in China that will affect the strategy of Chinese leadership.

After the first FONOP, netizens posted on sites like Weibo that China needed to resolutely defend itself against “foreign incursions” to prove that the nation’s defenses were not merely “paper tigers.”

Chinese foreign policy is in part predicated on the perception in China of a long history of encirclement and humiliation. Henry Kissinger famously wrote in his book On China that a large degree of Chinese strategic thinking is aimed at preventing encirclement by foreign powers, as in the Chinese intervention to save North Korea during the Korean War. That theme of encirclement still resonates strongly among the Chinese public. Even the Xinhua and Global Times editorials about the South China Sea allude to the “threatening of national security” by American FONOPs. The concept that China has been subject to a “century of humiliation” by foreign powers and is only now coming out of that period is a very salient argument for the Chinese national psyche.

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In the eyes of many Chinese citizens, the issues at hand in the South China Sea are critical. According to Bonnie Wang, a Chinese national currently living in North Carolina, “the advocacy of national sovereignty is very important to an ordinary Chinese citizen.” According to Professor Jessica Weiss, Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University, “Perceptions of foreign humiliation and encroachment on Chinese sovereignty and interests are easily reawakened by new slights and perceived insults. In the absence of tough words and actions, many among the Chinese public—particularly ‘netizens’—will accuse the Chinese government of being too soft in standing up for Chinese interests.” Indeed, after the first FONOP, netizens posted on sites like Weibo that China needed to resolutely defend itself against “foreign incursions” to prove that the nation’s defenses were not merely “paper tigers.”

Furthermore, there is a precedent for large-scale grassroots demonstrations in China in response to perceptions of Chinese foreign policy weakness, as with the anti-American protests after the accidental bombing of the Sarajevo Chinese Embassy in 1999 or the large-scale anti-Japanese protests in 2012 after the Japanese government purchased the Diaoyu/Senakau Islands from private owners. The threat of domestic backlash can have large consequences for the Chinese government’s foreign policy-making and diplomacy.

Perhaps surprisingly, no major protests have occurred yet over the South China Sea, be they government-organized or grassroots protests. Professor Weiss explains, “The Chinese government has held the upper hand so far in its territorial disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines, so Beijing has not needed protests to convey its resolve. But the situation could change with further US involvement and the international ruling on the nine-dashed line.” China is attempting to expand its physical presence in the region without provoking severe regional backlash. The illiberal nature of an authoritarian system allows it to frame, organize, or suppress domestic protests in a way conducive to diplomacy as a form of providing credible signals in negotiations. The government’s position could be contingent upon the cost of suppressing protest. If the cost of suppressing protest would be too high, as in the case of the 2012 anti-Japanese protests, then the government will permit them. But in cases regarding smaller countries like Vietnam that lack historical animus with China, the cost of suppressing protest is significantly lower. Yet, the United States’s involvement threatens to change that dynamic, as belligerent action from the US might make it more difficult for China to mitigate domestic backlash.

As the government of the PRC moves away from its traditional ideology-based legitimacy and as the government’s economic performance-based legitimacy flags amidst economic difficulty, nationalism becomes an increasingly important tool. Nationalist causes can provide a “rally around the flag” effect that increase support for the government. Alternatively, if the government is seen as too weak on issues related to nationalism, it could endanger the legitimacy of the CCP. According to Dalton Lin, a research fellow at Princeton University, Chinese nationalism can be built upon two ideological tenets: one is anti-imperialism; the other is the drive to move China away from colonialism. With the decline of the former colonial powers, however, what used to be anti-colonialism has become blurred with anti-imperialism. Taiwan and the United States are very much linked to the anti-imperialism issue because of historical animosity, but smaller countries like Vietnam and other claimants in the South China Sea are not as much of a part of China’s anti-imperialist narrative. Nationalist fervor in China is much stronger than most outside observers realize.

As evidenced by conversations with Chinese citizen s and the posts of the netizens, a perceived weak foreign policy remains a central political concern. American planners need to be wary of China’s domestic political conditions and of China’s effort to avoid another “century of humiliation” regarding foreign incursions on its territory. No major protests have yet occurred against the United States, but the possibility remains. If China does see protests, the cost of suppressing them will only rise for the Communist Party because of the way that the United States could be tied into the historical anti-colonialist narrative. In other words, more aggressive Freedom of Navigation actions could provoke a huge anti-colonialist backlash in China because of the perceived slight against Chinese territorial integrity. This could even lead to the Communist Party being forced to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy stance in order to placate domestic opposition. American planners neglect this domestic element of the crisis at their peril.

### L – Japan/SCS nationalism

#### Stats prove Chinese public has a nationalistic attitude toward Japan/SCS conflicts

\*also says Chinese public supports economic sanctions and reduced diplomacy with west

Fish, 14 – Eric Fish is a Beijing-based freelance journalist [“A Glimpse Into Chinese Nationalism”, The Diplomat, 9/07/14, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/a-glimpse-into-chinese-nationalism/]//Yak

These extreme protests and general anti-Japan sentiment have been linked to China’s education system. In the wake of the 1989 student-led Tiananmen Square uprising, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched its “Patriotic Education Campaign.” It shifted from emphasis on the triumphs of socialism and class struggle, to focusing attention on the atrocities inflicted by foreign enemies during the “Century of Humiliation” spanning from the 1839 Opium War through the particularly bloody Japanese invasion of WWII. The 2012 protests suggested Chinese leaders had perhaps too successfully molded their citizens into rabid nationalists, which could potentially force their hand in escalating to war.

A new study to be published this month by the University of Western Australia’s Perth USAsia Centre offers evidence that can be used to test this assumption. The study sought to examine Chinese public opinion on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute, as well as conflicts over islands in the South China Sea. It surveyed more than 1,400 respondents in five major Chinese cities during March 2013.

One of the less surprising survey findings was that respondents overwhelmingly supported all of China’s territorial claims, including the controversial “nine-dashed line” that stretches deep into the South China Sea just short of the Vietnamese, Philippine, Bruneian and Malaysian coasts, with an average response of more than 90 percent confidence in China’s position on every conflict. The surprising findings, however, came when respondents were presented with hypothetical policy options that the Chinese government should have at its disposal for dealing with these disputes.

“There were really only two unpopular policies,” said Andrew Chubb, a Ph.D candidate in international relations at the University of Western Australia, who conducted the study. “The famously unpopular ‘shelve disputes and pursue joint development’ policy that got so much criticism, and ‘send in the troops, don’t hesitate to fight a war.’”

Among the most popular options were making use of popular activism and strengthening international publicity of China’s position, with more than 80 percent support each. Economic sanctions and diplomatic measures like canceling official visits and reducing cooperative projects were also backed by solid majorities.

Seeking compromise through negotiation and submitting the disputes for UN arbitration both also received majority approval, with over 57 percent and 61 percent support respectively. Meanwhile, asked if they thought sending in the troops would be an acceptable option for the government to have on the table during an unspecified crisis, 41 percent agreed regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and 45 percent in the South China Sea.

Chubb explains that support for each policy option was more-or-less the same on both the East China Sea and South China Sea disputes, except on the possibility of sending in troops. To him, this suggests a sort of “rational nationalism,” since Chinese have far greater historical grievances with Japan than with any nation in Southeast Asia. Yet there was less support for military action in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, where China would be up against a highly capable Japanese military, possibly joined by the United States. On a separate question, support for sending in the troops dropped by 13 and 14 percentage points on the Senkaku/Diaoyu and South China Sea disputes, respectively, when respondents were presented with the possibility that it would harm China’s economy.

To Chubb, the fact that a majority agreed that it wouldn’t be in China’s national interest to send in the military in either dispute, even if the other side took a provocative stance and sought to escalate tensions, “seems to suggest that a lot of Chinese citizens would be amenable to national interest-based arguments against war that would jeopardize economic ties if the CCP were to decide that it needed to de-escalate tensions.” He added, “So we probably can’t see any evidence there for China’s population pushing leaders into an unwanted war.”

Another bit of conventional wisdom the survey challenges is the idea that China’s “post-90s” generation, which grew up after the Tiananmen crackdown and was subject to the full force of Patriotic Education, is more intensely nationalistic and thirsty for revenge against Japan. Only 37 percent of post-90s respondents approved of sending in the troops to deal with the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute, while 42 percent of those born before 1990 supported the idea.

This doesn’t mean that the “Patriotic Education” has been entirely ineffective on post-90s youth. While they were less likely than elders to favor sending in the military, they were slightly more likely to say they viewed the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute as a continuation of the Century of Humiliation. “You might say that the younger generations are more nationalistic if by that you mean they’re more likely to view the world through the lens of the past,” Chubb said. “But they’re not more nationalistic if we’re talking in terms wanting to go to war. Essentially it suggests that you need to tease the two apart.”

Not all of the survey findings suggested a future de-escalation of tensions. Groups that disproportionately advocated military intervention, even at the expense of the economy, and opposed compromise on all disputes included males and those in the middle-class (making more than 10,000 yuan per month). Over the next two decades, these demographics are poised to grow significantly with the number of excess adult males relative to the female population poised to more than double (due to sex-selective abortion) and the size of China’s middle class expected to quadruple.

“As China’s economic development continues, we can probably expect to see more and more people joining [the middle class] ranks and quite possibly believing that some islands either in the South or East China Sea are something perhaps worth starting a war over,” Chubb said.

#### PRC is opposed to US involvement in the region

Stanton, 14 – William A. Stanton is a Director of Center for Asia Policy at National Tsing-Hua University [last date cited in article is 2014, World United Formosans for Independence, “The U.S. Pivot to Asia and Taiwan’s Role”, http://www.wufi.org.tw/the-u-s-pivot-to-asia-and-taiwans-role/]//Yak

More PRC Backlash

In a subsequent statement posted on China’s Foreign Ministry website entitled “Foreign Minister Yang Jie-chi Refutes Fallacies on the South China Sea Issue,” charged that Secretary Clinton had attacked China at the ARF meeting in an effort “designed to give the international community a wrong impression that the situation in the South China Sea is a cause for grave concern.”

At a press conference on July 30, 2010, China’s Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng reiterated that China had “indisputable sovereignty” over the islands in the South China Sea and the nearby waters. On the eve of the ASEAN-US summit in New York in September, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said, “We resolutely oppose any country which has no connection to the South China Sea getting involved in the dispute, and we oppose the internationalization, multilateralization or expansion of the issue. It cannot solve the problem, but can only make it more complicated.”

Subsequently, when Secretary Clinton visited Beijing September 4-5, she met with a number of key Chinese officials, including Foreign Minister Yang, but then-Vice President Xi Jinping abruptly canceled his meeting with her. Although the South China Sea was again on the agenda, no progress was made, as might have been expected from the negative stories and editorials that greeted Secretary Clinton’s arrival. The Global Times, which is affiliated with the ruling Communist Party, said in a September 4 editorial that Clinton’s diplomacy in the region had “fomented frictions between China and some surrounding countries,” and called on her to “reflect upon the deep harm she is bringing to the Sino-US relationship.”

### L – SCS containment

#### SCS containment link ---

**Brown 16** --- PhD, King’s College, (Kerry Brown, 2-10-2016, "Foreign Policy Making Under Xi Jinping: The Case of the South China Sea" Journal of Political Risk, 6-22-2016, http://www.jpolrisk.com/foreign-policy-making-under-xi-jinping-the-case-of-the-south-china-sea/)//jonah

This does however offer the Xi Jinping style of leadership capital it can exploit. Xi has differentiated himself at least from his immediate predecessor, Hu Jintao, by showing a willingness to speak to Chinese desires for status and strength in the new era, and to appeal directly to the government’s mission to right the historic injustices done to it. While Hu did refer to this ‘historic mission’ of the Party, under Xi the construction of permanent structures in the South China Sea area equates to real action, showing the Chinese people that he is willing to do something rather than just speak, to show that China is serious over its claims and will not give up on them. While never descending to crude nationalistic rhetoric, it is not surprising that Xi’s general approach has received a wide band of public support, and has, in some constituencies at least, aroused deep nationalist fervor, a fervor that the government has shown great ambiguity about controlling. In an era of falling GDP growth and tough domestic politics, this offers a new source of legitimacy for the Communist Party, and one from which it is not able to easily walk away.

#### SCS policy inflames political backlash --- perceived as further containment

**Mead 12** --- James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and previously taught American foreign policy at Yale University (Walter Russell Mead, 4-30-2012, "High Noon in Beijing" American Interest, 6-25-2016, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/2012/04/30/high-noon-in-beijing/)//jonah

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will be arriving in Beijing at perhaps the diciest moment in US-China relations since Richard Nixon reached out to shake Chou Enlai’s hand on his historic visit to what American conservatives then still called Red China. Last fall, the Obama administration pulled off a diplomatic revolution in maritime Asia — the coastal and trading states on and around the Asian mainland that stretch in an arc from Korea and Japan, down to Australia and Indonesia, and sweep around through southeast Asia to India and Sri Lanka. Via Meadia has been following this story closely; it is the biggest geopolitical event since 9/11 and, while it builds on a set of US policies that go back at least as far as the Clinton administration and were further developed in the Bush years, the administration’s mix of policies represent a decisive turning point in 21st century Asian history. The legacy press, still befuddled from drinking too much of the ‘US in decline’ Koolaid so widely peddled in recent years, has still not grasped just how audacious, risky and above all successful the new strategy is: the United States is building a Pacific entente to counter — though not to contain — the consequences of China’s economic growth and military posture in the region. The US is lending its unequivocal support to the smaller Asian states who have boundary disputes with China in the resource-rich, strategically vital South China Sea. It has announced new deployments of troops and new military agreements as it extends its military network from northeast Asia (Japan, Korea, the Pacific islands) south and east to Australia, Singapore and beyond. It continues to deepen its strategic relation with India — Asia’s other nuclear superpower with a billion plus citizens and a country which openly states that the purpose of its (growing) nuclear arsenal is to balance China. Additionally, the US has launched a new round of trade talks, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP that will open markets dramatically among a group of Asia-Pacific countries. China has not been invited to join. These are bold moves. Many China specialists were unnerved as the administration rolled the new policy out last fall, fearing that the US push back would strengthen hardliners in Beijing to commit to a full-on anti-US policy. That hasn’t happened yet, largely because in spite of all the misguided hype about China’s inexorable rise there isn’t actually much Beijing can do about Washington’s new activism. The more it pushes its territorial claims in the South China Sea, the more tightly the other countries will cling to Washington’s skirts. Dumping its dollar hoard would wreck the Chinese economy. Taking a super hard line on Syria and Iran will annoy the Gulf Arabs whose oil keeps China’s factories running. Naval exercises with Russia don’t even impress North Korea, much less cow Washington. While a formidable power in many respects, and one potentially with a great future, China is simply not a peer competitor of Washington in Asia at this point, and its illusions and pretensions left China uncomfortably exposed when the real world power decided to raise its game in the Pacific Basin. Fine tuning diplomacy is a difficult thing, especially when adjusting the relations of great powers. Since the administration began to roll out its maritime initiatives last fall, a number of things have happened — some by coincidence, some as unforeseen consequences of steps the US took — that have actually made our China policy much stronger and more effective than planned. It is these follow-ons and the coincidences more than our actual Asia policies that make Clinton’s Beijing trip so fraught. Look at what has happened since the new US Asia policy launched last year: Myanmar, one of China’s only two regional allies, has switched sides, and is working increasingly closely with America’s partners in the Pacific Entente. The Philippines have taken a highly visible, confrontational posture toward Chinese ‘interlopers’ in waters Manila claims, and have attempted to engage direct US support. China’s economic growth has slowed and its exporters are experiencing shrinking demand even as labor unrest at home puts new pressure on manufacturers. The Bo Xilai fiasco has exposed the fissures in China’s leadership, destroyed hopes of a smooth power transition and shone a spotlight on entrenched corruption and the conflict and rivalries at the heart of China’s ruling elite. Now, the daring night time escape of Chen Guangcheng and his race across 500 kilometers to the shelter of the US embassy has both enraged and humiliated China’s government — hours before Secretary Clinton’s scheduled arrival. It is a safe bet that some Chinese nationalists, including people high up in various state and military organizations, are shaking with rage and frustration as they contemplate these events. Conspiracy theories popular in some circles associate the US with the Bo Xilai scandal — after all, it was to the US consulate in Chengdu that Wang Lijun fled and where he spilled the beans about the reign of Bo in Chongqing. Chen’s flight to the embassy will further deepen the angry paranoia in some circles; it will seem obvious to some that he could not have made this escape without more help than a handful of dissidents could provide, and the timing is so spectacular that it must be part of some secret, long prepared American scheme. Put these ‘facts’ together with the new American assertiveness in the region, and many serious people in China will draw the conclusion that the US is trying to do to China what it did to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they will think we are perilously close to success — so close, that any further concessions and retreats must be resisted as a matter of life and death. (That within a few months a leading Chinese official and a leading dissident should both have turned in extremis to American diplomats should, by the way, make Americans everywhere stand a little taller. We have somehow managed to acquire a reputation for honest dealing and political courage in China; it should be our goal to preserve that. There are times when it is appropriate to be proud of your country, and this is one of them.) These events tap into some deep wounds in Chinese historical memory, and fears of being ignored, humiliated and pushed around by a self-righteous and imperial West, never far beneath the surface in modern China, are flaring up. It’s worse because so recently China seemed to be riding so high; many people inside China believed all the hype about China’s rise and America’s decline as thoroughly as any group of European intellectuals, and the shock of realizing how wrong they were is severe. Meanwhile, the strategy of China’s current leadership had been to use both the Bo Xilai affair and the painful blow back from China’s South China Sea adventure to deepen their hold on power and strengthen the country’s adherence to the path of reform at home, “peaceful rise” abroad. Wen Jiabao was using Bo’s fall as an opportunity to target the entire left-nationalist-populist bloc in Chinese politics and cement the power of the more modernizing, reformist wing of the ruling party. Bo’s fall allowed the political leadership to reassert its leadership over the military as well, as military leaders fell in line to fight against those in the army who favored Bo’s nostalgic, left-tinged nationalism. From a US perspective, that looked like a pretty good outcome. The Obama administration was ready to approach China with open hands, offering its newly strengthened reformist leadership an opportunity to move forward even as it applied some discreet pressure on issues like Iran and Syria where it hopes for more Chinese help. The Chen escape seriously complicates that strategy. From the standpoint of China’s leadership, the flight points to a degree of incompetence and laxity that is deeply humiliating to all concerned. How can a single blind man in poor health outwit the security establishment of the most powerful one party state on earth? How can a dissident under house arrest pop up in American hands on the eve of vital talks with the American Secretary of State? And finally there is another shadow that will hang over Secretary Clinton in Beijing. Japan’s Prime Minister Noda will be meeting President Obama while Secretary Clinton is meeting the Chinese, and the Japanese and American leaders are expected to discuss enhanced security cooperation that would see Japanese troops training on US bases even as the island nation expands military ties, arms shipments and “strategic” aid throughout Asia. High on both President Obama’s and Prime Minister Noda’s to-do list: developing strategies to rein in China’s last remaining regional ally North Korea. None of this suggests easy bargaining over the fate of Mr. Chen, nor does it make it any easier for the Chinese leadership to cooperate right now on other issues of mutual concern. The Obama administration cannot force Mr. Chen to walk out into Chinese custody without a serious loss of prestige and moral capital; the Chinese authorities cannot let him go without paying a high price. When the Obama administration set out to check China last year, it did not intend to corner or contain it. But America is a bit stronger and China somewhat weaker and more fragile than most people thought, and our policies have succeeded perhaps a bit more than we might have liked. Kurt Campbell, Clinton’s chief Asia deputy, flew quietly to Beijing to try to prevent the Chen question from spoiling the summit; no doubt he and Secretary Clinton will have to talk fast and talk well to provide their hosts with some reassurance that the US genuinely does want reasonable and respectful relations with Beijing. What we all seem to be learning in Asia is that events have a logic and a pace of their own. America can set a policy in motion, but we can’t control or fine tune the consequences of our policies as they ripple out across the world. Many conversations with US officials in this and in prior administrations have left me convinced that the US is not trying to contain China the way we once contained the Soviet Union. While virtually all Americans at senior levels believe that over time economic progress will lead to political change in China, this is because most Americans are hardwired to think in those terms and this whiggish faith in the historical process is not a statement of policy or intent. Leading Americans in both parties generally hope for a peaceful and gradual reform process rather than violent conflict in China; they do not want to dismember or impoverish China and they would not welcome its disintegration. Nor do Americans see the evolution of a future Asian security order in zero-sum terms. The United States wants to prevent Chinese domination of Asia but we do not want to dominate the region ourselves. Many Chinese, I have found on my visits there, have a much darker view of our intentions, and see the US and China entangled in a zero sum battle for dominance which only one side can win. For now, it appears that the US, surprisingly to some Chinese analysts, is winning that contest. We should not expect Chinese hard liners to accept that situation with calm and resignation, even if their present options are limited. Secretary Clinton will be flying from China on to India by way of Bangladesh. With Japan’ Noda in Washington and Clinton in New Delhi, the view from Beijing is likely to remain dark. Additional irritating events are sure to occur. It is in the interest of smaller powers like Vietnam and the Philippines to exploit their new support from Washington for what they can; this will make them more assertive in the South China Sea and new incidents will likely occur that confront the Chinese government with an unpalatable choice between looking weak or enduring a crisis. The question of US arms sales to Taiwan will no doubt come up. North Korea can be expected to misbehave. More actions by more dissidents at home will agitate domestic opinion and affect China’s standing abroad. The global economic uncertainties will force China’s hand on economic policy in ways that may complicate its relations with trading partners, including the US. During the interminable US election campaign now already under way, the two candidates and their surrogates will compete to sound tough about China on trade, security and humanitarian issues. America’s new stance in Asia is real and it won’t be changing soon. The consequences of that shift for Asian politics and for US-China relations are complex and won’t be fully understood for some time. But this is a murky and even a dangerous time; we wish Secretary Clinton every possible success as she attempts to build bridges between two very different political cultures and world views.

### L – Chinese mil mod

#### Military modernization evokes nationalist criticism within the Politburo

**Montemalo, 15** – specialist in political science at St. John Fisher College (Michael, Fisher Journal of Research, “Assessing the Leadership of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Xi Jinping”, <http://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&context=ur>, //11)

In addition to this, Xi is faced with increasing opposition to implement his more assertive agenda of regional primacy. Christensen (2011) argues that “Beijing’s new, more truculent posture is rooted in an exaggerated sense of China’s rise in global power and serious domestic political insecurity—As a result, Chinese policymakers are hypersensitive to nationalist criticism at home and more rigid, at times even arrogant, in response to perceived challenges abroad.” Xi must balance both domestic and international pressures while pursuing his agenda. It is becoming increasingly difficult to pursue the modernization of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and regional hegemony if there is still support for a focus on economic development and neutral relations with the international community. Although Xi Jinping is described as a modernizer, Christensen (2011) explains that “driven by the fear of a precipitous collapse of a neighboring communist regime and the reduction of Chinese influence on the Korean Peninsula, Beijing has fallen back on long-held conservative Communist Party foreign policy principles in backing North Korea.” Moreover, a weakening of the CCP in recent years has led to increased zeal from China’s top leaders. This has enabled Xi to clean up the CCP and pursue an effective anti-corruption campaign that has brought down several high-ranking CCP officers, both civilian and military, however there is increased pressure on Xi himself.

Additionally, Xi’s vision for the modernization of the PLA may be difficult to attain. Garnaut (2013) uses a quote by Mao Zedong to argue his point: “the people’s army is not merely an organ for fighting; it is an organ for the political advancement of the party.” He claims that Mao’s statement has been confirmed by all of his successors and that “Xi may be able to build a military that either is modern and capable or loyal and political—But many in China now believe he can’t have both” (Garnaut 2013). Xi has to pursue his agenda against the status quo and although it seems as if he is doing this successfully, there are forces within the CCP acting against him. The largest problems are dissent within the Politburo against the shift in the PLA, as well as the more urgent problem of unchecked corruption throughout the entire military apparatus.

### L – Slights/Incursions

#### And, staving off slights or incursions from the west key to sustain Xi Legitimacy

**Christensen, 15 –** William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton(Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 190-192)

Domestically, China adopted by far the largest stimulus package as a percentage of GDP of all the major economies in the world (as much as 14 percent, according to some expert estimates).1 Unfortunately, by injecting money into flawed state institutions, these emergency efforts served to exacerbate existing problems that were fueling growing popular discontent. China has a startling imbalance of wealth, especially for a country where a red flag flies above a portrait of Chairman Mao in the national square. By marketizing an economy with a large state footprint, Beijing created massive corruption among Party elites and a deep cynicism in the Chinese population about the ethical virtues of their leadership. The stimulus package that Beijing injected into the Chinese economy unfortunately did more than sustain growth, it accelerated the maldistribution of capital to state- owned banks and state-owned firms, and in the process encouraged further corruption and overinvestment by local officials in real estate and infrastructure projects. To make matters worse, a shadow banking system formed in which local financial trusts loaned additional funds at higher than allowed interest rates so that their customers could finance their often already inflated debt. President Xi Jinping's very public efforts to initiate economic market reforms and crack down on state-sector corruption in late 2013 seemed designed to address all of these problems at once. The Party is considering new market-based approaches to the financial sector to reduce the huge footprint of state-owned banks and state-owned enterprises. There has also been an effort to limit the influence of the aforementioned shadow banks. The Party is also considering allowing farmers to use their land rights as collateral for business loans or to sell the land rights. This could allow them to create nonfarming businesses in rural areas or to ease the process by which they seek formal urban residency with social safety nets attached, instead of living in the cities as floating labor with no free access to public schools and other social services.2 The Party's goal is to create sustainable economic growth driven by domestic consumption and innovation and an economy less reliant on overseas markets and on profligate bank lending and investment at home by state banks. If successfully enacted, many powerful interest groups within China stand to lose influence from the reforms and consequentially wealth. It is probably not coincidental then that the reform package has been accompanied by a very tough anticorruption campaign. Top officials, including Politburo Member Bo Xilai, many associates of former Politburo Standing Committee Member Zhou Yongkang, and top PLA general Xu Caihou have all been sacked, stripped of their Party membership, and subjected to criminal prosecution in a manner clearly designed to send a chilling message to corrupt officials throughout the system. Xi has a confident and outgoing personality, especially in comparison to his stiffer and more bureaucratic predecessor, Hu Jintao. But personality and ambition may not be enough. At this point, no one can be certain of the answer to two critically important questions: Given the large number of influential people who stand to be harmed by deep reforms, will Xi and his deputies be able to effectively implement reform at the central government level and then get local officials to comply? And will the reforms, if effectively implemented, work as planned or will they create economic stagnation, social unrest, or both? What does all this have to do with China's rise and its foreign relations? The reader will recall that alongside economic performance, a main pillar of CCP legitimacy is its much- trumpeted legacy as defender of Chinese national honor against slights and incursions by foreigners, particularly the reviled Japanese and the U.S. "hegemon." For this reason, Beijing's unfortunate combination of external confidence and internal anxiety renders China more assertive internationally on occasion and more acerbic on others. Chinese assertiveness is only one way for it to destabilize the region. China's destructive reactions to the actions of others can also create enormous problems and in many ways are even more likely and harder to counter. The world is a rough place, and China is moving into it in unprecedented ways. As Chinese power grows, it will be exposed to an increasing number of challenges. Domestic politics problems make China more likely to adopt tough and often counterproductive responses to those challenges.

### must read L boost – consistency

#### Xi political capital and popular mandate key to reform ---

**Jia 13** --- graduate student in politics at Oxford and a Rhodes Scholar, previously a lecturer at China Foreign Affairs University (Mark Jia, 1-15-2013, "Xi Jinping: a new kind of politician?" openDemocracy, 6-25-2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/mark-jia/xi-jinping-new-kind-of-politician)//jonah

Xi gets it. Whether it’s Corey Booker’s masterful use of Twitter or Bill Clinton’s moving performance during the ‘92 debates, it is clear that the best politicians are the ones who can speak at the level of their audience, and in doing so humanize themselves as individuals who understand the struggles of ordinary citizens. In one sense, Xi has already proven himself to be a better student of this than Mitt Romney, whose comment antagonizing 47% of the country would have gone down just as badly in China as it did in the United States. This is all the more important because of the age Xi lives in. The country he inherits is a place where vigilant netizens can shelter criminal defendants, oust adulterous officials, and even help abolish unconstitutional regulations. This level of scrutiny is unprecedented, particularly for a new leader whose vision and humanity are still unknown quantities. In a country where the previous cohort of sovereigns have appeared ever more distant while public outrage towards graft and inequality have only grown fiercer, Xi’s projection of himself as an authentic and upright leader could set him apart as an entirely new breed of politician. Crafting an empathetic public image can enhance sound leadership. This is true for any polity, but particularly for non-democratic societies where leaders lack the legitimacy-conferring authority of popular election. President Obama had more than a year to sell himself on the campaign trail before setting foot into an office he had won. Xi, in comparison, had his stilted official biography rolled out via state news organs, but lacked the autonomy to personally introduce himself to the Chinese people until he actually assumed the reins of power. His 'presidential campaign' is only just beginning. If he succeeds, it will be a boon to him in two ways. First, China’s challenges are severe, and as they worsen, frustrated citizens will need to know they have an empathetic leader on high. In China, there remains a longstanding belief that the emperor, under the mandate of heaven, is fundamentally just. As long as instances of local abuse are brought to his attention, all will be remedied. This is what still brings countless aggrieved petitioners into Beijing every year with letters addressed to China’s highest authorities. But if trust in top leadership is eroded, and Xi is perceived to have lost his 'mandate' – whether heavenly or not – a loss of faith in existing arrangements can contribute to serious social instability. Second, public support – even under autocracy – can translate into real political capital. In the consensus-based decision-making model of the Politburo Standing Committee – where Xi is but first among seven peers, it is crucial that his (mostly conservative) colleagues see him as wielding a popular mandate. Naturally, Xi fans won’t be writing constituent letters to their elected representatives to support his agenda, but modern Chinese authoritarianism bases much of its legitimacy, and indeed its own conception of “democracy,” upon its ability to be responsive to public opinion. Rival peers will be slower to challenge Xi’s authority if he is seen to command the will of the Chinese people. Of course it remains to be seen whether Xi will be able to capitalize on his favorable persona. It will require more than popular support to defeat the many entrenched interests that stand in the way of genuine reform. But Xi the politician is off to a promising start, and if he succeeds, he may be only the first of a new generation of Chinese leaders who can speak directly – and compassionately – to the people they govern.

### L booster – hardliner spin

#### Regardless of its intentions, the plan will be spun by Chinese hardliners as an attempt to isolate and contain China

Rudd, 15 (Kevin, Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has emerged as a key broker of perceptions between the U.S. and China. He was a member of the Berggruen Institute’s 21st Century Council delegation that met Chinese President Xi Jinping in November 2013 in Beijing and is currently director of the Asia Society Public Policy Institute, “How to Break the ‘Mutually Assured Misperception’ Between the U.S. and China,” pg online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/us-china-relations-kevin-rudd-report\_b\_7096784.html //um-ef)

Americans offer their own variations on the same theme concerning Chinese mirror imaging. Nonetheless, the report argues that Chinese leaders have begun to form a worrying consensus on what they believe to be the core elements of U.S. strategy towards China, despite Washington’s protestations to the contrary. These are reflected in the following five-point consensus circulated among the Chinese leadership during 2014, summarizing internal conclusions about U.S. strategic intentions: To isolate China; To contain China; To diminish China; To internally divide China; and To sabotage China’s leadership. While these conclusions sound strange to a Western audience, they nonetheless derive from a Chinese conclusion that the United States has not, and never will, accept the fundamental political legitimacy of the Chinese administration because it is not a liberal democracy. They are also based on a deeply held, deeply “realist” Chinese conclusion that the U.S. will never willingly concede its status as the pre-eminent regional and global power, and will do everything within its power to retain that position. In Beijing, this assumption permeates perceptions of nearly all aspects of U.S. policy, from campaigns on human rights, political activism in Hong Kong, arms sales to Taiwan, and America’s failure to condemn terrorist attacks by Xinjiang separatists, to support for Falungong and the Dalai Lama. As a result, senior Chinese interlocutors conclude that the U.S. is effectively engaged in a dual strategy of undermining China from within, while also containing China from without. American arguments that U.S. policy toward China bears no comparison with the Cold War-era containment of the Soviet Union are dismissed by Chinese analysts. China points to the U.S. strategic decision to “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia as unequivocal evidence of this. Beijing also points to Washington’s de facto support for Japanese territorial claims in the East China Sea, and its alleged abandonment of neutrality on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea in support of the Philippines, Vietnam and other South-East Asian states at the expense of China, as further evidence of containment. Finally, China adds the most recent examples of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (which excludes China) and failed American efforts to dissuade its allies from joining the AIIB. All the above, as seen from Beijing, are designed to deny international space to China in policy domains ranging from hard security, to economics and trade diplomacy. The report notes that the U.S. disputes each of the above, and instead argues that Chinese foreign policy appears geared for an attempt to push the United States strategically out of Asia. It is against this unhappy background that, in 2013, Xi Jinping elevated the concept of “a new type of great power relationship” as a centerpiece of his diplomacy towards the U.S. Xi argued it was time to liberate the bilateral relationship from “a cold war mentality” (lengzhan siwei 冷战思维) and the politics of “a zero sum game” (linghe yo uqi 零和游戏). While disagreements inevitably arose over the definition of Chinese and American “core interests” (hexin liyi 核心利益). the U.S. administration initially welcomed the proposal. But this concept soon fell victim to a deeply partisan debate within the United States on the administration “conceding strategic and moral parity to China” and has since disappeared from the public language of the administration. The report argues that mutual strategic misperceptions between the U.S. and China, informed both by history and recent experience, are likely to endure.

### L booster – fine line

#### Xi is walking a fine line now --- appeasing nationalists and expanding his agenda --- the plan breaks that balance

**Economist 13** --- (Economist, 5-4-2013, "Xi Jinping and the Chinese dream" 6-20-2016, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21577070-vision-chinas-new-president-should-serve-his-people-not-nationalist-state-xi-jinping)//jonah

IN 1793 a British envoy, Lord Macartney, arrived at the court of the Chinese emperor, hoping to open an embassy. He brought with him a selection of gifts from his newly industrialising nation. The Qianlong emperor, whose country then accounted for about a third of global GDP, swatted him away: “Your sincere humility and obedience can clearly be seen,” he wrote to King George III, but we do not have “the slightest need for your country’s manufactures”. The British returned in the 1830s with gunboats to force trade open, and China’s attempts at reform ended in collapse, humiliation and, eventually, Maoism. China has made an extraordinary journey along the road back to greatness. Hundreds of millions have lifted themselves out of poverty, hundreds of millions more have joined the new middle class. It is on the verge of reclaiming what it sees as its rightful position in the world. China’s global influence is expanding and within a decade its economy is expected to overtake America’s. In his first weeks in power, the new head of the ruling Communist Party, Xi Jinping, has evoked that rise with a new slogan which he is using, as belief in Marxism dies, to unite an increasingly diverse nation. He calls his new doctrine the “Chinese dream” evoking its American equivalent. Such slogans matter enormously in China (see article). News bulletins are full of his dream. Schools organise speaking competitions about it. A talent show on television is looking for “The Voice of the Chinese Dream”. Countries, like people, should dream. But what exactly is Mr Xi’s vision? It seems to include some American-style aspiration, which is welcome, but also a troubling whiff of nationalism and of repackaged authoritarianism. The end of ideology Since the humiliations of the 19th century, China’s goals have been wealth and strength. Mao Zedong tried to attain them through Marxism. For Deng Xiaoping and his successors, ideology was more flexible (though party control was absolute). Jiang Zemin’s theory of the “Three Represents” said the party must embody the changed society, allowing private businessmen to join the party. Hu Jintao pushed the “scientific-development outlook” and “harmonious development” to deal with the disharmony created by the yawning wealth gap. Now, though, comes a new leader with a new style and a popular photogenic wife. Mr Xi talks of reform; he has launched a campaign against official extravagance. Even short of detail, his dream is different from anything that has come before. Compared with his predecessors’ stodgy ideologies, it unashamedly appeals to the emotions. Under Mao, the party assaulted anything old and erased the imperial past, now Mr Xi’s emphasis on national greatness has made party leaders heirs to the dynasts of the 18th century, when Qing emperors demanded that Western envoys kowtow (Macartney refused). But there is also plainly practical politics at work. With growth slowing, Mr Xi’s patriotic doctrine looks as if it is designed chiefly to serve as a new source of legitimacy for the Communist Party. It is no coincidence that Mr Xi’s first mention of his dream of “the great revival of the Chinese nation” came in November in a speech at the national museum in Tiananmen Square, where an exhibition called “Road to Revival” lays out China’s suffering at the hands of colonial powers and its rescue by the Communist Party. Dream a little dream of Xi Nobody doubts that Mr Xi’s priority will be to keep the economy growing—the country’s leaders talk about it taking decades for their poor nation to catch up with the much richer Americans—and that means opening up China even more. But his dream has two clear dangers. One is of nationalism. A long-standing sense of historical victimhood means that the rhetoric of a resurgent nation could all too easily turn nasty. As skirmishes and provocations increase in the neighbouring seas (see Banyan), patriotic microbloggers need no encouragement to demand that the Japanese are taught a humiliating lesson. Mr Xi is already playing to the armed forces. In December, on an inspection tour of the navy in southern China, he spoke of a “strong-army dream”. The armed forces are delighted by such talk. Even if Mr Xi’s main aim in pandering to hawks is just to keep them on side, the fear is that it presages a more belligerent stance in East Asia. Nobody should mind a confident China at ease with itself, but a country transformed from a colonial victim to a bully itching to settle scores with Japan would bring great harm to the region—including to China itself. The other risk is that the Chinese dream ends up handing more power to the party than to the people. In November Mr Xi echoed the American dream, declaring that “To meet [our people’s] desire for a happy life is our mission.” Ordinary Chinese citizens are no less ambitious than Americans to own a home (see article), send a child to university or just have fun (see article). But Mr Xi’s main focus seems to be on strengthening the party’s absolute claim on power. The “spirit of a strong army”, he told the navy, lay in resolutely obeying the party’s orders. Even if the Chinese dream avoids Communist rhetoric, Mr Xi has made it clear that he believes the Soviet Union collapsed because the Communist Party there strayed from ideological orthodoxy and rigid discipline. “The Chinese dream”, he has said, “is an ideal. Communists should have a higher ideal, and that is Communism.” A fundamental test of Mr Xi’s vision will be his attitude to the rule of law. The good side of the dream needs it: the economy, the happiness of his people and China’s real strength depend on arbitrary power being curtailed. But corruption and official excess will be curbed only when the constitution becomes more powerful than the party. This message was spelled out in an editorial in a reformist newspaper on January 1st, entitled “The Dream of Constitutionalism”. The editorial called for China to use the rule of law to become a “free and strong country”. But the censors changed the article at the last minute and struck out its title. If that is the true expression of Mr Xi’s dream, then China still has a long journey ahead.

#### Chinese politics is at a cross-roads between reform and nationalism --- the plan inflames the hardline direction

**Lautz 16** --- Moynihan Research Fellow at Syracuse University and former vice president of the Luce Foundation, (Terry Lautz, 5-14-2016, “Of Two Minds On China – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, 6-20-2016, Lexis)//jonah

The fictional Doctor John Doolittle traveled from England to Africa many years ago and discovered a rare creature called the pushmi-pullyu. It looked something like a gazelle, but with no tail. Instead it had two heads with horns, one at each end of its body. As one head slept, the other was awake and watching. One head did most of the talking, allowing the other to eat. How such an amazing animal could walk, much less run, must have been a problem. Of course the pushmi-pullyu existed only in the imagination of Hugh Lofting, who wrote books for children. Today's China is something like this impossible animal with two heads facing in opposite directions. One looks toward openness and reform – freedom of expression, unfettered access to the internet and an independent legal system. It thinks that China's continued development depends on wider acceptance of liberal values and norms. The other head believes, to the contrary, that China's paramount need is unity and stability, guided by the Communist Party. The leadership must do whatever it takes to avoid the fate of the former Soviet Union or, for that matter, the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. To maintain its internal sovereignty and external security, Beijing must be assertive in guarding its interests. China is pushed and pulled in both directions, but now appears to be moving on a perplexing path of more control than reform. If the continued success of its economy depends on greater creativity and innovation, isn't it counterproductive to restrict its citizens' access to ideas and information? If China needs to maintain smooth relations with the rest of the world for the sake of its growth and development, why run the risk of antagonizing other nations with aggressive behavior? There are multiple theories for China's more authoritarian domestic policy and assertive foreign policy: Some observers blame Xi Jinping's rise to power. Since assuming command as president and general secretary of the Communist Party in 2012, he has purged rivals through an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign and has accumulated more influence than any leader since Deng Xiaoping. He is ruthlessly eliminating opposition in the party, state, and military. The official media have cultivated a personality cult depicting him as strong, decisive and affable. While he is widely admired in China, critics view him as a dictator who rejects consensus and substitutes repression for moderation. Fear that the Chinese Communist Party might collapse is offered as another explanation. According to this line of thinking, the perpetuation of party rule is the only viable alternative to a descent into chaos. If the leadership were to accept constitutional democracy and allow a robust civil society, it would undercut the party's authority. Discipline must be imposed, which accounts for censorship of the media; arrests of dissidents; and restrictions on minorities, religious groups, and non-governmental organizations. Opponents say that the party's suppression of dissent and attacks on liberal values are evidence of its inherent weakness. Nationalism is also cited as a reason for China's hardline direction. It is argued that nationalism is the one idea that holds China together, despite efforts to revive allegiance to socialism or cultivate Confucian traditional values like loyalty and harmony. Building and fortifying remote islands in the South China Sea reinforce China's territorial claims, even if it is produces a backlash. Such actions provide a justification for military expenditures and deflect attention from serious internal problems. Since China now has the strength to do as it pleases, it can afford to abandon Deng Xiaoping's dictum of keeping a low international profile. China's social instability is viewed as an additional cause. Because of massive social, economic and political change, each year there are tens of thousands of rural and urban protests over unemployment, land seizures, environmental disasters, the household registration system and other issues. Beijing's inability to undertake fundamental reform to increase transparency and accountability has undermined faith in the government and the party. Attacking corruption, even on a large scale, only treats the symptoms, not the underlying causes of China's unrest. The party-state's response has been to revive policies of the past to keep the smoldering social volcano from erupting. One might logically conclude that China's global image is being tarnished by Xi's centralization of power, the Communist Party's crackdown on civil society, a more aggressive form of nationalism and growing social instability. Yet world opinion is not so negative as some observers might imagine. Mounting concern in the West about China's direction under Xi Jinping is not necessarily shared by others. Beijing has invested enormous amounts of money in television and print media as well as educational ventures such as the Confucius Institutes to cultivate a positive image abroad and convince the international community that its rise is not a threat. The success of these soft-power ventures is unclear, but many nations continue to view China through a pragmatic rather than an ideological lens. According to Pew Research Center surveys conducted in 2014 and 2015, views are most favorable in countries that benefit from substantial trade, aid and investment with China. Admiration for the success of China's state-directed capitalism is another factor in some parts of the world. Last year, 79 percent of Russia and over half of those surveyed in various African and Latin American countries were more positive than negative, as was Australia, which sells substantial natural resources to China. Pakistan, a long-time partner, was 82 percent favorable and only 4 percent unfavorable. India was ambiguous about China with 41 percent positive and 32 percent negative. At the other end of the spectrum, countries that have territorial disputes with China are far less positive. Japan was the most negative, 89 percent, followed by Vietnam, 74 percent. Public opinion in Turkey was unfavorable, 59 percent, because of China's treatment of Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang. American opinion has turned more unfavorable, 54 percent, than favorable, 38 percent, since Xi Jinping's rise to power. Americans are worried about the US-China trade deficit and the loss of jobs. They are also concerned about cyber attacks, Beijing's human rights record, China's impact on the environment and its growing military strength. Western Europe mostly shares these concerns, although France has been more positive than negative. Global responses to China's policies vary a great deal. Mostly positive views could quickly erode if China's economy experiences a severe downturn. Deeper social turmoil, possibly exacerbated by the challenges of a rapidly aging population, could worsen its image. Military conflict in Asia – in the South China Sea or with Japan or Taiwan – would disrupt trade and have a chilling effect on world opinion. But we must exercise caution in coming to conclusions about where China is heading. China is a wondrous and perplexing creature with two heads pointing in opposite directions. One is friendly and cooperative, the other appears menacing and unpredictable. Whether these can be reconciled seems unlikely, but the past is littered with predictions that never came to pass. We only know that the future is fraught with uncertainty and the stakes are extremely high.

### L booster – China Dream

#### Trending away from socialism and toward the “China Dream”

**EAF, 4/25**/16 – East Asian Forum (“The limits to Chinese political power”, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/04/25/the-limits-to-chinese-political-power/>, //11)

It is the second of these that worries him most. He thinks that Xi Jinping is trying to personalise institutional reforms, and argues that this personalisation of institutional power will lead to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s ‘cannabalis[ing] itself’. Nathan Attrill has similar concerns, noting that Xi’s personalised leadership is attended by great risks.

What does this mean?

According to Minzner, the mechanisms by which the central state exerts power are steadily sliding towards de-institutionalised channels. These channels include: ‘cultivation of a budding cult of personality around Xi and a steady ideological pivot away from the Communist Party’s revolutionary socialist origins in favour of the “China Dream”, a revival of an ethno-nationalist ideology rooted in imperial history, tradition and Confucianism, and a revival of Maoist-era tactics of “rule by fear” including televised confessions and unannounced disappearances of state officials and civil society activists alike. Fear, tradition and personal charisma do not amount to institutional governance…The Party-state’s reform-era efforts to build more institutionalised systems of governance are being steadily eroded’.

### L booster – transition period

#### Link booster --- period of transition magnifies political responses

**Rudd, 15** – Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Former Prime Minister of Australia (Kevin, Belfer Center, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping”, April 2015, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf>, //11)

American strategic perceptions and responses to Xi Jinping’s China are therefore in a period of transition, just as China itself is now in transition. During times of transition, therefore, there is often a risk of radically underestimating or over-dramatizing the significance of the profound changes underway. Rising China is no longer “business as usual” for America. But neither, for the decade ahead, is this new China becoming a major direct military threat to U.S. interests. Instead, the U.S. sees China as actively competing for political, diplomatic and security policy space in Asia at America’s expense; to the extent that China is increasingly seen as pursuing a long-term policy aimed at pushing the United States out of Asia altogether with a view to establishing its own sphere of strategic influence across the region over time.

### L booster – retaliation

#### The plan guts Xi’s ability to push reforms

**Lieberthal 12** --- Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution (Kenneth, 10-24-12, FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: A POST-DEBATE ANALYSIS, Brookings, 6-24-16, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/10/24-fp-debate/foreign-policy-post-debate-corrected-transcript.pdf)//jonah

But perhaps most important, the Chinese are electing a new leadership almost the same week that we are. And the new man coming in, Xi Jinping, has a huge set of domestic problems that he needs to focus on and he needs to build his credibility in China domestically after he gets into office. In China, you don’t campaign for office publicly and say what you’ll do. You campaign after you’ve already been given the office and then build your capacity to get something done. And coming in – therefore -- if we declare them a currency manipulator on day one, Xi will retaliate very strongly. And he will for two reasons: one, to teach the new U.S. President that this is the wrong way to get cooperation from China, but even more importantly, he cannot come into office and be seen in his initial days in office as caving to U.S. pressure and hope to have credibility to implement the domestic changes that are his real agenda. So this is a wrong assessment and risks getting off to a very bad start; worst case, escalating into a real trade war because I’m almost sure the retaliation would be on the trade side.

### L booster – factionalism

#### And, Chinese factionalism means Xi must carefully craft and execute policy decisions

Dr. Li 13

(Cheng, master's in Asian studies from the University of California, Berkeley and a doctorate in political science from Princeton University. director of the John L. Thornton China Center and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, From 1993 to 1995, he worked in China as a fellow with the U.S.-based Institute of Current World Affairs pg online @ “China’s Third Plenum: Reform And Opening Up 2.0?,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2013/10/31-chinas-third-plenum-reform-and-opening-up/103113\_cpc\_transcript\_ia.pdf //um-ef)

Finally, the third pessimistic view about the lack of consensus within the leadership and the factional in-fighting, it is true that we cannot understand Chinese politics without a grasp of factional tensions. And after past months, no one understands the importance of factional tension better than we do in Washington. Do you agree? Well, Chinese leaders in the past Deng era, are generally divided into two coalitions -- the Jiang Zemin camp currently led by President Xi Jinping, and the Hu Jintao camp, currently led by Premier Li Keqiang. President Xi Jinping now holds a six to one majority on the Politburo Standing Committee. Premier Li seemed to have had the cooperative partnership thus far. For example, publicly, Premier Li has been seen as the leader, pushing for the establishment of the Shanghai free trade zone, although the real driving force is, in fact, the Jiang Zemin camp, whose power base is in Shanghai. But the strong influence of President Xi and his protégé in China’s economic and financial circles may make Premier Li uneasy. Also, a majority of senior officials, one or two levels below the Politburo Standing Committee actually belong to Hu Jintao’s camp, particularly 376 Central Committee members. The majority of them belong to Hu Jintao’s camp. I just did a study about over 90 of them belong to the so-called tuanpai, the Communist Youth League. These are the protégés of Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang. They are surely interested in gaining more seats in the top leadership or having someone occupy the top driver seat in the years to come. Their policy agenda and the regional priority may differ from President Xi’s. In four years, China will have another round of leadership in-fighting as five out of the seven Politburo Standing Committee members will retire. This means that a new run of vicious fighting for seats on this superior leadership body now occurs on a fiveyear cycle rather than its general 10-year cycle. Now, it is possible that a vicious power struggle may get out of control leading to a Chinese style government shutdown. Luckily, for the Chinese, if such a shutdown occurs, they can still watch the American panda cam. No, we cannot see during the shutdown. But all of these observations will actually encourage Xi Jinping and his coalition to more forcefully carry out their market reform agenda. Failure to deliver will significantly undermine Xi Jinping’s credibility, reduce middle class support, further alienate the liberal intellectuals, marginalize China from important international economic integration, like the potential TPP. And most importantly, make accountable China’s strategic condition to a consumption-driven economy.

### AT link turn – P win for China

#### Nationalist pressure from powerful lobbyists thumps perceived economic and diplomatic benefits

PBS, 12 – (“New Chinese Leaders Affirm Nationalist Ideals Rather Than Reform,” November 15, 2012, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-july-dec12-china2\_11-15/) hk

JEFFREY BROWN: What kinds of things would be on the table that might impact the long-term relationship? CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON: Yes. I think what is going to be going on for Xi Jinping and his policy toward the U.S. is a struggle between his own inclinations and some of the pressures that we have been seeing developing in China. It’s clear. Because his daughter is at Harvard, because he’s visited the United States many times — his visit here in February, he made clear that he has positive feelings towards the United States and wants to maintain a stable bilateral relationship. The problem is that we have seen the increase of these nationalist voices as China’s status internationally has risen. And they’re calling for the new leadership not to be seen as caving to U.S. pressure. And so Xi is going to have to find that balance between his own natural inclinations to have a good relationship and these pressures that he’s facing from within. JEFFREY BROWN: But the question is, where do those pressures come from and how strong are they? CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON: They’re quite strong. And it’s a combination of factors. One, of course the one that everyone points to is the military and the increasing voice of the Chinese military. This is often overdrawn, however, in my opinion. They certainly are an influential actor within the system. They have been modernizing their military and they have strong views on these territorial issues, such as these island disputes and so on. But the bigger factor has been the nationalism among the common public that the party itself has unleashed in an effort to legitimize itself with the fall of communist ideology and so on.

## Links --- Specific

### L – AIIB

#### An AIIB that excludes the US is perceived by China as critical to Xi’s “Chinese Dream”

---part of this card makes the argument that the infl uq of other developed economies into the AIIB will diminish China’s influence --- in the context of the DA that’s not relevant b/c it’s all about posturing against US lead --- it can be spun that the Chinese public will see these developed economies as abandoning the US and instead aligning with China, which would prove China’s rising influence

**EAF, 15** – East Asia Forum (“China’s Credibility and Influence Risk in the Success of the AIIB”, 4/27/15, <http://www.economywatch.com/features/Chinas-Credibility-and-Influence-Risk-in-the-Success-of-the-AIIB.04-27-15.html>, //11)

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has become part of Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream’ of national rejuvenation. The United States’ failure to block other developed economies from joining the AIIB seems to have brought this part of the ‘Chinese dream’ closer to its realisation. But it is way too early to celebrate. A bigger AIIB does not necessarily mean a better one. Beijing must prepare to play an institutional game with other members inside the AIIB.

More members — especially from developed countries — will dilute China’s influence inside the AIIB. China originally held 49 percent of total capital, making its leadership undisputable. As more developed economies join as founding members, China’s total capital share will decrease. This opens up the challenge of institutional balancing.

Institutional balancing refers to the diplomatic strategies that allow states to rely on institutions to constrain other members’ power and influence. There are two types of institutional balancing: exclusive institutional balancing and inclusive institutional balancing. The former refers to excluding a target state from the designated institution, and using institutional unity to alienate and pressure the target state. The latter refers to including the target state in the institution, but using the institution’s rules and norms to constrain and shape its behaviour.

The AIIB can be China’s exclusive institutional balancing strategy against the United States. The success of the AIIB might not mean the end of US leadership but it will definitely steal the United States’ thunder in the global financial system. But China will face inclusive institutional balancing efforts from other countries, especially the UK, Germany, France and Australia.

#### Xi’s influence is linked to CCP success --- the plan is seen as appeasing China which consolidates Xi’s power

**Jian, 5/13**/16 – writer for the Bangkok Post (Ma, Bangkok Post, “Xi strives to secure Mao-style authority”, <http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/971225/xi-strives-to-secure-mao-style-authority>, //11)

Mr Xi knows that he can succeed only by reinforcing the Party's authority, and his position as its leader. So he has presented the narrative that there is a threat to China from within -- a threat posed by treacherous and corrupt leaders -- and has declared Party loyalty to be of paramount importance. There are only two types of people: Those who support the Party and those who do not. Like Mao in 1966, Mr Xi believes the power hinges on making all Chinese -- government officials and ordinary citizens alike – loyal and obedient through any means. Power is founded on the repression of opponents, such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo and the tens of thousands of other jailed authors and scholars.

But Mr Xi is not counting on fear along to cement his rule. He is also attempting to win popular support with a new unifying ideology, based on the so-called China Dream, a set of socialist values and goals that are supposed to bring about the “great renewal of the Chinese nation”. This has been accompanied by a galvanizing form of nationalism that portrays the world, particularly the US, as seeking to keep China from assuming its rightful place atop the international order. And he has nurtured a personality cult of a kind not seen since Mao.

### L – NoKo

#### Chinese engagement with North Korea cost Xi political capital

Glaser, 16 - (Bonnie S., senior adviser for Asia and director of the China Power Project at CSIS, "China’s Reaction to North Korea’s Nuclear Test," No Publication, 1-7-2016, http://cogitasia.com/chinas-reaction-to-north-koreas-nuclear-test/,//BR/)

China’s relations with North Korea have been strained in recent years primarily due to North Korea’s insistence on pursuing its nuclear weapons program. After a prolonged period of tension during which high-level exchanges were suspended, Beijing became anxious about its lack of both knowledge about developments inside North Korea and channels to Pyongyang and subsequently launched an effort to repair frayed ties. In mid-2015, China hosted Choe Ryong-hae at its military parade celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. A month later Beijing dispatched Liu Yunshan to Pyongyang to attend its military parade, the first visit by a member of China’s seven-man Politburo Standing Committee since 2011. The nascent improvement in China-North Korea relations apparently suffered a setback when Kim’s favorite North Korea pop band canceled its performances in China, possibly because of Pyongyang’s claim to possession of a hydrogen bomb. North Korea’s decision to conduct a fourth nuclear test will likely further sour China-DPRK ties. Pyongyang apparently did not provide any notice to Beijing prior to the test, which it had done prior to previous tests. Given China’s persistent diplomatic efforts to reconvene the Six Party Talks and its repeated urgings to North Korea to return to its denuclearization commitments, Kim Jong-un’s decision to proceed with another nuclear test is a statement of defiance and a slap in China’s face. Xi Jinping, who has been unwilling to spend any political capital on improving ties with Pyongyang, will likely be further convinced that his emphasis on developing relations with Seoul is correct. In the absence of a change in North Korea’s stance on its nuclear program Xi is unlikely to agree to meet with Kim Jong-un for the remainder of his term in office, which extends to the end of 2022. It cannot be ruled out that Xi will undertake a recalibration of China’s policy toward North Korea in an effort to more effectively protect and advance Chinese interests going forward.

#### Coercing China about North Korea inflames backlash --- perceived as further containment

**Mead 12** --- James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and previously taught American foreign policy at Yale University (Walter Russell Mead, 4-30-2012, "High Noon in Beijing" American Interest, 6-25-2016, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/2012/04/30/high-noon-in-beijing/)//jonah

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will be arriving in Beijing at perhaps the diciest moment in US-China relations since Richard Nixon reached out to shake Chou Enlai’s hand on his historic visit to what American conservatives then still called Red China. Last fall, the Obama administration pulled off a diplomatic revolution in maritime Asia — the coastal and trading states on and around the Asian mainland that stretch in an arc from Korea and Japan, down to Australia and Indonesia, and sweep around through southeast Asia to India and Sri Lanka. Via Meadia has been following this story closely; it is the biggest geopolitical event since 9/11 and, while it builds on a set of US policies that go back at least as far as the Clinton administration and were further developed in the Bush years, the administration’s mix of policies represent a decisive turning point in 21st century Asian history. The legacy press, still befuddled from drinking too much of the ‘US in decline’ Koolaid so widely peddled in recent years, has still not grasped just how audacious, risky and above all successful the new strategy is: the United States is building a Pacific entente to counter — though not to contain — the consequences of China’s economic growth and military posture in the region. The US is lending its unequivocal support to the smaller Asian states who have boundary disputes with China in the resource-rich, strategically vital South China Sea. It has announced new deployments of troops and new military agreements as it extends its military network from northeast Asia (Japan, Korea, the Pacific islands) south and east to Australia, Singapore and beyond. It continues to deepen its strategic relation with India — Asia’s other nuclear superpower with a billion plus citizens and a country which openly states that the purpose of its (growing) nuclear arsenal is to balance China. Additionally, the US has launched a new round of trade talks, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP that will open markets dramatically among a group of Asia-Pacific countries. China has not been invited to join. These are bold moves. Many China specialists were unnerved as the administration rolled the new policy out last fall, fearing that the US push back would strengthen hardliners in Beijing to commit to a full-on anti-US policy. That hasn’t happened yet, largely because in spite of all the misguided hype about China’s inexorable rise there isn’t actually much Beijing can do about Washington’s new activism. The more it pushes its territorial claims in the South China Sea, the more tightly the other countries will cling to Washington’s skirts. Dumping its dollar hoard would wreck the Chinese economy. Taking a super hard line on Syria and Iran will annoy the Gulf Arabs whose oil keeps China’s factories running. Naval exercises with Russia don’t even impress North Korea, much less cow Washington. While a formidable power in many respects, and one potentially with a great future, China is simply not a peer competitor of Washington in Asia at this point, and its illusions and pretensions left China uncomfortably exposed when the real world power decided to raise its game in the Pacific Basin. Fine tuning diplomacy is a difficult thing, especially when adjusting the relations of great powers. Since the administration began to roll out its maritime initiatives last fall, a number of things have happened — some by coincidence, some as unforeseen consequences of steps the US took — that have actually made our China policy much stronger and more effective than planned. It is these follow-ons and the coincidences more than our actual Asia policies that make Clinton’s Beijing trip so fraught. Look at what has happened since the new US Asia policy launched last year: Myanmar, one of China’s only two regional allies, has switched sides, and is working increasingly closely with America’s partners in the Pacific Entente. The Philippines have taken a highly visible, confrontational posture toward Chinese ‘interlopers’ in waters Manila claims, and have attempted to engage direct US support. China’s economic growth has slowed and its exporters are experiencing shrinking demand even as labor unrest at home puts new pressure on manufacturers. The Bo Xilai fiasco has exposed the fissures in China’s leadership, destroyed hopes of a smooth power transition and shone a spotlight on entrenched corruption and the conflict and rivalries at the heart of China’s ruling elite. Now, the daring night time escape of Chen Guangcheng and his race across 500 kilometers to the shelter of the US embassy has both enraged and humiliated China’s government — hours before Secretary Clinton’s scheduled arrival. It is a safe bet that some Chinese nationalists, including people high up in various state and military organizations, are shaking with rage and frustration as they contemplate these events. Conspiracy theories popular in some circles associate the US with the Bo Xilai scandal — after all, it was to the US consulate in Chengdu that Wang Lijun fled and where he spilled the beans about the reign of Bo in Chongqing. Chen’s flight to the embassy will further deepen the angry paranoia in some circles; it will seem obvious to some that he could not have made this escape without more help than a handful of dissidents could provide, and the timing is so spectacular that it must be part of some secret, long prepared American scheme. Put these ‘facts’ together with the new American assertiveness in the region, and many serious people in China will draw the conclusion that the US is trying to do to China what it did to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they will think we are perilously close to success — so close, that any further concessions and retreats must be resisted as a matter of life and death. (That within a few months a leading Chinese official and a leading dissident should both have turned in extremis to American diplomats should, by the way, make Americans everywhere stand a little taller. We have somehow managed to acquire a reputation for honest dealing and political courage in China; it should be our goal to preserve that. There are times when it is appropriate to be proud of your country, and this is one of them.) These events tap into some deep wounds in Chinese historical memory, and fears of being ignored, humiliated and pushed around by a self-righteous and imperial West, never far beneath the surface in modern China, are flaring up. It’s worse because so recently China seemed to be riding so high; many people inside China believed all the hype about China’s rise and America’s decline as thoroughly as any group of European intellectuals, and the shock of realizing how wrong they were is severe. Meanwhile, the strategy of China’s current leadership had been to use both the Bo Xilai affair and the painful blow back from China’s South China Sea adventure to deepen their hold on power and strengthen the country’s adherence to the path of reform at home, “peaceful rise” abroad. Wen Jiabao was using Bo’s fall as an opportunity to target the entire left-nationalist-populist bloc in Chinese politics and cement the power of the more modernizing, reformist wing of the ruling party. Bo’s fall allowed the political leadership to reassert its leadership over the military as well, as military leaders fell in line to fight against those in the army who favored Bo’s nostalgic, left-tinged nationalism. From a US perspective, that looked like a pretty good outcome. The Obama administration was ready to approach China with open hands, offering its newly strengthened reformist leadership an opportunity to move forward even as it applied some discreet pressure on issues like Iran and Syria where it hopes for more Chinese help. The Chen escape seriously complicates that strategy. From the standpoint of China’s leadership, the flight points to a degree of incompetence and laxity that is deeply humiliating to all concerned. How can a single blind man in poor health outwit the security establishment of the most powerful one party state on earth? How can a dissident under house arrest pop up in American hands on the eve of vital talks with the American Secretary of State? And finally there is another shadow that will hang over Secretary Clinton in Beijing. Japan’s Prime Minister Noda will be meeting President Obama while Secretary Clinton is meeting the Chinese, and the Japanese and American leaders are expected to discuss enhanced security cooperation that would see Japanese troops training on US bases even as the island nation expands military ties, arms shipments and “strategic” aid throughout Asia. High on both President Obama’s and Prime Minister Noda’s to-do list: developing strategies to rein in China’s last remaining regional ally North Korea. None of this suggests easy bargaining over the fate of Mr. Chen, nor does it make it any easier for the Chinese leadership to cooperate right now on other issues of mutual concern. The Obama administration cannot force Mr. Chen to walk out into Chinese custody without a serious loss of prestige and moral capital; the Chinese authorities cannot let him go without paying a high price. When the Obama administration set out to check China last year, it did not intend to corner or contain it. But America is a bit stronger and China somewhat weaker and more fragile than most people thought, and our policies have succeeded perhaps a bit more than we might have liked. Kurt Campbell, Clinton’s chief Asia deputy, flew quietly to Beijing to try to prevent the Chen question from spoiling the summit; no doubt he and Secretary Clinton will have to talk fast and talk well to provide their hosts with some reassurance that the US genuinely does want reasonable and respectful relations with Beijing. What we all seem to be learning in Asia is that events have a logic and a pace of their own. America can set a policy in motion, but we can’t control or fine tune the consequences of our policies as they ripple out across the world. Many conversations with US officials in this and in prior administrations have left me convinced that the US is not trying to contain China the way we once contained the Soviet Union. While virtually all Americans at senior levels believe that over time economic progress will lead to political change in China, this is because most Americans are hardwired to think in those terms and this whiggish faith in the historical process is not a statement of policy or intent. Leading Americans in both parties generally hope for a peaceful and gradual reform process rather than violent conflict in China; they do not want to dismember or impoverish China and they would not welcome its disintegration. Nor do Americans see the evolution of a future Asian security order in zero-sum terms. The United States wants to prevent Chinese domination of Asia but we do not want to dominate the region ourselves. Many Chinese, I have found on my visits there, have a much darker view of our intentions, and see the US and China entangled in a zero sum battle for dominance which only one side can win. For now, it appears that the US, surprisingly to some Chinese analysts, is winning that contest. We should not expect Chinese hard liners to accept that situation with calm and resignation, even if their present options are limited. Secretary Clinton will be flying from China on to India by way of Bangladesh. With Japan’ Noda in Washington and Clinton in New Delhi, the view from Beijing is likely to remain dark. Additional irritating events are sure to occur. It is in the interest of smaller powers like Vietnam and the Philippines to exploit their new support from Washington for what they can; this will make them more assertive in the South China Sea and new incidents will likely occur that confront the Chinese government with an unpalatable choice between looking weak or enduring a crisis. The question of US arms sales to Taiwan will no doubt come up. North Korea can be expected to misbehave. More actions by more dissidents at home will agitate domestic opinion and affect China’s standing abroad. The global economic uncertainties will force China’s hand on economic policy in ways that may complicate its relations with trading partners, including the US. During the interminable US election campaign now already under way, the two candidates and their surrogates will compete to sound tough about China on trade, security and humanitarian issues. America’s new stance in Asia is real and it won’t be changing soon. The consequences of that shift for Asian politics and for US-China relations are complex and won’t be fully understood for some time. But this is a murky and even a dangerous time; we wish Secretary Clinton every possible success as she attempts to build bridges between two very different political cultures and world views.

### L – Tibet

#### Fear of losing control of Tibet destroys Xi’s political credibility

Cheung, 5-27-2016 - (Justin, Stony Brook University’s 8 Year BE/MD Engineering Scholars for Medicine Program, published in the Center for International Relation’s International Affairs Forum, "China’s Chengdu-Lhasa Railway: Tibet and 'One Belt, One Road'," Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/chinas-chengdu-lhasa-railway-tibet-and-one-belt-one-road/,//BR/>)

It is no secret that Tibetan independence movements have long drawn the ire of Chinese authorities. Alongside heightened rhetoric in recent years over Tibetan unrest and the growing publicity of riots and self-immolations, China has sought to augment its capacity for crackdown in the restive province. The swiftness of Chinese response to previous swells of separatist sentiment is best illustrated in the 2008 Tibetan unrest. During that time, the BBC reported that within days of the start of anti-government riots, over 400 troop carriers of the People’s Armed Police were mobilized. Ultimately, the speed with which the Chinese government was able to ferry troops into sites of unrest was a crucial factor in quelling the upheaval. In more recent times, China’s “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) policy – Xi Jinping’s plan to expand the reach of Chinese trade routes to Europe through a land route in Central Asia and a sea route through the Indian Ocean and around the horn of Africa – has taken center stage as a cornerstone of modern Chinese foreign policy. Access to Pakistan and Central Asia are crucial to ensure the success of these trade routes, which incidentally must start or pass through Tibet or Xinjiang, historically separatist provinces. This has put particularly urgent pressure on the Chinese government to bring stability to its westernmost regions. Furthermore, the implementation of the OBOR policy comes at a critical time for China. Recent downturns in economic growth and output have put leaders such as Xi Jinping in a bind, spending a great deal of political capital to restrict and cripple any seeds of social dissent. On a geopolitical level, ensuring robust strategic control over Tibet has never been more essential, for both propaganda and economic reasons.

### L – QPQ

#### And, QPQ’s cause massive friction – too many bureaucratic actors

CSM 15

(“The US and China: Will it be collision or cooperation?,” pg online @ <http://m.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2015/0913/The-US-and-China-Will-it-be-collision-or-cooperation> //ghs-ef)

Boiled down, Rudd’s argument is that the US and China need to set aside political issues on which their positions are too far apart, such as the status of Taiwan. Instead, they should build mutual trust via joint initiatives on common problems where there is overlap while taking a “constructive” approach to bilateral and multilateral issues, such as reform of the UN and of Pan-Asian forums. Rudd argues that Sino-American cooperation can in time yield the political capital needed for strategic breakthroughs. Curbing the effects of climate change – Mr. Obama and Xi drew up a joint plan of action at a summit in Beijing last November – is an example of common purpose. Rudd says his report is aimed primarily at policy elites in the US and China, and that any bluntness is intentional. “It’s causing some level of discomfort in both capitals, I assume.... I’m not in the business of dancing around the edges,” he says. For US readers, Rudd deftly unspools Chinese “realist” thinking on the tenets of American foreign policy, namely that the US has “a dual strategy of undermining China from within, while also containing China from without.” Exhibit A: Obama’s first-term “pivot” to Asia and US arms sales to countries such as India and Vietnam. From China’s perspective, such steps are evidence of preemptive containment. Similarly, Rudd recognizes the concerns of US strategists who fret that China seeks to create a sphere of influence in Asia that would exclude the US. Rudd notes that Xi is far more decisive and destiny-driven than his predecessors. In May 2014, Xi outlined a regional security concept in which the US wasn’t welcome. “The people of Asia are capable and wise enough to strengthen cooperation among themselves in order to achieve the peace and stability of Asia,” he said. The US military remains far more capable and better equipped than the Chinese military and is likely to remain so for decades. But perceptions matter. In 2013, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reported the findings of a survey of opinion leaders in China and the US. Majorities in both countries said they viewed the other country as a competitor. Asked if they considered China as an enemy, only 2 percent of US government elites said they did. Among Chinese, 27 percent view the US as an enemy. Critics say Rudd’s engagement strategy – finding common ground and solving non-core problems – won’t defuse the deeper divisions. Sino-American tensions aren’t simply about a lack of goodwill or diplomatic mechanisms, says Ashley Tellis, a senior associate at Carnegie and coauthor of a report published in April that advocates a hawkish US stance on China. “These are fundamental clashes of interest. There’s nothing in Kevin’s report that tells me how to circumnavigate these clashes.” Rudd argues that Xi may be open to a “grand strategic bargain” with the US on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Other analysts have proposed that a parallel formula be found for Taiwan, whereby the US stops selling weapons in return for a Chinese pledge not to force reunification. Mr. Bader, who was Obama’s principal adviser on Asia from 2009 to 2011, is skeptical of sweeping quid pro quo deals. “They don’t happen. Every issue is unique and disaggregated and has its own set of bureaucratic actors involved,” he says. Professor Nathan discounts the likelihood of any great- power accommodation, too, which he likens to the 1815 Congress of Vienna. “I think there will be a long period of friction over these particular issues. I don’t think they can be settled upfront by some kind of compromise.”

# INTERNALS

## ILs – economy

### IL – reforms KT China econ

#### And, supply-side reforms key to Chinese Economy – passage key

China Daily 5/17 (“Supply-side reform 'needs a big push',” pg online at http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-05/17/content\_25310956.htm //um-ef)

President Xi Jinping urged on Monday to "resolutely push forward supply-side structural reform" as the world's second-largest economy still faces strong headwinds, reflected by its easing economic indicators for April. The reform is the key to the overall and long-term well-being of the Chinese economy, he told a meeting of the Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs. The Chinese economy faces cyclical problems as well as challenges of scale, but the structural and supply-side problems are the most serious, he was quoted by China Central Television as saying. "The main direction (of the reform) is to reduce ineffective supply, increase effective supply, and make the supply structure more fitting to the demand structure," he said. The core of the reform is to push the reform of State-owned enterprises, accelerate the transformation of government functions, and deepen fundamental reforms, such as those in the pricing, fiscal and taxation, financial and pension fields, the president added. The market and government should both better play their roles to balance the reforms, he said. Xi made the comments following publication of an article by People's Daily on May 9 citing an "authoritative figure" who analyzed the causes of China's economic woes and offered the prescription of supply-side reform. On May 10, People's Daily published the text of a speech that Xi delivered to principal ministerial and provincial officials in January, when he had said that China's economic future will hinge on supply-side structural reforms. "Xi's reiteration of supply-side structural reform reflects policymakers' judgment of the current situation," said Dong Yuping, an economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "Supply-side structural reform is the key to solving the problems facing the economy," he told China Daily. Supply-side reform, which should focus on "allowing the market to play a decisive role", must be pushed to add to the long-term vitality of the Chinese economy, said Dong. Niu Fengrui, director of the Institute for Urban and Environmental Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said China has yet to effectively implement the supply-side reform agenda. "That's why Xi has repeatedly called for strengthening of efforts to push the reform," Niu said. China's economic growth dipped to 6.9 percent last year, the slowest in 25 years. Although economic indicators showed a mild rebound in the first quarter, the April data show the momentum of recovery has eased.

#### And, reform is key to re-balance the economy – short term slow in growth is key to effective long-term growth and sustainability

Berkelmans 15 (Leon Berkelmans, Director of the International Economy Program and the G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy, “Xi Jinping and China's New Era of Reform,” pg online at http://www.cfr.org/china/xi-jinping-chinas-new-era-reform/p36442#transcript //um-ef)

BERKELMANS: So, on the Intel (ph) corruption campaign, I don't—I haven't seen too much discussion of the economic rationale behind it either, and I think there is economic rationale behind it. I've heard the argument made, and I think there's logic to it, that China's at a stage of its economic development, and it's staging—reforming economy that it needs to clean house. If they don't clean house then any further reforms are going to be ineffectual at best or counter-productive at worst. So if you think—I'll go back to the financial sector again, if corruption is rampant in the financial sector and you liberalize that sector, then you could get wide scale fraud, or you could get finance just diverted to fairly the unproductive areas of the economy. So I think there's a clearly economic rationale behind the anti-corruption campaign as well. KAHN: But the anti-corruption campaign has coincided with a tightening, a significant tightening, in the economy. You know, with the recent data showing a slowdown in the economy that we hadn't seen really since the direct aftermath of Tiananmen Square crackdown. Does that still—are you still optimistic that that's more a precursor to a new wave of more constructive, better balance growth, or are you wary about... BERKELMANS: Definitely better balanced. So, China is at a stage, I think, where—well, for a long time they've been reliant on construction and manufacturing as a large source of their growth, and I think that those days are pretty much over. So, when I was at the Reserve Bank of Australia, I worked on the China desk, and we did some projections out --long-term projections for—after 2040 for China's urban residential construction. Now, long-term projections like that are very bold in the Sir Humphrey Appleby sense of being bold, but they—we just sort of did it to get a sense check of what was going on. We came to the conclusion that China's residential construction was going to peak perhaps in about 2014, and that—we sort of see that coming through the data right now. So, as a source of growth, residential construction—and I think the same thing is happening in manufacturing—those days are pretty much over. Construction is going to remain at a very high level, but it's not going to grow anymore. What is going to have to take its place is consumption and services. And one thing about services, is that productivity growth is not as strong in services for whatever reason, as it is in construction and manufacturing. So, naturally, as the economy becomes more focused on services, it's just not going to grow as quickly. So this slowdown is necessary. It's healthy. They may be overdoing it a little bit. The extent of the slowdown has surprised me. The economy is experiencing deflation at the moment, which is some indication that they are producing...

#### Xi’s reforms are needed to continue China’s economic stability

**Tanaka, 15** – [Osamu, is the Executive Vice President at the Policy Research Institute of Ministry of Finance in Japan, Public Policy Review, “Economic Reform and Economic Policy of the Xi Jinping Leadership”, Vol.11 No.1, March 2015, <https://www.mof.go.jp/english/pri/publication/pp_review/ppr027/ppr027a.pdf>, 6/22/16]JRO

Contribution of Finance to the Actual Economy The 10 Financial Policies that were announced in July 2013 played an active role in facilitating economic development, strengthening weak points, and rehabilitating the financial system, etc. Currently, the economy is operated steadily; however, it is necessary to maintain moderate financial policies under the situation where the downward pressure remains to be strong. It is necessary to implement existing policies as well as deepening financial reform, implementing prior adjustment and micro adjustments moderately in a timely manner by using structural adjustment methods, and facilitate “blood circulation” so that finance can contribute to the actual economy. A Maintain a reasonable size of money, loans, and social financing. Strengthen measures to decrease reserve requirement rates with specified directions, decrease reserve requirement rates appropriately for banks which meet the demand of structural adjustment, such as the “Three Rural Issues,” small- and micro-sized companies, etc., and which have lent loans to actual economy satisfying market demand reached at specified rate of total loans.14 Expand the size of re-loan or special financial bonds by the central bank to support small- and micro-sized company support. Stimulate stock of loans by strengthening writing off bad debts, implementing securitization of loan assets, improvement of macro-prudence management, etc. B Reduce the cost of social financing. Standardize interbank loans, trusts, financial products, entrustment loans, and other operations, streamline unnecessary “routes” and “bridges” stages of capital, and reduce the chain of financing. Develop special inspections for collecting bank commission fees. Cancel any items that only collect commission fees, but provide no services. Reduce guarantee charges for small-and micro-sized companies. C Optimize loan structures. Distinguish items to be supported and items to be restricted, and increase support for national priority construction, company reconstruction, the service industry, etc. D Improve financial services. Increase the efficiency of loan examination and approval. Strengthen the establishment of a rural credit system and security and guarantee system. Expand the coverage percentage of agricultural insurance. E Strengthen risk monitoring and oversight. Streamline structures for sound default and failure resolution of financial markets, strengthen debt management of the local government, and thereby prevent financial risks.

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#### Try or die for Xi’s reforms – the 2017 power transition prevents meaningful collective action – proves Xi’s power grab is necessary

**Li 14** [Cheng - director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. “Xi’s Reform Agenda: Promises and Risks”, China US Focus, March 03, 2014, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/xis-reform-agenda-promises-and-risks/>] bjs

How can we reconcile the fantastic opportunities and potentially enormous risks that lie ahead for the world’s second-largest economy? Contrary to the widespread pessimism that currently holds sway, I am optimistic for several reasons. First and foremost, Xi’s economic reform agenda wisely addresses some of the country’s most serious economic problems. The new leadership unambiguously aims to tackle them in a forceful manner. Second, Xi not only took control of all the supreme institutions in the party, state, and military during the latest political succession, but he also now chairs the newly established National Security Committee and the Central Leading Group on Comprehensive Deepening of Economic Reform. The lower levels of the Chinese government have also established leading groups on economic reform headed by party secretaries and governors or mayors. All of these provide institutional mechanisms through which Xi and his team can more effectively implement reform policies. Third, Xi has been supported not only by experienced economic reformers in the top leadership but also by a group of world-class financial technocrats, including Harvard graduate Liu He and Stanford-trained Fang Xinghai. Recently, Ma Jun, Deuteche Bank’s former chief economist on greater China, was appointed as chief economist of the People’s Bank of China. Huang Yiping, former chief economist of emerging Asia for Barclays, also joined the advisory team to the top leadership. Finally, the timetable for the bold reform agenda reflects President Xi’s political calculations to stabilize the Chinese economy before the fall of 2017, when the party leadership will experience another major turnover (because of age limits, 5 out of 7 members of the Politburo Standing Committee will retire that year). Xi needs to consolidate power for his second term by unequivocally succeeding in implementing his economic reform agenda. To minimize political risks, President Xi needs to perform a delicate balancing act among several key issues. While it is strategically sound for him to prioritize economic reforms, he must make bold moves at the appropriate time to implement much-needed political reforms—like increasing political openness and the role of civil society—without which China will never become a true innovation-driven economy. The ongoing anti-corruption campaign is crucial to increasing public confidence in the short term, but this should not serve as a replacement for developing the rule of law or embarking on concrete steps toward establishing an independent judicial system in the country. It makes good sense that Xi initially wants to consolidate his power by taking over all important leadership posts and by promoting his confidants and allies. But he should also broaden his political coalition to incorporate some of the prominent leaders in the competing faction (notably Li Keqiang’s “youth league” officials). Finally, the broad public support that Xi has earned, especially from the military, should allow him to concentrate on a domestic economic reform agenda and avoid being distracted by the foreign disputes and tensions that could otherwise accompany the rise of ultra-nationalism in the country. The degree to which Xi and his team successfully maintains this delicate balance of economic and political measures will be the key indicator of the risk factors at this critical juncture of China’s development.

#### No link turns– current Chinese economy is doomed for collapse absent deep economic reforms

**Sisci, 16** [Francesco - sinologist, author and columnist who lives and works in Beijing. Currently he is the contributor for Il Sole 24ore and for Asia Times with the column Sinograph. “Latest China stock crash spotlights urgent need for financial reform: Sisci”, Asia Times, January 5, 2016, <http://atimes.com/2016/01/latest-china-stock-crash-spotlights-urgent-need-for-financial-reform-sisci/>] bjs

There’s a deeper reason: China’s old business model based on corruption and political patronage has collapsed, thanks to Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. But the new business model supposed to replace it is yet to take shape because conservative forces inside China’s communist party oppose the changes. The necessary reforms can be described as follows: 1) SOEs must be privatized. This cannot be done overnight but it must follow a process. These huge government enterprises are too inefficient to survive and they are in danger of dragging down the Chinese economy. 2) Private entrepreneurs must be encouraged to regain confidence in the system. Part of this involves issuing an amnesty for past economic crimes. This will help link the private sector to the government under a new political contract. While some entrepreneurs will be forgiven, they will have to obey new business rules. 3)The state must take a more active role as a final and real referee that controls the markets. Regulators must ensure that the new rules will be obeyed. This differs from the current situation where regulators and those they regulate share the same rooms, the same meals and can manipulate the markets behind the backs of naïve common investors. If these problems are not addressed in a radical way, any passing market wind will crash the Chinese stock market and take others with it due to the sheer size of China’s economy. Therefore, these reforms are not only necessary, they are an urgent matter for China and the rest of the world. But there is big political question that hangs over the question of reforming China’s financial system: Does Xi have enough political clout to carry out these reforms which threaten to smash the old networks of vested interests that have dominated China’s politics and economy for decades? Two signs point to the fact that Xi has accrued greater political capital. After a lot of arm twisting, Xi eventually managed to get local court tribunals to become more independent of local governments. This will help in effecting legal changes that counter the old power networks. (See China Grants Courts Greater Autonomy on Limited Matters ) Perhaps more significantly, Xi has launched an overhaul of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the traditional kingmaker of Chinese politics (See Xi’s Reforms to Make Military Slimmer and Stronger) However, in the midst of such larger challenges, focusing on economic and financial reforms can be an extremely technical and time-consuming task. Will Xi be able to tackle such issues while he’s absorbed in more pressing matters like the crucial PLA changes? Perhaps not.

### IL – reforms solv global econ

#### Chinese reform efforts key to global economy

**Lew 16** --- Treasury Secretary, (Jacob J. Lew, 6-16-2016, "Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew Remarks On U.S.-China Economic Relations At the American Enterprise Institute" No Publication, 6-20-2016, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0488.aspx)//jonah

First, will China fully implement the ambitious economic reforms that it has announced in a way that decisively embraces the market, leads to greater openness, and produces sustainable growth? China’s Third Party Plenum reforms seek to do just that. They set out a blueprint that, if implemented, would shift China’s economy away from dependence on exports, investment, and heavy industry towards sustainable growth based on domestic household consumption. The reforms are premised on allowing market forces to shape the dynamics and allocation of resources in China’s economy. These commitments were recently reaffirmed by the actions of the National People’s Congress to move ahead with reform policies. China’s success implementing these efforts is of great importance to the global economy, and how China’s leaders balance economic analysis and hard political choices will be key to that success.

### IL – anti-corruption solv econ

#### Corruption reforms essential to fixing the economy – redirects money away from hands of elite politicians and towards productivity – empirics prove.

Boskin, 13 (Michael Boskin, Professor of Economics at Stanford and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, “The Global Stake in China’s Anti-Corruption Reform,” Project Syndicate, <http://web.stanford.edu/~boskin/Publications/boskin%20ps%2009%2010%202013%20china.pdf>, \*fc)

Research reveals that strong enforcement of property rights and stable, predictable, and non-confiscatory tax and regulatory regimes are essential to long-run economic prosperity. The key to China’s reform, and what the Chinese people want most, is John Adams’s “government of laws, not men” – even-handed administration of reasonable laws, not special favors for the connected few. Indeed, Finance Minister Lou Jiwei echoed Adams (and Adam Smith) when he proclaimed, “…resources should be allocated by prices and markets, not government officials.” Chinese President Xi Jinping has said that a crackdown on corruption is a top priority, and that unless it reaches both “tigers” (higher-ups) and “flies” (lower-level officials), there may well not be another orderly leadership transition of the type that brought him to power earlier this year. Indeed, reducing corruption is essential if China is to join the small list of developing economies – Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan – that have escaped the “middle-income trap” that ensnares most developing countries and prevents them from attaining advanced-economy status. More than the unseemliness and capriciousness of many officials’ behavior, this is what is really at stake in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. China’s future prosperity requires restricting government officials’ administrative discretion, reducing state-owned enterprises’ power and subsidies, and strengthening the rule of law by developing an independent judiciary. But these reforms imply a change in culture and incentives. Some officials use their considerable discretion in granting licenses, permits, and contracts to solicit favors and side payments. The fortune accumulated by Bo’s wife (reliance on proxies, especially relatives, is a common tactic of corrupt officials everywhere) highlights the opportunities forthe well connected to get ahead. Many Chinese, regarding this as just the way things are, behave accordingly. To be sure, rent-seeking and favor-dispensing corruption exist to some degree everywhere; but they are more widespread in developing than developed countries and in resource-rich and/or centrally planned economies than in capitalist democracies. The time and other resources that individuals and firms devote to seeking government favors would be far more valuable if redirected to producing goods and services. Some promising anti-corruption ideas have successful antecedents in Chinese history from the Ming Dynasty to modern Hong Kong. Under the Ming Dynasty, the emperor’s officials came from other provinces and were frequently rotated. To protect China’s central bank from local political pressure, reformist Premier Zhu Rongji, on my and others’ advice in the 1990’s, reorganized the People’s Bank of China along regional lines, similar to the Federal Reserve’s district banks. In Hong Kong, corruption was so pervasive as late as the 1970’s – if your house was on fire, the fire department demanded payment before pumping water! – that an independent anti-corruption commission was appointed specifically to investigate and prosecute both public and private corruption. Hong Kong greatly reduced corruption and improved administration with an amnesty, pay increases, and financial-disclosure requirements for officials. China’s current leaders should revisit these precedents. A truly independent judiciary will take time to establish, but some judges can be appointed and paid by – and report to – the central government rather than local officials. And, as in Ming China, judges and other officials could be rotated every few years. Likewise, as in Hong Kong, an amnesty could be granted, conditional on financial disclosure and a fine for “unexplainable wealth,” for all but the most egregious behavior, thereby leaving the past behind. At that point, judges’ and government officials’ pay could be raised to competitive levels, which would weaken the incentive to continue corrupt practices – particularly if officials must regularly file financial disclosure statements and are penalized for withholding information. The recent willingness of ordinary Chinese to condemn corruption publicly is a harbinger, one hopes, of real anti-corruption reforms from the country’s new leadership. An independent judiciary, financial disclosure by government officials, and otherindependent institutions have been essential to limiting and forestalling – though not fully eliminating – corruption in the United States and most other advanced capitalist democracies. That is a lesson that China needs to learn far more quickly than some members of its entrenched elite will find comfortable.

#### Anti-corruption reforms good for the economy

Schiavenza, 14 (Matt Schiavenza, International Affairs correspondent with the International Business Times, “Xi Jinping's Anti-Corruption Campaign May Slow Down China's Economy, And That Could Be Good,” International Business Times, 21 August 2014, <http://www.ibtimes.com/xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign-may-slow-down-chinas-economy-could-be-good-1665348>, \*fc)

Since assuming China’s presidency in March 2013, Xi Jinping has engaged in a broad, sweeping anti-corruption campaign that has transformed China’s political and economic life. But while the campaign has brought down numerous high-profile targets, its has raised concerns that China’s economic growth may be also be an unwitting victim. Last month, the International Monetary Fund revised its projection for China’s GDP growth in 2014 down to 7.4 percent, while this month the Chinese economy experienced a downturn in foreign direct investment, which fell 6 percent in July, its first drop in 17 months. But while the initial months of the crackdown affected l uqury industries -- five-star hotels, for example, reported a decline in business -- Xi’s anti-graft movement now casts a wider net: Recent investigations into major multinational companies, such as Microsoft, GlaxoSmithKline and Audi, have sent a chill across the international business community. This trend raises an uncomfortable question for the Chinese Communist Party: Have the efforts to rid the Party of corruption damaged the single most important source of the Party’s legitimacy -- rapid, sustained economic growth? According to Anna Snyder, an analyst at Rhodium Group, a New York-based consultancy, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign must be considered within the context of China’s broader effort to reform its economy. “The government has taken an everything-but-the-kitchen-sink approach to reform, and the anti-corruption campaign is just one piece of the puzzle,” she said. China’s efforts to manage a gradual slowdown of its economy long predate Xi’s administration. The forces fueling China’s growth since 1978 -- exporting manufactured goods to developed markets and investing vast sums in fixed-asset infrastructure -- are both subject to decline, and internal consumption remains too low, while the risk that breakneck growth may slow down too quickly is foremost in the minds of policymakers. In 2007, a year when China’s GDP grew by a staggering 14.2 percent, then-Premier Wen Jiabao worried aloud that the economy was “unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.” Therein lies the paradox of the anti-corruption campaign: China’s leaders want to promote consumption, but the Xi administration is cracking down on industries -- such as l uqury goods, high-end hotels, and automobiles -- that spur it. But Cheng Li, an expert in Chinese politics at the Brookings Institute, argues that official corruption distorts the economy by siphoning off money from its most productive uses, and a crackdown will actually be good for the economy’s long-term health. “Tax dollars that previously served to fund unsolicited purchases are being returned to public coffers,” he wrote in July, “Money can then be spent on the projects it was supposed to fund initially, thus leading to improved infrastructure, public services, and employment rates.”

#### Xi’s crackdown on corruption is necessary and good – consolidates power necessary to make effective economic reform

**Raby 15** [Geoff - Australian economist and diplomat. He served as the Australian Ambassador to the People's Republic of China from February 2007 until August 2011. “Transformative year sees China's Xi Jinping score well: Dilemma”, The Australian Financial Review, January 8, 2015, Proquest] bjs

The government has shrugged off China's problems to post astonishingly steady growth. But the country must deal with the tensions between one-party state and market economy China's President Xi Jinping is coming to the end of his second year in the job. While his first year was inevitably one of consolidation, we can begin to evaluate his singular contribution and compile a report card on the leader of the second-biggest economy in the world. Domestic politics has been the arena of most activity and surprise. Xi has had to consolidate his succession. He has done so with dramatic effect. He has lived up to his promise to catch both "tigers" and swat "flies" with his anti-corruption campaign. This has been highly effective in dispatching political opponents and garnering widespread popular support. The avuncular, sometimes cuddly, man of the people has shown he has the claws of the dragon. No one knows exactly how many Communist Party officials have been caught, but some well placed in the system speak of 80,000 or more. The latest being the party secretary of Nanjing. Aside from the spectacular downfall of former standing committee member Zhou Yongkang, Xi has - against the odds - taken on the PLA, including a deputy chairman of the Central Military Commission. Politically, Xi is both unchallenged and unchallengeable. The question is, having consolidated his power so comprehensively and cowed potential opponents, what has he done to address China's manifest economic challenges and prosecute China's international and security interests? China's economic challenges are well-known and understood: high levels of local government debt, declining marginal efficiency of investment, over-reliance on investment-led growth, a weak and inefficient financial system, declining external competitiveness and gross misallocation of resources into construction. Combined with protracted weakness of the global economy, it is not surprising that China's economy is weaker than many anticipated, including the Chinese government. However, on another view, China's economy is showing remarkable resilience. Gross domestic product for 2014 is likely to be above 7 per cent. This is still an impressive result given where the rest of world is, and considering the absolute size of the Chinese economy. If growth comes in as expected, this will be the fourth consecutive year China has had 7 per cent-plus growth. Rather than a slowdown, as most headlines and analysts proclaim, this looks more like a steady, high rate of growth. Xi and his team can rightly claim credit for this. They have again managed to achieve relatively high GDP growth, together with low inflation and unemployment. Most governments around the world would be delighted with such a result. However, beyond competent macro-economic management is the perennial question of economic reform as China continues its three decade-long transition from a centrally planned economy to one where the markets are allowed to allocate resources more efficiently, competently and more fairly than Communist Party officials. Here, 2014 may be seen in retrospect as a transformative year for the Chinese economy. In October 2013, the third plenum of the party set out an ambitious economic reform agenda. For the first time, the party said that the market was playing the decisive role in driving the economy and that the private sector was to be on an equal footing with the state sector. As with catching tigers and swatting flies in the anti-corruption campaign, Xi has been true to his word. In everything - from approving investments domestically and overseas, easing controls on capital flows and internationalising the use of the yuan - the direction of change is clear, whether it is: the abolition of the 3000-year-old state monopoly of the salt trade; authorising and legitimising private banks; opening the Shanghai-Hong Kong stock exchange corridor; forcing state-owned enterprises to begin to divest themselves of business to the private sector or to accept greater private involvement in their business; or curtailing the powers of the National Development and Reform Commission. It has been a busy year. So much so, that many foreign analysts have had trouble keeping abreast of the broad moving frontier. For sure, there are contradictory trends and inconsistencies that make it incredibly challenging to track the changes. One study, by the Washington-based Rhodium Group, which was given its global launch by the Asia Society in Sydney, found that "China's leadership is moving ahead across all economic dimensions of reform with purpose and urgency". The tasks ahead for Xi are enormous but the past year has been a better than credible effort to address the deep-seated structural reforms that will be necessary for China to continue to sustain its growth.

### IL – China econ KT global econ

#### Chinese economic collapse causes instant value evaporation around the globe

**Gorrie 13** [James - political economist and leading financial journalist. *The China Crisis: How China's Economic Collapse Will Lead to a Global Depression,* Wiley] bjs

What ’s Really behind the Great Wall? What some see in China is not the next great superpower, but rather the next great collapse of a massively complex and brittle regime that is among the most brutal and oppressive the world has ever known. There is no crystal ball that tells us what will happen in the future, but there is known history in China, and China ’s modern history is one of great crises and spasms of social and political violence on a scale unknown anywhere else, with the possible exception of the old Soviet Union. There is, of course, the history and historical collapse of their former communist neighbor, the former Soviet Union; that in itself is not a definitive indicator, but it can certainly suggest possible outcomes. After all, command economies, wherever they are tried, all suffer from similar fundamental fl aws that have all resulted in cataclysmic disasters. But it won ’t be just one crisis that China will have to handle; it will be many, and all at the same time or in quick succession. There will defi nitely be a domino eff ect in play as the crises overlap and magnify the impacts of the others. Before too long, hundreds of billions, if not trillions, of dollars will be lost in China—and in Chinese companies around the world.

#### Chinese economic collapse goes global

**Grandi 16** [Kedra – staff writer, “IMF warns that an economic crisis in China could cause global recession again”, International Business Times, April 6, 2016, <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/imf-warns-that-economic-crisis-china-could-make-world-go-back-into-recession-1553150>] bjs

An economic crisis in China could result in a world-wide recession, warned the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was because China's financial links with the rest of the global economy was set to increase, the organisation said ahead of its spring conference in Washington next week. "It is likely that China's spillovers to global financial markets will increase considerably in the next few years", the IMF said. The warning comes at a time when there is continuing concern over the China slowdown and amid the Beijing government's efforts to shift its manufacturing dependent economy to one that is more dependent on domestic consumption. It also comes at a time when the central banks of developed nations such as the US Federal Reserve are taking a call on raising their interest rates after taking into account the economic activity in China and other emerging markets. The IMF said the impact of emerging economies on developed nations had increased to such an extent that "spillovers" now accounted for one-third of price movements across equity and foreign exchange markets of developed nations. The financial impact of China was also said to grow because of the opening up of its local bond and other markets to foreign investment. "China's financial integration with the rest of the world is expected to accelerate, and its financial influence abroad will likely catch up with its economic prowess" the IMF said. To cite a recent example, the Chinese turmoil at the start of 2016 gave the world's stock markets the worst start to a year since the financial crisis. The FTSE 100 index lost 5% or £81bn (€101.42bn, $115.49bn) in value, because of a crisis in Beijing. Last week, the Bank of England is said to have considered a Far East crash as one of the possible reasons for the next recession.

### at: manufacturing link turn

#### Rising Chinese innovation sector offsets traditional manufacturing – it’s a comparably larger internal link

**Huang, 15** [Yiping Huang is a professor of economics at the National School of Development, Peking University, and Editor of China Economic Journal. “The change in China’s economy”, EastAsiaForum, February 15, 2016, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/02/15/the-change-in-chinas-economy/>] bjs

Far less noticed are the favourable changes taking place in the economy. Despite the downward pressure on growth, there is no sign of a major unemployment problem occurring. This might be due to demographic change. The working age population is now falling by three million a year. It is probably also attributable to a changing economic structure — tertiary industry, for instance, is now bigger than secondary industry. Even income inequality started to decline from a couple of years ago, as evidenced by the Gini coefficient estimates by the National Bureau of Statistics. Despite significant difficulties in traditional manufacturing industries, the Chinese economy is becoming highly innovatory. The recently US-listed Alibaba is a case in point. Online shopping in China already accounts for more than 10 per cent of total retail sales and continues to grow at 40 per cent a year. China’s express delivery and internet finance services are now world class. Manufacturers of large machinery equipment, electrical machines, cheap mobile phones and other products are rapidly catching up to global leaders. Economic conditions in China today resemble those of South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong 30 years ago. Those economies also faced immense pressures to upgrade their industries. Difficulties in China’s labour-intensive manufacturing are a consequence of past success, while difficulties in capital goods manufacturing are partly exacerbated by past policies supporting investment. But the crucial fact is that innovation is taking place and new industries and products are emerging. This is an explosive change. Chinese policymakers have decided to lower the growth target further to around 7 per cent in 2015, while inflation is predicted to fall below 2 per cent. This should provide more room for policy easing, although the authorities will likely maintain the current practice of mini-stimulus. Fiscal spending should accelerate through the year, with important reallocations of overhead expenditure on social welfare spending. The PBoC has already lowered the reserve requirement ratio and the market expects it to further reduce policy rates. Headline macroeconomic data, such as GDP growth and CPI inflation, will probably look unexciting in 2015. But beneath these numbers there should be an important regime change occurring in China’s growth model. New higher value-added services and manufacturing industries — such as the online economy, logistics, and large and small machinery equipment manufacturing — should play greater roles in the economy. The relative importance of traditional labour-intensive and capital goods manufacturing should continue to decline. The economy also faces important challenges and risks in 2015. These include how to deflate a property bubble, reduce excess manufacturing capacity and lower the financial leverage ratio. None of these tasks are simple. Success or failure in dealing with them and facilitating structural transformation of the Chinese economy depends critically on economic reforms. Two of the most important policy areas will be reform of state-owned enterprises and restructuring of the financial system.

## Reforms good

### IL – mil mod

#### Xi’s reforms are necessary to PLA modernization

The Economist 16 Xi’s new model army Xi Jinping reforms China’s armed forces—to his own advantage Jan 16th 2016 | BEIJING <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21688424-xi-jinping-reforms-chinas-armed-forcesto-his-own-advantage-xis-new-model-army> //LKJ

CHINA’S biggest military shake-up in a generation began with a deliberate echo of Mao Zedong. Late in 2014 President Xi Jinping went to Gutian, a small town in the south where, 85 years before, Mao had first laid down the doctrine that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the armed force not of the government or the country but of the Communist Party. Mr Xi stressed the same law to the assembled brass: the PLA is still the party’s army; it must uphold its “revolutionary traditions” and maintain absolute loyalty to its political masters. His words were a prelude to sweeping reforms in the PLA that have unfolded in the past month, touching almost every military institution. The aim of these changes is twofold—to strengthen Mr Xi’s grip on the 2.3m-strong armed forces, which are embarrassingly corrupt at the highest level, and to make the PLA a more effective fighting force, with a leadership structure capable of breaking down the barriers between rival commands that have long hampered its modernisation efforts. It has taken a long time since the meeting in Gutian for these reforms to unfold; but that reflects both their importance and their difficulty. The PLA itself has long admitted that it is lagging behind. It may have plenty of new weapons—it has just started to build a second aircraft-carrier, for instance—but it is failing to make effective use of them because of outdated systems of command and control. Before any substantial change in this area, however, Mr Xi felt it necessary to strengthen the party’s control over the PLA, lest it resist his reforms and sink back into a morass of money-grubbing. The reforms therefore begin with the main instrument of party control, the Central Military Commission (CMC), which is chaired by Mr Xi. On January 11th the CMC announced that the PLA’s four headquarters—the organisations responsible for recruiting troops, procuring weapons, providing logistics and ensuring political supervision—had been split up, slimmed down and absorbed into the commission. Once these were among the most powerful organisations in the PLA, operating almost as separate fiefs. Now they have become CMC departments. Power to the party The political headquarters was the body through which the party kept an eye on the ranks and ensured they were up to speed on Maoist texts and the party’s latest demands. The loss of its autonomous status may suggest that the party’s role is being downgraded. Far from it. Now the party’s CMC (there is also a state one, which exists only in name) will be better able to keep watch. The body’s 15 new departments will include not only departments for politics but also for logistics, personnel management and fighting corruption. Mr Xi has already turned his guns on graft, imprisoning dozens of generals. The second reform has been to put the various services on a more equal footing. The land forces have hitherto reigned supreme. That may have been fine when the PLA’s main job was to defend the country against an invasion across its land borders (until the 1980s the Soviet Union was considered the biggest threat). But now China has military ambitions in the South China Sea and beyond, and wants the ability to challenge American naval and air power in the western Pacific. A recent editorial in the Liberation Army Daily, a PLA mouthpiece, berated the armed forces for their “army-centric mindset”. In addition to those for the navy and air force, a separate command has now been created for the army, which had previously run everything. On December 31st the CMC also announced the formation of a command responsible for space and cyberwarfare, as well as one for ballistic and cruise missiles (previously known as the Second Artillery Force, part of the army). There is also a new joint command with overall control of the various services, a little like America’s joint chiefs of staff. Big changes are also afoot in regional command structures. China used to be divided into seven military regions. These were powerful and relatively self-contained; sharing or swapping troops and equipment was rare. Now, according to reports in the South China Morning Post, a newspaper in Hong Kong, the number will be reduced to five. Troops will be recruited and trained by the various services before regional deployment. This will ensure greater central control over the regions.

#### Xi just overhauled military education as part of his modernization efforts.

Jun 3/24/16 China’s new-look army: Xi Jinping tells top military academy to overhaul courses and train commanders in joint operations PUBLISHED : Thursday, 24 March, 2016 Jun Mai, Deputy General Manager at Guangdong Hengrun Huachuang Industry Development Co., Ltd. and Chairman at Hunan Tianrun Enterprise Holding Co. Ltd. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1929879/chinas-new-look-army-xi-jinping-tells-top-military

The military’s top academy was told yesterday to focus on training commanders for joint forces operations amid a massive overhaul of the world’s largest standing army. In his first visit to the PLA National Defence University as the Central Military Commission’s highest commander, President Xi Jinping told the college to overhaul its courses and teaching methods, gearing them to foster officers who can command joint operations. Preparing the PLA for joint operations has been one of the key goals of military reforms launched by Xi late last year. The aim of the shift is to transform the outdated decades-old army-centred command system into a Western-style joint command, in which the army, navy and air force are equally represented. Innovation crucial for PLA, Chinese president tells military NPC delegates gathered in Beijing In his speech to junior and senior officers at the military university, Xi reiterated that political education was the top priority. He also reminded them to study the spirit of the 1929 Gutian Conference held in Fujian province, where late chairman Mao Zedong consolidated the principle of “the party controls the gun”. Xi also urged the PLA to uphold the traditional spirit of the PLA’s predecessor, the Red Army. The visit comes after the downfall of two former CMC vice-chairmen, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, in Xi’s anti-graft campaign. The academy is a cradle for top commanders in the PLA. Most members of the CMC graduated from the university. Chinese TV dramas urged to copy South Korean hit to improve image of military and boost army recruitment Since its foundation in 1985, it has educated more than 30,000 mid-level and senior military officers, according to the PLA Daily. University professors and lecturers were also told to “remain indifferent to personal interest and fame”, and to focus on teaching and research. Xi said the academy needed to be more aligned with the central leadership of the party, and make political awareness, a term referring to loyalty to the Communist Party, top place in education. The academy also needed to stay up to date on new trends in global military development, and study the use of hi-tech warfare, Xi added.

#### Xi is modernizing the military and consolidating near total control

Bo 1/12/16

Is China's PLA Now Xi's Army? By Bo Zhiyue. Professor BO Zhiyue, a leading authority on Chinese elite politics, is Director of the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre (NZCCRC) and Professor of Political Science at Victoria University of Wellington. January 12, 2016 <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/is-chinas-pla-now-xis-army/> //LKJ

In the most sweeping military reshuffle since the 1950s, Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping is creating an army that is loyal to no one but himself. In the old structure, the four general departments — the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Armament Department (GAD) — were the most powerful organizations. GSD and GPD were particularly important; GSD was the executive organization of the military and GPD controlled personnel issues. For many years, two former CMC vice chairmen, Guo Boxiong (now under investigation for corruption) and Xu Caihou (who was expelled from the party for corruption), controlled these two organizations. By downgrading these general departments, the CMC will have more power over military issues. In the new structure, these four general departments have been renamed and become four of 15 “functional departments” directly under the leadership of the Central Military Commission (CMC). In the new lineup, the CMC General Office is ranked first, followed by the four renamed departments (the CMC Joint Staff Department, the CMC Political Work Department, the CMC Logistic Support Department, and the CMC Equipment Development Department). These organs are followed by two new departments (the CMC Training and Administration Department and the CMC National Defense Mobilization Department), making a total of seven departments. It is significant that the CMC General Office is placed ahead of the four general departments. It is likely that the CMC chairman will control the military through the General Office and that the head of the General Office will likely become a member of the CMC. In the same structure, three commissions have been created. The military’s disciplinary inspection organ, which used to work under the GPD, has been upgraded into an independent organization with the same rank as the former GPD: the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission. The CMC Politics and Law Commission has been created anew. The final commission, the CMC Science and Technology Commission, however, is not entirely new. The Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (CSTIND) was established on May 10, 1982 by merging three relevant institutions. This commission was replaced by two organizations in the government restructuring in 1998: one was the GAD and one was the CSTIND of the PRC under the State Council. On March 15, 2008, the 11th National People’s Congress decided to abolish the CSTIND of the PRC. In the same rank, there are five new organs directly under the leadership of the CMC. They are the CMC Office for Strategic Planning, the CMC Office for Reform and Organizational Structure, the CMC Office for International Military Cooperation, the CMC Audit Office, and the CMC Agency for Offices Administration. If heads of these functional departments are all members of the newly structured CMC, along with the commanders of three new military institutions (the general command of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army, PLA Rocket Force, and PLA Strategic Support Force) and those of the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force, the membership of the CMC would be more than doubled, from 10 currently to 23. As Xi is the architect of this reorganization, no doubt the new commanders will all be personally loyal to him. Through the restructuring, Xi is effectively creating an army of his own.

### IL – laundry list

#### Xi’s reforms ensure a more transparent gov, higher living standards, environmental protections – empirics

**Vark, PhD, 2015**

(Juhan, senior lecturer at Euroacademy in Tallinn, Estonia, Baltic Journal of European Studies, Volume 5, Issue 1 Feb 2015)//cb

Coming to power, Xi Jinping soon showed strong left-leaning political orientation and that he is more Russian-friendly than his predecessor Hu Jintao, who tried to make friends with the United States and organized military exercises near the Russian border. Hu Jintao was ready, if necessary, to invade Siberia for its natural resources (Värk, 2013). Xi Jinping is trying to achieve success with a close Chinese-Russian economic and military cooperation and has remained flexible in his positions on planning the country’s economy. Despite a number of dangerous trends in Chinese economy, such as wide-spread corruption and crime at all levels, swollen shadow banking, huge municipal debts to banks, the credit bubble in a number of economic sectors and the very poor environmental situation, China’s new leadership under the lead of Xi Jinping had the courage to launch radical reforms. These important reforms must particularly improve the living standard of ordinary Chinese people and ensure for the country a stable socio-economic situation and normal defense. Also, Chinese society has become more open than it has been in the past. These tasks taken on by Xi Jinping’s team are not easy to fulfil. Furthemore, in China’s new leader’s team, many politicians are hardliners. However, in the society controlled by the reformist Xi Jinping some positive signs can already be noticed. The so-called one-child policy is no longer valid. People can again buy game consoles from stores. Workers incomes have increased so that in large Chinese cities an average worker’s monthly salary is up to 650 euros. What has also changed is the attitude of the Chinese leaders towards environmental protection and corruption. Under Xi Jinping’s orders, some high-level state officials and army officers accused of corruption and taking bribes have been arrested. Chinese government has declared war against smog in major cities. Monitoring the purity of water has intensified. China’s foreign policy has changed dramatically. The well-known expert of Chinese affairs James Gibney (2014) finds that Xi’s China follows Japan’s prewar blueprint and now it seems that he is on the right track in this question. While during Hu Jintao’s presidency, China’s main enemies were Taiwan, Vietnam, and by all manifestations also Russia, then now the main enemies are the United States, Taiwan, Japan, and Vietnam. At the same time, Russia has become (18) as China’s currently largest supplier of natural gas) a leading economic partner for China. This has made Xi Jinping face a number of dilemmas. On the one hand China recognizes the territorial integrity of all world countries. But when Russia violated this rule in Ukraine, China did not protest against it. Now China accuses Vietnam of some border accidents and the ownership issues of islands located in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Russia, however, refuses to support these China’s protests because Vietnam is Russia’s important trading and military cooperation partner. It is clear that for China such double play on the part of Russia cannot last forever. For example, Russian-Japanese defense cooperation, started in 2013 on the initiative of Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, has already created some problems to China. Also, China must quickly find compromises with the US, who is one of China’s largest trading partner and also largest finance debtor. Most observers of China believe that Xi Jinping has quickly consolidated political control after his rise to power, yet purge is a sure sign of a leader’s weakness, and under Xi Jinping there has been one purge after another, both of civilian leaders and military officers, which is the strongest indication that China’s political system is in distress (Chang, 2014). Therefore, China under Xi Jinping stands before great dilemmas and challenges.

### IL – ag/land rights

#### Xi’s agricultural land rights reform incentivizes agricultural contracting initiatives and extensive implementation of innovative tactics

Naughton, 15, Chair of Chinese International Affairs at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, (Barry, 2015, Is There a “Xi Model” of Economic Reform? Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014, http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46bn.pdf)//kap

Property rights in land are complicated in China, not least because property rights are divided into two completely different regimes in rural and urban areas. There are many respects in which change in the land system has been slower than expected since the Third Plenum, particularly in the procedures for converting rural land into land with urban development rights.11 However, in one respect there has been a major breakthrough. On November 20, 2014, the CCP and State Council jointly issued a document on rural land policy.12 The essence of the policy was to specify that agricultural land has three levels of ownership: the underlying collective ownership, which never changes; the land contract rights, which date back to the distribution of land to households in the early 1980s; and land management rights. Land contract rights belong to the individual household and are stable and long-term (meaning that villages should not redistribute contract rights or take them away from out-migrants). Land management rights, by contrast, are transferable. They can and should be rented or leased, without detriment to the farmer’s underlying contract rights. Moreover, the land use rights can be contributed as an equity stake to an agricultural corporation. This new specification of contract and use rights should be understood in conjunction with the work of surveying and titling all land—already well under way in many regions—which is to be completed nationwide within five years. The fundamental impact of this policy is to create a nationwide system of secure and transferable property rights in agricultural land. As Zheng Fengtian 郑风田 of People’s University explains, “Ever since the beginning of reform, aside from the [fundamental collective] ownership of rural land, land contract rights and land use rights have generally been bundled together into a single thing, that is ‘land contract and use rights.’ But with the establishment of three [levels of property] rights, farmers can relax and transfer their land use rights, receive rent, and not worry about losing their contractual rights to the land.”13 This important change shows up in the 2015 No. 1 Party Document, which, following tradition, is devoted to rural policy.14 The wordy document covers many topics of interest, and refers to the new property rights policy obliquely but unmistakably. Section 22, titled “reform of the property rights system in rural collectives,” states that the focus should be on “resolutely and realistically doing the work of determining rights, registering, and issuing certification [i.e., titling] for contracting and management rights” for land and other types of natural resource capital. This should be read in tandem with Section 28 on the rule of law, which says “revise the laws on rural land contracting in order to concretely specify that current land contracting relations are stable, long-lasting Naughton, China Leadership Monitor, no. 46 6 and unchanging; to clearly demarcate the [three-way] relationship between collective ownership, rural household contract rights, and land management rights; and to guarantee and protect the rights of rural women to the benefits from land contracting.”15 Given that this is such an important policy change, its presence in the No. 1 document, and in Chinese government propaganda overall, is remarkably muted. The evidence is clearly there, but the casual reader will not have noticed the change. There doesn’t appear to have been any commentary in the English-language press at all.16 Why is this policy shift so understated? The answer may lie in the fact that improving rural land property rights has long been a highly contentious issue in China, and reformers may prefer to duck the debate. Most market-oriented economists strongly support strengthening land rights, because this will give farmers the ability to use their land rights in diverse ways (including renting, mortgaging, and using as collateral) and will provide the proper incentives to restructure agriculture in more efficient ways. “Leftists” strongly oppose private land ownership, arguing that it violates one of the central covenants of socialism. More importantly, privatization of land rights has long been opposed by Chen Xiwen, the most influential rural policy economist. Chen has high personal credibility as someone who understands the rural economy and has dedicated his life to addressing rural policy issues. Moreover, he occupies the key staff/advisory position as head of the office of the Party Rural Work Leadership Small Group (and is concurrently vice-head of the office of the Finance and Economics Leadership Small Group). Chen Xiwen has long worried that with land privatization, commercial capital would buy up land and many poor farmers would lose the protection of land ownership, which represents their ultimate “social security.” The current policy is obviously a compromise, but one that has successfully brought Chen Xiwen into the pro-market camp, enabling him to support a policy that effectively allows for transferable land-use rights. The unmistakable sign of the policy compromise is the commitment to a stratum of basically unchangeable “contract rights,” which will become a kind of sub-surface ownership difficult for farmers to alienate. Over the long term, this could be a rather awkward provision: will there be a permanent class of former farmers who clip coupons, harvesting rent from farms they gave up generations ago? In any case, conditions in China’s rural areas are changing rapidly and new policies could scarcely be put off much longer. Most young farmers have already left the land, and most rural income is no longer derived from farming. Institutions must catch up with the changed rural reality, and this new policy created a space for compromise that allowed consensus among policy elites. Leftist opponents of market-oriented reform will, of course, continue to oppose such measures.

### IL – Africa investment

#### Chinese FOCAC investment can catalyze African international investment and trade sustainability

April, 16 – Masters of Arts in International Relations from the University of South Carolina in Columbia, USA (1996), and a Juris Doctorate of Law Degree from the John Marshall School of Law, Atlanta, Georgia, (Yazini, February 2016, Will China’s Reforms Impact FOCAC?, http://www.ai.org.za/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2016/02/Will-China%E2%80%99s-Reforms-Impact-FOCAC.pdf)//kap

In conclusion, China’s reform measures would have a strong impact on the African continent if these measures were to keep China from continuing to do robust business on the continent. Under FOCAC, China and Africa have become closely interlinked in their global transactions. This is demonstrated by the recent announcement by China’s President Xi Jinping that his country will provide $60 billion in aid to Africa to support agriculture, infrastructure and training on the continent.27 However, as Caulderwood states, the depth of this integration with its high levels of infrastructure and mining investment could be a double-edged sword. It is critical for Africa to be cautious and take time to analyse the implications and real benefits of China’s Africa policy in light of that country’s reforms. After all, China is advancing global ambitions that are not necessarily tied to Africa’s development. China’s global ambitions have resulted in a rapidly accelerating flow of African commodities to the People’s Republic.28 Therefore, the onus is on African governments to establish their own policies that represent the continent’s interests. This paper recommends that African governments should consider the following strategies in pursuing economic ties with China: a. Given China’s economic and infrastructural impact on the continent, the latter should not only determine what China’s structural adjustment reforms mean for Africa’s rising; it should ensure that the AU’s reform packages as couched in documents such as Agenda 2063 are able to address the impact of China’s reforms. b. Infrastructure spending in Africa is estimated to amount to $96 billion per year, and tax revenues and other domestic resources are not enough to fill the financing gap for new Thirdly, from an administrative perspective, it is highly unlikely that China’s reforms will have a negative impact on Africa. Some scholars argue that Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive could destroy rents, and therefore some of the incentives for industrial and service expansion. This article argues that, on the contrary, China’s anti-corruption drive and other governance reform measures serve as a good example to African countries. It is no secret that corruption is one of the leading causes of poor growth on the continent. Corruption is endemic in many of Africa’s most resource-rich countries. Rather than invest resource revenues into infrastructure and education, crooked politicians, often in collusion with the companies mining the resources, siphon proceeds from the continent’s mineral and petroleum wealth into their own pockets. The fact is, resource-rich countries are plagued by a phenomenon called ‘Dutch disease’. This illness afflicts both well-governed and poorly governed countries, but the former have more ways of allaying the consequences. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo has the highest total resource rents as a percentage of GDP in Africa (64 per cent) and one of the lowest scores for the control of corruption. Equatorial Guinea, with a government that is widely seen as being autocratic, has the worst score for control of corruption among African countries. It also has very high resource rents as a share of GDP at 47 per cent.26 While China’s reform plans in respect of anti-corruption speak to domestic matters and thus do not guarantee legislative reciprocity on the African side, FOCAC could be used as a platform to address the Dutch disease syndrome, which could produce a win-win situation for both sides. A discussion on possible collaboration regarding China’s administrative reforms, with possible linkages to Africa, could be to the continent’s benefit, as Africa cannot develop effectively without addressing the scourge of corruption. In the wake of the FOCAC Summit VI that was recently held in South Africa, it is imperative that the African Union (AU) and the Chinese government should include administrative reforms as part of FOCAC’s measures. It deserves mention that the AU has indeed designed its Africa Mining Vision to address corruption, but it is not clear how the continent intends to implement the required reform measures to address global uncertainties. The fact is that many anti-corruption crackdowns by African governments have purely been public relations exercises. Agenda 2063, which is now © Africa Institute of South Africa AISA POLICYbrief Number 121 – February 2016 5 projects. In essence, Africa needs partners likes China to carry out large infrastructure projects on the continent; but it is essential to assess whether the resource-for-infrastructure exchange model implemented by the Chinese will be beneficial to the continent in the long term. c. In regard to China’s structural adjustment reforms, it should be a key priority for Africa to diversify its economic and export base. Despite having large supplies of raw materials, Africa’s development prospects are constrained by its heavy reliance on the primary sector as the dominant element in its economies. This situation is compounded by a distorted international system that facilitates the export of raw materials but inhibits and restricts the trade in processed goods from Africa. So far, Africa does not show any meaningful deviation from this well-entrenched international practice, meaning it may be impacted by external reforms by countries such as China. d. Africa’s bargaining power is limited by its lack of industrialisation and its dependence on primary products as its main source of export. The question therefore is whether the continent can really maximise itself under FOCAC 2015 and China’s reforms. e. There is a need for a paradigm shift on the part of Africa’s leadership within both the public and private sectors which encapsulates good governance reforms, thereby eliminating the Dutch Disease syndrome. Given that China is willing to off-shore some of its manufacturing to the continent, discussions at the recent FOCAC Summit were significant in ensuring that Africa’s natural resources are no longer exploited but rather managed in a manner that contributes to mineral beneficiation and industrialisation.

### KT econ growth

#### Chinese investment in Africa key to African economic growth – Sino-African trade ties are expanding now

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Firstly, due to its reforms and the opening up of the country that began decades ago, China’s economic rise has contributed significantly to the concept of Africa’s rising. The extraordinary growth of China’s economic interests in Africa is one of the most important trends in the continent’s history since the end of the Cold War. Beyond setting the benchmark, China has become sub-Saharan Africa’s largest single trading partner, with a 17 per cent share of total trade. In comparison, India has a six per cent share and Brazil, a three per cent share. The so-called Group of Five (Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates) accounts for only five per cent of sub-Saharan Africa’s total trade.11 China-Africa trade passed US$1 billion in 1990, rising to US$10 billion in 2000 and then increasing 15-fold in little over a decade to US$150 billion in 2011, surpassing the United States as Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009. In 2012, this figure rose to US$198 billion, with some analysts now predicting that it will rise to US$385 billion by 2015.12 To put this into further perspective, trade between China and Africa amounted to US$108.9 billion in 2012.13 China also accounts for 16 per cent of total foreign direct investment into sub-Saharan Africa and has become a key investor and provider of aid. There is no doubt that China is interested in Africa’s natural resources (such as copper in Zambia and oil in Nigeria and Sudan), but it is expanding its focus. Over 2 000 Chinese enterprises are investing and developing in trade between China and Africa has increased by 5,6 per cent year on year to hit $201 billion in 2013, and is expected to hit $280 billion by 2015?2 Furthermore, does too much of Africa’s recent prosperity depend on China’s own continued prosperity and rapid growth?3 Judging from Premier Li Keqiang’s Davos speech, reform in the Chinese context means China will continue to abolish, or delegate to lower-level government, items previously subject to State Council review and approval. Moreover, China will comprehensively address items requiring non-governmental review and approval, and put in place a negative-list approach towards market access. According to the Chinese government, this will incentivise market players and help reduce the possibility of rent seeking and corruption.4 China will also protect intellectual property rights in accordance with the law and do its best to foster an environment that encourages entrepreneurship.5 According to Xu Songtao, reforms in China are nothing new, as the government has been moving along with the country’s economic and political reform process for decades. Xu argues that the policy of reform and opening up to the outside world began as early as the 1980s. Gradually, a market economy was established, with public ownership playing a supportive role while other economic components developed.

### KT rule of law

#### Sino-African partnership spurs solidified bilateral relations and adherence to rule of law

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This economic transition, of course, required administrative reform.6 It is also important to note that the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Party Congress, held in November 2013, called for an acceleration of China’s administrative reform by building a lawbased and service-oriented government.7 More specifically, it demanded deepening reforms of the administrative system, innovative administrative methods and an enhancement of government credibility and execution. Then, during the fourth plenary session, held in October 2014, the rule of law – refined the direction of administrative reform even further.8 In essence, China’s administrative reforms are in line with similar reforms carried out in many other advanced countries. The goals of such reforms are to use scientific management to improve efficiency, to wage war on wasteful spending, to standardise administrative procedures in order to make them fair and open, and to structure and limit administrative power to prevent corruption and reduce bureaucratic red tape. Returning power to the people and strengthening governance are at the heart of these reforms.9 © Africa Institute of South Africa AISA POLICYbrief Number 121 – February 2016 3 more than 50 African countries, and South Africa is the leading recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment. Amadou argues that the key advantage of having China in Africa is speed. Chinese firms are able to deliver quickly and work in close coordination with their financial and other national partners. Speed is a big comparative advantage in Africa. For instance, the continent has large infrastructure needs, and African policymakers are under pressure to deliver.14 It is on the basis of the aforementioned trade figures that Rotberg argues how China’s economic weakening, even if marginally, would not be good for Africa. The impact of China’s domestic economic growth is especially evident when it comes to resource-rich African countries – in particular oil exporters. For the top-five resourcerich countries ranked by exports to China as a share of GDP, namely Angola, South Africa, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an increase of one percentage point in China’s domestic investment growth equates to a 0.8 percentage point increase in their export growth rate.15 These are some of the countries that are likely to be hit hard if austerity measures and cutbacks were to be introduced in China.16 China’s structural adjustment reforms could be viewed as a wake-up call for African countries to reduce their dependency on natural resources. In the past decade, commodities accounted for only a quarter to a third of African growth, depending on one’s measure; most of Africa’s $38bn net foreign direct investment inflows in 2012 were into extractive industries.17 By not developing a manufacturing sector, the world’s poorest continent has effectively missed out on the type of industrial revolution that has powered China’s rise. The fact is, African countries, unlike East Asian countries, have not yet been able to turn their farmers into manufacturing workers, diversify their economies and export a range of increasingly sophisticated goods.18 This has left the continent vulnerable to a sharp slowdown as the global commodities boom now looks to be faltering. The only way out of this commodity trap is for the continent to diversify. Economic diversification based on high competitiveness, supported by specialist expertise, skills and technology transfer, could be the main contribution that China makes to Africa’s economic transformation in the global marketplace.19 The second effect of China’s economic reforms comes in the form of the industrial projects that have been implemented on the continent. China has changed the landscape of resource governance and industrial development through its infrastructure-for-minerals swap initiatives on the continent. China’s mining and infrastructure development programmes in Africa mushroomed after the establishment of FOCAC in 2000. Ever since FOCAC, Chinese firms have been trailblasing across the continent; there are now over 800 Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) present in Africa, mostly in the extractive industries. In addition, China has committed a 20 billion US dollar credit line to Africa in the form of increased investment in Africa’s agriculture, agro-processing and manufacturing industries. This credit line should contribute to helping Africa achieve food security, raise added value from its exports, boost employment and realise sustainable and inclusive development. Examples of infrastructure development include the Lagos-Kano railway line, which boasts a 2 600MW hydroelectric central worth US$8.3 billion.20 In Algeria, a 1 000km freeway has been established,21 and in Guinea, China’s Exim Bank has offered the Guinea ba uqite/aluminium industry an industrial package comprising one mine, one dam, one hydroelectric central, one railway and one refinery, with repayment taking the form of China being allowed to purchase alumina at a preferential price.22 Moreover, since 2007 China has been involved in the financing of 10 major dams in nine different African countries. The total cost of these projects is estimated to be more than US$5 billion, of which Chinese banks financed over US$3,3 billion.23 China has also been active in building roads across Africa. World Bank data records 18- plus projects involving Chinese commitments for the construction and rehabilitation of more than 1 400 kilometres of road. As regards the African rail sector, China has made a major comeback with financing commitments in the order of US$4 billion for this sector.24 These include the rehabilitation of more than 1 350 kilometres of existing railway lines and the construction of more than 1 600 kilometres of new railroad. To put this in perspective, the entire African railroad network amounts to around 50 000 kilometres.25 Most of the industrial projects China has implemented over the past decade include substantial contributions to the provision of ‘hard infrastructure’ such as roads, railways and hydropower projects which are critical for economic growth and development on the continent. Needless to say, China’s economic reforms in the past decades have had a positive impact on the African continent’s industrial growth. 4 AISA POLICYbrief Number 121 – February 2016 © Africa Institute of South Africa the AU’s blueprint for the future, will never materialise unless African countries implement strong governance and reform measures that promote state legitimacy. The continent can benefit administratively and otherwise from reforms if, like China, it were to apply scientific principles in managing its business, industries and economies to improve efficiency by waging war on wasteful spending, and if it were to standardise administrative procedures aimed at preventing corruption and reducing bureaucratic red tape.

### IL – enviro/pollution

#### Xi implementing first-step pollution reform

Vark, 15 – PhD in international relations and European studies , (Juhan, 2015, China’s Dilemmas on the Road to Reforms under Xi Jinping, http://www.degruyter.com/dg/viewarticle.fullcontentlink:pdfeventlink/$002fj$002fbjes.2015.5.issue-1$002fbjes-2015-0009$002fbjes-2015-0009.pdf/bjes-2015-0009.pdf?t:ac=j$002fbjes.2015.5.issue-1$002fbjes-2015-0009$002fbjes-2015-0009.xml)//kap

Sensing the gravity of the situation, Chinese government has suggested numerous solutions for fighting China’s notorious air pollution: adding sprinklers on top of skyscrapers, smog-sucking vacuums, air-cleaning bikes. Recently, the Aviation Industry Corporation of China started developing and testing aerial drones that carry air-purifying sprays for use in the most polluted areas (Singh, 2014). Xi Jinping and his government have mapped out ambitious environmental initiatives in recent five-year-plans, although experts say few have been realized. In December 2013, China’s National Development and Reform Commission, the country’s top economic planning agency, issued its first nationwide blueprint for climate change, outlining an extensive list of objectives to achieve by 2020. Since January 2014, the central government has required 15,000 factories, including large state-owned enterprises, to publicly report real-time figures on their air emissions and water discharges. And the central government has pledged to spend 275 billion US dollars over the next five years to clean up the air. As it is known, China is also one of the biggest investors in renewables; its spending could total 1.8 trillion RMB (which equals 300 billion US dollars) in the five years through 2015 as part of its promise to cut carbon intensity. According to the National Energy Administration of China, renewable energy sources comprised 57 per cent of newly installed electricity-generating capacity in the first ten months of 2013. Since Chinese authorities have been trying to hide the real situation of the country’s environment for years, it is presented by a number of “green protest” organizations. Friends of Nature is one of its oldest, and Global Village and Green Home are among other well-known green protest organizations. Despite state support, these organizations inevitably face constraints deriving from the government’s fear that their activities could catalyze democratic social change. Beijing, for instance, has put forward an amendment to China’s environmental protection law that would bar such green groups or organizations from suing polluters. The central government has structured its efforts in much the same way that it has pursued economic growth.

#### Chinese pollution contributing to nearly irreparable environmental degradation now – Chinese energy policy paradigm shift key to reverse status quo trends

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China’s economic boom has an environmental dark side. While China’s economy continues to grow at a rate of more than 8% annually, as it has for more than two decades, the country’s environment and the Chinese people are paying a steep price. China now boasts five of the ten most polluted cities in the world; 70% of the water that flows through China’s urban areas is unfit for drinking or fishing; and severely degraded land or desert, which now claims 1⁄4 of China’s land, is advancing at a rate of 1300 sq. miles per year. As Nathan Nankivell points out, the environmental crisis poses a challenge for China’s leaders on their own developmental terms. The environment is biting back into economic growth: regions from Qinghai to Shenzhen, for example, face significant costs to industrial production from lack of water; countrywide, these economic losses totaled $28 billion in 2003 and the challenge is only increasing. Overall costs to China’s economy from environmental pollution and degradation are estimated at 8-12% of GDP annually. Environment-related public health is a second significant problem. Chinese officials have acknowledged, for example, that 300 million people drink contaminated water on a daily basis, and of these, 190 million drink water that is so contaminated that it is making them sick. Finally, the failure of the government to redress its environment-related economic and public health problems has produced widespread social discontent. Environmental protests are a serious source of localized social instability that in numerous, widely-reported cases over the past year alone, have turned violent. For the rest of the world, how China responds to its environmental crisis has enormous implications. Nankivell outlines some potential future scenarios that suggest just how serious a threat China’s environmental practices might be to global security. Already, throughout Asia and beyond, China’s contribution to transborder air and water pollution provokes significant concern. Russia’s harsh criticism of China’s handling of the recent transborder water pollution disaster that poisoned the water for the twelve million residents of Harbin and many others suggests the potential for international conflict. Globally, China is one of the world’s leading contributors to climate change, ozone depletion, and biodiversity loss, and it is now in the early stages of following the United States and other rich nations in a race toward mass automobile ownership whose implications for air pollution and global warning are profound. Can China change its environmental trajectory? There are some positive signs. While quadrupling its GDP between 1980 and 2000, China's energy increased only twofold, suggesting a recognition of improved efficiency. And the Chinese state monitors pollution at 300,000 factories. Formally registered environmental non-governmental organizations now total more than 2000 in China, and environmental activists, with the help of the Chinese media and some outspoken Chinese officials, are pressing for environmental impact assessments to be openly conducted, bringing lawsuits against polluting factories, and even attempting to halt mega-dam construction. In some wealthier Chinese cities, such as Dalian and Shanghai, proactive leaders have increased the share of local funds devoted to environmental protection. Nankivell calls for greater assistance by the international community. In fact, international environmental NGOs, foreign governments and international governmental organizations such as the World Bank are all deeply engaged in contributing to China’s environmental protection effort. Indeed, by one account, international NGOs now account for as much as three fourths of funding for environmental protection in China. It is nevertheless difficult to escape the impression that, thus far, the combined efforts amount to chasing a problem that is growing by leaps and bounds, and that efforts to reverse the juggernaut appear rather like the application of band aids over gaping wounds. In the end, the possibilities for slowing and eventually reversing environmental disasters will have to come through the concerted efforts of the international community in combination with the agency of vigorous and informed states. In China, as in the United States, Japan and elsewhere, the priorities of the state will be crucial. But they will also reflect the pressures from the citizenry under circumstances in which the gods of accelerated development and global definitions of modernity (the private automobile most importantly) exercise powerful sway. Critical gaps in China’s domestic policy milieu will have to be reversed, and fundamental decisions about national priorities will have to be reconceived, if that nation is to avoid the crippling consequences of environmental pollution and contributing massively to global warming. Chief among these are corruption, low levels of investment in environmental protection, a lack of incentives to do the right thing, still nascent practice of the rule of law, a primacy on economic development, and poor transparency.

#### Inability to instill environmental reform in the status quo – lack of political will

Nankivell 6, Senior Researcher at the Office of the Special Advisor Policy, Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters, Canadian Department of National Defence, (Nathan, 1/4/6, China's Pollution and the Threat to Domestic and Regional Stability, http://apjjf.org/-Nathan-Nankivell/1799/article.html)//kap

While the general accessibility of this information is creating greater awareness, trends indicate that pollution and environmental degradation will worsen. Chinese consumers are expected to purchase hundreds of millions of automobiles, adding to air pollution problems. Despite pledges to put the environment first, national planners still aim to double per capita GDP by 2010 (China Daily, October 20, 2005). Urban populations are expected to continue expanding, leading to the creation of slums and stressing urban sanitation and delivery systems. Steadily richer Chinese will be able to purchase more goods and consume more resources. The nation lacks a powerful national body able to coordinate, monitor, and enforce environmental legislation: the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) is under-staffed, has few resources, and must compete with other bureaucracies for attention. The devolution of decision-making to local levels has placed environmental stewardship in the hands of officials who are more concerned with economic growth than the environment. Finally, the deficiency of capital and the lack of will to promote massive spending on environmental repair necessary to reverse more than two decades of destruction are perhaps most indicative of the fact that environmental restoration will not occur: estimates on the final cost of environmental repair range into the tens of billions of dollars (Canadian Security Intelligence Services Division; The Economist, October 20, 2005). From the examples above, it is clear that China’s environmental crisis will only worsen before it gets better. SEPA’s impotence, Beijing’s contradictory policy statements, expanding consumption, and a lack of funds to reverse already serious problems all suggest that pollution and degradation will most likely worsen in the decades to come.

#### Xi is trying to push environmental reforms now but needs more support

**Lehr and Wedell, 5/30** – [Deborah, Senior Fellow at The Paulson Institute; Leigh, former Chief Sustainability Officer of the Paulson Institute, The World Post, “Xi’s Green Teams Fight for the Environment”, 5/30/16, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deborah-lehr/xis-green-teams-fight-for_b_10206812.html>, 6/24/16]JRO

Chinese President Xi Jinping was an unexpected savior of the historic Paris Climate Summit last December. He offered far reaching Chinese commitments to reduce carbon emissions, and also provided necessary political momentum to finalize the difficult international negotiations. Now Xi has turned his attention to the even more difficult task of delivering on those commitments at home. To do so, he’s taking a page from his anti-corruption campaign: creating “Green Teams” or environmental experts tasked with conducting random inspections across China to ensure that provincial and municipal leaders are actually implementing his policies. Xi’s Green Teams are a broader symbol of his challenges to implementing his domestic reform agenda, particularly enforcing local compliance of his national policies. While President Xi may have consolidated power at the national level, he still has tremendous difficulty ensuring that policies issued from the center are carried out consistently at the local level. As the Chinese proverb goes, “the sky is high and the emperor is far away.” And Xi’s environmental effort will fail if he cannot get local leaders in line. The new inspection unit at the Ministry for Environmental Protection (MEP) is 120 experts strong and will visit all of China’s provinces every two years. They began their task this May in Hebei Province, adjacent to Beijing and home to the most polluted cities in China It is ground zero in the war against pollution. This initial Green Team’s conclusion would come as no surprise to President Xi: Hebei officials are not enforcing the laws consistently. The inspectors found 2,856 environmental infractions, shuttered illegal companies, detained 123 individuals and investigated another 65. As a result, the province has conducted their own investigation and identified 13,784 issues to be addressed by the end of 2016. Local officials are now on notice, and will be held personally accountable for successfully implementing these changes. To create some incentives to follow the rules, the Chinese have also changed the criteria for promotion of local officials to include implementation of environmental reforms as a key consideration for rising within the government system. Historically, the two main criteria were economic growth and job creation. Now mayors and governors are also ranked on their abilities to clean up the environment in their region. President Xi has also taken the much needed step of changing the reporting structure for the MEP and its provincial and municipal branches. Previously, all MEP branches were under the authority of the local Mayor or provincial governor, allowing them to exert undue influence if the MEP policies differed from their own interests. Now local MEP leaders are under the authority of the MEP headquarters in Beijing, which should ensure more policy consistency in the provinces. The concept of the “Green Team” is not new. Last year, the Xi dispatched eight SWAT-like inspection teams to the provinces to determine whether local officials were implementing Xi’s ambitious economic plans. They came back with a 1,000 page report that basically concluded that local officials were not cooperating. The Party continues to investigate the lack of consistent policy implementation as part of its anti-corruption campaign. Three years into his presidency, Xi is still struggling with implementing his sweeping agenda—with one of the main obstacles being local recalcitrance. In the case of the environment, China is making progress where the central government has authority. Investment in infrastructure is one of those areas: China now accounts for 30% of wind power and 17% of the solar power globally. China is also on track to become the world’s largest green bond market, and is uniting its seven regional carbon markets into a unified nationwide system next year. The government is also exploring unique public-private partnerships models to “green finance” the implementation of these commitments. There is strong economic rationale for growing the environmental sector and transitioning to low carbon growth. Xi is not taking this aggressive action however just to please the Paris signatories. At home, the number one source of protests is the poor quality of the environment. The growing Chinese middle class expects clean air to breath, safe food to eat and pure water to drink. One Green Team member told the media he was receiving at least 100 calls a day from the public just in Hebei province with complaints about local environmental degradation. Environmental protection has become a political imperative for the senior leadership as much as an economic one. Yet the battle for the future of China’s environment—much like the battle over curtailing corruption or spurring economic growth—will be fought as much in China’s myriad provinces and cities as in the halls of power in Beijing. Which begs the question: when it comes to cleaning up China’s environment, will the Green Teams be enough?

#### Xi’s reforms are key to ensuring compliance with environmental protections

**Xinhua, 15** – [Global Times, “Xi: reform to make environment watchdog more independent”, 11/3/15, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/950643.shtml>, 6/24/16]JRO

China will reform the current environmental protection management system, in an attempt to make the watchdog more independent, President Xi Jinping said in a statement on Tuesday. An absence of supervision over local governments and intervention in the environmental watchdog's duties are common problems, according to the statement which explains the Proposal on Formulating the Thirteenth Five-year Plan (2016-2020). Provincial-level environmental departments will be put directly in charge of the city level and allocating the budget, Xi said. County-level environmental bureaus will be abolished and in their place will be supervision agencies, he added. "The move will ensure effective law enforcement by local environment watchdogs," said the President. The reform will be tested first and then extended across the country, Xi said, adding the authority will strive to complete the task within the next five years.

### IL – judiciary

#### Xi is in the process of reforming the judicial system – key to accountability and maintaining social stability

**Xinhua, 1/22 -** [Xinhuanet, “China's Xi urges deepening judicial reform”, 1/22/16, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/23/c_135037100.htm>, 6/24/16]JRO

\*This is a news site in China

Chinese President Xi Jinping has called on the country's political and legal affairs departments to deepen ongoing judicial reforms to give a boost to the country's judicial credibility and people's sense of security. Xi, also general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, made the remarks in a written instruction on political and legal work. A central conference on political and legal work opened on Friday in Beijing. Meng Jianzhu, head of the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs of the CPC Central Committee, delivered Xi's instructions to the meeting. In his instruction, Xi, who is on a tour of the Middle East, commended the Party's political and legal work over the past year. He said China's judicial reforms and the establishment of a multi-level social security system were off to a good start in 2015. In the new year of 2016, political and legal affairs departments must further step up efforts to "prevent and contain risks" and work to facilitate China's economic and social development. They shall build up capacities to safeguard national security and social stability so as to augment citizens' sense of security, and shall comprehensively deepen judicial reforms in order to boost people's confidence in the system, he said. Team building must also be strengthened to cultivate a clean judicial environment, the president said. Xi also urged Party committees at all levels to improve leadership in political and legal work, and support judiciary organs in their duties. A statement issued after the political and legal affairs meeting pledged creating a secure and stable social environment, a fair and just judicial environment and a quality and effective service environment for China's social and economic developments during the 13th Five-Year Plan period (2016-2020). Meng Jianzhu urged stepping up early warning and prevention and control of risks and safeguarding political, financial and public security as well as cybersecurity. Judicial reforms, which are now being piloted in 18 provincial level localities in the country, shall be promoted across the country, Meng said. Friday's conference came a little more than a year after the Party promised sweeping judical reforms in the country's legal system, unveiled in a new blueprint on the rule of law adopted at a key CPC meeting in late 2014. Despite continuous efforts in the recent years to boost judicial justice, the judicial system is still dogged by unfair trials and corrupt judges, Xi said at the meeting, denouncing judges and prosecutors who manipulate cases in exchange for money or favors. A decision adopted at the meeting vowed to ensure the independence of courts and prosecutors, while promising the supreme authority of the Constitution. Fourteen months after that meeting, key progress in upholding the rule of law has been made. Government and Party officials were told not to "meddle" in court cases, while circuit courts were set up by the Supreme People's Court (SPC) for major administrative, civil and commercial cases involving different administrative regions, making it easier for local communities to file suits. Meanwhile, the country's Legislative Law was revised last year, delegating legislative power to more lower-level bodies and prohibiting ministries and local governments from arbitrarily issuing rules and policies that undermine citizens' rights or increase their obligations without legal foundation so as to rein in administrative power. In addition, Chinese officials in state organs are now required to pledge allegiance to the Constitution when taking their posts. Pledging allegiance is not just a symbolic move, but a showcase of firm belief towards the rule of law, said Jiang Ming'an, a law professor with the Peking University. Recalling changes that have been made in 2015, Jiang said China is already on the fast track for the rule of law. "By making China's law systems more complete and just, the power of rule of law will without doubt play a major part in safeguarding China's economic, social, cultural and ecological developments during the 13th Five-Year Plan period," he said.

#### Xi is trying to reform the judiciary – roots out corruption and creates credibility

**deLisle, 15** – [Jacques, is the Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law & Professor of Political Science and Director for the Center for East Asian Studies, The Asian Forum, “Xi Jinping’s Impact on China’s Legal Development: Domestic and International”, 10/15/15, <http://www.theasanforum.org/xi-jinpings-impact-on-chinas-legal-development-domestic-and-international/>, 6/26/16]JRO

The Xi leadership also has turned to law to address behavior that could imperil the prospects of market-oriented economic reforms, old and new. The Fourth Plenum acknowledged public perceptions that law and courts are not fair and just. Its policy document, the Supreme People’s Court’s most recent Five-Year Plan for judicial reform, and other initiatives have pledged to make courts more available and effective for those seeking to protect economic-related legal rights. They promised progress toward a more just, efficient, and authoritative justice system that could better adjudicate cases independently, fairly, according to law, and with proper regard for parties’ lawful interests.15 Specific reforms, some of which quickly began to be implemented, moved to limit courts’ discretion to reject cases and took on long-standing problems of judicial corruption and “local protectionism,” which has provided a “home court” advantage to litigants who are rooted, well-connected, and receive preferential treatment in local courts. Measures included creating circuit courts of appeal delinked from provinces and localities, permitting transfer of some types of cases to courts in other jurisdictions, increasing centralization of court finances, giving greater roles to higher-level courts in promoting judges, promoting professionalization of the judiciary (including recruiting into the judiciary experienced lawyers and “legal experts”), holding judges responsible (for life) for erroneous decisions, requiring disclosure of attempts by officials to intervene in individual cases, and including the judiciary among the targets of anti-corruption efforts.16

### KT econ

#### Judicial reforms will restore credibility and faith in the system – key to the economy and Chinese security

**Shanming, 15** – [Jin, currently acts as a researcher at the Institute of Law of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and was previously the President of the Intellectual Property Law Association of China, China Today, “Social Equity and Justice via Judicial Reform”, 5/28/15, <http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/english/society/2015-05/28/content_689891.htm>, 6/24/16]JRO

AS China undergoes rapid economic and social development and its people’s judicial demands exponentially grow, it becomes more and more important that the population feels proper justice is served in every legal case. This is to be achieved by deepening the reform of the judicial system and enhancing judicial credibility. Resolved to comprehensively promote the rule of law, China has set the goal of improving the judicial management system and judicial power operating mechanism. The Supreme People’s Court released last February The Opinion on Comprehensively Deepening the Reform of the People’s Court (the Opinion) and the 2014-2018 court reform outline, marking the beginning of a new round of judicial reform in China. Reshape the Concept For a nation in the midst of transformation, stability and development are the leitmotifs of economic and social life in China. Social and economic development is impossible without good governance, and the judiciary is a key element of the national governance system. The performance of judicial bodies has great bearing on the state’s governance capacity. Although the term “rule of law” has been part of the constitution for a long time, what precisely is at its core awaits further exploration. The idea of the rule of law needs full, elaborate and proper definition in order to fill the gaps in people’s understanding of judicial principles and practices, as it is often influenced by cultural traditions. For instance, some observers maintain that the value of judicial work lies in dispute dissolution. This leads to the excessive pursuit of mediation rates, which skews values and opinions on what is right and wrong, ruins public trust, and shakes people’s faith in the law. Others believe that the value of judicial work lies in maintaining social stability. As long as parties accept the judgment, the judicial mission has been accomplished. Therefore, some local authorities set maintenance of stability as the paramount goal of the judiciary, ignoring true justice, citizens’ legitimate rights, and proper procedures mandated by the law. Of course, some people hold that the value of judicial work consists in achieving social equity and justice. This standpoint gives a positive slant to China’s judicial work. However, due to differences in the understanding of what is fair and just, certain judges are inept in their interpretation and application of laws, or fail to abide by required procedures, creating a disunion between their self-perception and public evaluation. Moreover, the thousand-year-long bureaucratic prioritization mindset has been found to be the biggest obstacle to judicial reform. Deep-rooted misconceptions inhibit judicial reform, such as the notion that judicial power is merely one of the government’s powers and that the law should give way to political goals. In addition to ideology, the judicial system itself needs to be improved. For example, the Supreme People’s Court should enhance its supervision and guidance of the courts at lower levels. The authority of the people’s court should also be further improved. Some unfair judgments, delays to action, and non-uniform standards await further solutions. And harsher punishments should be handed down to those who evade or refuse to implement court orders. Some judges fall short of the requirements of their jobs in the new situation, failing to accurately ascertain facts, correctly apply the law, or properly defuse conflicts. Moreover, along with the increase in cases stemming from the latest developments in Chinese society, pressures on judicial workers is mounting. In light of these problems, the new round of reform highlights the central status of judicial authority in the execution of public powers, and aims to continually improve judicial credibility to build a socialist judicial system with Chinese characteristics. Build the Institution China has been exploring judicial reform for more than two decades, and yet the structure is still incomplete. This round of judicial reform will first make clear its theoretical basis and objectives, and formulate concrete measures to promote reform accordingly. The subject factor of judicial authority is the judge, whose quality directly determines and influences the results of the judgment. This exerts strong demands on the judge’s independence and professional ethics. Any factor that may affect a judge’s independent and fair judgment should be dispelled institutionally. Therefore, to establish a rational and strict system to appoint and evaluate judges is the logical starting point of this judicial reform. The Opinion pinpoints the path of reform, including differentiated management of court personnel, specifying the number of judges for courts of different levels, reforming judge selection and performance evaluation systems, and enhancing on-the-job training for them. The reform aims to put the judge and the administration of justice at the center of the judicial system, and to build a professional and standard team of judges. The operating mechanism of judicial authority refers to how judgments are formed, a process that must follow mandated procedures and be transparent throughout. To ensure the independence of the trial and outcome, the Opinion better defines the responsibilities of the presiding judge and collegiate bench. It also clarifies the supervision duties of the court president and presiding judge, improves the working mechanism of the judicial committee, further regulates relations between upper and lower courts, and requires full explanation of the reasons for decisions in written judgments. The ultimate aim is to establish open, dynamic, transparent, and people-friendly adjudication mechanisms, in which the people who handle trials and make decisions have full and clear authority and accountabilities, and are subject to orderly supervision. The fairness of the judgment depends on the independence of the judge. Being deprived of necessary resources, or being subject to string pulling from certain parties on such matters as promotions, housing, and salary, inevitably prejudices judges’ impartiality. In response to these problems, the Opinion calls for accelerated reform to the funding system for courts, improved cross-regional jurisdiction, the launch of the circuit court system, deepened reform of the litigation jurisdiction system, reform to the letters and visits system, and strengthening of the supervisory role of the Supreme People’s Court. These measures are expected to foster the institutional conditions and social atmosphere that promote people’s faith in, and respect and support for the judiciary. Reform in an Orderly Process Reform requires not only courage but also a well-designed schedule. Based on sufficient research and extensive debates, the Opinion articulates 65 concrete measures in seven aspects, with a roadmap for implementation. These are as follows. By the end of 2015: Build a complete judicial power operation mechanism that features well-defined authorities and accountabilities of judicial personnel, and orderly supervision; build platforms that give the public full information on trial procedures, court decisions and their enforcement, and establish an extensive judiciary service network. By the end of 2016: Promote a trial-centered litigation system in which investigation and prosecution evolve around the court proceeding; form a scientific, clear, and effective court configuration mode. By the end of 2017: Form a reasonable, orderly, and impartial judicial jurisdiction system and a sound court personnel management system. By the end of 2018: Foster the institutional conditions and social atmosphere that promote people’s faith in, and respect and support for the judiciary. A response to China’s efforts to advance the rule of law, the Opinion calls the shots for the new round of judicial reform. It is a long and arduous task that in its course maintains people’s rights and interests and defends justice in every case.

### IL – anti-corrupt reforms

### KT Chinese judicial legit

#### Anti-corruption measures restore Chinese judicial legitimacy

Leung 15, (James, 2015, Xi's Corruption Crackdown How Bribery and Graft Threaten the Chinese Dream, Foreign Affairs, available via Hein Online)//kap

Corruption has also infected law enforcement and the legal system. Organized criminal groups pay police officers to protect their drug and prostitution rings. Criminal suspects and their relatives often bribe police officers to win release from jail or to avoid prosecution. If that fails, they can try their luck with prosecutors and judges. And of course, since China's judiciary is not independent, there are always party and government officials who might be able and willing to intervene in a case-for the right price. Authorities allege that Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the party's Standing Committee who oversaw legal and internal security affairs, personally intervened in many court cases after accepting bribes. Zhou was arrested, charged, and expelled from the party last year and is currently awaiting trialthe first time in decades that the state has pursued a criminal case against a former member of the Standing Committee. As China's domestic markets have grown, multinational companies and banks have learned that getting access means knowing whose palms to grease. Many firms have taken to hiring the children of senior government officials, sometimes even paying their tuition at Western universities. Others have opted for a more direct route, paying hefty "consulting" fees to middlemen in order to participate in stock offerings or to win preferential treatment in bidding for government contracts. This environment has discouraged some multinational companies from investing and conducting business in China, especially those constrained by U.S. anticorruption laws. Meanwhile, officials have taken advantage of loose financial controls and a lack of transparency to safeguard their illicit profits. Many officials hold a number of Chinese passports, often under different names but with valid visas, and use them to travel abroad and stash their money in foreign bank accounts. But corruption is hardly limited to official circles and big business; every aspect of society feels its effects. Consider education. To give their child a shot at getting into one of the relatively small number of high-quality Chinese primary and secondary schools and universities, parents often have to bribe admissions officers or headmasters. May/June 2015 35 James Leung Similarly, the scarcity of good hospitals and well-trained medical personnel has led to the practice of supplying doctors or medical administrators with a hongbaoa "red packet" of cash-to secure decent treatment.

#### XI’s anti-corruption measures only target specific political dissidents – status quo push fails to establish adherence to rule of law

Leung 15, (James, 2015, Xi's Corruption Crackdown How Bribery and Graft Threaten the Chinese Dream, Foreign Affairs, available via Hein Online)//kap

Faced with this far-reaching problem, Xi has promised more than a mere BandAid, envisioning a long-term process of systemic reform. The first phase has been the heavily stage-managed crackdown of the past two years. So far, the campaign has contained an element of populism: it has targeted only officials, bureaucrats, and major business figures whom the party suspects of corrupt dealings; no ordinary Chinese people have felt the sting. The campaign seeks not only to punish corruption but to prevent it as well. In late 2012, the party published a set of guidelines known as the "eight rules and six prohibitions," banning bureaucrats from taking gifts and bribes; attending expensive restaurants, hotels, or private clubs; playing golf; using government funds for personal travel; using government vehicles for private purposes; and so on. The government has also required all officials and their immediate family members to disclose their assets and income, to make it harder to hide ill-gotten gains. At the same time, the party has sought to reduce incentives for graft by narrowing the income gaps within the system. In the last year, it raised the salaries and retirement benefits of military officers, law enforcement personnel, and other direct government employees, while sharply cutting the higher salaries enjoyed by top managers of stateowned enterprises. Still, to date, Xi's campaign has been chiefly an enforcement effort. Investigations are led by the party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), which sends inspection teams to examine every ministry and agency and every large state-owned enterprise. The teams enjoy the unlimited power to investigate, detain, and interrogate almost anyone, but mainly government officials, the vast majority of whom are party members. Once the teams believe they have gathered sufficient evidence of wrongdoing, the CCDi expels suspects from the party and then hands them over to the legal system for prosecution. Xi has declared that no corrupt official will be spared, no matter how high his position. In practice, however, the CCI has chosen its targets very carefully, especially at senior levels. The decision to go after Zhou was heralded as setting a new precedent-since the late 1980s, the party has followed an unspoken rule against purging a member or former member of the Standing Committee. And yet Zhou's removal and prosecution remain unique; they appear to have been less a signal of things to come than a shot across the bow, intended to scare off any potential opposition to Xi within the leadership. Zhou was vulnerable because he was retired and no longer had direct control or power. Also, Zhou had backed a group of senior party officials who had challenged Xi's power and authority early in his tenure; among them was Bo Xilai, the influential party chief of Chongqing, who in 2013 was brought down by a scandal involving corruption and a murder plot in which his wife 36 FOREIGN AFFAIRS Xi's Corruption Crackdown participated. Finally, Zhou and his immediate family members were particularly flagrant in their corrupt pursuits, which made him an easy target. Some media reports have indicated that authorities are investigating the family members of other retired Standing Committee members. But so far, no ranking member of the "red aristocracy" has yet been targeted, and all the highest-level targets, including Zhou and Xu, have been part of a single loose political network. Apparently, there are still lines Xi is not willing to cross. It is also worth noting that although Xi has allowed investigations of the country's key military institutions, he has yet to make any major personnel changes within the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission, the armed forces' equivalent of the CCDI. Xi still needs more time to consolidate his control over the military and its institutions. A number of other elements of Xi's campaign are also problematic, because they present opportunities for abuse and run contrary to the spirit of the legal reforms that Xi is pursuing. Xi claims that he wants to improve due process and reduce abusive police and judicial practices. But the CCDI itself does not always follow standard legal procedures. For example, Chinese law allows police to detain a suspect for only seven days without formally charging him, unless the police obtain express permission from legal authorities to extend the detention. The CCDI, on the other hand, has kept suspects in custody for far longer periods without seeking any approval and without issuing any formal charges, giving the appearance of a separate standard. Meanwhile, with its newfound authority, the CCDI is gradually becoming the most powerful institution within the party system. Unless the party balances and limits the agency's power and influence, the CCDI could grow unaccountable and become a source of the very kinds of conduct it is supposed to combat. Perhaps the biggest potential obstacle to the success of the campaign is strong resistance to it within the bureaucratic system. Xi has launched a direct attack on the interests of many entrenched bureaucrats and officials; even those who have escaped prosecution have watched their prosperity and privilege shrink. Many officials might also resent the idea that there is something fundamentally wrong with the way they are accustomed to conducting themselves. They may feel that they deserve the benefits they get through graft; without their work, after all, nothing would get done-the system wouldn't function. Early in Xi's tenure, some officials seemed to believe that although the days of flagrant self-dealing were over, it would still be possible to exploit their positions for profit; they would just need to be a bit more subtle about it. In 2013, The New York Times, citing Chinese state media, reported that a new slogan had become popular among government officials: "Eat quietly, take gently, and play secretly." But that sense of confidence has evaporated as it has become clear that Xi is serious about cracking down. During the past two years, party members and state bureaucrats have become extremely cautious about running afoul of the new ethos, although many are quietly seething about the situation. This has interfered with May/June 2015 37 James Leung the traditional wheel-greasing function of corruption and contributed to China's economic slowdown. If corruption no longer assists entrepreneurs in slipping past bureaucratic barriers, it will put additional pressure on Xi to institute economic reforms that genuinely reduce those obstacles.

### KT mil restructure

#### Xi is using his anti-corruption reforms to restructure the military and assert personal control

Panda 4/7/16 Xi Jinping's PLA Ambitions: Why Guo Boxiong Had to Go By Ankit Panda. April 07, 2016 <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/xi-jinpings-pla-ambitions-why-guo-boxiong-had-to-go/> Ankit Panda is a foreign affairs analyst, writer, and editor with expertise in international relations, international security, and geopolitics. He is currently an associate editor at The Diplomat. //LKJ

On Monday, the Chinese government announced that an old tiger was the latest to be ensnared in President Xi Jinping’s wide-ranging anti-corruption campaign. Guo Boxiong, a former vice chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission and a retired People’s Liberation Army (PLA) general, confessed to taking $12.3 million in bribes. Xinhua, citing a statement from the PLA’s military procuratorate said that Guo was additionally found to “have taken the advantage of his position to assist the promotion and relocation of other people.” Guo stepped down from the CMC in 2012. The announcement regarding Guo’s past misdeeds is not surprising. Last summer, he became the senior-most military official to be expelled from the Chinese Communist Party since Xu Caihou, another former CMC vice chairman. (Xu died awaiting trial on corruption charges.) Chinese state media reporting echoed the charges that led to Guo’s expulsion from the party nearly verbatim when reporting on his confessions this week. “His acts seriously violated party discipline and left a vile impact,” the CCP Politburo had said at the time. Moreover, Guo’s son, Guo Zhenggang, a PLA general himself and former deputy commissar of the Zhejiang Military Region, had been investigated last year for corruption as well. The significance of Guo’s prosecution is two-fold. First, Guo held enormous influence over the PLA during the Jiang Zemin presidency. Though Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has sought to stamp out “tigers and flies” alike (referring to senior and low-level party officials respectively), the “tigers” have often been linked politically to Jiang Zemin. Guo, along with Xu Caihou, benefited from his status as one of Jiang’s close confidants in the PLA. As Bo Zhiyue noted in The Diplomat, both Guo and Xu owed their eventual promotions to CMC vice chairmanships to Jiang. The fall of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou reinforces the idea that Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign–insofar as it has affected the People’s Liberation Army–seeks to strike Jiang Zemin’s lingering influence. In particular, Xi’s resolve to go after Xu and Guo after their retirement sends a powerful signal to other senior PLA leaders from the Hu and Jiang eras, warning them to avoid interfering in the affairs of the PLA past their prime. The anti-corruption-as-power-consolidation understanding of Xi’s campaign isn’t new. For instance, the fate of other “tigers” that fell to the campaign spurred rumors in China that a motley crew of former officials–some linked to Jiang and others linked to Bo Xilai and the “New Left” in China–was conspiring to undermine and even overthrow Xi’s leadership. Ling Jihua, Zhou Yongkang (the ultimate “tiger”), and Xu Caihou were linked to these conspiracies. Second, Guo’s prosecution comes at a time of major reform and organizational change to the People’s Liberation Army. The ongoing restructuring was initiated by Xi last fall and represents the most radical rethink of how China’s armed forces are structured since the People’s Republic’s founding in 1949. As part of these reforms, Xi has sought to solidify his personal control over the PLA as commander-in-chief, solidifying the already powerful post of chairman of the CMC. High-level corruption has the instrumentally undesirable outcome of weakening the accountability of senior PLA leadership to Xi’s whims. With the ouster of Guo and Xu before him, Xi and Wang Qishan, Politburo Standing Committee member and head of the powerful Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, have made it clear that the ‘new’ PLA will not tolerate a senior military leadership that has its loyalties anywhere but the CMC. Learning from Mao’s purges of senior generals during the Cultural Revolution, which has its 50th anniversary next month, Xi understands the value of asserting personal control over the military.

### IL – legitimacy

#### Xi’s reforms key to mindset shift, diplomatic legitimacy and efficacy, enhancing foreign relations

Kejin and Xin 15, China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, World Scientific, (Zhao and Gao, 2015, China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Pursuing the Chinese Dream Institutional Changes of Chinese Diplomacy under President Xi Jinping)//kap

Enhancing foreign relations is an important part of Xi Jinping’s mandate and power portfolio. To him, reforming the diplomatic system is not an isolated matter. It is not only an indispensable component of the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, but also one of the keys to promote the national governance system and the modernization of governance capacity, so as to serve the grand strategic goal of realizing the Chinese Dream. As for why the diplomatic system should be reformed, Xi Jinping stated that “Reform is the result of problems. When we are solving problems, the reform is also enhanced.”28 In the process of reform, “we should have a strong sense toward problems, for major problems can act as our guidance to grasp the key issues. By further pondering over different issues, we can find [out] resolutions to the overwhelming contradictions and problems facing our development.”29 Since the 18th CPC National Congress, national development and security are two “grave issues” for China’s diplomacy. As Xi himself pointed out, “At present, our nation faces double pressure. Internationally, there are sovereignty issues, security issues and development interests to protect. Domestically, there is political security and social stability to preserve. All kinds of potential risks, predictable or not, are increasing.”30 Therefore, Xi Jinping called for government leadership at all levels to “coordinate two designs, both of the domestic level and of the international level. Likewise, development and security should also be coordinated at the same time.”31 Though he did not elaborate on the details of the two “grave issues,” by stressing their importance, Xi made it clear that National development and security are two key issues for China’s diplomacy. diplomacy should not only serve the cause of modernization centered on economic construction as it did during the past three decades of reform and opening-up, but also serve the long-term stability of the nation. At the third plenary session of the 18th CPC National Congress, when Xi explained why the National Security Commission was established, he also mentioned that “our security system and mechanism cannot meet the needs of securing our nation, so we have to forge a powerful platform to plan and coordinate national security. It is high time a National Security Commission was established to unify the leadership of national security.”32 Then, why does China need top-level design and strategic planning under the new leadership? Xi Jinping has answered this question as well. In his words: “to deepen all-round reform is a complex project, which calls for the efforts of more than just one or several departments, so a higher level of leading mechanism is in order.”33 Meanwhile, he also noticed that “the obstacles of ideologies towards deepening the reform are not from outside the system but from the inside.”34 Among the factors that hinder the reform from inside the system, it is Xi Jinping’s belief that the biggest obstacle is the so-called “restrictions of a rigid way of thinking” and the “constraints of departmental interests.”35 He emphasized that “we must break through the obstacles of ideology and the fences of entrenched interests.”36 He believes that to reform means to have the courage and the willpower to readjust oneself, “by strengthening the relations, coordination and feasibility between different reforms,” because “reform in any one field would affect the reforms in other fields, thus reforms in different fields should connect with each other. If the reform of different fields do not match each other, or even conflict to some extent, the all-round deepening of the reform will be hard to push forward. Even if it is imposed, the result will not be as satisfactory.”37 As for diplomacy, Xi Jinping stressed at the Central Conference on Foreign Affairs that “the unified leadership of the Party must be reinforced; the system and mechanism of foreign affairs must be reformed and perfected, while the planning and coordination of foreign affairs among different fields, departments and local governments must be enhanced. We should also expand the strategic investment, regulate the management of foreign affairs, and strengthen the construction of a strong leading team for foreign affairs.”38 From the statement of Xi Jinping about the reform of the diplomatic system, it can be seen that the effort to push forward the innovation of the diplomatic system and related mechanisms is not a result of some pre-set national strategy, but it is due to the many problems facing the realization of the Chinese Dream. It is also a part of constructing the national governance system and deepening the all-round reform. The core objective of the reform is to avoid “calamitous mistakes,” while effectively coping with the two “grave issues” of development and security, maintaining the long-term safety of the nation. As Xi said, “China, as a vast country, should never make calamitous mistakes on fundamental issues. Once it does, there is no way to make amends. Our standpoint is that we should be brave and steady, exploring with boldness yet on careful deliberations.”39

### IL – rule of law

#### Xi pushing for closer adherence to the rule of law – distinct from merely anti-corruption measures – contributing to a paradigm shift in Chinese legal interpretation – but Xi faces opposition – full court press key

Delisle, 15 – Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, (Jacques, July 2015, Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/588272/summary)//kap

Xi Jinping and China’s fifth-generation leadership have given law even greater pride of place in official rhetoric than their predecessors did. The October 2014 Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee—widely dubbed the “rule of law plenum”—declared the rule of law to be a guiding force in pursuing the Chinese Communist Party’s major tasks, including economic development, political modernization, and realization of Xi’s “China dream.” After the Fourth Plenum, Xi included “comprehensively governing the country according to law” among his “Four Comprehensives,” which also included other goals that law is expected to advance (deepening reform, building prosperity, and limiting party misbehavior). These statements amplified earlier commitments to law, including Xi’s declaration in 2012 on the 30th anniversary of the 1982 constitution that China “must firmly establish throughout society, the authority of the constitution and the law,” and the seminal Third Plenum’s pledges in 2013 to “move forward with building a rule of law country,” “strengthen rule of law guarantees,” and “safeguard the authority of the constitution and the laws.”1 This emphasis on law contrasts with decline in official support for law during much of the Hu Jintao period, which was marked by an emphasis on informal dispute resolution, skepticism toward the idea that the courts should be guided primarily by law, and an apparent sense that law had failed to fulfill its promise in advancing the regime’s aims. At the same time, one of the most dramatic initiatives of Xi’s early tenure—a remarkably energetic drive against corruption—has been conducted primarily through the party’s extralegal discipline inspection commission under the leadership of Politburo Standing Committee member and venerable regime trouble-shooter Wang Qishan. Advocates of [End Page 23] more robust constitutionalism, rights protection lawyers, and law-focused NGOs have all faced heightened repression since Xi came to power. These seemingly contradictory trends are consistent with a relatively coherent conception of law’s roles that has deep roots in the reform era and has been evolving under Xi. Throughout the Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao periods, law came to be expected to perform—and to some extent did perform—supporting functions for the regime’s core agenda: providing frameworks for market-oriented, internationally open development strategies; checking potentially development-subverting misbehavior, much of it by party-state or state-linked actors; and preempting pressures for democratic reform. Incipient and likely non-transformative changes in law’s mandate under Xi point toward a legal order that is still reformist and developmentalist (in its notion of law’s role in the economy), more legalist (that is, giving law a larger role in some, but not all, areas), and more Leninist (in the sense of being less liberal, more top-down, and more narrowly instrumentalist). As the sections of this essay examine in turn, the fifth-generation leadership’s strategy appears to imply a large role for law in economic reform, a limited but perhaps growing role for law in addressing corruption and other party-state-based threats to economic development and effective governance, and a mostly, but not entirely, repressive role for law in handling pressures for political change. As this essay also discusses, factors beyond Chinese leaders’ control constrain their options in “ruling the country according to law.” Although the elite’s plans for legal change may fall far short of full implementation and are subject to revision, these measures—and the context in which they must be pursued—do show that there is room in China’s legal universe in the Xi era to increase reliance on law, even if anticorruption campaigns leave little room for law and the political environment is hostile to liberal notions of legality and their advocates.

#### Chinese leadership attempting to strengthen adherence to judicial decree and rule of law

Minzner 13, associate professor at Fordham Law School specializing in China law and governance. Prior to entering academia, he served as Senior Counsel to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, (Carl, 1/4/13, What Direction for Legal Reform under Xi Jinping, http://law.fordham.edu/28665.htm)//kap

Hopes for reform in China have risen in recent weeks. Xi Jinping’s decision to make Shenzhen the site of his first formal inspection tour as party general secretary spurred predictions that he will seek to assume Deng Xiaoping’s mantle as an economic reformer (“Xi Jinping’s ‘Southern Tour’ Reignites Promises of Reform,” China Brief, December 14, 2012). Similarly, Xi’s speech regarding China’s need for the rule of law—given on the 30th anniversary of the 1982 constitution—gave rise to press speculation that he may pursue legal and political reform (South China Morning Post, December 13, 2012; AFP, December 4, 2012). Naturally, this comes against the background of a conservative turn against legal reform by Chinese leaders in recent years [1]. Since 2005, party authorities have cooled on the rule-of-law discourse that characterized the late 1990s and early 2000s. Party political campaigns have warned Chinese judges and courts against foreign legal norms. Public interest lawyers have been subjected to increased pressure, harassment and periodic disappearances or torture. Moreover, under the leadership of former party political-legal committee head and standing committee member, Zhou Yongkang, extralegal “stability maintenance” (weiwen) institutions have ballooned in size and influence. New language in official pronouncements now suggests Chinese leaders intend to reverse at least some of these policies. This appears to be linked directly to internal party efforts to curb the power of political-legal committees in the wake of the Bo Xilai scandal (“Year-End Questions on Political-Legal Reform,” China Brief, December 14, 2012). This shift has allowed activists some greater space to advocate for reforms to state practices, including the reeducation through labor (RETL) system. Central authorities, however, remain committed to maintaining party political control, rendering it unclear how far such legal reforms will be permitted to proceed. Changes in Party Rhetoric Ironically, some of the key linguistic shifts have not originated (at least on the surface) from Xi himself. Rather, they came from former Party General Secretary Hu Jintao during the run-up to the November leadership handover. One such shift originated with Hu’s July 23 speech to ministerial and provincial heads. Attended by all of the then-members of Politburo Standing Committee and presided over by Xi, it was accompanied by an unusually high degree of media coverage. At the time, the speech was widely viewed as an opportunity for top Chinese leaders to demonstrate their unity in the aftermath of Bo’s dismissal and publicly emphasize Xi’s role as the heir apparent in the political succession process, but lacking in substantive content regarding institutional reform (Reuters, July 24, 2012). This speech, however, appears to have introduced a new political phrasing (tifa), calling for authorities to “devote more attention…to the important uses of rule of law in national governance and social management (shehui zhili)” (People’s Daily, July 24, 2012). Since party political-legal authorities had employed “social management” as an umbrella term for the expansion of their activities in recent years, this new phrasing appears to be an implicit rebuke. It suggests that Chinese leaders may deploy rule-of-law norms strategically to curtail the power of party political-legal authorities. Further linguistic changes appeared in the 2012 work report delivered by Hu and drafted by Xi (“The 18th Party Congress Work Report: Policy Blueprint for the Xi Administration,” China Brief, November 30, 2012). Parallel passages of the 17th and 18th Party Congress work reports also offer some hints of reform: “Each party organization and all party members must self-consciously operate within the boundaries of the constitution and the law, and must take the lead in upholding the authority of the constitution and the law” (Xinhua, October 24, 2007). “Since the party has led the people to promulgate the constitution and laws, the party must operate within the boundaries of the constitution and laws. No organization and no individual are entitled to special powers exceeding the constitution and laws. It is absolutely impermissible for (any individual in power) to take their own words as law, to use power to suppress the law, or to bend the law for ones relatives or friends” (Xinhua, November 27, 2012) [2]. The 18th Party Congress Work Report has marginally stronger language that the party itself is obligated to operate within the confines of the constitution and laws. This, however, remains nuanced by the statement that the party itself remains the originator of both. Last, the final sentence clearly implied that this change in nuance is aimed at combating problems raised by recent scandals, such as the one surrounding former Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai. Yet a third example of a change in rhetoric occurred in the White Paper on Judicial Reform released by the Information Office of the State Council in October 2012 (The Diplomat, October 13, 2012). Such documents (issued in 2008 and 2011 as well) serve a regular propaganda function, reeling off state accomplishments in the field of human rights. They also serve to transmit the officially approved political line regarding legal reform. For example, the 2011 white paper confirmed the shift away from pro-reform agenda of earlier years. Rather than emphasizing the need to establish the “rule of law,” it spoke of building a “socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics.” Where the 2008 document spoke of these efforts as a work in progress, the 2011 version stressed that these efforts were largely completed. It also deleted discussion of China’s efforts to engage in international legal cooperation in favor of extensive rhetoric regarding the inapplicability of foreign legal norms to China. Now, the 2012 white paper marks a sharp break with the version issued just a year ago. The politicized language regarding a “socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics,” a hallmark in Party political-legal pronouncements over recent years, has receded. The white paper clearly states that the current round of legal reforms begun in 2008 (not coincidentally, the year that Wang Shengjun, the current conservative head of the Supreme People’s Court, assumed office) is “basically finished.” Even more noteworthy, there is not a single reference in the entire document to the Chinese Communist Party. Of course, it is important to not overstate the thrust of the 2012 white paper. While it characterizes judicial reform as an integral part of “institutional political reform” and states that it will continue to strengthen in the years to come, it gives no concrete suggestions as to how this will be carried out. It also clearly states that Chinese judicial reform will proceed from its own “national characteristics” and will not “copy” models from other countries. Nonetheless, the white paper does suggest that some Chinese leaders may seek to curb efforts of party political-legal organs to re-impose greater political controls on the Chinese judiciary in recent years. The paper also suggests there may be some openness to dealing with the issue of judicial and legal reform in a more objective manner.

# IMPACTS

## Im – econ

### at: interdependence

#### Economics won’t deter China --- they’ll continue aggression

**Marston 16** --- works in a major Washington, DC think tank and writes on Southeast Asia and U.S. foreign policy (Hunter Marston, 6-19-2016, "More Trade Won't Stop China's Aggression" National Interest, 6-16-2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/more-trade-wont-stop-chinas-aggression-16587?page=2)//jonah>

China’s brazen and “improper airmanship,” buzzing an American surveillance plane in the skies above the East China Sea last week, is but the latest signal of Beijing’s proclivity for risk and willingness to undermine both its regional reputation and economic stability in order to stake expanding claims in Asia. Western observers have not relinquished the perennial hope that China’s global economic interconnectedness will constrain its proclivity to military conflict. But this belief is misguided and not borne out by history. In fact, as China’s economic and military power rise, it has shown an increased tolerance for risk and raised the likelihood of future war. China has repeatedly harassed Indonesian, Vietnamese and Philippine ships in the latter’s territorial waters, claiming that Chinese citizens have been fishing there “since ancient times,” entitling them to vast maritime sovereignty. Its island construction on top of shallow reefs is another component in Beijing’s strategy to assert dominance over the South China Sea. The near-collision of the Chinese fighter jet with the U.S. spy plane last week follows a string of gutsy, high-risk encounters. Only last month, two Chinese jets flew within fifty feet of an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea. Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, commented, “It’s clear that China’s tolerance for risk has risen in the last several years and remains high, though luckily below the level at which deadly force is likely.” Despite high-level progress from Beijing and Washington on a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in recent years, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may be testing the strategic limits of the outgoing Obama administration’s patience. Poling added, “What is most worrying to me is that it took less than six months for Beijing to violate the air-to-air annex to CUES that Presidents Obama and Xi inked during the latter’s visit to DC. That suggests that no matter how hard we might try, China is not willing to have its behavior in disputed waters bound in any way, including by bilaterally agreed-upon rules and norms.” Do Chinese military forays in the East and South China Sea signal Beijing’s clear quest for regional domination and the inevitable ratcheting up of tensions with other Pacific powers? Will increasingly risky provocations lead to military conflict as China stakes its claims? Or does China’s dependence on global trade for continued economic growth at home preclude war in the foreseeable future? The past has repeatedly proved wrong those who assume that a rising power’s economic connectivity obviates the inevitability of great power military conflict. Peacenik theorists of the pre–World War I era opined that the level of interconnectivity in global markets had rendered obsolete the great-power warfare of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Likewise, in the interbellum period before the breakout of World War II, advocates of appeasement wagered that a militarizing Germany would not threaten continental peace due to its deep economic ties with the rest of Europe. Obviously, both schools of thought overestimated the ability of global economic connectivity to deter military aggression. What makes scholars think China is different today? Of course, the scale of interpenetration of global markets has risen and bound major powers such as China and the United States, as well as regional groupings like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ever more tightly together. But just as proponents of peace were proven wrong in the twentieth century, echoes of the past are perceivable in Asia and Europe today. Despite its dependence on the EU for revenue from gas exports, Russia invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014. Likewise, European dependence on Russian gas has not prevented the EU from leveling heavy sanctions against Russia for its bellicosity. Nationalist impulses often trump economic considerations that would otherwise impel autocrats toward moderation. Just as the Communist Party in Beijing is beholden to a public whose education hammered home the lessons of a “century of humiliation” at the hands of Western imperialists, Russia’s Vladimir Putin’s legitimacy—and mythos—flows from a narrative of western domination that has prevented Russia from attaining the greater world power that Russians feel their nation deserves. Similarly, though Beijing is investing in massive infrastructure projects across Southeast Asia and pursuant to the sixteen-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free-trade agreement, Beijing’s behavior indicates that it will prioritize security interests over regional economic integration, peace and stability. Material facts dictate that China’s increasing economic wealth and concordant military might will allow Beijing to exercise greater power in its backyard and on the world stage. These factors afford the CCP a greater ability to risk reputational and economic costs to achieve its national security goals.

### at: asean checks

#### ASEAN won’t check China --- they’ll continue aggression

**Marston 16** --- works in a major Washington, DC think tank and writes on Southeast Asia and U.S. foreign policy (Hunter Marston, 6-19-2016, "More Trade Won't Stop China's Aggression" National Interest, 6-16-2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/more-trade-wont-stop-chinas-aggression-16587?page=2)//jonah>

China has shown its capability to drive a wedge in ASEAN to suit its purposes. In 2012, with Cambodia chairing ASEAN, tensions in the South China Sea became so acute that the regional grouping failed to deliver a joint statement for the first time in history since its 1967 founding. Facing a barrage of diplomatic pressure from Beijing, the ten member states were unable to agree on whether to mention even the location of a Philippines-China standoff at the Scarborough Shoal, claimed by both sides and occupied by the Philippines until Chinese ships seized it in 2012. Beijing similarly undermined ASEAN unity in April when it announced that it had come to an agreement with Cambodia, Brunei and Laos—to the surprise of others—that the South China Sea dispute should not jeopardize relations between China and ASEAN. The United States supports ASEAN centrality as a strategic bulwark against China’s attempts to impose unilateral faits accomplis. For its own reasons, Beijing prefers to deal with ASEAN claimants one-on-one so as to reduce the capacity of the group to stand with a unified voice contra its security interests. Satu Limaye, director of the East-West Center in Washington, has written, “Instead of serving as a platform to manage bilateral and multilateral cooperation among member states, ASEAN may become an arena where bilateral and multilateral cooperation are contested.” As the two superpowers battle for influence within ASEAN, China has demonstrated its ability to use both charm and threats to advance its interests. Moreover, as Nick Bisley of La Trobe University writes, despite a U.S. China policy that blends containment with moral suasion, “it is far from clear that China can be contained or cowed into submission.” Ultimately, “the region’s two major powers have irreconcilable visions for Asia’s future.” If that is the case, expect rocky times ahead as differences of interest not only manifest in further naval and air confrontations, but also introduce further friction into competing visions of the economic and security architecture of Asia. The result is a net loss for all countries concerned.

### at: econ low now

#### It’s not a crisis --- decline is controlled and growth is robust in core CCP hubs

**Sambijantoro, 16** – journalist for Jakarta Post, master’s degree in public policy at Peking University (Sanja, Jakarta Post, “Is the ‘China economic crisis’ overblown or a ‘new normal’”, 1/15/16, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/01/15/is-china-economic-crisis-overblown-or-a-new-normal.html>, //11)

Unlike in 2008, when the stock and housing market crash in the US and the impact rippled through to the real sector through rampant layoffs and mortgage closures in a flash, optimism among the Chinese remains intact despite the slowdown and the constant, worrying drops in the stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen since mid-2015. Most importantly, the terms “economic crisis” or “market crash” were never mentioned by my economics professors at Peking University, a campus known for its culture of being critical toward the government. They showed no gesture of worry at all. One of my professors coolly explained that Chinese policymakers might have decelerated growth on purpose, as overly fast economic growth had predisposed the country to overheating. This is why, despite the lingering slowdown, China’s fiscal and monetary policy stances are still at a rather tight setting, not an expansionary one. The no-big-deal viewpoint of my professors is shared by most Chinese: Their country is growing slower, but it is far from falling into an economic disaster. In short, the nation is just experiencing a rational slowdown needed to steer the economy toward a healthier and more sustainable growth path, which will mean more efficient utilization of resources and less pollution. Over the past two decades, annual GDP growth in China has averaged around an impressive 10 percent, underpinned mostly by investments, as well as exports. As China’s reliance on investment grows, its efficiency falls, hence the long-run unsustainability of this growth model. As capital accumulates, the capital-output ratio will trend lower meaning that China will need a higher and higher level of capital if it wants to record the same level of growth. China stubbornly relying on investments would only lead to a piling up of debts, inefficient usage of resources and overexploitation of the environment. This is why China wants to drive its growth not with investments, which now accounts for 46 percent of its GDP, but with household consumption, which accounts for 36 percent of GDP — a low figure for the world’s most populous country. Some of China’s leading economic indicators, such as its manufacturing index and factory output, are indeed slowing. However, those readings are sensible in a country where the government is now aggressively shutting down many dirty factories and enacting various regulations to force industries to adopt cleaner, more efficient technology, in response to a serious pollution problem. China’s underperforming provinces for example, the biggest laggards to national growth, are either exposed to dirty commodities, or are known for their inefficient and polluting factories, thus making them soft targets for the government’s environmental crackdowns. For example, annual GDP growth fell to 2.7 percent in the first half of last year in Shanxi, the country’s top coal producer. Other Chinese provinces that also experienced sharp growth slowdowns were Inner Mongolia, which provides around one-third of China’s coal; Hebei, a leading steel producer; and Heilongjiang, a manufacturing base with substantial oil production. Meanwhile, in the capital and in China’s emerging provinces, growth remained robust thanks to the booming service sector. GDP growth in Beijing, which has twice Jakarta’s population with 22 million people, is estimated at least 7 percent for last year. Where in the world does a crisis-threatened country still sees its capital growing by 7 percent?

#### It’s regulated --- Xi is sacrificing short-term gains to stabilize growth in the long term

**Scutt, 15** – Global Markets and Economics Reporter at Business Insider Australia (David, Business Insider, “China's economic turmoil isn't a mistake -- it's part of Xi's new grand plan”, 10/15/15, <http://www.businessinsider.com.au/chinas-economic-turmoil-isnt-a-mistake-its-part-of-xis-new-grand-plan-2015-10>, //11)

But perhaps there are other factors at play which those anxious about China’s slowdown need to consider. Xi, unlike his predecessors, is not a reactionist. He doesn’t rush to turn on the stimulus taps at the first sign of economic weakness, avoiding the trap of stimulating the economy to ensure short-term growth targets are met without considering the long term consequences. No, maybe what we’re seeing today is Xi playing the long game, taking short term economic pain to ensure long term economic gain. According to Evan Feigenbaum and Damien Ma, writing on Foreign Affairs, there is a method to Xi’s disorienting economic approach. “Far from ‘mismanagement’, as some commentators have called it, the turmoil in China’s economic policy process seems instead to be the deliberate byproduct of the leadership’s emphasis on politics and party-building,” write the pair. “The leadership’s efforts to fix the party have come, in effect, at the expense of their predecessors’ long-standing and singular focus on near-term growth. But that is not all: Xi’s team is also choosing, as a direct consequence of this focus on rectifying and rebuilding the CCP, to constrain the government’s capacity for economic management, not least by pulling China’s technocratic bureaucracy into the whirlwind of elite politics.” They suggest that the fear over recent actions taken by China’s political leaders have been “badly misunderstood” by markets, something that is due to investors and businesses growing accustomed to the ways of Xi’s predecessors who had a tendency to bolster investment and stimulate growth by pumping more money into the economy at the first sign that the economy was weakening. Despite the slowdown in the economy, the pair noted that China’s leadership seems comparatively relaxed about recent developments in the economy, a response at the polar end of the spectrum compared to global financial markets.

### at: Chinese leadership checks

#### Collective Leadership can’t check Xi

Whalen, 6-19-16 – (Christopher, senior managing director and head of research at Kroll Bond Rating Agency, “Xi Struggles to Reform China's Politics—and Its Economy, Too,” National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/xi-struggles-reform-chinas-politics%E2%80%94-its-economy-too-16632,//BR/)

The biggest factor behind mounting worries regarding China’s debt is the slowdown in economic growth, which is now at the lowest level in twenty-five years. Even as China has accelerated bank lending to boost demand, measures of GDP have been falling after decades of government-sponsored investment activity. At the same time, the government of paramount leader Xi Jinping and his trusted lieutenants has led a growing political purge that raises questions as to whether the reforms of the past several decades are now being reversed. Concepts such as collective leadership, for example, have been discarded under Xi. “[O]nce Xi acceded to top office he was widely expected to pursue political liberalization and market reform,” notes veteran sinologist Andrew J. Nathan, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, in the New York Review of Books. “Instead he has reinstated many of the most dangerous features of Mao’s rule: personal dictatorship, enforced ideological conformity, and arbitrary persecution.” Other observers believe that Xi and his allies are in a struggle with vested interests resistant to economic reform. As the economic situation in China slows, the struggle among different factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is also intensifying. Several observers point to the failure of former Premier Wen Jiabao, in particular, which has led to some urgency in economic reforms, hence the need for Xi to remove party officials with significant economic interests that would resist change.

### at: empirics

#### Empirics shouldn’t apply to Xi – his presidency represents a shift in Chinese politics

Rachman, 5-30-2016 - (Gideon, chief foreign affairs commentator for the Financial Times, recipient of Orwell prize for journalism, "Xi Jinping has changed China’s winning formula," Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/56c87262-2423-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d.html,//BR/)

Politics in the west are so dramatic at the moment that China can look relatively staid and stable by comparison. But that impression is deceptive. Xi Jinping is taking his country in radical and risky new directions. If the president’s new policies succeed, then the Xi era will be remembered for the achievement of his often-stated goal of the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation. But if Mr Xi’s experiments go wrong, then his legacy is likely to be political turmoil, economic stagnation and international confrontation. What Mr Xi has done is essentially to abandon the formula that has driven China’s rise over the past 30 years. That formula was created by Deng Xiaoping, after he came to power in late 1978, and then refined by his successors. It consisted of three ingredients — political, economic and international. In economics, Deng and his successors emphasised exports, investment and the quest for double-digit annual growth. In politics, China moved away from the charismatic and dictatorial model created by Mao Zedong and towards a collective leadership. And in foreign affairs, China adopted a modest and cautious approach to the world that became colloquially known in the west as “hide and bide”, after Deng’s famous advice to his colleagues to “hide your capacities, bide your time”. Under Mr Xi, who assumed the leadership of the Chinese Communist party towards the end of 2012, all three key ingredients of the Deng formula have changed. In politics, China has moved back towards a model based around a strongman leader — Mr Xi himself. In economics, the years of double-digit growth are over and China is groping towards a new model, driven more by domestic consumption than exports. And in international affairs, the Xi era has seen a move away from hide and bide towards a foreign policy that challenges US dominance of the Asia-Pacific region.

### turns SCS conflict

#### Chinese slow growth causes SCS conflict – rally around the flag effect

**O’Reilly 15** [Brendan - China-based writer and educator from Seattle. He is author of The Transcendent Harmony. “The Implications of China’s Growth Slowdown”, World Affairs Council of Western Michigan, March 5, 2015, <http://www.worldmichigan.org/the-implications-of-chinas-growth-slowdown/>] bjs

The once extraordinary rate of Chinese economic growth is slowing. In 2014, China’s GDP grew at an official rate of 7.4 percent, slightly less than the stated goal of 7.5 percent. Although more recently monthly data have been more robust, the trend towards slowing growth seems inexorable. A decelerating Chinese economy, coming at a time of global economic uncertainty (especially in the eurozone), could have dramatic economic implications throughout the world. However, the repercussions of a Chinese economic slowdown would not be limited to the economic sphere. Given the incredible importance of economic growth to political stability – both within China itself and East Asia in general – adapting to a dampened Chinese economy will be a pivotal challenge in the Asia-Pacific. While an official GDP growth rate of 7.4 percent would be the envy of most major economies, this figure represents China’s lowest economic growth since 1991. And of course, economic data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics is not completely trusted by all observers. Local officials (and the central government itself) have a vested interest in exaggerating their economic performance. Capital Economics, a London-based research group, monitors the Chinese economy by looking at the five factors of electricity output, freight shipmen, construction, passenger travel, and cargo volume. According to this China Activity Proxy, recent annual growth is closer to 5.7 percent. Regardless of the statistical specifics of the Chinese slowdown, this development poses some degree of political risk for the Chinese state. For more than two decades economic growth has been the major factor in ensuring political stability in China. Many Westerners forget that the massive protests that rocked Beijing and other Chinese cities in 1989 coincided with the biggest economic crisis of the post-Mao era, with annual inflation of 30 percent leading to panic buying throughout the country. Since 1990, China has been governed by a social contract in which the material lives of ordinary citizens improve dramatically while the Party keeps a monopoly on political power. Rising wages and standards of living helped ensure political stability. Historically most revolutions, including the recent upheavals in the Middle East, only reached critical mass when a majority of a country’s people lost hope in the economic capabilities of the governing political structure. Recent initiatives by the Chinese state can be understood in light of these economic concerns. Since coming in to power in 2013, the administration of President Xi Jinping has launched several populist measures. Posters throughout the country combine traditional Chinese themes with Communist Party slogans to promote the “Chinese Dream.” Xi’s campaigns against lavish banquets and other government waste led to a significant drop in the price of high-end liquor soon after his rise to power. Perhaps most important has been a massive anti-corruption campaign, which has netted thousands of corrupt officials, from minor bureaucrats to the massively powerful former head of internal security. The anti-corruption campaign in China has been so far-reaching that it is now having negative effects on the Chinese economy. These effects create something of a contradiction in the Chinese polity, because although the anti-corruption campaign enjoys widespread support, it appears to be having some detrimental effects on the main economic pillar of Chinese political stability. Besides dampening the high-end liquor market, the anti-graft and ant-waste campaigns have had deleterious effects on industries from tourism and gambling to real estate. Mao Daqing, deputy chief executive officer of the largest property developer in China, openly warned ofthe economic impacts of the political campaign: “For us developers, the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on the sales of high-end property is very serious.” China’s once-booming housing market is now deflating, with prices falling in a majority of cities. Prices appear to be dropping because the rapid increase in housing supply in recent years has outstripped demand. Problems in the real estate market are mirrored by other macroeconomic troubles. Much of the low-hanging economic fruit in China has been plucked. Rising wages in China have led many manufacturers to relocate to countries such as Vietnam or the Philippines. China’s historically strong international trade is also taking a hit, with exports down 3.3 percent from a year ago and imports dropping nearly 20 percent. In June 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang pledged to maintain a robust growth rate: “China’s economy needs to grow at a proper rate, expected to be around 7.5 per cent this year… Despite considerable downward pressure, China’s economy is moving on a steady course. We will continue to make anticipatory and moderate adjustments when necessary. We are well prepared to defuse various risks.” Indeed, since this pledge and the subsequent slowdown, the central government has used macroeconomic tools to boost growth. The People’s Bank of China cut interest rates in November, and more recently lowered the reserve requirement ratio, freeing up $100 billion for lending. China has weathered previous economic predicaments, for example the 2008 global financial crisis, and emerged stronger. A hard landing is by no means a foregone conclusion, and China still has many macroeconomic advantages. However, for all the policy tools at Beijing’s disposal, China’s leaders cannot guarantee rapid economic growth forever. It may be necessary to lower economic expectations, while shoring up the state’s popular legitimacy through non-economic means. Back in 2013, Xi criticized the myopic focus on economic growth, saying “We should never judge a cadre simply by the growth of gross domestic product.” More recently an article in China’s NetEase quoted Fudan University Department of Finance professor Kong Aiguo as saying, “Since we are entering what is called the ‘new normal’, we should not worry about the speed of GDP, bur rather we should focus on livelihood issues, public welfare issues, entrepreneurship issues, and financial transparency issues.” Adapting to China’s “new normal” of lowered GDP growth will be an important challenge for leaders in China and around the world. China does more international trade than any other country on earth. Besides issues of trade, any problems in the Chinese financial system could have serious global impacts, especially coming at a time of relative global economic uncertainty. If China does face a prolonged period of economic difficulty, the political repercussions could be volatile. The Chinese state might be forced to look for alternative sources of popular support. China’s leaders could implement additional populist measures. It is also possible that increased nationalism could come in to play, especially in the unresolved territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Regional and global powers would be wise to monitor China’s economic situation closely.

## Im – mil mod

### 2nc mil mod impact

#### Xi’s reforms are creating a stable a functioning military – stabilizes the region

Garafola, 4/1 – [Cristina L., a project associate at the RAND Corporation and holds aM.A. in international relations and international economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced and International Studies; Certificate in Chinese and American studies, Hopkins-Nanjing Center; B.A. in international relations and Chinese, Hamilton College, Rand Corporation, “Will the PLA Reforms Succeed?”, 4/1/16, <http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/will-the-pla-reforms-succeed.html>, 6/22/16]JRO

The “Opinion” acknowledges the “unprecedented range of impact” of the reforms, saying that they “touch on deep interests” within the PLA. Despite the disruption to these entrenched interests, the reform process will likely succeed in the end, at least in the terms of success defined by the Party: creating a politically reliable modern force capable of joint operations. Such speculation seems credible because the reform programme provides the right balance of carrots and sticks to three core groups that can be identified within the PLA. The first group consists of officers who either see value in building a more capable fighting force or hope to advance their careers by implementing the new policy (or both). The second group includes senior officers who have risen to the top of the current system. Many senior officers have been placated by being allowed to hold onto their current privileged status until they retire; though for a few, such as Liu Yuan and Cai Yingting, the case is different.[7] A third group of influential senior officers, who might otherwise resist reforms, will likely fall in line because of the threat of investigations, trials, or the worse fates that have befallen their disgraced colleagues.

### KT China interests

#### Xi is looking to modernize the military to protect strategic interests

Heath 16 1 Timothy R. Heath; a senior international defense research analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation 1 The RAND Corporation Developments in China’s Military Force Projection and Expeditionary Capabilities 2 Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission January 21, 2016//LKJ

China’s national defense policy consists of an official vision of security and the associated directives issued by the central leadership to address threats to the nation’s core interests and to the pursuit of national revitalization. Because Ch ina has yet to openly publish an official document outlining its national security strategy, the most authoritative sources on China’s security policy remain speeches by President Xi Jinping on military- and security-related matters and the biannually published defense white papers. Chinese military leaders and scholars provide insightful expositions of the official vision of security and of key directives in official newspapers and journals such as People’s Daily ( renmin ribao ), China Military Science ( zhongguo junshi kexue ), and the People’s Liberation Army Daily ( jiefangjun bao ) and in books published by PLA academies. These sources explain that while China nominally adheres to a “defensive” policy, the focus has shifted since around 2010 from one of homeland defense to one that I believe is best characterized as “peaceful expansion.” Like its predecessors, China’s most recent defense white paper, published in 2015 to highlight its evolving military strategy, upheld the “defensive nature” of the country’s national defense policy and stated China will “never seek hegemony or expansion.” However, it also acknowledged that China’s evolving situation has set “new requirements” for the military to help build a “fav orable strategic posture” and “guarantee the country’s peaceful development.” It highlighted in particular the need to better protect the country’s “growing strategic interests.” To shape the international order, the paper outlined requirements to “actively expand military and security cooperation” and “promote the establishment of a regional framewor k for security and cooperation.” 3 These directives evoke an ambition to build a stable, peaceful Asian security environment in which China plays a leading role and in which countries lack the ability or motivation to militarily challenge China over its “core” interests.

### navy KT SLOCs/silk road

#### Navy modernization and a maritime silk road are major goals for China, but more modernizing efforts like Xi’s are needed.

Clemens 15 The Maritime Silk Road and the PLA 1 A paper for China as a “Maritime Power” Conference July 28-29, 2015 CNA Conference Facility Arlington, Virginia By Morgan Clemens; Research Associate at Jamestown Institute, where his work focuses on the Chinese armed forces and defense industry //LKJ

The Maritime Silk Road already represents Chin a’s most vital sea line s of communication, both because it gives China access to three major economic zones (Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East) and because it is the route for many of China’s stra tegic materials, including oil, iron ore, and copper ore imports. Moreover, activ e efforts to develop strategic and economic relationships along the Maritime Silk Road afford an opportunity (in the Chinese view) to escape the growing containment and encirc lement embodied by the U.S. “p ivot to Asia.” Indeed, some Chinese military authors have gone so far as to call the route of the Ma ritime Silk Road “the crucial strategic direction of China’s rise” ( 中国崛起的关键战略方向 ), indicating a belief that developing the route will be critical to the country’s entire development program. 4 Language such as this could easily lead Western analysts to believe that China would wish to quickly ensure control of these sea lanes. Yet, the re alization that such an objective could only be achieved by a navy several times the size of the current People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)—the development and construction of which would be itself a vastly expensive undertaking that would not come to pass for so me decades (if ever)—should give us pause. 5 As Xi Jinping and the central l eadership have continually empha sized in recent years, China’s primary security concern is the preservation of conditions conducive to continued economic development. And, in the words of one Chinese sc holar, “China’s effort to build a middle-class society is entering a decisive stage under new historical conditions” during which external conditions could present a threat to larg er social and economic development goals. 6 It is thus the task of the People’s Liberation Army to act as a “security guarantee for China’s peaceful development,” 7 largely by supporting China’s efforts to diplomatically and economically tackle the “security dynamics along [the] periphery” ( 周边安全动态 ) 8 —with the “periphery” encompassing states, islands, and sea lanes critica l to China’s lines of communication, especially in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and In dian Ocean. Despite this emphasis, however, it remains clear that the region west of Singapore must be of secondary importance in military terms, with the most critical threat emanating fr om (perceived) American containment to the east, which also directly threatens China’s national territory itself in the form of American forces’ deep strike capabilities. 9 Moreover, China’s military moderniz ation itself is far from complete and will require furthe r expensive investments in training, systems, a nd personnel before the PLA can exercise the multitude of capabilities necessary for engaging in modern warfare across a wide range of domains (sea, air, cyber, and others). 10 Compounding this will be the need for ever greater social and domestic spending as the Chinese party-state attempts to guide the country through the fraught transition to a mi ddle-class economy driven and sustained by domestic consumption, with the decade or so ahead serving as th e critical juncture. Thus, if we are to take Chinese leaders at th eir word when they say that China is still a developing country and indicate th at there is no perpetual blank check for military development, it would seem that actual sea control along the Maritime Silk Road is not in the cards for China. And, indeed, it would appear that China’s exis ting and future military activities west of Singapore are being cast not in this light but rather in terms of s ea lane security and ensuring the sea lanes’ continued utility as a global commons. Chinese analysts point out that small-scale, low-intensity action will be typical of the use of naval force in the years ahead, and that when China uses force along the Maritime Silk Route, it will often occur on short notice, be focused on low-grade threats (including te rrorism, piracy, drug smuggling a nd other transnational crime), and be multilateral in nature. While involvement in interstate conflict is certainly possible, it is considered unlikely.

### piracy

#### The PLA Navy is a vital component in anti-piracy measures, but more modernization is needed.

Erickson and Strange 13

Andrew S. Erickson; Professor of Strategy in, and a core founding member of, the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)'s China Maritime Studies Institute; and Austin M. Strange; Research Associate at AidData, where he helped co-create the Tracking Underreported Financial Flows initiative and PhD. at Harvard University’s School of Government “No Substitute for Experience Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden” CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island November, 2013//LKJ

The twenty-sixth of December 2012 marked an important date in Chinese military history—the fourth anniversary of China’s furthest and most extensive naval operations to date, the ongoing antipiracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden. In the first-ever simultaneous three-f leet public display, China’s North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet all held “open day activities.” 1 The guided-missile destroyers Qingdao, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen and guided-missile frigate Zhoushan, together with their associated helicopters and personnel, were visited by more than eight thousand people “from all sectors of the society” at the port cities after which they are named. 2 Over the past four years, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has deployed nearly ten thousand personnel on thirty-seven warships with twenty-eight helicopters in thirteen task forces. 3 Over the course of more than five hundred operations, these forces have protected more than five thousand commercial vessels—Chinese and foreign in nearly equal proportion, the latter f lagged by more than fifty nations. 4 They have “successfully met and escorted, rescued and salvaged over 60 ships.” 5 Ships saved from pirates by PLAN ships include four transports loaded with World Food Pro - gramme cargo. 6 Beijing has rightly been recognized for this contribution: “The escort in the Gulf of Aden provided by the Chinese naval task force is a strong support in cracking down [on] Somali piracies [ sic ] for the international community” Ban Ki-moon, secretary-general of the United Nations (UN), has been quoted as declaring, “which reflects China’s impor - tant role in international affairs.” 7 In a new era of international interaction, the PLAN has cooperated with counterpart vessels from over twenty foreign countries “to exchange information regarding piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali sea area.” 8 Undertaken primarily to safeguard China’s economic interests, the operations also stimulate interagency coordination with the PLAN in a vital position, provide irreplace - able naval training, catalyze the development of naval skill sets often taken for granted but absolutely critical for long-distance operations, and offer tentative indications of Beijing’s approach to maritime governance as a great power. The results thus far are largely positive, albeit modest. China’s navy is increasing its out-of-area capabilities, but it would require tremendous improvements in force structure, human capital, training, Introduction: Why Antipiracy in the Gulf of Aden? 2 c h i na m a r i t i m e s t u d i e s and experience to translate present resources into an ability to engage in high-intensity combat operations in what Chinese strategists term the “Far Seas” ( 远海 ). Still, antipi - racy operations serve as a modest springboard by which China can achieve the inter - national status and influence that it covets, since they allow China to be seen providing public goods and cooperating to defend the global system. Whatever the ultimate trajec - tory of China’s maritime power, its escort missions are likely to persist for some time and hence will continue to offer a valuable window into the future of China’s naval role beyond East Asia. Indeed, they offer the first major insights into China’s Far Seas opera - tions and its approach thereto. Four years on, the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden antipiracy mis - sion is highlighted by ten Chinese naval breakthroughs, all of which underscore China’s most significant lesson learned through its antipiracy mission: there is no substitute for experience, and the PLAN has had to learn many things by doing them.

#### China Military Modernization bolsters their Navy. A strong Chinese Navy is necessary for anti-piracy and disaster relief.

O’Rourke 16, , “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress” ronald o’Rourke is BA in international studies and a naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service, 3/31/16 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf//LKJ

China is building a modern and regionally powerful navy with a limited but growing capability for conducting operations beyond China’s near-seas region. Observers of Chinese and U.S. military forces view China’s improving naval capabilities as posing a potential challenge in the Western Pacific to the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain control of blue-water ocean areas in wartime—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War. More broadly, these observers view China’s naval capabilities as a key element of an emerging broader Chinese military challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific. The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is a key issue in U.S. defense planning. China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China’s naval modernization effort also includes improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises. Observers believe China’s naval modernization effort is oriented toward developing capabilities for doing the following: addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; asserting or defending China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); defending China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs); displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China’s status as a leading regional power and major world power. Consistent with these goals, observers believe China wants its military to be capable of acting as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. Additional missions for China’s navy include conducting maritime security (including anti-piracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals from foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.

### laundry list

#### Strong Chinese military key to counter-terrorism, anti-piracy and disaster-relief

Heath 16 1 Timothy R. Heath; a senior international defense research analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation 1 The RAND Corporation Developments in China’s Military Force Projection and Expeditionary Capabilities 2 Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission January 21, 2016//LKJ

Overland trade routes. The announcement of the “Silk Road” initiative in 2014 has coincided with growing Chinese economic and political interests in Central Asia. China has invested billions of dollars in the energy sector; contracts with Kazakhstan alone total $30 billion. 23 The main threat posed concerns terrorism and political instability in bordering ce ntral Asian countries. The PLA has sought to deepen military relations with partner countries through exercises under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Continge ncies could include bilateral or multilateral counterterrorism operations against cross-border groups. 24 Maritime trade routes. The Maritime Silk Road envisions an expansion of infrastructure development throughout the Southeast Asian regi on, Indian Ocean, and through the Red Sea to the Middle East. China’s dependence on sea lines of communication (SLOCs) have grown in recent years. Threats include piracy, insurgency, and terrorism, as well as threats to the SLOCs by rival powers. Missions to counter these threats include traditional anti-ship/air/submarine warfare, aircraft carrier operations, counte rpiracy, at-sea replenishment, and counter-mine operations. To facilitate execution of such mi ssions, China has begun to seek supply points abroad to provision deployed forces. In 2015, Ch inese authorities confirmed that arrangements had been made for a military base in Djibouti, Africa. 25 Overseas resources and personnel. China reportedly has over 5.5 million citizens working abroad and nearly 60 million travelers annually. As China expands its business presence abroad, terrorists and other violent groups have kidnapped and killed a growing number of its citizens. In 2015, Islamic State militants murdered a Chinese citi zen in Syria, and an al Qaeda affiliate killed three railway workers in Mali, among other deaths. 26 China has increased evacuations of citizens facing such dangers. In 2011 alone, China evacuat ed 48,000 of its citizens from Egypt, Libya, 11 and Japan. 27 Chinese government forces have also sought to increase security through participation in UN peacekeeping operations. In 2012, China deployed combat troops as part of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. 28 However, this limited presence addresses the needs of but a small number of Chinese firms. As a co nsequence, many companies have turned to private companies to provide guards and security forces. 29 To protect lives and assets, the military has stepped up its focus on noncombatant evacuation op erations, counterterrorism, and humanitarian aid/disaster relief.

## Im – nationalism

### 2nc nationalism impact

#### Xi offsets domestic nationalism by lashing out abroad and heightening cyberconflicts

**Auslin, 15** – resident scholar and the director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute where he specializes in Asian regional security and political issues (Michael, American Enterprise Institute, “The risks of a falling China”, 7/13/15, <https://www.aei.org/publication/the-risks-of-a-falling-china/>, //11)

Economics is just part of the story of peak China. Years of promoting the idea that China would develop into a pillar of international order has run aground on the rocks of national interest and territorial disputes in the seas around China. While far from the only nation to assert territorial claims through land reclamation in the South China Sea, the scale and speed of Beijing’s building is shocking. The People’s Liberation Army is creating new military bases in the contested Spratly Islands for power projection and further intimidation of its smaller neighbors. Beijing’s stated intention to defend the “sovereignty” of its 12-mile maritime territorial limits around newly built islands poses a threat to free navigation. An Asian ambassador in Washington asserts that China is attempting to present the Obama administration with a new status quo in Asia. Even President Obama, who just concluded another annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue with top Chinese officials, has called Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea “aggressive.” Far from being seen as a factor contributing to stability in Asia, a more assertive and confident China is perceived as a destabilizing element. As in the economic realm, decades of the world encouraging a larger Chinese role both regionally and globally has resulted in Beijing feeling emboldened to define its interests in opposition to the rules-based political order that promotes free exchange. Even if China claims that it is simply protecting its national interests in the South China Sea, and is thus not a threat to those around it, no such assertion can be made about its predatory cyberattacks on some of its biggest trading partners. The Japanese government has stated that it suffered approximately 10 billion cyberattacks from Chinese sources in 2014, 40% of the national total. Meanwhile, the Obama administration has admitted that at least 21 million personnel files of U.S. government workers were breached by Chinese hackers. U.S. Congressional sources put the figure at upwards of 30 million, including those Americans holding security clearances. It is increasingly hard to claim that China is a partner when it is writing a new history of cyberaggression. Behind all these dangers lies one common factor: an unreconstructed Communist Party determined to hold on to absolute power. Unable to stop the stock slide, and facing growing opposition to its assertiveness abroad, the Party runs its own risk: being seen as dangerous, out of control, or incompetent, if not a combination of all three. Domestic frustration with Mr. Xi’s heavy-handed suppression of dissent will easily find a new outlet in criticism of a government now creating more problems than it solves. That might augur an even greater crackdown at home, or possibly adventurism abroad to deflect attention away from failure.

### aggression

#### Nationalism increases the risk of confrontation – legitimacy and patriotism

Gideon Rachman 16 - journalist at the Financialist Times (“Xi Jinping has changed China’s winning formula,” May 30, 2016, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/56c87262-2423-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d.html#axzz4CWv9Poli) hk

At the same time as economic and political tensions within China have risen under Mr Xi, so the country’s foreign policy has become more nationalistic and more willing to risk confrontation with the west and with China’s Asian neighbours. Beijing’s increasingly tough assertion of its territorial and maritime claims, epitomised by its “island-building” in the South China Sea, has led to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These near-clashes may serve a political purpose. In harder economic times, the Communist party may need new sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US at sea is liable to stir patriotic support for the government. The key to the Deng formula that created modern China was the primacy of economics. Domestic politics and foreign policy were constructed to create the perfect environment for a Chinese economic miracle. With Mr Xi, however, political and foreign policy imperatives frequently appear to trump economics. That change in formula looks risky for both China and the world.

### East Asia conflict

#### Sino nationalism will destabilizing East Asia – mistrust with Japan puts tensions on the brink

**He, 07** - [Yinan, associate professor in the Department of International Relations at Lehigh University, Journal of Contemporary China, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict”, Vol. 16, No. 50, February 2007, <https://ir.cas2.lehigh.edu/sites/ir.cas2.lehigh.edu/files/YinanHe_HistoryChineseNationalism.pdf>, 6/20/16]JRO

The nearly three weeks of demonstrations in April were the largest anti-Japanese mass movement since such movements first appeared in the mid-1980s. They marked the culmination of Chinese public outrage at Japan in recent years. In summer 2003, more than one million Chinese people responded to an online petition demanding that Japan apologize and compensate for Chinese injuries due to the leaking of Japanese chemical weapons left behind after the war.2 In October, nearly 1,000 Chinese students marched in the streets of Xi’an protesting an obscene skit performed by several Japanese students during a university cultural festival. Seeing the skit as a deliberate Japanese insult against China, the demonstrators shouted slogans such as ‘Down with Japanese imperialism!’, ‘Japanese bastard out!’, and ‘Boycott Japanese goods!’3 These incidents remind people that Chinese memory of the traumatic war with Japan remains vivid. Collectively, they overshadowed the prospect of future Sino– Japanese cooperation, a key to regional stability and prosperity in East Asia. Such anti-Japanese movements clearly indicate a rising tide of popular nationalism in China. Where did the popular nationalism come from? Can the Chinese government restrain the negative emotions of its people towards Japan? Can such emotions significantly damage Sino– Japanese relations and affect regional security? These are the questions that this article addresses. I argue that the visceral nationalist sentiment has deep roots in the decades of centralized school education and official propaganda in China that implanted pernicious myths in the national collective memory. Owing to the structural imperatives of the Cold War, the official history of the Sino– Japanese war in the Mao-era emphasized the communist victory and blamed only a few Japanese militarists for the war. From the 1980s, however, domestic political needs prompted the government to purvey new myths highlighting Japanese war atrocities and Chinese victimhood. But the inconsistency in the official historiography marred the images of not only Japan but also the Chinese government itself. The current Chinese popular hostility to Japan sprang from both the public’s hatred of Japan stimulated by the post-Mao era history propaganda and their cynicism toward their own government, who they believed had lied about the history and acted too softly on Japan. While most scholars of contemporary Chinese nationalism acknowledge that popular nationalism and official propaganda are different but also interconnected, not all believe that the former would be strong enough to challenge the later or fundamentally divert the course of Chinese foreign policy.4 Many point to the weak influence of public opinion in an authoritarian state, and argue that overall the Chinese government has exercised restraint when handling international disputes.5 These skeptics, however, overlook the reality that the recent opening up of Chinese society has created more public space for bottom-up emotional venting and policy advocacy. The public tendency to absorb information selectively with regard to Japan and the increasing influence of nationalist sub-elites also strengthen the power of a radically anti-Japanese popular nationalism. The government is compelled to accommodate the popular sentiment, especially when the public raises their demands in the name of patriotism that is now the main ideological underpinning of Beijing’s regime legitimacy. Although it has yet to push the two governments into direct confrontation, China’s popular nationalism has fueled widespread mutual mistrust and antipathy in both countries. Given the great uncertainty in the bilateral power balance due to the rise of China and Japan’s international assertiveness, popular nationalism can increase mutual threat perception and embolden hawkish government policies. All three factors, the potency of the anti-Japanese popular sentiment, the increasing difficulty for the Chinese state to harness the nationalism, and the fear among the Chinese public of lagging behind in the bilateral power rivalry, have contributed to the significant role played by nationalism at this stage of Sino– Japanese relations. Because controversies surrounding war history interpretation have often triggered nationalist protests in China and seriously bedeviled Sino–Japanese relations, in order to improve relations they have to settle the history problem. The difficulty lies in the egoist, pernicious national myths that inculcate a sense of innate superiority, inflame mutual hatred and fear, and, as a result, worsen mutual misperception and justify bellicose policy demands. I argue that the two countries need the vision and determination to remove nationalistic myths and promote a shared, honest understanding of their history. One critical measure to stop national mythmaking is for both sides to not just emphasize the wrongdoings of others but also to conduct self-reflection and self-criticism of their own nation’s history.

### Japan conflict

#### Nationalism sparks war with Japan – culture is put ahead of the economy in decision making

**He, 07** - [Yinan, associate professor in the Department of International Relations at Lehigh University, Journal of Contemporary China, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict”, Vol. 16, No. 50, February 2007, <https://ir.cas2.lehigh.edu/sites/ir.cas2.lehigh.edu/files/YinanHe_HistoryChineseNationalism.pdf>, 6/20/16]JRO

In terms of common economic interests, although they are each other’s top trade partners, China and Japan’s economic interdependence hardly extends to the strategic dimension, meaning that trade disruption would not inflict intolerable damage on their national security interests. Even in the best years of bilateral relations in the 1970s, no Japanese weapons or sensitive military technology were transferred to China.67 Neither are the two countries dependent on each other for energy or natural resource needs. China still counts as an important source of Japan’s imported coal and food stuffs, but coal only constitutes less than 20% of Japan’s total energy supply,68 and if the relationship drastically worsened, Japan could easily find alternative sources of supply. Certainly both countries would suffer significant economic setback if the flourishing trade and capital flow between them were cut off, but the cost would not be so great as to reverse critical national security decisions. The weak linkage between trade interdependence and stable political relations was demonstrated in the eruption of WWI between countries that had heavily traded with one other before the war.69 Particularly, the benefit of economic cooperation cannot neutralize Chinese emotions of historical grievances or ensure smooth political relations. Afraid of being accused of selling out national pride and face for money, the Chinese government cannot afford to make concessions on bilateral controversies on the grounds of economic interests. During the 1996 island dispute, for instance, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman explicitly stated that: ‘Japanese loans to China will benefit bilateral trade and economic cooperation. Nonetheless, the Chinese government offers no room for compromise and will take whatever action necessary to safeguard China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty’.70 This does not mean that the government would not take ad hoc measures to limit the economic damages of political disputes, but concerns about public opposition still preclude any bold diplomatic moves that would generate a long-term solution. Even the thriving economic cooperation between the two countries will be jeopardized if Chinese popular nationalism continues to simmer. The case of the Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railroad project illustrates that Chinese public emotions about the war history can interfere with the government’s economic diplomacy with regards to Japan. Since 1994, policymakers in Beijing have long debated which country’s technology fits its needs best: the Japanese shinkansen (bullet train), the German maglev, or the French TGV. It was only in 2003 that the shinkansen appeared to be the leading contender in the bid for this $15 billion project. However, within ten days of the Hong Kong media reporting in July that Japan might win the project, more than 80,000 Chinese netizens had signed an online petition opposing the choice of shinkansen because of Japan’s failure to come to terms with its past. Public pressure compelled the Chinese government to reconsider the political consequences of its decision. So when Japan’s Transport Minister Ogi traveled to China to make a pitch for the shinkansen in August, she received the cold shoulder, unable to secure meetings with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao or senior officials from the Railways Ministry.71 Beijing made it clear that, besides the technical and financial aspects, the political factor was also important in decision-making. ‘Politics is not an absolute factor, but it definitely cannot be excluded’, said a high-ranking Chinese official participating in the project.72 Recently, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei suggested to a visiting Japanese Diet delegation that Beijing might have to exclude Japan from the railway project due to the pressure of public opinion: ‘we are facing high anti-Japan sentiment in China. If our government adopts the shinkansen technique in the railway project, the people would have (negative) opinions’.73

#### Unchecked nationalism threatens global stability – anti-foreign protests set the groundwork for conflict

**Cookson, 15** – [John Richard, senior editor at The National Interest, The National Interest, “The Real Threat of Chinese Nationalism”, 8/28/15, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-threat-chinese-nationalism-13729?page=2>, 6/20/16]JRO

On Monday, China’s Shanghai Composite Index dropped 8.5 percent, the largest percentage fall since the financial crisis hit in 2007. Hours earlier it was reported that Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, would not attend a ceremony in China on September 3 marking the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War Two. So far, China’s economic slowdown has been seen as separate from the country’s antagonisms with Japan. Both domestic and antiforeign discontent might concern China watchers, and both might be simmering at the moment, but each registers as its own threat, requiring its own policy response. This is wrong. What connects these issues is the worrying role popular nationalism has taken on in China in the era after Mao Zedong and, more recently, after Deng Xiaoping. All of this comes on the eve of a state visit by Chinese president Xi Jinping to the United States in September. Xi lands in Washington as the leader who has, according to President Obama, “consolidated power faster and more comprehensively than probably anybody since Deng Xiaoping." No force has been more important in Xi’s power grab than nationalism. He has presided over a country that has stoked patriotic fervor as well as antagonized its neighbors and the United States. The most immediate result of stirring up national sentiment has been to strengthen Xi’s power within the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee. With this backstop of popular support, Xi has steadfastly pursued a set of programs, even amid some opposition. For example, his anticorruption purge has continued even after an authority as prominent as former president Jiang Zemin warned against it becoming too ambitious. Nationalism has worked for Xi. So far, patriotic, mass support has protected him from a strong, public challenge by the military or the party. But nationalism in China has an uncertain and at times combustible relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leaders in Beijing. In China, street-level, unchecked nationalism—nationalism en masse—is a precarious threat both to the CCP and to regional and global stability overall. In 2012, Xi took control of a China unthinkable without Deng Xiaoping. By opening up its economy and jettisoning Mao-era programs, China created an average of 10 percent growth per year over the thirty years beginning with 1980. Millions were brought from subsistence living to a point where median income now approaches a “middle-income trap.” As if to acknowledge this change, Xi reiterated his commitment to Deng’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” shortly after coming to power. But this phrase, “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” is by now, of course, “nonsense,” China scholar Roderick MacFarquhar said at the time. Communism no longer connects the nation; it is no longer a unifying ideology. Instead, China now has over the last two-and-a-half decades, and with the strict tenets of communism shed as a unifying ideology, nationalism has been paired with robust economic growth in China to legitimize the country’s leadership. Both contributed to an “authoritarian resilience,” as China scholar Jessica Chen Weiss describes it. Now, nationalism and economics have begun to decouple as growth has slowed and stocks have tumbled. Comparisons with Deng have turned from complimentary of Xi to concerning for China as a whole. “The country is now going through a crisis of transition, unparalleled since Deng Xiaoping set out to put clear water between China’s future and the Mao era,” writes George Magnus, an associate at Oxford University’s China Centre and senior advisor to UBS, in the Financial Times. What connects the faltering economy with the animosity between China and Japan is that antiforeign protests are some of the only forms of mass, organized protest that have been permitted to take place in China. As Weiss points out, while anti-Japanese demonstrations were repressed in the 1990s and 2000s, they nonetheless flared up in 1985, 2005, 2010 and 2012. Moreover, she notes, the 1985 anti-Japanese protests were early precursors of the pro-democracy protests of 1986 and 1989, giving participants much needed experience in mass mobilization. Weiss explains what the CCP knows well, that “[e]ven strong authoritarian governments may have difficulty reining in protests that are widely seen as patriotic and legitimate." History shows that Chinese officials quickly repress demonstrations about domestic issues. This is less the case with antiforeign protests, which not only can have an intrinsic, patriotic legitimacy leaders find difficult to counter, but also, as Weiss argues, can have a value for China’s leaders to signal resolve in diplomacy. In a statement released for the anniversary of the end of World War II on August 15, Japanese prime minister Abe said that his “heart is rent with the utmost grief” about the damage done by his country. But he also emphasized that “[w]e must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize.” This statement joins a list of recent perceived slights, including a row this summer over the treatment of the war in Japanese textbooks, that irk many Chinese. Chinese-Japanese tensions have eased somewhat since the worst days of 2012, which Weiss says saw the largest anti-Japanese demonstrations since relations were normalized in 1972. Of the 287 prefecture cities Weiss and a colleague studied in 2012, nearly three-quarters saw street protests. Should Xi tolerate another spate of anti-Japanese protests, he would be using popular sentiment to signal to Japanese officials that China’s avenues for compromise are few. Importantly, this wish to signal resolve in diplomacy is weighed against the threat that such protests will spiral out of control, turning to domestic grievances and turning against Beijing. In this way, any anti-Japanese protests ostensibly about the Second World War are a potential rallying point for discontent about the present. “In current American usage,” the scholar Bernard Lewis noted, “the phrase ‘that’s history’ is commonly used to dismiss something as unimportant, of no relevance to current concerns.” Not so in much of the world, and not so in China now. China’s leaders, Xi chief among them, can wield nationalism for their own ends. And now, leaders may wish to double down on nationalism as both the economy and the legitimacy the government has gained in the post-Deng era from a strong economy weaken. But nationalism isn’t an easy tool to control. As Weiss points out, "the past two Chinese governments fell to nationalist movements that accused them of failing to defend the country from foreign encroachments: the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and the Manchu leaders of the Qing dynasty." Going into this autumn, policy makers should be mindful of what is happening in China’s streets, as well as what Xi does and says before and during his trip to Washington.

### ECS conflict

#### Nationalism deters East China Sea conflict – huge amounts of anti-Japanese sentiment means that any risk of Chinese loss would have a detrimental impact on Chinese stability.

Carlson 15 (Allen R. Carlson, Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University, “Why Chinese Nationalism Could Impact the East and South China Seas VERY Differently,” The National Interest, 24 September 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-chinese-nationalism-could-impact-the-east-south-china-13922>, \**fc*)

There is a great deal at stake in both the East and South China Seas, not only for those competing over these spaces, but also for the United States. It is crucial to understand why the situation there has become so fraught: In both cases it is widely recognized that the key driver for conflict is the rise of nationalism, particularly in China. But, such a view is incomplete, and as a result misleading. Chinese nationalism is not a singular entity. The way it is framed with reference to China’s Asian neighbors varies significantly. Within such variations lie important, but largely overlooked, implications for the how Beijing is handling its maritime disputes, and by extension for the degree of volatility within such conflicts. Paradoxically, Chinese nationalism towards Japan is so pointed that it has an ossifying effect on Beijing’s approach to the East China Sea. In contrast, in the South China Sea there is somewhat less at stake for Chinese nationalists and the situation is much more fluid and potentially dangerous. The East China Sea-How Nationalism May Be A Deterrent of Conflict: Opposing Japan is a foundational anchor for contemporary Chinese nationalism–and it is difficult to understate the depth of antagonism toward Japan in China. It is readily visible in everyday life within China, both in casual conversations and in the stream of shows on Chinese television that repeatedly re-create scenes of past Japanese aggression. Such belligerence was most recently on public display during Beijing’s September 3 commemoration of the 70th anniversary of Japan’s surrender that ended WWII. One might think that such a vilification of Japan would tend to make the conflict between Beijing and Tokyo over ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea all the more explosive. It did appear to fuel confrontation in 2012 when the two sides last escalated their dispute over this territory. However, at that time, China’s leaders stopped short of direct military engagement with Japan, because domestic ramifications of a battlefield death would have been wide-ranging and potentially impossible to manage. In other words, Chinese nationalist sentiment toward Japan was so toxic that Beijing appears to have come to the realization that bluntly engaging Tokyo on disputed territory carried too much risk. The subsequent period of extended détente, albeit a frosty one, between the two East Asian nations, is a natural extension of such a push. Beijing is being deterred in the East China Sea by the depth of anti-Japanese sentiment in China.

### Im uq – nationalism contained

#### Chinese Nationalism is high but contained now

Sun, 3-16-16 - (Ei, reporter, Golabl Times, "Nationalism must take back seat to reform," No Publication, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/974010.shtml,//BR/)

The CFR report argues that China's foreign policy may well be driven increasingly by the risk of domestic political instability. It further argues that Chinese nationalism, "long a pillar of the state's legitimacy," will most probably be stimulated and intensified in order to, among others, "compensate for the political harm of a slower economy." While these rather pessimistic outlooks on China's socio-economic situation and its influence on China's foreign policy would bode a sad outcome for all in the region if realized, a more realistic and insightful assessment of China and its current blues would lead to a more nuanced scenario for China and its international dealings. There is scarcely any doubt that China, like many other countries, has already experienced a few years of what the officials dub a "new normal economic situation," with growth figures stepping down from their previously impressive double-digit figures for most of the past two decades or so, to the relatively low figure of around 7 percent. At least in the short run, a lowered growth number is actually beneficial to China's long-term economic development. For too long a period, in the rush toward reform and opening up its economy, much of China has focused on boosting the quantitative aspects of its booming economy. As the "world's factory," units upon units of production were relentlessly rammed up, often with scant attention paid to the astounding environmental impact and the sometimes questionable quality of the products. A lowered but still substantial expectation for economic growth, as presently promulgated by the Chinese authorities, should hopefully usher in a period of calmer reflection upon the long-term prospects of the Chinese economy, especially on the innumerable costs of rampant environmental destruction and neglect of product and service quality. That is perhaps why, in the recent 13th Five-Year Plan, the Chinese authorities stress on innovation, with its implications for quality improvements, and green growth as among the main engines for its economic development. A slowed economy, in this sense, presents not an insurmountable crisis for China, but, if adroitly handled, an opportunity for its economic rejuvenation. And China's senior leadership clearly sees it as such. And nationalism is not to be recklessly toyed with, in China and beyond. China, like many of its neighbors, is a multiracial country, with more than 50 ethnic groups thus far living reasonably peacefully within its borders. Calls for nationalism or, worse, jingoism in China will only open the proverbial can of worms, inevitably leading to social chaos, possibly spilling into violence and destruction. That is anathema by the Chinese authorities, whose priority is the maintenance of social stability in a massive and populous country like China. That is why another key aspect of the latest Five-Year Plan is the concept of "inclusiveness." The idea there is to make sure the fruits of economic development are enjoyed by every part of society. China has been vigorously promoting its "One Belt, One Road" initiative in the region, aiming to build up more comprehensive and strategic relationships with most regional countries. China surely sees that a more nationalistic stance will only frustrate its avowed goals of befriending more neighbors on a win-win basis. Instead, what China should do and has been doing is to encourage more of its businesses, both State-owned and small-and-medium enterprises, to step out of their comfort zones and undertake commercial endeavors abroad, starting with Southeast Asia. I agree with Campbell and Blackwill that the US "grand strategy for Asia" should seek "to avoid a US-China confrontation." Such a confrontation will do no one in the region good - not the US, not China, and certainly not Southeast Asia. The authors are also right to urge the expeditious passing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a humongous free-trade-plus agreement, by the US Congress. The US and other signatories should welcome China's eventual accession into the TPP fold. And China should also seriously assess its TPP prospects, especially in view of its previous WTO accession having substantially uplifted the quality of its economy. With enhanced trade and investment between China and its neighbors, and common prosperity thus lurking in the horizon, nationalism will have to take a distant back seat.

### at: CCP doesn’t care

#### Chinese nationalism is rising and influences government politics

Wallace and Weiss, 14 – Ohio State University, Yale University [Jeremy and Jessica, 7/11/14, “The Political Geography of Nationalist Protest in China: Cities and the 2012 Anti-Japanese Demonstrations”, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2406056]//Yak

Why do some cities take part in waves of nationalist protest but not others? Nationalist protest remains an important but understudied topic within the study of contentious politics in China, particularly at the subnational level. Relative to other protests, nationalist mobilization is more clustered in time and geographically widespread, linking citizens across different cities against a common target. Although the literature has debated the degree of state-led and grassroots influence on Chinese nationalism, we argue that it is important to consider both citizen propensity to mobilize as well as local government fears of instability. Analyzing an original dataset of 377 anti-Japanese protests across 208 of 287 Chinese prefectural cities, we find that both state-led patriotism and the availability of collective action resources were positively associated with nationalist protest, particularly “biographically available” populations of students and migrants. In addition, the government’s role was not monolithically facilitative. Fears of social unrest shaped the local political opportunity structure, with anti-Japanese protests less likely in cities with larger populations of unemployed college graduates and ethnic minorities, and more likely in cities with established leaders.

In 2012, China witnessed the largest wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations to occur since relations with Japan were normalized in 1972, condemning Japan’s decision to purchase three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. By our count, protesters took to the streets in 208 of China’s 287 prefectural cities. Smaller waves of anti-Japanese protest occurred in 2010 following a maritime collision and in 2005 over Japan’s bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat. Anti-American demonstrations erupted in 1999 after U.S. planes accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Anti-French protests took place in 2008 after riots in Tibet threatened French support for the Beijing Olympics.1

With each wave, China watchers have disagreed over whether nationalist protests reflect the spontaneous eruption of grassroots grievances2 or state orchestration to gain diplomatic leverage3 or divert domestic discontent. Scholars continue to debate whether Chinese nationalism is driven by genuine anger at foreign slights or manipulated to bolster state legitimacy. 4 Although the literature has been polarized between “top-down” and “bottom-up” views of Chinese nationalism, we argue that explaining patterns of nationalist protest requires simultaneous attention to state and societal factors.

In a strong authoritarian state like China, nationwide protests do not take place without some degree of state acquiescence. But neither have nationalist protests in the post-Mao era been akin to “puppets” or “rent-a-crowd” mobs that form at the state’s behest. Indeed, nationalist protest in China is far more risky than conveyed by terms like “manipulation” or “statesponsorship.” Nationalist activists and protest participants regularly run up against the limits of state tolerance,5 risking heightened surveillance, detention, and arrest. For the government, allowing nationalist protests risks creating a platform for other grievances to mobilize, while repressing patriotic activities leaves the government vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy and weakness.

In our view, variation in nationalist mobilization reflects both grassroots propensity to protest and state willingness to tolerate popular mobilization. Citizens are galvanized by genuine anger against foreign provocations even as government statements and media coverage raise the salience of foreign insults and signal that nationalist outrage is politically acceptable. At the same time, government authorities often fear the implications of street demonstrations for social stability and diplomatic ties, particularly if nationalist protests threaten to spin out of control and aggrieved citizens use the opportunity to mobilize for other purposes.

## Im – CCP stability

### Im – CCP stability

#### CCP instability causes global war and economic collapse

**Trang 16** --- Chief Representative for China at ARC Informatique (Nicolas Trang, 05-30-2016, "How will an implosion of the Chinese Communist Party affect the United States?" 6-17-2016, https://www.quora.com/How-will-an-implosion-of-the-Chinese-Communist-Party-affect-the-United-States)//jonah

An implosion of the CCP would mean that the moderates actually in control have fallen. Hard liners at the PLA and Politburo might have taken the driver seat. Taiwan will be considered a priority course of action and imminent war is planned. Relationship with North Korea gets sourer at first but young Kim learns his place and especially understands that he has real allies in China now. Kim is the best ally against the other Asian nations, especially in the race for islands and water control in the South China sea. The US will be in high alert and all its partners, from Taiwan to Philippines and Japan will convey a meeting for an increase military coverage in the Pacific. At the same time, the Asian Bank Development will try to buy allegiance from recipients in Central Asia to join the Chinese cause. The IMF which lost its influence in Asia and Africa can’t find leverages to hamper Chinese diplomatic efforts. The US leadership is cringing. China hard liners will make life tougher for Foreign companies in China which in turn will go back to their homeland, driving consumer products’ prices to the sky. In the US, people will blame the Obama legacy and the Democrats lack of control on domestic issues. In China loss of jobs will create dangerous discontent for the CCP. But the new leadership finds a solution by recruiting in the army. The arm race is started.

#### CCP collapse causes regional instability and nuclear war

**Yee and Storey 02** [Herbert - Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University. Ian - Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths, and Reality”, Taylor and Francis Group, pdf] bjs

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario—nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

### bioweapons

#### CCP collapse causes them to use biological and chemical weapons – extinction

**Renxing 05** [San – staff writer for the Epoch Times, “The CCP’s Last-ditch Gamble: Biological and Nuclear War”, Association for Asian Research, 8/29/05, <http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2692.html>] bjs

In a show of strength to save itself from demise, the CCP has brought out a sinister plan that it has been preparing for years, a last-ditch gamble to extend its life. This plan is laid out in two speeches written by Chi Haotian, Minster of Defense and vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, and posted on the Internet. The background surrounding the speeches is still shrouded in mystery. The titles of the two speeches are “War Is Approaching Us” [1] and “War Is Not Far from Us and Is the Midwife of the Chinese Century.” The two, judging from their similar contexts and consistent theme, are indeed sister articles. These speeches describe in a comprehensive, systematic, and detailed way the CCP’s nearly 20 years of fear and helplessness over its doomed fate, and its desperate fight to extend its life. In particular, the speeches lay uncharacteristically bare what is really on the CCP’s mind and hide nothing from the public—a rare confession from the CCP that can help people understand its evil nature. If one truly understands what is said in this confession, one will immediately catch on to the CCP’s thinking. In short, the speeches are worth reading, and I would like to comment on them. I. A Gangster Gambles with the World as His Stake, and the Lives of People in this Global Village Become Worthless What, then, is the gist of this wild, last-ditch gamble? To put it in a few words: A cornered beast is fighting desperately to survive in a battle with humanity. If you don’t believe me, read some passages directly from the speeches. 1) “We must prepare ourselves for two scenarios. If our biological weapons succeed in the surprise attack [on the US], the Chinese people will be able to keep their losses at a minimum in the fight against the U.S. If, however, the attack fails and triggers a nuclear retaliation from the U.S., China would perhaps suffer a catastrophe in which more than half of its population would perish. That is why we need to be ready with air defense systems for our big and medium-sized cities. Whatever the case may be, we can only move forward fearlessly for the sake of our Party and state and our nation’s future, regardless of the hardships we have to face and the sacrifices we have to make. The population, even if more than half dies, can be reproduced. But if the Party falls, everything is gone, and forever gone!” 2) “In any event, we, the CCP, will never step down from the stage of history! We’d rather have the whole world, or even the entire globe, share life and death with us than step down from the stage of history!!! Isn’t there a ‘nuclear bondage’ theory? It means that since the nuclear weapons have bound the security of the entire world, all will die together if death is inevitable. In my view, there is another kind of bondage, and that is, the fate our Party is tied up with that of the whole world. If we, the CCP, are finished, China will be finished, and the world will be finished.” 3) “It is indeed brutal to kill one or two hundred million Americans. But that is the only path that will secure a Chinese century, a century in which the CCP leads the world. We, as revolutionary humanitarians, do not want deaths. But if history confronts us with a choice between deaths of Chinese and those of Americans, we’d have to pick the latter, as, for us, it is more important to safeguard the lives of the Chinese people and the life of our Party. That is because, after all, we are Chinese and members of the CCP. Since the day we joined the CCP, the Party’s life has always been above all else!” Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches.

## Other

### Im – piracy

#### Piracy screws world on energy —PLA Navy MUST be strong enough to counter it.

Erickson and Strange 13

Andrew S. Erickson; Professor of Strategy in, and a core founding member of, the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)'s China Maritime Studies Institute; and Austin M. Strange; Research Associate at AidData, where he helped co-create the Tracking Underreported Financial Flows initiative and PhD. at Harvard University’s School of Government “No Substitute for Experience Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden” CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island November, 2013//LKJ

While the collective response of national navies and multilateral task forces in the Gulf of Aden and parts of the Indian Ocean has contributed to a large overall reduction in piracy, risk-taking pirate crews, utterly lacking domestic economic opportunities, are willing to venture farther offshore in their small coastal skiffs to attack merchant ves - sels. 23 The net result is an expanded maritime area that is vulnerable to pirate attack, making pirates more elusive and control costs higher. 24 Moreover, China’s leadership has, on numerous occasions, learned that individual pirate attacks on commercial vessels that generate media coverage have greater impact on Beijing’s domestic and international po - litical image than do abstract statistical trends. 25 As long as the threat of piracy remains, states like China will be wary of taking formidable public-relations risks that carry major economic and political implications. 2 Whatever the debate about the root causes of modern piracy worldwide, its costs are clear—pirates pose serious threats to the economic and political stability of states throughout the world. One recent study has found that the cost of these disruptions totals between seven and twelve billion dollars annually.27 Many of the world’s most vital SLOCs and shipping routes—including the Bab el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Singapore, and the South China Sea—regularly face destabilizing piracy threats.28 For example, approximately half of the world’s container shipments pass through the Bab el Mandeb (“Gate of Grief”) connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.29 Moreover, it is estimated that approximately 40 percent of global energy shipments pass through the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow body of water between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that is considered a strategic “choke point.”30 While most pirate attacks are limited in scale, even a temporary disruption of trade by pirates in any of these regions could produce a ripple effect, by forcing companies to reroute shipments and thereby delaying critical energy and industrial supply deliveries. For complex transnational production networks and just-in-time supply chains, with little spare capacity, the potential impact of such disruption would be significant.31 Successful pirate attacks can also bring heavy scrutiny to the international community for its failure to protect global shipping lanes adequately. Some studies contend that rerouting is a relatively cheap and safe option for some ships, especially the older, slower, and bulkier ships that are most vulnerable to pirate attack and least equipped for protective measures.32 Indeed, rerouting is often preferable to 12 china maritime studies hefty ransoms or more expensive insurance premiums. Nevertheless, the aggregate costs of avoiding high-traffic waterways where piracy is rampant in favor of such less convenient routes as the Cape of Good Hope are significant.33 For example, one report estimates actual rerouting costs at between $2.4 and $3 billion annually.34 A more recent study by Oceans beyond Piracy, an American nonprofit organization, estimates annual rerouting costs at $486–$680 million.35 These costs stem from additional fuel and excess wages to crew members, the primary direct expenses associated with rerouting. Of course, the extra time required to circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope rather than transiting waterways near the Middle East—estimated by China’s MoT at six days—is also very significant in terms of aggregate opportunity cost.36 Moreover, longer distances increase shipping times and hence require more ships to accommodate the same volume of trade. Rerouting to avoid pirate attacks thus imposes meaningful costs on the shipping industry. However, navigating waters affected by persistent piracy also raises the costs of maritime shipping, by increasing insurance premiums.37 These economic forces motivate greater regional and international cooperation. China is no exception to the general vulnerability to piracy.38 Internal and external security developments have driven both China’s original deployment of antipiracy forces in the Gulf of Aden and Beijing’s growing focus on nontraditional security tactics to protect China’s maritime interests. Chinese-led joint patrols in other crime-infested waters, such as the upper Mekong Delta, are a prime example. Specifically, the persistence and complexity of modern piracy have created new challenges for the PLAN, which is particularly unproven in such Far Seas as the IOR. These challenges are formidable and perhaps even daunting for the CCP, for reasons explained in the introduction. Antipiracy operations thus represent a critical test for Beijing, not only operationally, but also in terms of policy and symbolism. Yet the benefits are too compelling to ignore. China, like other nations, has opted for direct naval involvement rather than relying solely on private security initiatives to address an expanding piracy “industry.” However, one Chinese observer, Li Ruijing of the PLA Academy of Military Science, asserts that PLAN antipiracy operations alone are insufficient to protect completely PRC interests endangered by pirates:

#### LNG Piracy and Terrorism are on the rise—maritime security is crucial. A hijacked tanker is just as dangerous as a loose nuke.

Iftikhar 15, (Mohid Iftikhar has Masters of Philosophy in Peace & Conflict Studies from National Defence University, Pakistan and Bachelor in Business Administration from University of Southern Queensland, Australia. He has completed a short course on Defence & Security Management in collaboration with Defence Academy, UK, Cranfield University and NDU, PK. He is a member of Center for International Maritime Security and Associate member, the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King’s College London. At present, he is working for the Federal Ministry of Planning Development & Reform in Pakistan"Australia World’s Largest LNG exporter by 2018: Understanding Maritime Security Challenges," Center for International Maritime Security, http://cimsec.org/australia-worlds-largest-lng-exporter-by-2018-understanding-maritime-security-challenges/18490//LKJ

In relation, the Chinese initiative of the Silk Road and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route aim to connect Africa, Europe and Asia, and poses numerous questions in the field international relations and development. Chinese enterprise predicts greater demand of LNG in the region, according to the Asia Times there will be over 900 projects involving 60 countries in the New Silk Road Economic Corridor. Simultaneously, the existing conflicts in the South China and East China Seas are a potential source of maritime security predicament; asking if conflict is evitable amongst states? Internationally, LNG will also help Australia’s goal to establish itself as a more active participant in the Asia-Pacific region, as outlined in the government’s 2012 white paper “Australia in the Asian Century.” Perhaps, Australia does have a concrete direction of international growth through LNG exports, at the same time maritime security remains equally essential. On the same course, the Australian Defense white paper from May 2009, “Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific century: Force 2030”, does signify importance of maritime security and a self-dependent defense strategy in the oceans. A liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker operated by Energy Advance Co., a unit of Tokyo Gas Co., is moored at the company's Sodegaura plant in Sodegaura City, Chiba Prefecture, Japan, on Thursday, March 22, 2012. Japan's imports of LNG rose to a record last fiscal year as utilities turned to fossil fuels after the Fukushima nuclear disaster led to the shutdown of almost all the nation's atomic reactors. Photographer: Tomohiro Ohsumi/Bloomberg A liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker operated by Energy Advance Co., a unit of Tokyo Gas Co., is moored at the company’s Sodegaura plant in Sodegaura City, Chiba Prefecture, Japan, on Thursday, March 22, 2012. Maritime security challenges are interlinked through adverse economic breakdown for LNG exports that fall under threats of terrorism and piracy. Possibly, terrorism remains a vital concern as LNG cargo can be targeted as floating bombs, the statement is supported as quoted in the book “Organizational and psychological aspects of terrorism” by the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, “There is a concern amongst many maritime terrorist experts that a terrorist group could use a hijacked LNG tanker as a floating bomb. The amount of LNG held in a large tanker could generate an explosion of a similar size to a small nuclear bomb.” . Religious radicalization in the Middle East and terrorism in South Asia and Southeast Asia are both critical towards safety of Australian LNG shipments to their destinations. While transnational concerns have a firm relationship between maritime commerce and security, concurrently the 21st century has evolved geo-political concerns. The increasing power projections and geo-strategic goals in the Asia-Pacific are strongly connected to international maritime security. The wider hypothesis can be “Effect of Geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific towards Maritime Security.” The relationship between geopolitical dynamics and transnational crimes in the seas has shaped a new picture; while an important question is; would the latter capitalize on the stance? CIMSEC content is and always will be free; consider a voluntary monthly donation to offset our operational costs. As always, it is your support and patronage that have allowed us to build this community – and we are incredibly grateful. U.S ambitions in the Indian and Pacific Ocean are towards deploying 60% of its naval fleet by 2020. Perhaps, sea lines of communication for Australian exports are not only critical towards intra and interregional trade, but geopolitics post 2020 will evolve the architecture of maritime security. It is equally important to sustain international harmony in the maritime sphere of Asia-Pacific, but are China, USA and other rising powers willing to extend collaboration and coalitions for maritime security? Many experts and scholars from war studies and international relations agree towards the minimum possibility towards a military conflict in the Asia-Pacific, but they don’t completely rule out the fact. Power projections in the seas of Asia-Pacific remain a source of anxiety, and the deployment of submarines and destroyers in strategic positions produces a negative image. Transnational criminals today have accelerated in their modus operandi by advancing in strategic intelligence through contemporary technologies. The cyber domain remains sophisticated, but has its cons that can be favorable to criminals for locating LNG shipments through GPS tracking and etc. On the same note, the Straits of Malacca remain the central route for Australian LNG shipments to pass towards East Asia; the year 2014 had accounted for 75% of the world’s piracy attacks in the area. Further, in an article from BloombergView “Islamic State Is Rapidly Expanding in Southeast Asia” quoted as Southeast Asia is a key recruitment center for ISIS, the nexus between terrorism in Southeast Asia and Jihadi extremism from the Middle East evolves a broader challenge in the maritime route for Australian LNG shipments. It is a question of international economic security towards safety of Australian LNG shipments, in two parts. First preventing an economic breakdown for Australia and second the dependence of importer states for their national operations and productivity. International development requires a sustainable mechanism of integration between states, and the Asia-Pacific region is evolving complex dynamics that inculcate development, geopolitical, race, and transnational challenges. Demand of LNG in the Asia-Pacific will extensively grow in forthcoming years; Australia will be a significant contributor towards the same. But geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific is defining competition in facets of arms race, strength and modern imperialism. Transnational crimes such as terrorism, radicalization and piracy are a threat to Australian LNG shipments capitalizing on geopolitical objectives in a camouflaged manner. Simply, while there is a debate going on amongst great and rising powers of who is right in the Asia-Pacific, transnational criminals are emerging through the sideways planning catastrophic events.

### Im booster – China aggressive

#### China’s aggressive --- that lowers the threshold for conflict to escalate

**Auslin, 5/31**/16 – resident scholar and the director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute where he specializes in Asian regional security and political issues (Michael, American Enterprise Institute, “In Search of the Xi Doctrine”, <https://www.aei.org/publication/in-search-of-the-xi-doctrine/>, //11)

All nations act in their self-interest, and no one should be surprised that Beijing has altered its policies to take advantage of its years of economic growth and new military strength. Yet few nations are able to assert their national interest in ways that have the potential to reshape their regions. China’s selective adherence to international law is not unique, but its power and influence makes its actions far more disruptive than smaller states when it chooses a unilateral path based on might.

Xi Jinping has pushed China toward a more confrontational posture throughout East Asia. Japan is scrambling its jet interceptors hundreds of times per year in response to Chinese fighters encroaching on Japanese territory, including the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. New Chinese Coast Guard cutters, larger than any operated by other Asian nations, patrol contested waters, intimidating smaller vessels from other nations. Philippine and Vietnamese fishing boats regularly face pressure from Chinese maritime patrol vessels. Cyberattacks emanating from the mainland relentlessly test the computer defenses of Japan and other countries.

The Xi doctrine presents the nations of Asia and the United States with a version of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s “known unknowns.” While it is clear that Beijing intends to shape the East Asian security environment to its preferences, the exact means it will use, or how far it will test its strength remains uncertain. That alone may be part of China’s plan, to maintain strategic flexibility by sowing uncertainty among those enmeshed in disputes with Beijing. Such uncertainty could possibly lead China’s counterparts to become more cautious and risk averse in the light of Xi’s forceful statements.

Yet with The Hague ruling looming, and continued bad economic news, the belief that China is an unstoppable force may be waning. With countries like the Philippines willing to use international means to challenge China, and Japan increasing its defense budget, Chinese foreign policy may run into stiff headwinds in coming years. Xi’s statements can be interpreted therefore as a way of forestalling greater challenges to China’s regional interests.

The problem is that Xi will have to respond, if for some reason he were directly and materially challenged on any of his pronouncements. A new air defense identification zone in the South China Sea, for example, might result in a response even from a nation that is far weaker than China, such as the Philippines. Or, the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel could unleash nationalist demonstrations in both countries. That could be an incident which could easily spin out of control, further poisoning relations in Asia, and possibly bringing the United States into the conflict, were its allies involved. It would be better for all if the Xi doctrine were never put to the test.

### at: China nukes don’t reach US

#### China has the capability to nuke every major US city

**Goldstein, 1/19** – [Lyle J., is Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, The National Interest, “The Chinese Plans to Nuke America”, 1/19/16, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-chinese-plans-nuke-america-14952>, 6/24/16]JRO

When one reads enough Chinese naval literature, diagrams of multi-axial cruise missile saturation attacks against aircraft carrier groups may begin to seem normal. However, one particular graphic from the October 2015 issue (p. 32) of the naval journal Naval & Merchant Ships [舰船知识] stands out as both unusual and singularly disturbing. It purports to map the impact of a Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) strike by twenty nuclear-armed rockets against the United States. Targets include the biggest cities on the East and West Coasts, as well as in the Midwest, as one would expect. Giant radiation plumes cover much of the country and the estimate in the caption holds that the strike “would yield perhaps 50 million people killed” [可能造成5000 万死亡]. The map below that graphic on the same page illustrates the optimal aim point for a hit on New York City with a “blast wave” [火风量] that vaporizes all of Manhattan and well beyond. That makes the North Korean “threat” look fairly insignificant by comparison, doesn’t it? But what’s really disturbing is that the scenario described above envisions a strike by China’s largely antiquated DF-5 first generation ICBM. In other words, the illustration is perhaps a decade or more out of date. As China has deployed first the road-mobile DF-31, then DF-31A and now JL-2 (a submarine-launched nuclear weapon), China’s nuclear strategy has moved from “assured retaliation” to what one may term “completely assured retaliation.” Indeed, the actual theme of the article featuring those graphics concerns recent reports regarding testing of the DF-41 mobile ICBM. The author of that article, who is careful to note that his views do not represent those of the publication, observes that when a Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson was queried about the test on August 6, 2015, the spokesperson “did not deny that the DF-41 exists” [并没有否认‘东风’41 的存在]. The author also cites U.S. intelligence reports, concluding that four tests have now been conducted, including one that demonstrates multiple-reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology. The author estimates that DF-41 will finally provide China with the capability to launch missiles from north central China and hit all targets in the U.S. (except Florida). With the goal of better understanding the rapidly evolving strategic nuclear balance between China and the U.S. and its significance, this Dragon Eye surveys some recent Mandarin-language writings on the subject of Chinese nuclear forces. To be sure, a flurry of Chinese writings on the nuclear balance did follow after the September parade in Beijing that highlighted Chinese missile forces. Perhaps the most remarkable revelation from the parade was the unveiling of the DF-26, a new, longer-range anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), based on the revolutionary shorter-ranged cousin, the DF-21D ASBM. In fact, the November 2015 issue of the aforementioned journal ran a series of articles on the DF-26. In those articles, the weapon is described multiple times as a “nuclear conventional dual-purpose” [核常兼备] weapon. The major thrust of the article in that issue on the impact of the DF-26 on nuclear strategy seems to be to try to debunk the argument that China’s deployment of this new type of missile is “destabilizing.” Like their American counterparts, Chinese strategists seem to be increasingly practiced (at least in a domestic context) at selling the argument that more and new types of weapons enhance deterrence and thus strategic stability. Despite the developments related above, the balance of opinion in Beijing seems impressively moderate on the prospects for a major nuclear buildup by China. In the allegedly nationalist forum of Global Times [环球时报], one commentator from the China Institute for International Studies (associated with the Foreign Ministry), for example, offered a few illuminating comments about a year ago in an expert forum entitled “How Many Nuclear Warheads Are Enough for China?” He is evidently concerned that “We have heard some new voices calling to ‘build a nuclear force appropriate for a great power.’” Instead, he argues that China must continue to focus on building a “small, elite and effective nuclear forces” [精干有效的核力量]. Likewise, a former vice-director of the Chinese Navy Nuclear Security Bureau offers that China is a medium-sized nuclear power, which should learn from the experience of Britain and France and deploy no fewer than four submarines carrying nuclear weapons (SSBNs)—far fewer than operated by either Russia or the United States. Yet one can still find in that same analysis ample concern among Chinese specialists regarding new directions in U.S. military capabilities that could threaten China’s deterrent. Another concern amply evident in Chinese writings concerns tactical nuclear weaponry. Most of this reporting of late concerns a recent upgrade to the American B-61 nuclear bomb. A full-page graphic in the same issue that discusses the DF-41 missile tests offers many specifics on the B-61, including its “dial-a-yield” [威力可调技术] feature that enables the operator to choose destruction on a scale ranging from fifty to 0.3 kilotons. That same month, in the magazine Aerospace Knowledge [航空知识], a “centerfold” featured the SS-26 Iskander, a Russian short-range tactical nuclear weapon. Elsewhere, I have, moreover, documented Chinese discussions of tactical nuclear weapons for anti-submarine warfare, as well as the importance of nuclear-tipped submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCMs) for strategy in the late Cold War. Let’s hope that these are just academic discussions in the Chinese context and do not reflect actual weapons under development. As one can see from this discussion, there is ample reason for anxiety with many new Chinese nuclear systems now coming online, as well as substantial reason for optimism. As an author who frequently rides China’s high-speed rail [高铁], I am acutely aware that astronomical sums of money spent on that system could just as easily have been spent building an enormous arsenal of nuclear weaponry. That was not done and it’s certainly good that Chinese leaders have their priorities straight. American strategists need to keep this Chinese restraint in mind, especially as they weigh both new, expensive weapons systems (missile defense augmentation, the new strategic bomber, SSBN-X and also prompt global strike) and a set of measures to counter Beijing within the maritime disputes on its flanks.

## Turns case

### 2nc – turns case – must read

#### And, factional in-fighting causes shutdown of the Chinese government – turns the case

Dr. Li 13 (Cheng, master's in Asian studies from the University of California, Berkeley and a doctorate in political science from Princeton University. director of the John L. Thornton China Center and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, From 1993 to 1995, he worked in China as a fellow with the U.S.-based Institute of Current World Affairs pg online at “China’s Third Plenum: Reform And Opening Up 2.0?,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2013/10/31-chinas-third-plenum-reform-and-opening-up/103113\_cpc\_transcript\_ia.pdf //um-ef)

Finally, the third pessimistic view about the lack of consensus within the leadership and the factional in-fighting, it is true that we cannot understand Chinese politics without a grasp of factional tensions. And after past months, no one understands the importance of factional tension better than we do in Washington. Do you agree? Well, Chinese leaders in the past Deng era, are generally divided into two coalitions -- the Jiang Zemin camp currently led by President Xi Jinping, and the Hu Jintao camp, currently led by Premier Li Keqiang. President Xi Jinping now holds a six to one majority on the Politburo Standing Committee. Premier Li seemed to have had the cooperative partnership thus far. For example, publicly, Premier Li has been seen as the leader, pushing for the establishment of the Shanghai free trade zone, although the real driving force is, in fact, the Jiang Zemin camp, whose power base is in Shanghai. But the strong influence of President Xi and his protégé in China’s economic and financial circles may make Premier Li uneasy. Also, a majority of senior officials, one or two levels below the Politburo Standing Committee actually belong to Hu Jintao’s camp, particularly 376 Central Committee members. The majority of them belong to Hu Jintao’s camp. I just did a study about over 90 of them belong to the so-called tuanpai, the Communist Youth League. These are the protégés of Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang. They are surely interested in gaining more seats in the top leadership or having someone occupy the top driver seat in the years to come. Their policy agenda and the regional priority may differ from President Xi’s. In four years, China will have another round of leadership in-fighting as five out of the seven Politburo Standing Committee members will retire. This means that a new run of vicious fighting for seats on this superior leadership body now occurs on a fiveyear cycle rather than its general 10-year cycle. Now, it is possible that a vicious power struggle may get out of control leading to a Chinese style government shutdown. Luckily, for the Chinese, if such a shutdown occurs, they can still watch the American panda cam. No, we cannot see during the shutdown. But all of these observations will actually encourage Xi Jinping and his coalition to more forcefully carry out their market reform agenda. Failure to deliver will significantly undermine Xi Jinping’s credibility, reduce middle class support, further alienate the liberal intellectuals, marginalize China from important international economic integration, like the potential TPP. And most importantly, make accountable China’s strategic condition to a consumption-driven economy.

#### In-fighting undermines the effectiveness and implementation of the plan

Dr. Li, 13 (Cheng, master's in Asian studies from the University of California, Berkeley and a doctorate in political science from Princeton University. director of the John L. Thornton China Center and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, From 1993 to 1995, he worked in China as a fellow with the U.S.-based Institute of Current World Affairs pg online at “China’s Third Plenum: Reform And Opening Up 2.0?,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2013/10/31-chinas-third-plenum-reform-and-opening-up/103113\_cpc\_transcript\_ia.pdf //um-ef)

The third pessimistic view is that the Chinese top leadership, namely the Politburo Standing Committee, and especially the 25 members of the Politburo may have difficulty reaching consensus on new policy initiatives and the priorities. As this view goes, factional in-fighting will deepen and undermine both effectiveness of policy implementation and the unity of the leadership. Now, while each of these three pessimistic views have some validity, I believe that none of them adequately express the momentum that new leadership carries. In the next 12 minutes or so, I will assess each of these pessimistic views, elaborating on the respective merits and more on their inadequacies. My cautious optimism is not based on political naiveté or neglect of the daunting challenges that a new leadership confronts, but quite on the contrary, my optimism is based on the top leadership sense of urgency and the collective understanding of the need to do something big, broad, and bold to gain public support before it’s too late.

### 2nc – turns coop/rels

#### Turns the whole aff --- Uncontrolled nationalism turns US-China cooperation – China uses anti-foreign protests as justification to derail diplomatic engagement with other countries – also means there’s no risk that the AFF can access our impacts.

Cookson 15 (John Richard Cookson, Senior Editor of The National Interest with MA in English from Columbia University, “The Real Threat of Chinese Nationalism,” The National Interest, 28 August 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-threat-chinese-nationalism-13729?page=2>, \**fc*)

Nationalism has worked for Xi. So far, patriotic, mass support has protected him from a strong, public challenge by the military or the party. But nationalism in China has an uncertain and at times combustible relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leaders in Beijing. In China, street-level, unchecked nationalism—nationalism en masse—is a precarious threat both to the CCP and to regional and global stability overall. In 2012, Xi took control of a China unthinkable without Deng Xiaoping. By opening up its economy and jettisoning Mao-era programs, China created an average of 10 percent growth per year over the thirty years beginning with 1980. Millions were brought from subsistence living to a point where median income now approaches a “middle-income trap.” As if to acknowledge this change, Xi reiterated his commitment to Deng’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” shortly after coming to power. But this phrase, “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” is by now, of course, “nonsense,” China scholar Roderick MacFarquhar said at the time. Communism no longer connects the nation; it is no longer a unifying ideology. Instead, China now has "No ideology. No sense of what the country is about. And the only way, and it is a very dangerous way, that they can achieve some kind of unity between party, state and people, is the dangerous route of nationalism." Over the last two-and-a-half decades, and with the strict tenets of communism shed as a unifying ideology, nationalism has been paired with robust economic growth in China to legitimize the country’s leadership. Both contributed to an “authoritarian resilience,” as China scholar Jessica Chen Weiss describes it. Now, nationalism and economics have begun to decouple as growth has slowed and stocks have tumbled. Comparisons with Deng have turned from complimentary of Xi to concerning for China as a whole. “The country is now going through a crisis of transition, unparalleled since Deng Xiaoping set out to put clear water between China’s future and the Mao era,” writes George Magnus, an associate at Oxford University’s China Centre and senior advisor to UBS, in the Financial Times. What connects the faltering economy with the animosity between China and Japan is that antiforeign protests are some of the only forms of mass, organized protest that have been permitted to take place in China. As Weiss points out, while anti-Japanese demonstrations were repressed in the 1990s and 2000s, they nonetheless flared up in 1985, 2005, 2010 and 2012. Moreover, she notes, the 1985 anti-Japanese protests were early precursors of the pro-democracy protests of 1986 and 1989, giving participants much needed experience in mass mobilization. Weiss explains what the CCP knows well, that “[e]ven strong authoritarian governments may have difficulty reining in protests that are widely seen as patriotic and legitimate." History shows that Chinese officials quickly repress demonstrations about domestic issues. This is less the case with antiforeign protests, which not only can have an intrinsic, patriotic legitimacy leaders find difficult to counter, but also, as Weiss argues, can have a value for China’s leaders to signal resolve in diplomacy. In a statement released for the anniversary of the end of World War II on August 15, Japanese prime minister Abe said that his “heart is rent with the utmost grief” about the damage done by his country. But he also emphasized that “[w]e must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize.” This statement joins a list of recent perceived slights, including a row this summer over the treatment of the war in Japanese textbooks, that irk many Chinese. Chinese-Japanese tensions have eased somewhat since the worst days of 2012, which Weiss says saw the largest anti-Japanese demonstrations since relations were normalized in 1972. Of the 287 prefecture cities Weiss and a colleague studied in 2012, nearly three-quarters saw street protests. Should Xi tolerate another spate of anti-Japanese protests, he would be using popular sentiment to signal to Japanese officials that China’s avenues for compromise are few. Importantly, this wish to signal resolve in diplomacy is weighed against the threat that such protests will spiral out of control, turning to domestic grievances and turning against Beijing. In this way, any anti-Japanese protests ostensibly about the Second World War are a potential rallying point for discontent about the present. “In current American usage,” the scholar Bernard Lewis noted, “the phrase ‘that’s history’ is commonly used to dismiss something as unimportant, of no relevance to current concerns.” Not so in much of the world, and not so in China now. China’s leaders, Xi chief among them, can wield nationalism for their own ends. And now, leaders may wish to double down on nationalism as both the economy and the legitimacy the government has gained in the post-Deng era from a strong economy weaken. But nationalism isn’t an easy tool to control. As Weiss points out, "the past two Chinese governments fell to nationalist movements that accused them of failing to defend the country from foreign encroachments: the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and the Manchu leaders of the Qing dynasty."

### 2nc – turns china stability

#### Link alone turns China stability

Li 9 <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/01/chinas-team-of-rivals/> China’s Team of Rivals By Cheng Li October 1, 2009 Cheng Li is director of the John L. Thornton China Center and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. He is also a director of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. //LKJ

The rise of the team of rivals arrangement may result in fewer policies aimed at maximizing GDP growth rates at all costs. Instead, it might give way to policies that provide due consideration to both economic efficiency and social justice. Already, the ongoing global financial crisis has driven the leadership to change its emphasis from export-led growth to encouraging domestic demand, which means addressing rural needs. An ambitious land reform plan, which was adopted in the fall of 2008, promises to give farmers more rights and market incentives to encourage them to subcontract and transfer land. This strategy aims to increase the income of farmers, reduce economic disparity, promote sustainable urbanization, and ultimately end the century-long segregation between rural and urban China. Some analysts think that this land reform, along with a nearly $600 billion stimulus plan announced in November that favors railroad construction and rural infrastructure development, will greatly boost the country’s domestic economy and hopefully propel China through the current economic crisis. Although the land reforms largely reflect President Hu’s agenda and the influence of the populists, leaders from the elitist camp have also been supporters of these policy initiatives. Political compromise and consensus-building, not zero-sum factional infighting, have shaped the rural development and stimulus plans. But China’s new game of elite politics may fail. What will happen, for instance, if economic conditions continue to worsen? Factionalism at the top might grow out of control, perhaps even leading to deadlock or outright feuding. Different outlooks over many issues — including how to redistribute resources, establish a public healthcare system, reform the financial sector, achieve energy security, maintain political order, and handle domestic ethnic tensions — are already so contentious that the leadership might find it increasingly difficult to build the kind of consensus necessary to govern effectively.

### 2nc – scs – turns econ

#### South China Sea conflict wrecks the global economy.

Harjani 14 (Ansuya Harjani, Writer for CNBC Asia with BA in International Relations from the University of Virginia, “Will nationalism undo Asia's economic success?,” CNBC, 1 June 2014, <http://www.cnbc.com/2014/05/30/will-nationalism-undo-asias-economic-success.html>, \**fc*)

Territorial spats between China and its neighbors over competing claims in the East and South China Seas have precipitated a groundswell of nationalism in Asia, which if unmanaged, threatens to destabilize the region, say experts. "Nationalism is on the rise in Asia, which is a serious issue because it shifts the rationality of actors from cost-benefit calculations from an economic and military sense towards a cost-benefit calculation ideologically," Ruediger Frank, department head and professor of East Asian economy and society at the University of Vienna told CNBC. Growing nationalism may force politicians to act in a much sharper way than they may have done previously to respond to public sentiment, he said, increasing the risk of conflict. The perils of nationalist fervor are apparent in the escalating row between China and Vietnam over territory in the South China Sea. China claims the resource-rich South China Sea nearly in its entirety, rejecting rival claims from Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei. "In both China and Vietnam, leadership has promoted aggressive nationalism as a means to unify the country, consolidate domestic support, and underpin foreign policy decision-making," said U.S.-based security intelligence firm The Soufan Group. "As a result, flare-ups between the neighboring countries over tiny but strategic slices of territory in the South China Sea have escalated tensions between the two, threatening to invite full-out conflict," it said. The stand-off intensified last week when Vietnam accused China of sinking one of its fishing boats near a Chinese oil rig that was placed in the contested waters around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea in early May. The deployment of an oil rig triggered deadly anti-China protests in Vietnam that led to the evacuation of over 3,000 Chinese nationals. "We need to look at the involvement of our citizenry - moving along in foreign policy gets more complicated with citizens get involved," said Laura del Rosario, Undersecretary for International Economic Relations at the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. Economic ramifications of conflict If a conflict were to break out in the South China Sea, it would endanger global trade,potentially derailing the global economic recovery, Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung warned at the World Economic Forum on East Asia last month. The South China Sea is as a major international shipping route, a blockage of which is unchartered territory in terms of the potential scale of disruption, according to Parag Khanna, senior fellow at public policy institute New America Foundation. "Whenever you have a supply chain disruption in individual countries - whether its Thai floods, riots in Vietnam, typhoon in the Philippines or a tsunami in Japan - you have significant global supply chain disruptions. Those are individual events, and none of those are acts of war," he said. "If you do have conflict in the Paracel Islands, where there's obviously a tremendous amount of shipping, it's going to create a lot of bottlenecks and uncertainty," he added. Espen Barth Eide, managing director at the World Economic Forum agreed that conflict would have significant global implications: "Asia is the powerhouse of the global economy, so bad news for Asia is bad news for the rest of the world," he said.

### 2NC – turns rels/scs/hr

#### Xi will resist western pressure to maintain power and increase his credibility – downturn in credibility results in lashout and collapses U.S.-China Relations

Blackwill, 5/26/16 --- Henry A. Kissinger Ssenior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning under President George W. Bush as well as U.S. Ambassador to India (Robert D., “China's Strategy for Asia: Maximize Power, Replace America,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-strategy-asia-maximize-power-replace-america-16359, article downloaded 5/27/16, JMP)

Diplomacy After the Downturn Economic growth and nationalism have for decades been the two founts of legitimacy for the Communist Party, and as the former wanes, Xi will likely rely increasingly on the latter. As a powerful but exposed leader, Xi will tap into this potent nationalist vein through foreign policy, burnishing his nationalist credentials and securing his domestic position from elite and popular criticism, all while pursuing various Chinese national interests. In the future, Xi could become more hostile to the West, using it as a foil to boost his approval ratings the way Putin has in Russia. Already, major Chinese newspapers are running articles blaming the country’s economic slump on efforts undertaken by insidious “foreign forces” that seek to sabotage the country’s rise. On territorial matters, Xi will be unwilling or unable to make concessions that could harm his domestic position, and may even seek to escalate territorial disputes against Japan or South China Sea claimants as a way of redirecting domestic attention away from the economic situation and burnishing his nationalist record. Globally, in order to demonstrate at home that China is taken seriously abroad, Xi will maintain a proactive and assertive Chinese foreign policy that involves institution-building and occasional provocation, while remaining firm in the face of external pressure on the South and East China Seas, human rights, conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang, and diplomatic visits by the Dalai Lama. Finally, Xi’s resistance to Western culture and values may intensify. Because China’s economy is now slowing, Xi’s fear of political instability may push him to adopt even sterner measures, and new violations of human rights and the emerging challenges that Western NGOs and businesses face will likely cause renewed friction in China’s relationships with the West.

# AFF ANSWERS

## uq/pc

### 2ac – wont pass – general

#### Xi’s reforms are fruitless --- structural opposition

**Jian, 5/13**/16 – writer for the Bangkok Post (Ma, Bangkok Post, “Xi strives to secure Mao-style authority”, <http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/971225/xi-strives-to-secure-mao-style-authority>, //11)

Fifty years after the Cultural Revolution, its crimes and sins remain unexpurgated. On the contrary, it is being used to justify more political and social repression in China. But, despite Mr. Xi’s best efforts, his attempts to secure Mao-style authority are likely to end very differently for him, with his incompetent economic rule and political purges and repression gradually producing secret cadres that oppose him. As economic failures increasingly explode into political unrest, the old Red Guards may once again reprise their central role in the Cultural Revolution, backed by a young generation unaware of history.

### 1ar – wont pass – general

#### Reforms unpopular now- corruption reform comes before economic reforms

**Saikia, 6/24**

(Makhan, 2016, Senior Editor Edit & OpEd, www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edit/cult-of-xi-the-second-coming-of-mao.html)//cb

For Xi, bringing reforms may not be easy as China currently needs harder reforms like removing state monopolies in crucial sectors of the economy, an impartial judiciary etc. These all can potentially threaten the very dominance of the party itself and Xi can hardly afford to move forward. Xi is no Mao in the true sense of the term. Some old generation Chinese people may squirm the way he functions so reminiscent of Mao’s time, but fashioning Xi as Mao will do no good either to China or to the rest of the world. There is enough of evidence to support the view that China’s next decade, when a much younger generation of leaders will be taking over the leadership of the country, may be a turbulent one for sure. Simultaneously, Xi has plenty of resources as well as liabilities, wide support from the public and large sections of the elite, vast foreign exchange reserves, a protected currency, a controlled banking system, party sponsored smart technocrats, a large real economy and most importantly, no perceived threat or rather an absence of any marked political opposition till date. Hence, turning the tide in China may not be easy as the political system in that country is proved so far good at maintaining ‘order’. With Xi fast coming to the global stage, China’s future veered around hopes and fears as predicted by the liberal commentators mostly from America. But many like Gideon Rose thinks otherwise, seeing a vast array of opportunity under the current leadership of China: ‘And it’s possible that the likeliest scenario will be neither crisis nor resilience but rather an eventual gradual political evolution….’. In this, China may continue the cult of Xi, but when the baton passes on to the next generation, it may be so that as the Chinese authoritarian model is continually embracing market liberalism, it has to come along with a cost for sure. Surprisingly, Xi has completely ignored the hallowed guiding principles of the yesteryears, when Deng was putting 'economic construction at the centre' and now for him, politics always comes first. Admittedly, many optimists still feel that Xi believes the time for bold economic reforms has not come yet in China. To him, first the party must clean up from deep-rooted corruption, else people may lose complete faith on it. Once his anti-graft campaign brings back the true image of the ‘people’s party’, he is likely to initiate economic reforms without disturbing the party system. It has been predicted that he will unleash the much-awaited economic reforms only after the party Congress due late next year when many of his loyalists will be brought in crucial posts in the party. Besides, Xi’s decisive leadership style, backed by unmatched political power within the party and his relentless effort for refashioning a vigorous Chinese foreign policy have all together launched the country into a new realm of global dynamism which was not even visible during the peak of Deng. As we move on, Xi’s new found style of functioning may pose either a threat to his own survival or to the CCP. As The Economist notes: “Either way, the success of Xi’s rule will rest not just on whether he wins the battles he has chosen to fight, but on whether he has picked the right ones. Seen from the point of view of China as a whole, it does not look as if he has. Xi seems bent on strengthening his party and keeping himself in power, not on making China the wealthier and more open society that its people crave”. Let’s wait and watch how Xi takes his new ‘cult forward’ and how the CCP bigwigs react to it, before it wreak havoc on the global political system.

#### Xi’s specific reforms fail

**Tanaka 2015**

(Osamu, executive vice president policy research institute @ ministry of finance, https://www.mof.go.jp/english/pri/publication/pp\_review/ppr027/ppr027a.pdf)//cb

I have sorted and explained three issues regarding the economic reform and economic policy of the Xi Jinping leadership. They are linked to each other. For example, urbanization is a key for stable medium-growth of economy; however, if relevant reforms, such as the family registry system and local government financial administration system, are not implemented at the same time, the urbanization preoccupied with overdevelopment and may cause an erosion of rural areas and a crisis in food security. Conventional macro control methods cannot achieve comprehensive deepening of reform. It is necessary to place a priority on economic system reform and structural adjustment even if it means slowing down the economy for a short-period, but avoid implementing easy economic measures just like those in 2009 and 2010. At present, the Xi Jinping leadership considers that the economy is still within a reasonable range even though the growth rate was slightly below the annual target and it holding the attitude of avoiding issuing a large-scale economic stimulus policy, while announcing a mini-stimulus policy for the economy. However, vested interest group who do not want the reform will aspire to a higher growth rate and strongly demand implementation of economic policies and the postponement of reforms whenever the economic growth rate shows signs of decreasing. In order to control them and implement economic system reform and structural adjustments drastically, the power of Prime Minister Li Keqiang alone is not enough and it is essential to have the strong political leadership of President Xi Jinping. So far, President Xi Jinping seems to be successful in establishing leadership by concentrating authority in himself and putting pressure on managers of state-owned companies and local governments through anticorruption activities. However, it is not sure if this strong power will continue until 2020 which is the goal year for reform. In order for the Chinese economy to get rid of the so-called “middle income trap,” to complete and shift to a market economic system, and achieve sustainable and sound growth, 36 O Tanaka / Public Policy Review it is essential to implement economic system reform, a new type of urbanization, and the innovation of macro control at the same time. If any one of these is lacking, the Chinese economy cannot expect a stable transfer to the stage of medium-growth. The duties imposed on the Xi Jinping leadership are very heavy.

### --2ac – wont pass – econ

#### Backlash on economic reform now

**Lelyveld, 2016**

(Michael, 5-16, www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy\_watch/chinas-xi-faces-pushback-on-economic-policy-05312016104928.html, "China's Xi Faces Pushback on Economic Policy")//cb

As China's economy struggles, officials are turning increasingly to anonymous statements on policy differences in a sign that political tensions are rising while economic growth falls. On May 9, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) leading paper People's Daily carried a lengthy front-page interview with an unnamed "authoritative person," outlining the government's policies on debt risks, economic pressures, restructuring and reforms. In one of the most widely quoted excerpts, the anonymous official warned that rising debt levels "can trigger a systemic financial crisis, cause negative economic growth and even eat up people's savings—and that's fatal." "Big stimulus will only result in bubbles, which is a must-learn lesson," said the authoritative person in a translation by Bloomberg News. As Bloomberg noted, this was the third economic commentary by the unidentified authority during President Xi Jinping's time in office with previous policy pronouncements in January and last May. But the latest interview on economic policies may be more than one in an occasional series, since it follows an extraordinary open letter from unnamed "loyal party members" in March, calling for Xi's resignation and citing "consideration for your personal safety and that of your family." The letter posted on the Canyu (Participation) and Wujie (Watching News) websites at the start of China's annual legislative sessions blasted Xi for his "excessive concentration of power" and criticized his economic program. Xi's direct involvement in policy development had led to stock market instability and losses for "hundreds of thousands of ordinary people," the critics charged. "Supply-side reforms" and production capacity cuts had forced layoffs at state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while his "belt and road" trade plans had reduced foreign exchange reserves and brought the economy "to the verge of collapse," they said. Exposing cracks Whether justified or not, the anonymous broadsides have exposed cracks in the government's facade of unanimity on economic policies as it battles to keep growth from further declines. While the secret CPC members blame Xi for weakening gross domestic product growth, which slipped to 6.7 percent in the first quarter, the "authoritative person" appears to be blaming Xi's underlings for issuing rosy assessments and running up debts after first-quarter bank lending jumped 25 percent. China's economic performance "cannot be described ... (as) a 'good start'," the authority argued, citing a term used repeatedly by officials and the state-controlled press. The country's recovery will be L-shaped, or slow, "not U- shaped and absolutely not V-shaped," the person said, adding that "it is neither possible nor necessary to force economic growth by levering up." Analysts have been divided on whether the remarks reflect the collective views of top party and government officials or those of a single leader like Xi or Premier Li Keqiang. "Yes, the 'authoritative person' was Li," wrote South China Morning Post commentator Shirley Yam, noting the pointed denial that the first-quarter GDP was a "good start" to growth for the year. Yam called it "a resounding slap in the face" for Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli who used the words in March to describe his expectations for the first quarter. But the words were repeated in April by a spokesman for the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the top economic planning agency, and used again in the official first-quarter press release from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). On April 29, a statement by the Politburo of the party's Central Committee also described "a good start to the year" following a meeting chaired by Xi, according to the official Xinhua news agency. An anonymous persona? It seems possible that Xi may have spoken through an anonymous persona to push back against official optimism after the loan surge failed to produce quick results. But there is also uncertainty about who the "authoritative person" really is and what it means for political conflict over policy. Some analysts shied away from attributing the critique to any single figure. "It should be understood as a consensus view reached at the senior level, rather than an individual point of view," said Han Meng, a senior researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Economics, quoted by Bloomberg News. The mask of anonymity may keep Xi's detractors guessing about how much internal support he has for an economic policy that may be slow to produce positive results. "Putting it in the paper as from an authoritative spokesman is an attempt to show that it isn't just Xi speaking. It's the collective leadership of the party, giving you the lowdown on what's what," said David Bachman, a professor of international studies at University of Washington in Seattle. After the reference to "personal safety" by the "loyal party members," Xi may see the ambiguity of anonymity as preferable on several counts for some of his stronger statements. "The slowing of the economy is creating real tension," said Bachman in an interview. "No one has a good answer for what to do about it." "Xi has tried so hard to centralize decision making under his auspices that he has become the obvious person to blame for whatever problems there might be, even though he's trying to deflect some of that back onto Li Keqiang and some of the others," he said. Last week, The Wall Street Journal may have added to the anonymous sniping over the economy with a report claiming that the People's Bank of China (PBOC) has secretly abandoned a policy reform announced last August for setting daily exchange rates based on market forces. The report, based on minutes of PBOC meetings with unnamed economists and bankers, said the daily exchange rate "is now back under tight government control." On Friday, the PBOC posted a statement on its Weibo social media account, denying the report as "fabricated" and misleading. A spokeswoman for The Wall Street Journal said the paper stood behind the story, Reuters reported. Shifting into a higher gear The anonymous back-and-forth may only be getting started as the government prepares to shift its overcapacity-cutting policy into a higher gear. If the government follows through on Xi's plans to restrict lending to deeply-indebted SOEs and "zombie companies," job losses and loan defaults are likely to rise far above current levels. So far, officials have downplayed the employment impacts and have only repeated forecasts of 1.8 million job cuts in the coal and steel industries, although many other sectors are suffering with similar overcapacity. On May 18, a meeting of the cabinet-level State Council chaired by Premier Li decided that 345 state-owned "zombie companies ... will be reorganized or left to the market within three years," Xinhua said. The government has tried to minimize reactions to plans for factory shutdowns by talking in terms of "supply-side reforms." But resistance from SOEs, local officials and the unnamed party members is likely to rise as the reforms unfold, particularly if economic growth continues to fall. Xi appears to be bracing for more internal conflict. One week after the anonymous interview, Xi called for "unswerving efforts" from "local authorities and various departments" to advance supply-side reforms, according to Xinhua. On May 3, People's Daily also reprinted a speech that Xi gave in January at a plenary session of the corruption- fighting Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), warning against internal dissent. Xi said that "some officials have been forming cabals and cliques to covertly defy the CPC Central Committee's decisions and policies." They "risk compromising the political security of the Party and the country," he said.

### --1ar – wont pass – econ

#### Economic Reforms being reversed now

Hornby, 6-14-16 - (Lucy, journalist centered in Beijng, "China rows back on state-sector reforms," Financial Times, 6-14-2016, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/92e52600-31f7-11e6-ad39-3fee5ffe5b5b.html#axzz4CWLN0vLy,//BR/>)

China’s Communist party is moving to tighten its grip on state-owned enterprises, reversing nearly two decades of attempts to remodel them along the lines of western corporations. The new push, outlined in recent state media articles and party documents, comes amid a tightening of controls over civil society, the military and media as President Xi Jinping seeks to consolidate power within the party. By giving greater power to the party cells within every SOE, the new direction undermines efforts to establish boards of directors to push SOEs to make decisions based on market conditions, profitability and hard budget constraints. It flies in the face of policies aired as recently as September to make SOEs more efficient and market-oriented. On Tuesday the International Monetary Fund recommended China create a task force that would help restructure debt-laden SOEs, in line with a government drive this spring to recognise and address industrial overcapacity. “All the major decisions of the company must be studied and suggested by the party committees,” according to an article by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission in the influential party magazine Qiushi, or Seeking Truth. “Major operational management arrangements involving macro-control, national strategy and national security must be studied and discussed by the party committees before any decision by the board of directors or company management.” “It’s effectively returning to the pre-reform times,” says Hu Xingdou, economics professor at Beijing Institute of Technology, arguing that the move violates Chinese corporate law. “It’s the institutionalisation of non-institutional politics,” another Chinese political observer added. China’s state sector dates from the early-1950s, when private businesses as well as any infrastructure that survived the previous decades of war were nationalised by the Communist party under Soviet tutelage. In the 1980s and 1990s local factories, steel mills, oil refineries and power plants were spun off from powerful ministries while most consumer-oriented state groups were privatised or went bankrupt. After reforms in the late-1990s to purge the most inefficient and debt-laden state groups, the companies that remained in “pillar industries” were reassembled into national champions. Those businesses tried to look and act like large multinational competitors, adopting corporate logos, shiny new headquarters in Beijing and listing on international and domestic stock exchanges. IMF warns on China debt David Lipton, first deputy managing director of the IMF, left, speaks with Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as they attend the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in Washington, D.C., U.S., on Saturday, April 16, 2016. Group of 20 economies threatened yesterday to penalize tax havens that don't share information on their banking clients, after the leak of the Panama Papers provoked a global uproar over tax evasion. The International Monetary Fund has issued its sternest warning to date on the risk from China’s rising debt burden, urged more aggressive action to curb credit growth and subject state-owned enterprises to the discipline of the market. Mr Xi’s more than three-year anti-corruption drive has decimated the management of those national SOEs, especially oil company PetroChina. Zhou Yongkang, the now-disgraced oil and security tsar who backed Mr Xi’s political rival Bo Xilai, had built a patronage network within the state oil and resources firms that drew on their financial and international clout. Almost all executives at SOEs are party members. Within the Chinese system, their corporate status gives them a rank equivalent to the government officials who regulate them. The heads of the largest SOEs also enjoy senior party ranking. China’s SOE sector officially makes money — but a 2012 study by the Unirule Institute of Economics estimated that the most powerful national, provincial and local SOEs lost money from 2001 to 2009, when their reported profits were offset by subsidies received. More recently, the SOEs binged on debt during a Beijing-backed stimulus programme in the wake of the global financial crisis.

#### Xi’s reforms failing now – lack of leadership on economic reforms makes it impossible to implement effective policies

Trey McArver 16 - Senior Analyst fir Trusted Sources, (“Xi Jinping’s failed economic policy,” 6 May 2016, http://www.trustedsources.co.uk/china/macro-policy/xi-jinping-s-failed-economic-policy) hk

The real problem is leadership

We agree with Xi that wayward officials and vested interests inhibit the ability of the centre to successfully implement its policies. As we have argued elsewhere (see our 22 January 2016 note China’s Failing Fight Against Overcapacity), this dynamic is the main reason why we expect the current drive to reduce overcapacity to be unsuccessful.

But a far more serious problem, in our opinion, is the lack of effective economic leadership from Xi. The Chinese leader has centralized economic policymaking in his person but has failed so far to provide a coherent vision of what should be done. This may be a bandwidth issue. Xi has concentrated his efforts as General Secretary on three main tasks: Party-building, military reform, and foreign policy. On the economic front, he has been largely aloof.

Among the growing number of officials, businessmen and economists who are frustrated with the current state of affairs, hopes have emerged that Xi will now make the economy his top priority. Indeed, there are signs that this may be the case. Our sources in Beijing report that Xi and Premier Li Keqiang have greatly reduced their travel schedules to focus more on the domestic economy. The fact that the recent Politburo meeting focused primarily on the economy looks to be further proof that economic management is now top of the leadership’s agenda.

But those looking for a bold, coherent vision for how to spur sustainable growth will have been sorely disappointed by last week’s meeting. Official statements reiterated the same vague and confused policies that have been a hallmark of the Xi administration. Chief among those are Xi’s five “new development concepts”: innovation, coordination, green, open and sharing. Xi has said that, if followed, they hold the key to China’s economic recovery. He has not, however, given any guidance as to what these concepts means in practice.

Less vague are the much-touted “supply side” reforms, whose implementation Xi encouraged again at the meeting. But the five main components of supply-side reforms – reducing excess capacity, reducing the housing overstock, de-leveraging, cutting business costs and shoring up weak spots – are at times conflicting and fail to address many of the key issues hindering sustainable growth. On the whole, they do not represent new thinking, but rather perpetuate already existing, and in many cases flawed, policies, as we explained in our 14 January 2016 note China Monitor: Supply-side reforms with Chinese characteristics will not fix the economy.

### wont pass – fragmentation

#### Political stagnation has developed as a result of CCP factions’ ideological disputes

Lam 15, Adjunct Professor in the Centre for China Studies and the Department of History of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, (Willy Wo-Lap, 2015, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping, available via Google Books)//kap

Whether or not to reform thus revolves around the question of money: whether members of the privileged classes arc willing to give up fortunes worth billions upon billions of renminbi. Reform has become well-nigh impossible because any change of the political or economic status quo will threaten the finances of the big clans. This state of impasse was expertly analyzed by then-Guangdong Party secretary Wang Yang in 2012. “Thirty years ago. reform consisted of shaking oil' ideological shackles.” Wang said. “Now. the major task of reform is breaking up the constraints of vested interests.”\*4 Because of the rigidity of China’s one-party authoritarian rule—as well as the political elite’s determination to uphold the status quo—expectations of significant changes to the system have fallen to new lows among the intelligentsia as well as ordinary citizens. Great Expectations of Xi’s Leadership Despite President Xi’s lack of reformist credentials, expectations were high in the run-up to the Eighteenth Party Congress that the son of revered Party elder Xi Zhongxun (1913—2002) might be willing and able to go further than Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao in economic and political reform. For Wu Jinglian. the grand old man of market-style liberalization, the message of the Eighteenth Party Congress was that “we must have greater political courage and wisdom.” “We face major economic and political difficulties.” he said not long al ter the watershed conclave. “We have to rely on market-oriented economic reform and political reform based on the rule of law and democracy to solve these problems.”\*3

### wont pass – power opposition

#### Leadership consolidation in the Chinese government faces challenges through regime-change based opposition – means reforms are unlikely to gain traction

Lam 15, Adjunct Professor in the Centre for China Studies and the Department of History of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, (Willy Wo-Lap, 2015, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping, available via Google Books)//kap

The Eighteenth Party Congress demonstrated stunning setbacks for political reform, even the much less ambitious goal of “intra-Party democracy”—or boosting the democratic rights of the 85 million CCP members. In his Political Report to the Eighteenth Party Congress (hereafter Report). Hu repeated many points made in his Political Report to the Seventeenth Party Congress live years earlier. Emphasis was laid on reforming the Party’s personnel system, particularly fairer and more transparent ways for picking leaders by the rank and file. For example. Hu said that the authorities must substantiate Party members’ “right to know, right to take part |in Party deliberations!, electoral rights, and supervisory rights." Regarding the selection of senior cadres. Hu indicated that the Party must “comprehensively and correctly implement democratic, open, competitive and meritorious” goals.22 However, while discussing leadership issues in 20()7. Hu had put emphasis on systems of “democratic centralism and collective leadership" and indicated that the Party must “oppose and prevent dictatorial [practices] by individuals or a minority [of leaders. I" There were no more references to preventing the dictatorial practices of strongman-like figures in the 2012 Report.2\* The failure to push forward with political reform was highlighted by remarks made by ex-premier Wen Jiahao. the only member of the old Politburo who had consistently rooted for liberalization. While discussing Hu’s Report with congress delegates from his native Tianjin. Wen again highlighted the imperative of institutional changes. “We must strengthen and improve the leadership of the party” Wen said. “In particular, we must push forward the reform of the leadership system of the Parly and state.”24 Wen’s comment on the “reform of the leadership system of the Parly and state” seemed as timely as it was hard-hitting. While Wen had made dozens of appeals to speeding up political reform, including upholding Deng Xiaoping’s edicts on the subject, this was the first time that he made an indirect—but obvious—reference to one of the most celebrated articles of the chief architect of reform. In a 1980 piece titled “On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership." Deng cited the following daunting obstacles to political and institutional liberalization: “bureaucracy, overconcentration of power, patriarchal methods, life tenure for leading positions and | special | privileges of various kinds.” Deng had this to say about the Party’s “patriarchal" traditions: “Besides leading to overconcentration of power in the hands of individuals, patriarchal ways within the revolutionary ranks place individuals above the organization, which then becomes a tool [for dictatorial leaders I”25 The Chinese media made much of the fact that there were cha V elections (polls in which candidates outnumber the positions up for grabs) at this congress. Thus when the conclave opened, the delegates were given a name list of 224 candidates from which to pick the 205 members of the Central Committee. Among those eliminated was thcn-commcrcc minister Chen Deming. His unexpected failure to make it to the Central Committee meant that the original script in which Chen would become a Politburo member and vice-premier in charge of foreign trade had to be scrapped.2h The margin of elimination for the Central Committee elections, however, was a mere 9.3 percent, barely one percentage point higher than that at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 2007. Moreover, the speculation that the CCP would for the first time hold cha V elections to pick members of the Politburo turned out to be false.27 In terms of democratic procedures for picking top leaders, the CCP has lagged further behind the Vietnamese Communist Party, which introduced competitive elections to choose its Parly general secretary in 2006.2K The new leadership did not even pass muster in terms of the most basic criterion of rejuvenation. The average age of the seven PBSC members was 63.4. Only two of them—General Secretary Xi and Premier Li. who first made it to the PBSC in 2007—were bom in the 1950s. The age of the five new inductees ranged from sixty-four to sixty-seven. Given the convention that cadres aged sixty-eight arc barred from consideration for the PBSC. all five can only serve one term.29 Equally problematic of the new leadership corps was its lack of representativeness. Despite pledges made by both Hu and Xi about doing more for the disadvantaged sectors, there were no bona fide workers and peasants on the 205-member Central Committee. Forty-one Central Committee members hailed from the PLA and the paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP). This was in keeping with the long-held tradition that 20 percent of Central Committee scats be reserved for the armed forces, who were seen as the pillar of the “dictatorship of the proletariat.”30 Another power bloc that made impressive gains at the Eighteenth Party Congress consisted of representatives of China’s yangqi (centrally held SOE conglomerates; see Chapter 4). Six newly minted full Central Committee members were yangqi bosses, compared to just one five years ago. They were the general manager of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation. Ma Xingrui; general manager of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation. Xu Dazhe; president of the China Aviation Industry Corporation, Lin Zuoming; president of the China North Industries Group Corporation (Norinco). Zhang Guoqing; general manager of Petro China and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). Jiang Jicmin; and president of the Bank of China. Xiao Gang. In addition, the president of China’s sovereign fund China Investment Corporation, Lou Jiwei. was promoted from alternate to full Central Committee member. Most of these SOE bosses were transferred to government posts in 2013 and 2014 (see Chapter 3). Yangqi. particularly those with links to the military, arc traditionally close to the Gang of Princelings. For example, the eldest son of ex-president Jiang Zemin. Zhang Mianheng. has had a long association with the defense and aerospace industries.31 By contrast, there is only one private entrepreneur in the Central Committee: alternate member Zhang Ruimin. who is the leader of the Hai’er Corporation, which makes household appliances. This was the third time since 2002 that Zhang had been named a Central Committee alternate member. Liang Wcn’gcn. chairman of the Sany Group and one of China’s richest men. failed to be elected alternate Central Committee member, despite widespread reports in the official Chinese media that he would be inducted into this inner sanctum of power. The increasing political clout of the yangqi CEOs seems to testify to the fact that the trend, characterized by Chinese economists as “SOEs making advances even as private enterprises retreat.” will continue in the foreseeable future.32 Fighting graft was another area in which Hu Jintao’s efforts seem to have fallen short. Hu echoed warnings sounded by ex-president Jiang in the late 1990s that the Party’s failure to eradicate endemic corruption could “deal a body blow to the Party and even lead to the collapse of the Party and country.” “We must never slacken in fighting graft and in building clean governance.” he warned. ‘The alarm bells must be rung unceasingly." Yet the retiring Party chief failed to introduce measures such as Party regulations requiring all senior cadres to publicize the assets of their close kin—and to disclose whether the latter have foreign residency status. It was also significant that while reading his speech. Hu omitted this clause, which was in the printed version: “Senior cadres must not only discipline themselves stringently but also strengthen the education of and constraints over their relatives and close associates."33 In the run-up to the congress. Bloomberg and the New York Times published detailed reports about the business activities of the relatives of then-vice president Xi and ex-premier Wen. Despite immediate action taken by state censors to block online access to these articles in China, millions of netizens arc believed to have read them. While Hu’s warnings about the exacerbation of graft could be the Party’s answer to growing criticisms about greed in high places, no investigations were believed to have been launched on the well-publicized business activities of the close relations of top oflicials despite the fact that while participating in discussions among provincial and municipal deputies to the Congress, top cadres such as CPPCC chairman-designate Yu Zhengsheng claimed that effective steps had been taken to prevent their relatives from making money improperly.34 In his Report. Hu urged Party cadres and members to work harder at “innovation of the implementation |of policies |. theoretical innovations, and the innovation of institutions.'\* Yet he also repeated this same point that he made five years earlier: “While | the Party 1 will not go down the old mad of ossification, it will also avoid devious paths that will change the flag and standard |of socialist orthodoxy 1" On other occasions. Hu and Xi declared that cadres must do whatever it takes to preserve the status of the CCP as China’s “perennial ruling party." Both the Fourth- and the Fifth-Generation leader pointed out that “the CCP’s ruling status may not necessarily last forever: what we had in the past does not mean we have them now; what we possess now docs not mean we’ll have them forever.”35 Given the predominance of conservatism in the Report—and the Byzantine fashion in which the new corps of leaders was chosen—the chances arc not high that the new leadership under Xi Jinping will push reformist goals and policies in the foreseeable future.

### 2ac – pc not key

#### Xi doesn’t have an agenda, and his “unique power” comes from the CCP itself – factions don’t matter because the overall goal of self-preservation is the same

Dickey, 6-15-16 - (Lauren, PhD candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and the National University of Singapore, where she focuses on relations between China and Taiwan, member of the Pacific Forum Young Leaders program at CSIS, "Xi is The Man, But Just The Man of the Party," War on the Rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/xi-is-the-man-but-just-the-man-of-the-party/,//BR/)

Xi’s the man. Or so the deluge of Xi-centric coverage would lead one to believe. Where many China watchers once examined history to understand strategy, some have become “Xi watchers,” scrutinizing music videos, paraphernalia, and social media accounts on Xi for clues of what he may be thinking. This undertaking, aimed at tracing and explaining Chinese behavior, has led to an obsession with Xi’s personality, endless comparisons between Xi and Mao Zedong (and even Chiang Kai-shek), and a singular emphasis upon Xi’s position at the apex of China’s political system akin to the “great helmsman” or as the “core leader.” But a singular focus on his personality and background misses the forest for the trees by mistakenly ascribing strategic behavior to highly subjective interpretations of Xi’s life story and overlooking the preeminence of the Communist Party’s (CCP) mandate. While Xi’s background makes for compelling prose, a preoccupation with the personalities of Chinese leadership — be it Mao, Xi, or leaders yet to come — risks elevating less meaningful correlations between personages and strategy at the expense of understanding the Party’s agenda. Under Xi, the argument goes, collective leadership has been pushed aside for personalized rule. The political ranks are less reflective of interests across the spectrum and rather increasingly encompass those that support Xi’s strategic vision. To be sure, Xi has competently and confidently filled his role as President and General Secretary of the Communist Party since 2013. The Third Plenum, held in November 2013, effectively set out the agenda and priorities for Xi in its communiqué: economic reforms, political stability, and greater coordination of China’s security strategy as focal points. To these ends, Xi has created new leading small groups to spearhead economic reform efforts and lead the anti-corruption crackdown. A new National Security Commission (中央国家安全委员会) has also emerged, a mechanism that David Lampton interprets as a way to manage the flow of information and decision-making processes from the central government outward. More recently, Xi emerged in military green as he assumed his new title as commander-in-chief, a role that symbolizes his command and control of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) amid ongoing overhauls to expand and transform the Chinese fighting force, linking the realm of politics to the PLA’s military sphere of influence. Where the comparisons to Mao run particularly strong is the shift to personalized rule — leadership, in other words, that has cult-like undertones. But the Chinese political system is explicitly structured to avoid another Mao. The collective leadership model that emerged under Deng Xiaoping intentionally preserves the centrality of CCP norms and prevents the emergence of an all-powerful strongman. Xi’s job as the “core” leader (领导核心) is to ensure reliability and stability within the ranks of Party leadership while spearheading consensus-driven decisions with input from the CCP Secretariat, the Politburo, and its Standing Committee. His selection as the “core” of the current leadership cohort is but another facet of political power, allowing Xi to construct the government bureaucracy in service of the Party’s strategic objectives and less in pursuit of a personal agenda or vision. From other perspectives, Xi’s emergence as the new core or as some sort of “Mao 2.0” is often weighed retrospectively, detailing his childhood as the son of Xi Zhongxun — one of the first generation of Chinese leaders, who was imprisoned and purged several times. Equally pervasive are references to Xi’s formative experiences in Shaanxi during the Cultural Revolution or even the start of his career in the lower ranks of the Party, rising through the ranks in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai while navigating both marriage and divorce. Some accounts laud his time in Fujian as fostering a receptivity to the cross-Strait issue or a particular attentiveness to taishang, Taiwanese businessmen operating in mainland China; still others point to the seven months he spent in Shanghai as a window of opportunity Xi seized to push aside then-rising star (and now Premier) Li Keqiang. Xi’s back story may explain much about his personal psychology, but it would be a mistake to attribute his grasp on political power as President and CCP General Secretary to his personage alone. Nor is Xi’s centralization of power through new bureaucratic apparatuses and recognition as a “core” leader simply an attempt to reform the governance system and economy. While Xi is stronger than his predecessors, he is no Mao, and there is very little about Xi that is Maoist. If he was Maoist, Xi would be actively evading the CCP’s dictums rather than endeavoring to save and preserve the Party as his existing and planned reform packages suggest. Maoism would further require a return to class struggle, a guiding point of Stalinism that Mao cited in crafting violence to induce social change. And while Maoism still exists, it has yet to take root in Xi’s approach to statecraft. Rather, what can be seen in Xi’s life story and references to Mao is an homage to the founding father of the People’s Republic of China. Without Mao, there would be neither a CCP nor Xi Jinping. So that leaves us with the question of where Xi’s political power comes from in the “post-strongman era.” The answer is the CCP. His power — to change the political system, oversee huge reform plans and an increasingly assertive politico-military strategy — comes from the Party and the political mandate set for the Xi era, beginning with the 18th Party Congress in 2012 and trickling down ever since. To a certain extent, the work report of the 18th Party Congress was the legacy of Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao. It is a document that reflects the highest level of consensus within the Chinese political system and sets the agenda for the five-year period until the next Congress. Xi assumed the presidency at a time when China was starting to feel the ripple effects of a slowing economy, with inequality growing and manufacturing declining. The work report thus offered a guideline for what Xi’s priorities needed to be and what his boss — the CCP — expected of him. While the political mandate handed down from the CCP to Chinese leaders has changed over the years, as has the ability of different administrations to operationalize the Party’s mandate, what has not changed is the underlying goal such a mandate serves: preserving the legitimacy and legacy of the one-Party Chinese state. As seen in the text of the 18th Party Congress work report, the mandate for the Xi era is to “build a moderately prosperous society and achieve the renewal of the Chinese nation.” His task as President and General Secretary is actually, on the surface, no simpler than to ensure a single-mindedness permeates all levels of Party cadre. It is a task that demands of Xi unwavering loyalty to the Party. Xi wields power to establish new arms of the Chinese political apparatus out of the blue, only made possible through the Party’s mandate. Without the Party, it is difficult to conceive of Xi bestowing new titles and affiliations upon himself or others or tightening the screws on those officials ensnared in corruption. It is the same political mandate that shapes his strategic outlook and his ability to turn concepts and resources into actual, measurable progress on issues at the core of contemporary Chinese strategy. Taking the party mandate as the lens through which to examine continuity and change in China entirely reorients an understanding of China’s trajectory on numerous issues. It is the CCP — not Xi — that should be held accountable and responsible for the changes seen in Chinese defense and foreign policy. Taking this approach, Chinese strategy thus becomes less about what Xi’s personal vision for Chinese strategy is and instead evolves into a more nuanced appreciation for strategy as rooted in terms of the Party’s own priorities. For instance, under the mandate Xi has been handed, Taiwan is less a policy problem with an indefinite timeline and more an important piece of renewing the Chinese nation through reunification. Other issues at the forefront of this summer’s policymaking agenda, such as last week’s U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue and tensions in the South China Sea over China’s island reclamation efforts are no different. Each serves a purpose in support of the Party’s mandate and, by corollary, for Xi’s efforts as “core” leader and president. Efforts by senior U.S. government officials to understand how Xi may see the world in comparison to his peers or predecessors are worthwhile, but only to a point. Instead, focus can and should remain upon how Xi’s actions are made in service to the CCP’s political mandate. Absent an overhaul to the highest echelons of political power at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, it is likely that Xi’s hawkish strategy and accompanying behaviors will continue, for both are ultimately in service of the Party’s agenda of building a prosperous society and achieving national renewal. In other words, without Xi, the structure of opportunities and incentives would be similarly shaped by the Party’s priorities and driven by a wide range of domestic reforms and assertive foreign and defense policy. There is hardly anything unique about Xi’s background that makes him a stronger, more capable leader than his predecessors. What is different — and what policymakers and academics alike must not lose sight of — is Xi’s wholehearted devotion to the Party’s mission. For it is through such a commitment that strategy is formulated, policy implemented, and decisions made that may well

### 1ar – xt: pc not key

#### PC not key – intimidation and nationalism allow authoritarian presidential power

Jian, 5/13/16 [writer for Bangkok Post and author of The Dark Road, “Xi strives to secure Mao-style authority”, <http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/971225/xi-strives-to-secure-mao-style-authority>, Bangkok Post, 5/13/16]//Yak

Yet instead of recoiling from the ideology and organisation that tore apart his family and his country, Mr Xi has adopted the key tenets and tools of the Cultural Revolution as his own. Mr Xi seems to have retained within him the belligerence of Cultural Revolution-era youth. Power is his lodestar, and he appears to be willing to go to any length to secure it. In this effort, he has one key advantage: Mao's legacy.

For decades, Mao promoted a form of class struggle in which citizens informed on one another, even their closest friends, neighbours, and family members. With no safe haven, everyone became a servant of the Communist Party. In this environment of fear, the state quietly and efficiently subsumed personal identity.

The savagery required to assert absolute power over the population is one lesson of the Cultural Revolution to which Mr Xi seems indifferent. He is concerned only about the "absolute power" part. And in his effort to obtain it, the survivors of the Cultural Revolution -- people who know what it means to be intimidated into choosing politics over the personal -- have become Mr Xi's most reliable political capital.

Mr Xi knows that he can succeed only by reinforcing the Party's authority, and his position as its leader. So he has presented the narrative that there is a threat to China from within -- a threat posed by treacherous and corrupt leaders -- and has declared Party loyalty to be of paramount importance. There are only two types of people: Those who support the Party and those who do not. Like Mao in 1966, Mr Xi believes power hinges on making all Chinese -- government officials and ordinary citizens alike -- loyal and obedient through any means. Power is founded on the repression of opponents, such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo and the tens of thousands of other jailed authors and scholars.

But Mr Xi is not counting on fear alone to cement his rule. He is also attempting to win popular support with a new unifying ideology, based on the so-called China Dream, a set of socialist values and goals that are supposed to bring about the "great renewal of the Chinese nation". This has been accompanied by a galvanising form of nationalism that portrays the world, particularly the US, as seeking to keep China from assuming its rightful place atop the international order. And he has nurtured a personality cult of a kind not seen since Mao.

#### Xi doesn’t have to use political capital to persuade NPC members – the CCP controls the legislature

Lawrence and Martin, 13 – specialists in Asian Affairs [Susan and Michael, “Understanding China’s Political System”, Congressional Research Service, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41007.pdf]//Yak

The Legislature: Strong on Paper, Weak in Practice

China’s 1982 state constitution, adopted six years after the death of Mao Zedong, describes the country’s unicameral legislature, the National People’s Congress, as “the highest organ of state power.” The constitution gives the NPC the power to amend the constitution; supervise its enforcement; enact and amend laws; ratify and abrogate treaties; approve the state budget and plans for national economic and social development; elect and impeach top officials of the state and judiciary; and supervise the work of the State Council, the State Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. In reality, however, the NPC exercises many of those powers in name only.

One major reason for the NPC’s weakness is the Communist Party’s insistence that it serve as little more than a rubber stamp for Party decisions. While the constitution gives the NPC the right to “elect” such top state officials as the President, Vice President, and Chairman of the State Central Military Commission, for example, in practice, the Party decides who will fill those positions. The NPC’s role is simply to ratify the Party’s decisions.

Some analysts see a related reason for the NPC’s weakness in the dual identity of most of its deputies and the way they are “elected.” The Party nominates all candidates for positions as deputies, usually nominating 20% to 50% more candidates than available positions. Provincial- level People’s Congresses and the People’s Liberation Army elect deputies from among the nominees. Campaigning is forbidden.18 Because China rejects the principle of the separation of powers, the heads of all the constitutional branches of government over which the NPC is meant to exercise oversight are themselves NPC deputies, including the President and the Premier of the State Council. In all, according to calculations by a leading Chinese media organization, 85% of the current NPC’s nearly 3,000 deputies hold concurrent posts as Communist Party or state officials or civil servants.19 Holders of state, judicial, and procuratorial positions are barred, however, from serving on the NPC Standing Committee, the elite body that carries out the work of the NPC when the full NPC is out of session, as it is for all but approximately 10 days a year. As a guarantee of Party control of the legislature, a member of the Party’s seven-man Politburo Standing Committee serves concurrently as chairman of the NPC Standing Committee.

### 2ac – no pc

#### No capital to institute reforms

Dr. Wang 12

(Xiang Wang, Iowa State University Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Life Science (Horticulture)Penn State University Master’s Degree, Applied Statistics, “Xi Jinping and Political Reform of China,” pg online @ http://psuglobalforum.blogspot.com/2012/11/xi-jinping-and-political-reform-of-china.html //um-ef)

Finally, conflicts between the different groups in the CPC are the largest threat to Xi Jinping’s political reforms. In the CPC, there are two almost equally powerful coalitions. The first group is the populist clique composed of the “Tuanpai” (the Youth League Faction) and “the Red Team”. Its leadership includes current President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. The elitist clique contains the “princeling,” “sea turtles,” “Shanghai clique” or “Jiangpai” (a faction with its power base in Shanghai and built by Jiang Zemin, the former President of China), and the “Blue Team”.4 These two coalitions control most of China’s power and resources. Recently, the leadership struggles and conflicts between these two coalitions have become increasingly bitter, illustrated vividly by case of Bo Xilai,5 as they fight for the leadership of the CPC and control over China’s resources. Chen Liangyu, Party Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee from 2002 to 2006, was sacked purportedly for his involvement in a social security fund scandal.6 The reality is that Chen Liangyu was forced to step down due to the conflicts between the “Tuanpai” and “Jiangpai”. Chen Liangyu was targeted and removed because he was a member of the clique led by Jiang Zemin. Compared to these two powerful coalitions, the strength of Xi Jinping’s group is much weaker and it will take several years for him to cultivate his own clique in order to challenge the two existing coalitions. In this grim situation, Xi Jinping does not have sufficient political power and capital to institute political reforms.

### 1ar – no pc – econ

#### Economic downturn undermines Xi’s authority

Blackwill and Campbell, 16 – (Robert D., senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Kurt M., Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, CEO of the Asia Group LLC., “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage: Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader”Council Special report No. 74, Feb 2016, Council of Foreign Relations,//BR/)

Xi is exposed precisely because he sits at the center of all decisionmaking and is visible to the public. He must address countless domestic challenges for which he is now explicitly accountable, and a major misstep on any of them could be costly to his political popularity and position. Without question, the largest problem looming over Xi’s tenure is China’s economic slowdown and its related manifestations, including unemployment and stock market volatility. As noted, China’s economy, which had expanded at an annual rate of 10 percent for three decades, is entering a new era of slow growth that has forced the government to reduce its growth target to a record-low 6.5 percent. Xi’s challenge is to smoothly reorient the economy toward consumption and away from exports and investment even as growth continues to fall. China’s economic woes began years before Xi entered the presidency and flow from the country’s inability to find a sustainable alternative to the growth model upon which it has long relied. That model, which catapulted the country into the ranks of great powers, was based on a simple premise: weak-productivity agricultural laborers would move into low-wage but high-productivity manufacturing jobs, producing goods for foreign markets. Nearly every component of that model has been subject to mounting strain. China has fewer agricultural workers that it can shift into industry. Its workforce peaked in 2013 and is now shrinking in size.18 Its wages often exceed those of regional competitors even as productivity growth slows.19 Finally, China’s export markets can no longer soak up its surplus production. After the 2008 global financial crisis, China began to cope with these vulnerabilities using a mixture of cheap lending and massive infrastructure investment. For a time, this investment-heavy approach was able to return China to high growth, but it was not sustainable. Investment now accounts for roughly half of Chinese growth, an unprecedentedly high amount, and it is subject to diminishing returns, with one dollar of investment producing 40 percent less GDP growth today than it did a decade ago.20 Meanwhile, the loans that underwrite these unproductive investments—such as China’s famed ghost cities, which are filled with buildings but lacking in tenants or businesses—threaten the country’s banking system and have pushed debt to 280 percent of GDP, according to a recent estimate from McKinsey & Company.21 A significant portion of these loans, and by some accounts a majority, have been disbursed to inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) rather than to productive private-sector companies, which in any case face higher interest rates than state companies. If these loans to SOEs are not paid back, they will threaten the banking system and the overall economy.22 Growth having slowed every year since 2010, the party is under pressure to continue rebalancing the economy away from exports and investment and toward consumption, and to do so without systemic disruption. The sudden decline in the Chinese stock market in the summer of 2015 and again in January 2016 raised worries in China and around the world that the party, under Xi, will fail to make this structurally difficult transition. These concerns are compounded by widespread distrust of official statistics and the belief of some economists that a hard landing may already be under way. At the peak of the crisis, the market decline wiped out trillions of dollars in wealth and temporarily reversed many of the gains of the preceding year. This was a considerable setback, but it is important not to overstate its significance for the finances of most Chinese citizens and the state of the economy. Less than a fifth of household wealth is in stocks, and much more of it is invested in a property market that has remained stable throughout the stock market’s recent swings. Moreover, the stock market has a tradeable value less than a third of China’s economy, compared with more than 100 percent in developed countries.23 The real risk to China’s economy, and to Xi’s fortunes, comes not from the stock market’s raw economic impact but from the damage done to the government’s credibility. Xi’s strongman image suffered in the wake of the market collapse. His government had vocally encouraged average Chinese citizens to enter the country’s stock market under the premise that good returns would incentivize higher spending, and was embarrassed when those investors were singed by the crash.24 The government then publicly staked its credibility on a commitment to arrest the stock market decline, but its ill-conceived market manipulations and hasty currency devaluations were of limited effectiveness. Eventually, China was able to reverse the declines, but similar or repeated episodes will undermine the party’s legitimacy. Aside from the perceptual costs posed by such economic downturns, Xi faces the considerable risk that a prolonged slowdown will directly affect the welfare of the average Chinese citizen. The possibility of a hard landing looms, and an economic wreck or a serious financial crisis could produce years of prolonged stagnation and slow growth that could shake the party to its core. Even absent such a disaster, if growth continues to slow, it will worsen a number of internal trends. The labor market already struggles to absorb the eight million college graduates China’s universities produce each year. Blue-collar wages that had risen for a decade have been stagnant for well over a year as layoffs continue in coastal factories, with labor disputes doubling in 2014 and again in 2015.25 Chinese companies also face challenges, as corporate debt grows to 160 percent of China’s GDP, up from 98 percent in 2008 and more than twice the current U.S. level of 70 percent. The fragile recovery in the country’s property market could face a reversal that would undercut what is the biggest store of household wealth for Chinese families. These problems could intertwine with the psychic impact of another stock market swing or economic crisis, which could further erode consumer confidence and jeopardize China’s economic reorientation.26 Business and investor trust have similarly been hit, largely because the government’s panicked attempts to control the market signaled the hesitancy of its commitment to reform. If the government’s reputation is diminished and economic growth remains stagnant, then the leadership will grow increasingly worried about social unrest. Past economic crises contributed to outbreaks of mass protests, including those in 1986 and 1989 that brought down two Chinese leaders, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and led to the violence in Tiananmen Square. Although the party weathered the stock market slumps reasonably well, there is no guarantee it will be so fortunate in a future crisis. The reputational challenges and economic obstacles Xi faces will not abate in the next few years. Removing them will require implementing a number of costly reforms to inefficient SOEs, providing affordable capital to the private sector, allowing workers greater geographic mobility, reducing inefficient forms of infrastructure investment, and building the commercial rule of law. These inherently disruptive moves would break China’s old growth model but could risk increased social instability, leaving Xi struggling to choose between high-quality growth tomorrow and societal order today. If Xi largely abandons reforms and doubles down on the current model, he will only delay the day of reckoning; if he pursues reforms, it could take years before he sees results. Regardless of which course he chooses, or if he tries to square the circle, China’s economy will likely slow for the next few years and the reputational risks to Xi will continue to rise as domestic frustrations mount. Some analysts are skeptical that the situation is quite so serious. In their more sanguine view, economies naturally slow as they get bigger and China’s economy is already twice as large as it was seven years ago. Mathematically, this means that even if growth slows to half its previous pace, it will still generate income gains that are just as large in absolute terms. This fact, however, by no means guarantees political stability.

#### Reforms won’t be implemented – economic slowdowns undermine Xi’s agenda

Magnier and Page, 15 – Mark Magnier is based in the Wall Street Journal’s Beijing bureau where he covers China’s economy and its broader implications for the world and the Middle Kingdom’s growing global ambitions. Jeremy is a reporter in the Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau, covering domestic politics, international relations and security. [7/9/15, The Wall Street Journal, “China’s President Faces Rare Backlash”, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-president-faces-rare-backlash-1436467976]//Yak

BEIJING—President Xi Jinping got the credit as China’s stock markets revved up. Now their unraveling is inviting rare finger-pointing at his forceful rule and putting his far-reaching economic goals at risk.

Vibrant stock markets are at the center of Mr. Xi’s plans for an economic makeover, intended to help companies offload huge debts, reinvigorate state enterprises and entice more foreign investment. Some economists called reviving the moribund markets among his most consequential reforms in the more than two years since coming to power. Investors talked of “the Uncle Xi bull market.”

But with the markets having lost around a third of their value in the past month, and the government appearing to panic in its response to the drop, some people are starting to voice doubts about Mr. Xi’s autocratic leadership style.

Sun Liping, a sociologist at Tsinghua University, took to his social-media account to say the stock-market crash has exposed crucial flaws in Mr. Xi’s highly centralized approach to government, including a lack of financial expertise and a pervasive instinct among subordinates to obey superiors.

“Power has limits,” he wrote.

Mr. Xi, who arrived in Russia on Wednesday for a summit, hasn’t commented publicly on the market moves or the criticism.

The criticism amounts to a rare backlash for a leader with an eye for publicity and who so commandingly put his stamp on the Communist Party, the military, economic policy and other areas. At the same time, Mr. Xi is facing resistance from officials and the business community upset with the slowing economy and how he has tried to concentrate power in his hands, among other policies.

Although Mr. Xi faces no immediate challenge to his authority, there is a risk that the stock market crisis could trigger social unrest and hamper his efforts to promote key allies at the next big leadership reshuffle in 2017. His government has placed a priority on quashing dissent and unrest, and recently passed a law that broadly defines national security threats to preserve the party’s leadership.

The sudden doubt in China’s leadership threatens to undermine Mr. Xi’s broad-ranging agenda to keep raising standards of living and transition to consumer economy.

“The market selloff is definitely the largest challenge that the new administration has faced,” said Victor Shih, a China expert at the University of California, San Diego. Chief among the weaknesses exposed, Mr. Shih said, was the ineffectiveness of Mr. Xi’s pledge to limit bureaucratic interference and give markets greater scope.

“He’s trumpeted reform for the past couple of years but a lot of so-called reforms have gone out the window with this dramatic…government intervention in recent days,” Mr. Shih said.

The government’s scattershot efforts, which have included cutting interest rates and ordering state-run companies and brokerages to buy and hold stocks, appeared to make headway Thursday after floundering for weeks. The benchmark Shanghai Composite Index rose 5.8%, the biggest daily gain in six years, while other indexes saw smaller rises. On Thursday, Chinese police visited the nation’s stock regulator and vowed to investigate any market manipulation.

Just how damaging the stock meltdown ends up being for Mr. Xi will depend on how quickly the market recovers and whether Beijing summons the unity to marshal its significant resources. The administration still has some $4 trillion in foreign reserves, and its policies to promote innovation and entrepreneurship offers a road map out of the slow-growth morass for many ordinary Chinese, said Cheng Li, a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution and author of a book on Chinese leadership.

“This is a very critical period, a test of public confidence, leadership capacity and how the international community views China,” Mr. Li said. “This week is pretty bad and if it lasts a few more weeks, it will be terrible, but we need to see how it unfolds.”

Mr. Xi took charge in late 2012, presiding over a group of leaders and senior officials applauded by China’s elite for wanting to shake things up. His central-bank governor and finance minister have argued for relying more on market forces and loosening controls on currency and cross-border investments.

A potential casualty of the concerted intervention, some economists said, is Beijing’s goal of getting the yuan named as a global reserve currency when the IMF conducts a review late this year. The effort relies on opening financial markets wider to foreign investors, whose confidence in the wake of the massive stock-market intervention has yet to be gauged.

One of Mr. Xi’s most popular policies, an anticorruption campaign against party officials high and low, has also run into headwinds. Businesses and even other Chinese leaders complain that the purge is paralyzing the bureaucracy, frustrating companies trying to gain approvals for projects. It has also antagonized some senior party figures who feel it is splitting their ranks and distracting the leadership’s attention from the economy.

That is why, some political insiders said, that the trial of Zhou Yongkang, the former security chief and most senior figure caught in the antigraft campaign, was held in secret and given little play in state media at its conclusion.

Also battling from within are influential state industries that dominate large swaths of the economy and which have managed to delay the government from issuing broad guidelines for consolidation. Much of that reform program is premised on selling more shares to the public and converting corporate debt to equity, reforms that economists said are being set back by the efforts to stabilize the markets.

Some economists said driving Beijing’s aggressive prop-up of the markets is fear of contagion and social instability as accounts fueled by debt started to rapidly lose value. Many of those hit hardest in the past few weeks have been individual investors with relatively small accounts—the majority of Chinese investors—some of whom have bought stocks on margin or with proceeds from real estate, another area hard hit by the economic slowdown. A 26-year-old graduate student at Peking University who would give only his surname, Zhou, said he has lost around 50,000 yuan [$8,050] on stocks in the past few weeks, leaving him depressed and scrimping on meals. Mr. Zhou said he blames the steep decline on the government, which did little to temper frenzied buying, and on state media for playing cheerleader.

“The People’s Daily made things worse by saying that the 4,000 level was just the beginning of the bull market,” Mr. Zhou said. “50,000 yuan is a big deal for a student. Some of this was money my parents gave me for my wedding.” On Thursday, the Shanghai market closed at 3709.33.

### 1ar – no pc – ccp backlash

#### Xi can’t push reforms – internal strife

**Phillips, 6/25/**16

(Tom, Beijing correspondent for the Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/26/chinas-feud-over-economic-reform-reveals-depth-of-xi-jinpings-secret-state)//cb

Yet this headline – and the accompanying 6,000-word article attacking debt-fuelled growth – has sparked weeks of speculation over an alleged political feud at the pinnacle of Chinese politics between the president, Xi Jinping, and the prime minister, Li Keqiang, the supposed steward of the Chinese economy. “The recent People’s Daily interview … not only exposes a deep rift between [Xi and Li] … it also shows the power struggle has got so bitter that the president had to resort to the media to push his agenda,” one commentator said in the South China Morning Post. “Clear divisions have emerged within the Chinese leadership,” wrote Nikkei’s Harada Issaku, claiming the two camps were “locking horns” over whether to prioritise economic stability or structural reforms. The 9 May article – penned by an unnamed yet supposedly “authoritative” scribe – warned excessive credit growth could plunge China into financial turmoil, even wiping out the savings of the ordinary citizens. As if to hammer that point home, a second, even longer article followed 24 hours later – this time a speech by Xi Jinping – in which the president laid out his vision for the Chinese economy and what he called supply-side structural reform. “Taken together, the articles signal that Xi has decided to take the driver’s seat to steer China’s economy at a time when there are intense internal debates among officials over its overall direction,” Wang Xiangwei argued in the South China Morning Post. Like many observers, he described the front page interview as a “repudiation” of Li Keqiang-backed efforts to prop up economic growth by turning on the credit taps. China’s economy stabilised in the first quarter of this year as a record 4.6 trillion yuan (£477.3bn) of credit was released, leading some to question Beijing’s commitment to structural reforms. China watchers have been left bamboozled at the mystifying way in which top-level policy making debates have played out in the pages of the party newspaper. Some read the articles as a sign relations between Xi and Li are breaking down and predict the latter could be replaced next year by the president’s current anti-corruption tsar Wang Qishan. As evidence they point to the widespread suspicion that the first People’s Daily article was the work of Liu He, a Harvard-educated economist who went to school with Xi during the 1960s and is now one of his closest advisers. Others believe the articles suggest major policy changes are imminent or are designed to remind provincial officials that a massive new stimulus campaign – similar to that seen during the global financial crisis in 2009 – is off the menu. “The very fact that this gets played out in the People’s Daily leaves us all thinking, ‘What is going on?’” said Fraser Howie, the co-author of Red Capitalism: the fragile financial foundation of China’s extraordinary rise. “Yes, it’s indicative of something – but like so much in China we are not exactly sure what it is indicative of.” Bill Bishop, the publisher of Sinocism, a newsletter about China’s politics and economy, admitted he was also struggling to untangle the “crazy speculation”. “We all have to start exercising our atrophied Pekingology muscles to figure out what is really going on.” Bishop said one plausible scenario was that Li would be sidelined from economic affairs at next year’s 19th Communist party congress and replaced by Wang Qishan in a bid to advance painful but necessary economic reforms. “From the perspective of reform, Wang has got a great reputation and in many ways would be much more effective within the bureaucracy. Certainly people are afraid of him.” During a tour of China’s northeastern rust belt this week, Xi reaffirmed his commitment to reforms. “If we hesitate in making decisions and do things halfway, we will lose this rare opportunity,” he said, according to China’s official news agency. Howie said he saw the battles over economic policy less as a boxing match, in which red and blue teams traded punches, and more as a raging forest fire where police officers and fire fighters were tripping over each other as they tried different techniques to extinguish the flames of a rapidly fading economy. “There is this mismatch of endeavours. They all understand they need to solve the problem. I just don’t think they fully appreciate the coordination that is needed to solve it,” the financial markets expert said. Howie said Li could not have been thrilled about having his policies rubbished so publicly by the president’s team. “Clearly… [Xi] is saying: ‘What’s gone before isn’t working. We can’t continue to do it.’ This is hardly rousing support for Li Keqiang and what has gone before.” But he rejected the idea that a Tony Blair-Gordon Brown-style feud was playing out between China’s two most powerful men. “I don’t believe it is that vitriolic or open or contentious,” he said. Bishop said he also believed there was more consensus over the economy than many outside observers admitted. “The idea that the leadership doesn’t understand how bad the problems are and that foreign experts have a much better idea of what is going on in the Chinese system I think are hogwash. I think they are very clear how bad it is.” Whatever the truth, the saga has underlined how under Xi, a centralising strongman president dubbed the “Chairman of Everything”, China’s already intensely secretive political system has become even more opaque. “The fact that we are even speculating about this is quite remarkable because frankly nobody has any idea,” said Bishop. “And I guarantee you that most people at the top level of Chinese government probably have no idea what is going to happen.”

#### Party backlash to political repression undermines Xi’s agenda

WSJ, 3/28/16 [The Wall Street Journal, The Backlash Against Xi Jinping, 3/28/16, http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-backlash-against-xi-jinping-1459204928]//Yak

Chinese authorities have detained more than a dozen people suspected of involvement in an anonymous letter that calls on China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, to step down. Published online earlier this month and signed by “loyal Communist Party members,” the letter criticizes Mr. Xi for “gathering all power” and silencing other points of view. The incident is one more sign that China’s internal power struggle isn’t over.

It’s impossible to know for sure, but clues suggest the letter is a product of dissatisfaction within the Party. First, the wording differs from most dissident manifestos, which tend to call for democratic reform and the end of censorship. Instead the letter uses the jargon of the Party, blaming Mr. Xi for “unprecedented problems and crises in all political, economic, ideological, and cultural spheres.” It also contains an implicit threat, advising Mr. Xi to resign “out of consideration for your personal safety and that of your family.”

Second, Party stalwarts are beginning to express similar views, albeit in less extreme forms. Jiang Hong, a delegate to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, told Caixin magazine, “The rights to speak freely must be protected.” He and others, such as property tycoon Ren Zhiqiang, who had 37 million social-media followers, have warned that Mr. Xi’s gag on “disloyal” comments within the Party means that policy mistakes will be made. Mr. Jiang’s interview was deleted and Mr. Ren’s social-media accounts have been closed.

Mr. Xi has made plenty of enemies in his three years in power. He used an anticorruption campaign to consolidate his power, though the letter and his Party critics generally laud the campaign. Instead, the nascent revolt of the Party elite hinges on Mr. Xi’s turn away from democratic centralism, the doctrine that decisions should be reached by consensus and after open debate within the leadership.

The debate goes back to Deng Xiaoping’s efforts to reform and open the Party after Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution nearly destroyed it. Deng set down internal Party guidelines to ensure no future leader would monopolize power the way Mao did. These included consensus leadership within the Politburo, the end of personality cults, and the separation of party and government. He also committed China to a moderate foreign policy that respected the international rules of the road.

Mr. Xi has begun to chip away at Deng’s precedents. The state media encourage adulation of the first couple, Uncle Xi and Mama Peng. A recent song is titled “If You Want to Marry, Marry Someone Like Uncle Xi.” Earlier this month, Tibetan delegates to the legislature wore badges with Mr. Xi’s picture, a throwback to the Mao badges that all Chinese were required to wear in the 1960s. Some delegations called Mr. Xi the leadership core, a title last granted to Jiang Zemin after the 1989 Tiananmen protests.

Mr. Xi has also taken unprecedented control over the key “central leading groups” within the Party that set policy. The Party now micromanages state companies, ministries in Beijing as well as provincial governments. As a result, the quality of governance has declined and officials are paralyzed with fear. Mr. Xi has also used China’s growing power to flout international norms abroad and exploit nationalist sentiment at home, causing neighboring countries to strengthen ties with the U.S.

The irony is that Mr. Xi argued for and won undisputed power so that he could push economic reforms after a decade of factional struggles that paralyzed decision making. So far he has accomplished little on the reform front despite some impressive rhetoric. Instead he focuses most of his energy on crushing “improper discussion” within the Party.

That may now be backfiring. The Communist Party’s remarkable resilience after the upheaval of 1989 was a result of economic growth but also a balancing of political repression against the need for greater openness and professionalism in decision making. Mr. Xi has upset this balance, and cadres who fear a slide to one-man rule are taking the risk of speaking out. Mr. Xi may defeat his Party opponents, but the backlash against him means that China faces more political turbulence.

### 2ac – winners win

#### Xi winners win and won’t pass

**Sisci 16** --- Senior Research Associate of China Renmin University, (Francesco Sisci, 1-5-2016, "Latest China stock crash spotlights urgent need for financial reform: Sisci" Asia Times, 6-22-2016, http://atimes.com/2016/01/latest-china-stock-crash-spotlights-urgent-need-for-financial-reform-sisci/)//jonah

If these problems are not addressed in a radical way, any passing market wind will crash the Chinese stock market and take others with it due to the sheer size of China’s economy. Therefore, these reforms are not only necessary, they are an urgent matter for China and the rest of the world. But there is big political question that hangs over the question of reforming China’s financial system: Does Xi have enough political clout to carry out these reforms which threaten to smash the old networks of vested interests that have dominated China’s politics and economy for decades? Two signs point to the fact that Xi has accrued greater political capital. After a lot of arm twisting, Xi eventually managed to get local court tribunals to become more independent of local governments. This will help in effecting legal changes that counter the old power networks. (See China Grants Courts Greater Autonomy on Limited Matters ) Perhaps more significantly, Xi has launched an overhaul of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the traditional kingmaker of Chinese politics (See Xi’s Reforms to Make Military Slimmer and Stronger).However, in the midst of such larger challenges, focusing on economic and financial reforms can be an extremely technical and time-consuming task. Will Xi be able to tackle such issues while he’s absorbed in more pressing matters like the crucial PLA changes? Perhaps not.

### 2ac – at: Nationalism Backlash

#### No nationalist backlash or public dissent, and it won’t cause Chinese aggression anyways.

Weiss 14 (Jessica Chen Weiss, Associate professor of government at Cornell University, *Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China's Foreign Relations*, “Anti-American Protest and U.S.-China Crisis Diplomacy,” \**fc*)

Given the low likelihood of military conflict in both cases, it is important to assess the role of nonmilitary signals of resolve and reassurance. According to many Chinese analysts. China's leaders "no longer regard force as an effective tool for achieving limited political gains in a crisis," taking military action only when alternative measures have failed.2° Crises often tempt states to use nonmilitary means to showcase their resolve. Even in military confrontations, the material balance of power is not necessarily the most important factor. A country's willingness to risk escalation and endure the costs of military, economic, or diplomatic retaliation is just as important. As Swine notes, "Chinese leaders tended to believe that a strong show of resolve was necessary in part to compensate for relative weakness. "-1 The management of nationalist sentiment may play a compensatory role in signaling resolve when one side is otherwise disadvantaged. For example, one Chinese scholar describes the utility of domestic factors in signaling resolve, drawing upon Schelling: Risk and cost are the defining characteristics of a crisis. In fact, crises are a kind of competition in accepting risk. The greater the ability to accept risk, the stronger the display of resolve (juexin). . . . Pointing to domestic factors, such as the political system, the orientation of public opinion, and popular attitudes can increase one's ability to accept risk and show one's determination to prevail in the aisis.22 Yet public sentiment is not always a credible diplomatic card, requiring grassroots mobilization to create the popular pressure that makes the management of nationalist protests a costly signal. Under Mao Zedong, mass demonstrations against the United States were government-organized. Kuang-sheng Liao notes that these were "government-directed protest rather than a spontaneous mass movement. . . few of them can slip out of control and be turned against the central authority."23 From a diplomatic standpoint, such protests should be considered cheap talk, organized for primarily domestic purposes. In reform-era China, popular attempts to mobilize protests against the United States have been sparse relative to protests against Japan.'' In 1993, the United States interdicted the Chinese freighter ship Yinhe (Milky Way) and forced an inspection based on faulty intelligence that its cargo contained chemical weapons bound for Iran. No protest attempts were reported in mainland China, even though Chinese officials invoked popular will in denouncing American actions.2' Not long after, Beijing narrowly lost the competition to host the 2000 Olympics. American actions stoked popular anger and increased Chinese suspicions that the United States sought to "hold China down."26 The U.S. Congress had held hearings and passed a nonbinding resolution opposing Beijing's bid on human rights grounds in the months leading up to the International Olympic Committee's decision.`' Amid rumors that students were planning protests at the U.S. embassy if Beijing lost, Chinese authorities reportedly increased campus security.28 Two years later, student anger was confined to campus posters and assemblies over the U.S. visit of Lee Teng-hui, which precipitated the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Students were also reportedly denied permission to protest against the U.S.-led mission at the outset of the Kosovo war in March 1999.29 In March 2003, students were allowed to hold campus assemblies to condemn the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but Chinese authorities prevented protest marches that would have taken place at locations around Beijing, including the U.S. ambassador's residence." As these anecdotes make clear, the Chinese government in the post-Mao era has stifled anti-American demonstrations more often than it has allowed them. The embassy bombing and protests have been assessed in detail, and both the embassy bombing and EP-3 incident have been analyzed from the perspective of crisis management.31 Yet why protests were allowed in 1999 but prevented in 2001 has not been explicitly examined. Revisiting these crises enables us to trace the logic of protest management to the government's diplomatic and domestic objectives as well as to assess the impact of domestic decisions on foreign perceptions. In both episodes, the domestic management of public opinion appeared to influence foreign perceptions of Chinese resolve and diplomatic intent. By allowing anti-American protests in 1999, the Chinese government communicated its determination to stand up to the United States as well as the domestic demands it faced to take a tougher foreign policy stance. By repressing nationalist protests in 2001, the Chinese government sent a costly signal of its intent to keep U.S.-China relations on an even keel. Despite domestic accusations that the government was being too soft, Chinese leaders signaled that the incident should not impede progress in bilateral relations. The repression of nationalist protests in 2001 demonstrates that Chinese leaders have not always been forced by popular nationalism to take a tougher stance against their will. Tracing the stage management of protests after the embassy bombing also demonstrates the role of risk and credibility. Protests that appeared spontaneous and volatile on the first day of the crisis were more credible than protests that appeared stage-managed thereafter. Orchestration reduced the amount of information sent by prolonged protests and the perceived constraints imposed by public opinion. Nonetheless, the signal of resolve and the government's vulnerability to nationalist opinion persisted, shaping U.S. perceptions during the 2001 crisis.

### 1ar – at: nationalist backlash

#### No nationalist backlash --- other things contain it

**Welch 12** --- Research Intern with the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies (Jennie Welch, 11-16-2012, "China’s Domestic Pressures Shape Assertive Foreign Policy" CSIS Asia, 6-24-2016, http://cogitasia.com/chinas-domestic-pressures-shape-assertive-foreign-policy/)//jonah

Xi will also be under pressure from the millions of Chinese who have demonstrated their foreign policy views through efforts such as the September anti-Japanese protests. The growth of nationalism in China partially stems from the government’s “Patriotic Education” campaign, which focuses on China suffering from and eventually overcoming foreign imperialism. Nationalism is also a product of China’s rising status in the international community. Younger Chinese have grown up in an era where China is seen an increasingly powerful and influential nation, ascending into the foreseeable future while the current leading power – the United States – suffers from political grid-lock, failed foreign policies, and economic woes. As a result, the forces of domestic nationalism tend to push for a more assertive China, one that reflects the confidence and potential of its people. Domestic factors are certainly influencing Chinese foreign policy. However, it is uncertain the degree to which these pressures will dominate. Backlash from neighboring countries and the U.S. may well counterbalance Chinese military and nationalistic opinions. The Chinese “charm offensive” that won over its neighbors in the 1990’s and early 2000’s was mostly successful, until China’s forceful handling of competing territorial claims encouraged Asian states to beseech the United States to renew it focus on the region. The U.S. military and diplomatic rebalance towards Asia will likely restrict Chinese influence and military movements in the region, and is viewed by some Chinese as an attempt to contain China’s rise. This generation of Chinese leaders may therefore feel that it is more prudent to avoid further alienating regional powers and prevent hedging towards the United States.

### --Econ Turns Nationalism

#### Chinese economic decline leads to nationalistic power grabs as the government tries to maintain stability.

Feldman 15 (Noah Feldman, Bloomberg View columnist and professor of constitutional and international law at Harvard University, “As Markets Fall, Nationalism Rises,” Bloomberg View, 26 August 2015, <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-08-26/as-markets-fall-nationalism-rises>, \**fc*)

After the correction comes the nationalism. China's market meltdown portends a potentially dangerous rise in nationalist sentiment likely to be whipped up by leaders both in China and in the U.S. The motives on each side are slightly different: China's leaders need to shore up the legitimacy of Communist Party rule as growth slows, while Republican presidential candidates need to criticize the Democratic administration on foreign policy without mentioning the Middle East. But there’s an underlying symmetry that's highly worrisome. On both sides, nationalism is a proven strategy for generating popular support while changing the subject. On China’s side, the equation is pretty simple. The Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy doesn’t come from communism. It comes from economic growth, which is slowing. Even if the stock market’s losses don’t directly affect most Chinese, the sharp market decline is likely to be felt in the real economy. If you take the “communism” out of “Chinese Communist Party,” you’re left with the “Chinese” part. The Chinese public is deeply proud of its rise, and takes its place in the world very seriously. President Xi Jinping’s slogan of the “Chinese dream” isn’t just a dream of individual welfare, but of collective national self-assertion. Nationalism is the most potent and effective mechanism for creating governmental legitimacy that’s been tried in the modern era. It’s worked almost everywhere on earth -- and it works in China, too. And taking advantage of national sentiment doesn't have to be as blatant as Russian President Vladimir Putin's invading Crimea. China can be more belligerent without being totally reckless. It can provoke conflict with its neighbors over islands in the seas surrounding it, which will stir up public sentiment. Or worse, it can take aim at the U.S., and criticize its emerging strategy of military containment. These strategies are risky, because they can produce backlash. But domestic legitimacy is the sine qua non of a nondemocratic regime. And measured in terms of dollars or yuan, nationalism costs almost nothing.

### 2ac – at: PLA Backlash

#### they can’t backlash against the Party

**Brown 16** --- PhD, King’s College, (Kerry Brown, 2-10-2016, "Foreign Policy Making Under Xi Jinping: The Case of the South China Sea" Journal of Political Risk, 6-22-2016, http://www.jpolrisk.com/foreign-policy-making-under-xi-jinping-the-case-of-the-south-china-sea/)//jonah

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) In this area, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a fundamental actor. But this has to be viewed in the context that properly understands that the PLA is as much a servant of the Party as is the MFA, perhaps even more so, and remains answerable to the Party, just as it was on its foundation in the 1920s as the Red Army.[20] Its fundamental task during the era of Reform and Opening Up since the late 1970s has been to assist the Party and government in creating a strong, prospering, secure China, and one therefore with a powerful economy. Over the last decade, the Chinese Ministry of Defense has issued White Papers outlining its holistic vision for the role of the PLA in China, and the ways it relates to the Party and government. The latest, in 2015, states simply that: “Building a strong national defense and powerful armed forces is a strategic task of China’s modernization drive and a security guarantee for China’s peaceful development.” To this end, the PLA focuses on the following core priorities: Building a strong military Implementing the military strategic guideline of active defense Accelerating the modernization of national defense and armed forces, Resolutely safeguarding China’s sovereignty, security and development interests Providing a strong guarantee for achieving the national strategic goal of the “two centenaries” Realizing the Chinese dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation[21] Specifically on the South China Sea issue, the White Paper states: “On the issues concerning China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China’s reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied. Some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China. It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests.”[22] For all the talk of the PLA being bellicose, sabre rattling and itching to promote its new prowess and gain some combat experience, it is often forgotten just how much it is a creature of the politicians. The PLA has never defied the Party in the way that the USSR Red Army turned against the Communist Party in the 1980s, and then played a role in bringing down its leadership and putting a new government in power in 1991. The recent anti-corruption struggle has lapped at the doors of the PLA, ensuring it is even more disciplined and politically circumscribed. And while there are a few vociferous PLA officials stating that China needs to be pushier and tougher with its neighbours, and that the PLA might be able to articulate an area of policy unilaterally or even take a lead, these claims are highly speculative. There is simply no hard evidence that this is the case nor any real indication it might become so. As proof of this, one only has to look at the case of Rear Admiral Yang Yi, writing in the government owned ‘Global Times’ Chinese newspaper in October 2015, where he warned that China would deliver a ‘head-on blow” to any foreign forces “violating” China’s sovereignty. He went on to state that, “Safeguarding maritime rights calls for force and power.”[23] Despite this, when the U.S. destroyer did sail through the disputed waters, there were no immediate Chinese military response. In the words of Australian journalist John Garnaut, “when the United States tested this thesis … by sailing a guided missile destroyer close to one of those islands, China barely raised a murmur.”[24] It is hard to think that Xi Jinping and his colleagues therefore are structuring the framework of their policy around the South China Sea on considerations about placating the PLA. This is not to claim that the PLA does not figure in their thinking, but it is only one of a number of voices, and has a tightly circumscribed space. Elite Party officials under Xi do not hope that tensions in the South China Sea are ratcheted up in order to satisfy the generals, nor have there been signs at least since 2012 that local military leaders are able to make decisions about action on their own (the most visible case of this possibly happening was that of Hu Jintao appearing to be blind sighted during a visit by a U.S. Secretary of Defence who brought up the testing of a new stealth jet in January 2011). The PLA conceptualizes its work in ways that mean it is hard to imagine it ideologically, militarily, or politically having sufficient policy autonomy, or a narrative of it own power that would set it against the Party. It is part of the Party, within the Party, and gains its raison d’être from the Party. That has not changed, and is unlikely to do so.

### 1ar – at: PLA Backlash

#### Lack of coherence now

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In a crisis, this lack of a reliable management at the highest levels may lead to unintended and far-reaching consequences, such as accidental escalation. Yet the Chinese foreign policy establishment continues to rely on temporary mechanisms created on an ad hoc basis. During a politico-military crisis, these mechanisms are often as inefficient for information processing as they are ineffective for coordinating actions, since quality information does not reach those in charge in a timely fashion. The decision-making procedure, too, has the potential to slow crisis management. Judging from the procedures applied in the EP-3 incident and the Chinese embassy bombing, it was the top leaders in the Standing Committee of the Politburo who called the shots. But because those leaders were not able to come together quickly, China’s responses were slow. In recent years, there has been talk in Chinese academic and policy circles about the advantages of establishing a supervisory body to facilitate foreign policy coordination, prevent escalation, and manage conflicts. The new Chinese National Security Council, established in 2013, was described by Li Wei, director of the Anti-Terrorism Center at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, as “an organization that has the power to coordinate different government organs at the highest level in response to a major emergency crisis and incidents which pose threats to the national security, such as defending China’s borders and dealing with major terrorist attacks.” Although this seems like a step in the right direction, it serves primarily internal security purposes, and its precise relationship with the CMC and Xi Jinping remains obscure. And so it appears that despite an increasingly pressing need, foreign policy coordination is unlikely to improve anytime soon.

## links/internals

### 2ac – no link

#### Foreign bashing backfires in China – public isn’t fooled by nationalist rally around the flag effect

Richburg, 12 – Keith Richburg is an American journalist, a longtime foreign correspondent for The Washington Post [Washington Post, “In China, foreigner-bashing brings a public backlash”, 5/25/12, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-china-foreigner-bashing-brings-a-public-backlash/2012/05/25/gJQA4eAenU\_story.html]//Yak

BEIJING — Faced with political turmoil at the top, a slowing economy, and a young and wired population restless for change, China’s Communist rulers appear to have dusted off a time-tested tactic: blaming foreigners for the country’s problems.

This time, however, the technique does not seem to be working as well as it used to. Judging from a torrent of online criticism, it may even have backfired.

In mid-May — as blind legal rights activist Chen Guangcheng was garnering worldwide headlines for his escape from house arrest to the U.S. Embassy and his bid to travel to the United States — Beijing’s Public Security Bureau announced a 100-day crackdown on foreigners staying illegally in the city. Beijing is home to about 120,000 foreigners.

The campaign was announced just days after a May 8 incident, caught on video, in which an apparently inebriated British man attempted to assault a young Chinese woman and was then set upon and beaten by several Chinese men passing by.

Since then, official media and popular Chinese Web sites have been filled with accounts or depictions of similar incidents, most of which have drawn comments denouncing the foreigners’ bad behavior.

A May 14 video posted online, for example, showed the principal cellist with the Beijing Symphony Orchestra, a Russian, getting into a fight on a high-speed train from Shenyang to Beijing after he placed his bare feet atop the seat in front of him. When a female passenger complained, Oleg Vedernikov hurled an unprintable Chinese slur at her. He apologized several days later, speaking in Russian in a video also posted online. But it was too late to stop the orchestra from dismissing him.

Video of “suspected Koreans” assaulting Chinese women in a KFC restaurant in Chengdu also went viral, provoking general outrage.

But public opinion appeared to shift after an anchorman on government-owned CCTV International — the channel that promotes itself as presenting China’s face to the world — delivered a diatribe against foreigners on his Sina Weibo account, the local equivalent of Twitter.

“Cut off the foreign snake heads,” Yang Rui wrote May 16. “People who can’t find jobs in the U.S. and Europe come to China to grab our money, engage in human trafficking and spread deceitful lies to encourage emigration. Foreign spies seek out Chinese girls to mask their espionage and pretend to be tourists, while compiling maps and GPS data for Japan, Korea and the West.”

Yang capped his tirade against “foreign trash” with a salute to the Chinese government for its recent decision to expel Melissa Chan, a U.S. journalist at the news network al-Jazeera’s Beijing bureau. “We should shut up those who demonize China and send them packing,” he wrote.

The online response, far from being supportive, was withering, with many commenters calling the CCTV host an “idiot” and far worse epithets, most unfit to print. “You being a TV presenter is a waste of time,” one wrote. “You should join the Central Propaganda Department.”

Several others accused Yang, and the Communist Party, of trying to stir up a modern-day version of the Boxer Rebellion, the nationalist uprising against foreigners, unequal treaties and Christian proselytizing that began in 1898.

Many began to voice suspicion that the spate of stories about misbehaving foreigners was part of an effort by the government to deflect public attention from its problems. “Is there an anti-foreign campaign?” asked one Weibo poster using the name Elyaniu. “Is there an invisible hand manipulating public opinion?”

Yang later tried to soften his broadside, saying that by “foreign trash,” he meant people like the inebriated Briton or the Russian cellist, not the “silent majority” of law-abiding expats. He also quibbled with an initial translation of his characterization of Chan.

Despite his efforts to backtrack, the episode — and the criticism it generated — showed the apparent limits of foreign-bashing in China, where the urbanized “Weibo generation” is increasingly plugged in, informed and impervious to official or unofficial campaigns or pronouncements.

“In China, there’s a strange mentality, which is — we always need to create an imaginary enemy to feel safe,” said Li Chengpeng, an independent columnist. But, he added, “I know people around me, not only intellectuals and entrepreneurs, but ordinary people working in restaurants and communities. What they care about is not ‘foreign devils,’ but their real lives — sunshine, clean air, food and freedom.”

### 2ac – link turn – noko

#### And, Xi wants cooperation with the U.S. – there is political space for him to create a grand bargain with the U.S. on North Korea

Rudd 15

(Kevin, frmr Prime Minister Australia, “How to Break the ‘Mutually Assured Misperception’ Between the U.S. and China,” pg online @ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/us-china-relations-kevin-rudd-report\_b\_7096784.html //um-ef)

For these several reasons, Xi, unlike his predecessor, has the personal authority and policy flexibility to be a potentially dynamic interlocutor with the United States, albeit always within the framework of his nationalist vision for China’s future, and his definitive conclusions concerning the continuing role of China’s one-party state. When, therefore, Xi uses the term “win-win” (shuangying 双赢) to describe his desired relationship with the U.S., it should not be simply discarded as a piece of Chinese propaganda. Xi does see potential value in strategic and political collaboration with the United States. In short, there is still reasonable foreign and security policy space for the U.S. administration to work within in its dealings with Xi Jinping, although it is an open question how long it will be before policy directions are set in stone, and the window of opportunity begins to close. I argue that Xi is capable of bold policy moves, even including the possibility of grand strategic bargains on intractable questions such as the denuclearization and peaceful re-unification of the Korean Peninsula. It is up to America to use this space as creatively as it can while it still lasts.

### 2ac – link turn – engagement

#### China uses US engagement to project parity with the United States – allows Xi to exploit nationalism to gain political capital

Li, 14 – Cheng Li is director of the John L. Thornton China Center and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. He is also a director of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. Li focuses on the transformation of political leaders, generational change and technological development in China. [“Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism Over the “New Type of Great Power Relations"”, Brookings, 12/2/14, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/05-chinese-pessimism-american-cynicism-great-power-li-xu]//Yak

It has been widely noted that President Xi Jinping, however, repeatedly promoted the framework first at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July, and then at the summit with Obama in mid-November. After the summit, China’s official news agency reported that Xi and Obama “pledged to push forward a new type of major-country relations,” and that “[Obama] is willing to… lift the new type of major-country relationship between China and the U.S. to a higher level.” Xinhua implied that Obama not only accepts, but also actively supports, the “New Type” concept. In fact, the Obama administration has been cautiously staying away from it.

Why is China so keen on a “New Type of Great Power Relations” and on creating perceptions of endorsement by Obama? And why is the U.S. reluctant to adopt it? What are the reasons behind such contrasting views –– Chinese enthusiasm and American cynicism –– towards this seemingly benign concept?

When Xi Jinping defined the “New Type of Great Power Relations” in his meeting with Obama at Sunnylands last year, he described it in three points: 1) no conflict or confrontation, through emphasizing dialogue and treating each other’s strategic intentions objectively; 2) mutual respect, including for each other’s core interests and major concerns; and 3) mutually beneficial cooperation, by abandoning the zero-sum game mentality and advancing areas of mutual interest.

Embedded in the “New Type of Great Power Relations” is a nation’s hope for an international environment more conducive to its development. From the rise and fall of its many dynasties to its forced opening up to the West in the wake of the Opium Wars, China has always seen itself as a civilization deeply entangled and affected by history. Recognizing the historically recurring clashes between an existing great power and an emerging power, China looks to the “New Type” framework to avoid historical determinism and to seek a less-disruptive rise in an increasingly integrated world.

At the same time, China wants to be viewed as an equal. By using the term “Great Power” to primarily, if not solely, refer to China and the United States, China aims to elevate itself to a level playing field. Obtaining U.S. support of the concept would imply Uncle Sam’s recognition of China’s strength and power. This is what China’s official media sought to show when it suggested Obama’s support of the concept: parity and respect between the two countries.

Furthermore, Chinese leaders believe that the “New Type of Great Power Relations” enables the two powers to establish a new code of conduct in line with China’s interests. By emphasizing the respect of “core interests” as an element of the concept, China pushes its territorial claims to the forefront. This is China’s attempt at more clearly demarking where the United States and other neighboring countries need to toe the line. American adoption of the term would imply that the United States recognizes China’s “core interests.” This mutual respect of each other’s national interests is at the core of China’s aspirations.

The Chinese media avidly reporting on Obama and Xi’s joint endorsement of the concept suggests that there are also domestic reasons driving the “New Type of Great Power Relations.” Although the Chinese concept is an inherently U.S.-geared proposal, the domestic goals of such a concept should not be overlooked. From a Chinese perspective, the United States is the only superpower in today’s world that has the capacity to contain China’s rise. By strengthening China’s view of itself as a recognized and respected power, Xi Jinping is able to foster stronger nationalistic pride under CCP leadership and gain political capital to consolidate his own power at home.

### 1ar – link turn – enagagement

#### Xi’s influence is linked to CCP success --- the plan is seen as appeasing China which consolidates Xi’s power

**Jian, 5/13**/16 – writer for the Bangkok Post (Ma, Bangkok Post, “Xi strives to secure Mao-style authority”, <http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/971225/xi-strives-to-secure-mao-style-authority>, //11)

Mr Xi knows that he can succeed only by reinforcing the Party's authority, and his position as its leader. So he has presented the narrative that there is a threat to China from within -- a threat posed by treacherous and corrupt leaders -- and has declared Party loyalty to be of paramount importance. There are only two types of people: Those who support the Party and those who do not. Like Mao in 1966, Mr Xi believes the power hinges on making all Chinese -- government officials and ordinary citizens alike – loyal and obedient through any means. Power is founded on the repression of opponents, such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo and the tens of thousands of other jailed authors and scholars.

But Mr Xi is not counting on fear along to cement his rule. He is also attempting to win popular support with a new unifying ideology, based on the so-called China Dream, a set of socialist values and goals that are supposed to bring about the “great renewal of the Chinese nation”. This has been accompanied by a galvanizing form of nationalism that portrays the world, particularly the US, as seeking to keep China from assuming its rightful place atop the international order. And he has nurtured a personality cult of a kind not seen since Mao.

#### Working with the US empirically boosts credibility

**Xiangwei**, **MA** **6-16-**16

(Wang, Editorial Advisor of South China Morning, [www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1945530/xi-jinpings-supply-side-plan-now-genuine-article](http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1945530/xi-jinpings-supply-side-plan-now-genuine-article))//cb

On the slowdown that has appeared sharper than both global markets and Beijing expected, Mr. Xi urged foreign investors to take the long view and compared the world’s second-largest economy to a vessel in rough seas. Mr. Xi, who starts his visit in Seattle on Tuesday, played down differences that have unsteadied relations with the U.S., including cybersecurity and China’s island-building in the South China Sea, saying China isn’t militarily adventurous and wants to work with Washington to address world challenges. Added to the agenda in recent weeks for Mr. Xi’s summit with President Barack Obama are concerns about China’s wobbly economy—and whether that’s dented the leadership’s appetite for economic liberalization. So far, with China’s manufacturing-driven growth model flagging, the shift to consumer spending and services that the government is trying to engineer hasn’t picked up the slack. Mr. Xi sought to dispel any concern that China is faltering in its transition toward more sustainable growth: “Like an arrow shot that cannot be brought back, we will forge ahead against all odds to meet our goals of reform.” On another move that surprised global markets—a nearly 2% devaluation of China’s currency that fueled concerns about capital flight—Mr. Xi said the reduction in foreign reserves that followed is normal “and there’s no need to overreact to it.” The lead-up to summits between the U.S. and China have become fraught in recent years, as have overall relations, as Beijing, particularly under Mr. Xi, has vigorously sought to use the country’s economic, military and diplomatic clout to further its increasingly global interests. Calls are rising for the Obama administration to develop better strategies to neutralize a more assertive China. Still, Messrs. Xi and Obama have used their past summits to project a workmanlike relationship in public, despite friction in their behind-the-scenes discussions. In the interview, Mr. Xi cited cooperation on pressing global issues, from agreements to reduce emissions linked to climate change and common efforts in negotiating limits to Iran’s nuclear program; rather than supplanting the U.S., he said, China wants to work with Washington on improving global order, he said. “I don’t believe any country is capable of rearranging the architecture of global governance toward itself,” he said. He later added: “Facts have shown that the interests of China and the U.S. are increasingly intertwined.” On issues of contention, however, Mr. Xi appeared conciliatory without giving much ground. He said his government treats all businesses fairly and brushed aside complaints by foreign business organizations that regulations are being used to hobble foreign firms, particularly U.S. technology companies, and favor Chinese competitors. Mr. Xi said reclamation and other construction work in the disputed South China Sea that has alarmed neighbors and the U.S. would serve freedom of navigation—a key U.S. concern—though he didn’t say how. He also signaled that there would be no let-up in restrictions on the Internet that have blocked several foreign media sites, including the Journal’s English and Chinese editions. He also backed a proposed law that foreign non-profit groups say would limit their ability to work with social activists. Mr. Xi tried to counter allegations about the cybertheft of trade secrets to benefit Chinese companies—a problem the Obama administration is considering using sanctions to deter—and welcomed greater engagement. “The Chinese government does not engage in theft of commercial secrets in any form, nor does it encourage or support Chinese companies to engage in such practices in any way,” Mr. Xi said. “We are ready to strengthen cooperation with the U.S. side on this issue.” Mr. Xi seldom engages with the international media. For the written interview, the Journal submitted a dozen questions to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Mr. Xi. While the ministry acknowledged that officials pulled together facts and research for the answers, it said Mr. Xi revised and reviewed them. The answers at times glint with the rhetorical flair that has differentiated President Xi from his immediate predecessors and made him popular among many Chinese. His policies having met resistance from vested interests, he vows “to crack hard nuts and ford dangerous rapids” in pursuit of reforms that would rely more on market-based solutions. Overall, though, he made it clear that the government will maintain firm regulatory hold as it allows markets broader sway in allocating resources. “That means we need to make good use of both the invisible hand and the visible hand,” he said. His current trip to America—his first formal visit since taking office nearly three years ago—showcases China’s wider sway in the world as visits by previous Chinese leaders didn’t. In Seattle, Mr. Xi will see top executives of Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp., Boeing Co. and other U.S. business giants on Tuesday and Wednesday. Mr. Xi will address U.N. sessions over the weekend, presiding at a panel on empowering women. In between are his discussions at the White House and with members of Congress—the optics of which, Chinese and U.S. officials say, are important for his image back home.

#### Engagement galvanizes support for Xi

**Brown 16** --- PhD, King’s College, (Kerry Brown, 2-10-2016, "Foreign Policy Making Under Xi Jinping: The Case of the South China Sea" Journal of Political Risk, 6-22-2016, http://www.jpolrisk.com/foreign-policy-making-under-xi-jinping-the-case-of-the-south-china-sea/)//jonah

The Role of the Party in Foreign Policy Under Xi: Not Just Speaking about the Historic Mission, but Doing Something About it In view of the crucial political importance of foreign policy and its often intimate links with domestic issues (something the South China Sea issue illustrates well, as will be shown later), it is not surprising that the ruling Communist Party set the parameters and tone. The question however is how they do this, and in what ways China’s system differs, for instance, from a multi-party democratic system like the US or those in the European Union, or, for that matter, even from non-democratic ones like that of Russia. The leadership at the elite level of Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the Party offers a very good opportunity to look into this question. This is because of Xi’s particular activism and interest in foreign affairs issues (see below). This activism can be partly explained by his own political personality and the ways in which it impacts his style of leadership – something we have seen unfold since he was appointed in November 2012. But it also arises from an historic context, one in which China not only has a greater foreign policy space and impact, but also shows signs of being deeply conscious of this. The treatment of the South China Seas issue is symptomatic of this change. Even in the middle of the decade from 2000 to 2010, during the era of Hu Jintao as General Secretary of the Communist Party, it would have been surprising to hear someone state that the South China Sea disputes were a high priority for the country. They were part of a constellation of issues left over from the era of colonisation and China’s hard march towards modernity, which it labels as ‘The Century of Humiliation.’ While Hong Kong and Macau had reverted to Chinese sovereignty in the late 1990s, the key issue for Hu’s China was more around managing its new prominence in the world through the popular concept at that time of ‘peaceful rise’ (和平崛起heping jueqi),[8] rather than daring to stake out new territory on which to issue strong views. Tensions with Japan, which flared up on the streets in 2005, were perhaps a precursor of things to come. But tellingly, when China finally did issue something approaching a statement of its core interests through its then state councillor for foreign affairs, the South and East China Sea did not explicitly figure.[9] China’s transition to becoming the world’s second largest economy in 2010 had a psychological impact bigger than was realized at the time, when it was noted largely as yet another statistic the country was toppling. It perhaps made the central leadership to realize that they had a foreign policy attitude that was not suitable to their real importance and status. From this time onwards, complaints about US containment of their strategic space started to escalate. Xi is therefore the first leader who speaks within, and to, this context of China as a truly global actor, who is aware of its international role and wants to state it more forcefully. This desire for greater status for China and for a global role more commensurate with its economic importance and size has given rise to a Chinese narrative articulated towards the world, in particular by Xi as the chief spokesperson for the Party State, which is more confident, more aware of its core economic and political role, and more willing to state (or even, to use a more loaded word, assert) its interests. This has been more than just rhetorical. Xi Jinping has visited 33 countries in 30 months up to September 2015, on four continents, including three trips to Russia, three to Indonesia, two to the US, and one to India. Never before has a Chinese leader been so active on the world state. But it is not only the fact that he has travelled so much, but also what he has said during these trips that is particularly worthy of note. During this globetrotting he has articulated a vision of China in which the world is seen in concentric circles around it, according to the relative rank of importance of these countries or territories to China politically and economically. The US of course ranks in the top tier, and is accorded the moniker by Xi of ‘a new type of great power relations’ (新型大国关系)[10] status. Russia is also, on some accounts, accorded ‘great power’ ranking, though in a very different way than the US. Below this is the EU (Civilisational partners),[11] and then beyond it places like the Middle East (key for China’s energy needs)[12], Africa (increasingly important for investments and new markets), Latin America and Australia (resources). This is the world according to Xi, as far as it can be divined from his words abroad. In this Xi ranking, China’s own region occupies a highly distinctive place. Relations with Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia (interestingly, only one of these, South Korea, had he visited to as of November 2015), all contesting parties for some parts of the South and East China seas territory, have, because of their disputed maritime borders, a unique and intimate impact on China’s view of itself and its role in the world. They are foreign countries. Yet their disputes with China concern territories that the People’s Republic considers part of its own territory, and which for this reason figure within its domestic policy framework, not in the Chinese international realm. About these, therefore, it uses the strident language of `non-interference in internal affairs’ and `non intervention,’ making it hard sometimes even to discuss these issues, let alone move towards resolving them. In a far more visceral sense than the US with its constant perceived interference in terms of hard power and political dominance, or the Europeans with their irritating claims (to the Chinese Party State at least) to universalist values and ideological influence over a China increasingly keen to assert cultural and intellectual autonomy, Japan and its other regional partners directly erode and invade China’s sense of its own sovereignty by denying the historic primacy of its claims and the sense of an ancient Chinese civilizational hegemony encoded in them. The infamous nine-dash line by which China in recent years has marked the general area it claims therefore marks not only an asserted (albeit vague) territorial border, but also a deeply emotional one. This ambiguity, or duality, is part of the reason why an issue like the South China Sea does not sit easily with any single decision making body within China, nor has it proved easy about which to make flexible policy. It touches raw emotions, and relates profoundly to the sense of who the Chinese are and how they see their new role in the world as a reborn and resurrected nation. Even the Party State deals with these issues at its peril.

### 1ar – link turn – econ

#### Xi influence in the dumps now—last summer ruined him. But he’s not dead, and action now is key. The economy is a key consideration.

Minxin 15

“If Xi stumbles” Even the slightest perception of vulnerability is politically risky. He needs to change the subject in China. Written by Minxin Pei | Published: September 11, 2015 Professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. <http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/if-xi-stumbles/> //LKJ

If nothing else, a military parade is an entertaining sight. However, it is impossible to assess the longer-term political effect of the parade. If Xi thought that the parade would boost his political capital, he needs to think again. This is not to say that holding this parade was unwise. The unfortunate truth is that the timing is a bit off. When Xi and his political advisors decided on the parade six months ago, they could not have foreseen the series of events this summer that has raised disquieting doubts about Xi’s leadership and political strength. First came the stockmarket crash. The government’s attempt to save the bubble, reportedly on Xi’s order, turned out to be an expensive flop. After spending nearly $190 billion, the main stock indices have essentially remained where they were when the market-rescue operations began in mid-July. Then there was the tragic explosion in Tianjin, which killed 160 people. Although the accident was blamed on corrupt local officials and unscrupulous businessmen who violated regulations in storing hazardous chemicals in close proximity to a densely populated area, the government’s handling of the incident, such as evasive answers to many key questions about the ownership of the company involved in the accident, the identification of the hazardous materials stored and the suppression of reporting by the media, severely damaged the notion that Xi’s reforms have made a difference in how officials behave. The Tianjin tragedy was followed by perhaps the worst real economic event of the year: A sudden devaluation of the Chinese currency after a spate of bad news indicating stagnant growth. All of a sudden, popular perceptions of the Chinese economy and of the strength of Xi’s political leadership appeared to have changed. In their totality, these events revealed a clueless government that did not seem capable of getting things done the right way, or at all. For Xi, even the slightest perception of a stumble is politically risky. In the two-and-a-half years since he came to power, his anti-corruption drive has turned many of his former comrades into bitter enemies. The bureaucracy, frozen in fear and outraged about the loss of many of its privileges, including entitlements to bribes, may well be cheering the apparent comeuppance of China’s new strongman. Xi’s rivals, cowed by his sheer display of power and momentum not too long ago, may smell blood now. Even though the horrid events of the summer may not have fatally wounded Xi, they have made him, for the first time, politically vulnerable. To recover his lost momentum and repel any attempt by his rivals to challenge his authority, Xi has to do something quickly to demonstrate his political strength. He has two options, one political and the other economic. The political option is to arrest and prosecute another very senior retired leader for corruption. This step will dispel doubts about his weakened grip on power. More importantly, escalating the anti-corruption campaign has deterrence value: Anyone trying to conspire against him will end up in jail. The risk of this option, however, is that it will further fuel the division inside the regime and have no effect on his standing with ordinary people, who are now waiting for him to deliver actual improvement in the economy. The economic option is, therefore, more urgent and necessary. But unfortunately, it is also more difficult because it is more complex and, if poorly executed, could create even more economic turmoil down the road. A more sustainable way of fixing China’s sputtering economy is to apply bitter medicine in the short term. This will entail forcing zombie firms (mostly state-owned enterprises and real-estate developers) into bankruptcy to squeeze out excess manufacturing capacity and the property bubble. The price of this measure could be recession for two to three years as real financial deleveraging takes place, but the reward is sustainable long-term growth. A less painful way of delivering the goods immediately is to stimulate the economy with more monetary easing and pumping more funds into investment projects (consumption would be nice, but Beijing may not want to hand out free money to ordinary people). This step can revive growth immediately, but at a high cost. China’s debt load will likely rise to potentially catastrophic heights. Zombie firms will continue to sap economic vitality. No real reform will be implemented. And artificially stimulated growth will sputter as soon as the stimulus is withdrawn. China’s current economic mess will only worsen. It is hard to know which route Xi will take. None of the options is particularly attractive. But he may have no choice. As the image of the Victory Day parade fades, Xi has to show off — and preserve — his own political might.

### 2ac – link uq/engagement turn

#### S-quo engagement thumps the DA --- increased economic engagement solves the impact to reform ---

**Zimmerman 16** --- Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China (James Zimmerman, 4-13-2016, "Stalled Chinese Reforms, Stalled Chinese Economy" WSJ, 6-20-2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/stalled-chinese-reforms-stalled-chinese-economy-1460566422)//jonah

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang promised last month that there would be no hard landing for his country’s economy. Indeed, there’s no reason the current economic transition must result in a catastrophic decline in growth. But with headwinds increasing, China will need all the help it can get. Sometimes foreign companies wonder whether Beijing fully appreciates this. In many ways, China and the U.S. are closer than ever before. Last year, $18.3 billion in foreign investment flowed between the two countries, with an additional $562 billion in trade. Both now offer 10-year visas to each other’s citizens. And China is a topic every U.S. presidential hopeful must address on the campaign trail. Interactions between the world’s two largest economies are growing in both frequency and complexity. But the American Chamber of Commerce in China has witnessed another trend emerging over the past few years. China has been building walls and turning away from international norms. This can be seen when foreign nongovernmental organizations are blindsided by draft laws that threaten their ability to operate in China. It can be seen in restrictions that defy the World Trade Organization by limiting the direct delivery of cloud services by foreign-invested enterprises. And it can be seen in the medical-device and pharmaceutical industries, where innovative and life-saving products have difficulty reaching Chinese consumers due to standards that are sometimes not based in science. International businesses have been patient, waiting for China to reform and enter the global business community as an equal and engaged player. But AmCham China members are growing weary. A recent member survey shows 37% are “pessimistic” or “slightly pessimistic” about the next two years’ regulatory outlook. China has gotten this far with great support from the international community. Its membership in the WTO, for example, has generated immense dividends. Hong Kong and mainland China now rank as the No. 2 and No. 3 recipients of foreign direct investment. As the No. 1-ranked recipient of FDI, the U.S. knows the value of engagement through investment. It also understands that investment is not just about money, but also technology and innovation. In China, all of these will be important for the stable growth Mr. Li promises. We hope China’s disconnect can be corrected to help it achieve its reform and development goals. We see three areas in particular where direct and immediate attention is needed. The most pressing is fairness and transparency. While the rule of law has been a top concern for American businesses and China’s own policy plenums for several years, this year marks the first time inconsistent and unclear rules have topped AmCham China members’ concerns. The difficulty in obtaining business licenses is also of high concern. Licensing should be a simple procedure, but in China it’s a major discriminatory barrier to doing business. Economies benefit from competition and transparent enforcement of regulations. China should embrace more open policies for receiving input on draft laws and procuring business licenses. China’s restrictive stance toward investment also deserves more attention. The Brookings Institution describes China’s investment environment as the strictest among the G-20. How can the country weather an economic slowdown without support from other nations? Foreign direct investment into the U.S. expands annually at a brisk pace, having risen 30% in 2015, but U.S. investment into China has stagnated and represents just 1% of all U.S. direct investments abroad. U.S. companies in China are drawing back on their investment plans, and this year’s decrease is even greater than in 2009, when the world was mired in a financial crisis. In the present climate, China’s own roadblocks impede further investment in areas such as services, which could contribute most to economic growth. Nonetheless, China remains a top-three investment priority for most U.S. companies. And Americans are willing to work on this relationship, as demonstrated by negotiations on a U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty, a process that began in 2008. The U.S.-China BIT would likely be China’s largest market-liberalization exercise since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. While the basic language has been agreed upon, there are several issues unique to China, such as the role of state-owned enterprises, data localization and intellectual property protections, that need to be addressed. The “negative list” of exceptions must also be kept to a minimum for the treaty to be worthwhile. But the benefits in terms of improving the transparency and fairness of the regulatory environment that a high-quality agreement could bring are immense. Finally, innovation is an area of the Chinese economy with much room for improvement. Policies such as “Made in China 2025,” aimed at upgrading China from a manufacturer of quantity to one of quality, put innovation at the forefront. Yet many of these pilot programs exclude the U.S. companies best suited to helping China move up the value chain. Many foreign companies struggle to bring innovative products to China due to domestic standards that do not conform with the international business community. Independent or duplicate standards keep China isolated from the global economy, and take the country a step back from the strides it made over the past 30 years. China should consider U.S. companies as valuable partners for innovating in the international arena. We, too, believe that a hard landing can be avoided. But China cannot afford to disengage from the rest of the world. The benefits of international cooperation have been immense for China, and those in power should appreciate that there is still much more that can be

### 2ac – reofrms fail – generic

#### Reforms will be ineffective and weaken leadership

**Huang, MA in IR, 2016**

(Cary, Beijing Bureau chief at South China Morning Post, www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1933769/party-needs-state-planning-so-chinas-market-reforms-will , “The party needs state planning, so China’s market reforms will only go so far”)//cb

In a market economy, decisions regarding investment, production and distribution are based on market-determined supply and demand, not planned by the government. However, a host of targets in the 13th plan apparently contradict the 2013 document which proclaims that market forces should play a “decisive role” in resource allocation. The most fundamental goal of the plan is to achieve political targets of doubling gross domestic product and per capita income from a decade earlier, a central part of President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) agenda to make China a “moderately prosperous” society during his 10-year tenure. To achieve that goal, the government must utilise all resources to realise a minimum 6.5 per cent average annual growth rate in the coming five years. Why now is the time for China’s leaders to bite the bullet on economic reform China is no longer “socialist” by economic definition, following decades of market reforms. Still, it is a communist-ruled nation as the party controls the means of production through a bloated public sector. State planning reinforces government control. Despite the growth of private and foreign businesses, the state-owned firms control everything from banks and telecoms to infrastructure and strategic industries. With their political privilege and monopoly status, they enjoy preferential benefits. Beijing understands the critical importance of reforming state firms, as a free market is a precondition for the economy to move up towards higher incomes, avoiding the “middle-income trap”. The state-owned firms are obstacles to such a transition. A man carries shopping bags on a busy street in Shanghai. Photo: AFP China sets 2016 growth target range at 6.5 to 7 per cent But such reform will weaken the party’s political monopoly. The party needs state planning to directly wield significant economic power to achieve two important political objectives. One is to distribute resources to politically important priorities, such as prestige projects and industrial policy. The other is to use resources to reward its political supporters. Thus, against wide expectations of massive privatisation of the state firms to embrace the marketplace, the plan instead aims to make the firms “bigger, stronger and better” state champions and to maintain their leading role in the economy. The market is seen as the compromise, but state planning is still the backbone. This explains why Friedrich von Hayek’s famous book, The Road to Serfdom, says central planning carries a high political cost.

### 2ac – reforms fail – judicial

#### Judicial reforms fail – they are just an extension of the Party’s power

**Rosenzweig, 14** – [Joshua, an independent human-rights researcher based in Hong Kong., The Wall Street Journal, “The Credibility Crisis in China’s Courts”, 10/20/14, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/joshua-rosenzweig-the-credibility-crisis-in-chinas-courts-1413824610>, 6/24/16]JRO

The Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is underway in Beijing this week with the theme of “ruling the country according to law.” The rhetoric and reform proposals that emerge are expected to focus on restoring the credibility and authority of the country’s judicial system—a problem that has been a particular focus of President Xi Jinping since he took power in 2012. The Chinese public has grown increasingly cynical toward the courts, which have been plagued by wrongful convictions and other miscarriages of justice. The judiciary is widely perceived to be weak, inconsistent and easily manipulated by those with power and money. In hopes of addressing this credibility problem, the Fourth Plenum is expected to bring renewed affirmations of commitment to the law and proposals to strengthen important legal institutions. One rumored reform would shift administrative responsibility for court budgets and judicial appointments upward, thereby removing certain levers that local officials have traditionally used to influence court decisions. Addressing specific and longstanding systemic problems like this has the potential to reduce some of the public pressure. However, the legal system’s credibility crisis is unlikely to go away altogether—and it might very well get much worse. That’s because reforms are unlikely to change the fundamental nature of the courts as extensions of the Communist Party’s political power. China’s rulers equate their continued grip on power with the common good. Flexibility to change laws and institutions in the face of changing circumstances is the key, not commitment to fixed principles or procedures. This explains why they resist the idea that their freedom to maneuver should be checked by an independent judicial authority. Meanwhile, as the Party discusses ways to strengthen the judiciary for its own purposes, a struggle is underway in the legal trenches. A growing number of human-rights lawyers, skilled not only in points of law but also publicity, are exposing and opposing injustice and hypocrisy within China’s legal system. To this small but vocal group of Chinese lawyers, each procedural violation is worth fighting over. Even the smallest abuse represents the chronic inability of their country’s judicial system to protect individual rights and provide a fair and just forum where cases are decided according to the facts and law. Pu Zhiqiang, a veteran rights lawyer who doggedly defended free expression and other rights cases, is perhaps the best known of the many Chinese lawyers who have found themselves behind bars under questionable charges in recent months. Another is Cheng Hai, a Beijing lawyer who in September had his license suspended for a year for leaving a trial hearing earlier this year to lodge complaints about a list of procedural violations that infringed on the rights of his client, another lawyer put on trial in connection with an anticorruption protest. A few days later in Guangzhou, two lawyers representing veteran human-rights activist Guo Feixiong protested the prosecution’s failure to hand over all of its evidence by refusing to appear at trial. Their actions forced the temporary adjournment of the trial but resulted in the court’s decision to kick the two lawyers off the case. The reason why China’s die-hard lawyers have become so controversial—and why the authorities bar them from practice and even throw them in jail—is because they are at the forefront of a growing skepticism about an authoritarian model of justice overly focused on preserving stability. Instead, they insist that the Chinese legal system operate within a framework of commonly understood principles of fairness that constitute an autonomous moral authority separate from the Party-state. Their vision of justice relies on the existence of an impartial judiciary authority to put those principles into practice, but this is fundamentally irreconcilable with the idea, long dominant in China, that judicial authority is an extension of state power. This is why, though it’s a phrase we’re likely to see in media coverage of the Fourth Plenum, China’s legal reforms should not be understood as a strengthening of the rule of law. Local lawyers understand all too clearly that in China’s nondemocratic system, laws are designed and enacted without adequate input from the public. Similarly, decisions in the courts are often reached through processes outside of the courtroom involving coordination between police, prosecutors and other officials in the interest of the “big picture.” Thus when Chinese lawyers demand the recusal of a judge or register their objections to rights violations by refusing to speak, they refuse to lend legitimacy to a system that is a tool of political power. They believe not only that their disruptive efforts can force China’s legal institutions to respect human rights and rule of law but also that they have a moral responsibility to do so. By their efforts, China’s die-hard human-rights lawyers demonstrate just how far the country has to go before it can truly claim to have the rule of law. By contrast, when Chinese leaders assert that law is a bottom line that must be respected and insist on the uncontestable authority of legal institutions, they merely perpetuate the idea that power, not principle, is what gives those institutions legitimacy. As long as this is the only version of “rule of law” on offer, no amount of new rhetoric or piecemeal reform can bolster the credibility of China’s courts.

### 2ac – reofrms fail – corruption

#### Xi Jinping’s reforms fail – they’re incapable of solving corruption and only spur uncertainty and alienation within party officials – he’s more concerned with maintaining CCP dominance than solving problems.

Keliher and Wu 15 (Macabe Keliher, Doctoral candidate in History and East Asian Languages at Harvard, Hsinchao Wu, Sociologist with Ph.D. from Harvard, “How to Discipline 90 Million People,” The Atlantic, 7 April 2015, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/xi-jinping-china-corruption-political-culture/389787/#about-the-authors>, \**fc*)

Can cultural reforms substitute for institutional reforms? Many China-watchers and even some within the party see the current government as doomed without the latter. The most progressive calls are for an independent judiciary and making officials more accountable to the people by, for instance giving individuals the ability to sue the state or introducing democratic elections—two scenarios that pose a direct threat to the authority and legitimacy of the Communist Party. Given the leadership’s apparent determination to maintain the party’s dominance, however, it is not surprising that Xi has placed the burden of reform on the officials themselves rather than the political structure they inhabit. Some in the party, such as former premier Wen Jiabao, have expressed support for (albeit minor) political reform, but the current leadership has made clear that changing China’s political or legal institutions is out of the question. This crop of leaders has pursued what they seem to view as the safer alternative: the imposition of a new set of practices and standards to make people better adhere to existing institutions. History suggests they may need to broaden their strategy. A similar campaign of cultural reform was undertaken by rulers of the Qing dynasty. In the mid-17th century, Emperor Hong Taiji incorporated politically and ethnically diverse populations into a single cohesive entity that became one of the largest land-based empires in history. He co-opted different ethnic groups and military leaders by giving them incentives like ranks and titles to join the new dynasty. Officials were moreover assigned based on merit and promoted for performance. All this meant that people’s individual interests were served by serving the goals of the state. The circumstances of the People’s Republic of China today are much different than those of the Qing dynasty 300 years ago. For the ever historically minded CCP leaders, however, the lesson should be clear: Guarantee the interests of your officials and they will give you their loyalty. Punishing and threatening only ensures alienation, uncertainty, and fear. The anti-corruption drive will have to wind down at some point, and when it does, China’s leaders will have to better align the interests of rank-and-file party members with their own, in particular by rewarding performance and creativity as opposed to distributing patronage and promoting based on seniority. Xi may be able to avoid major institutional reforms by changing the political culture. But transforming the way government is run requires greater discussion about how government is run, and giving officials—especially lower- and mid-level officials—a greater voice. So far, Xi is only dealing with half the problem.

#### Corruption reform fails – government model is designed to distribute economic opportunity using party status

Lee, 1/29/16 – John Lee is an Adjunct Associate Professor at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, and a Senior Fellow (non-resident) at the Hudson Institute in Washington DC [“Why Xi's Anti-Corruption Campaign Won't Work”, Hudson Institute, 1/29/16, http://www.hudson.org/research/12152-why-xi-s-anti-corruption-campaign-won-t-work]//Yak

Corruption is part and parcel of the authoritarian model

It’s not that simple. China’s political-economy has been deliberately designed to ensure that Party members and officials are the primary beneficiaries of economic growth and opportunity. From this century onward, the Party’s strategy to remain in power is based largely on becoming the primary dispenser of commercial and career opportunity in the country.

This was a lesson learned from the countrywide riots in 1989 which almost unwound the authoritarian system. The key to remaining in power is to prevent the emergence of a genuinely independent middle and elite class which no longer views the Party as necessary or relevant to their own advancement – something occurring in the 1980s. In any rapidly industrialising society, it is the urban elites that decide the fate of authoritarian regimes. Co-opt and even create the elite class by making the authoritarian system work for them, and the future of CCP rule is that much more assured.

The problem is that too successful or comprehensive an anti-corruption campaign undermines this whole political strategy. Business and political success is widely viewed as interchangeable. A large number of those entering politics, or just joining the Party, do so on the expectation that they will benefit materially. This is the true social and political contract between the CCP and the country’s elites.

Take the 2015 National’s People’s Congress gathering which includes the Chinese People’s Consultative Political Conference in March 2015. Some 203 lawmakers and/or representatives were ranked amongst the richest 1,271 people in China with a combined net worth of $463.8 billion, according to the Hurun Report which tracks the rich in China.

Putting aside the mega-rich, well over 98% of the senior management of SOEs are card carrying Party members in the country’s state-dominated model. Over 90% of the approximately 85 million Party members are business elites. This is no coincidence since the point of Party membership and offering one’s loyalty is to access commercial benefits and opportunities that would not otherwise be available. It is no wonder that there is an estimated waiting list of one hundred million additional people wanting to join.

In a model where political position or connection is more decisive than any other factor in terms of material advancement, corruption is part and parcel of how things work within a political-economy where land, capital and even labour is still controlled or supervised by political entities, and for political purposes. Killing ‘tigers’ and swatting ‘flies’ might present as a morally attractive headline. But the relevance and popularity of the CCP depends on producing opportunities for these same tigers and flies to enrich themselves. Otherwise, why would elites and wannabes care how China is ruled and by whom? They may even demand rule-of-law rather than the rule-of-Party which currently exists.

In short, Xi cannot truly clean up the system without undermining the authority of his beloved Party. He can use the palpable fear he has generated to restrict ostentatious display of outrageous wealth, restrict capital flight out of the country, or eliminate political opponents or else keep them anxious and cowed.

But he cannot clean up China or the Party if that were ever his intention in the first place.

## Impacts

### 2ac – at: econ

#### Economic decline is inevitable – inevitably brings down Xi’s legitimacy

Elizabeth Economy 16 - C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (“The Key to Understanding China’s Economy: Its Politics,” January 25, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-key-understanding-chinas-economy-its-politics-15015) hk

Economic Reform=Less Control=Risk to Legitimacy.

No matter how talented the economists sitting around the perimeter of Zhongnanhai may be, decisions are made by the mostly non-economist leaders of the Communist Party, and economic reform puts their legitimacy at stake in a very fundamental way. It is easy to forget that all the proposed reforms—currency, stock market, state-owned enterprise, among them—require that the Chinese leaders loosen or lift their levers of control over the economy, something they are loath to do. Their legitimacy hinges largely on economic growth, and the market introduces a significant degree of uncertainty into the equation and their ability to deliver that economic growth. The leaders will constantly be experimenting with how much they can let go to achieve the change they want while still holding on to as much power as they can. We should expect economic reform to continue in fits and starts.

Xi Jinping Is the Ultimate Decider.

The word on the hutong is that the buck stops with Xi Jinping. Some good may come from that, but here are a few of the reported challenges: First, the buck stops with Xi, but Xi does not necessarily understand the nuts and bolts of the economic issues he is trying to address; and when he does address them, it is not clear that he is entirely comfortable with the risk and volatility that transforming China into a market economy entails. Second, Xi is primarily concerned with how the economy can advance China’s position in the world, so appealing to Xi’s sense of China as a global power is the way to get an initiative approved: hence “One Belt, One Road” (which many Chinese economists are concerned will not actually provide any real benefits to the Chinese economy) and the aggressive push for the Chinese yuan to be added to the International Monetary Fund’s SDR basket (a move some Chinese analysts believe happened before the country’s financial institutions were ready). Third, there are multiple power centers in the economic decision-making process: Xi and his advisers, Wang Qishan and his economic kitchen cabinet, and Li Keqiang and his increasingly hapless team. Enough said. And finally, when Xi travels, economic decision-making grinds to a halt, and Xi travels a lot.

### 1ar – at: econ

#### Economic hardships already coming – stock market fluctuations

Robert Blackwill & Kurt Campbell 16 - Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and Campbell is chairman and chief executive officer of the Asia Group. (“Xi Jinping on the Global Stage Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader,” February 2016, Council Special Report No. 74) hk

The sudden decline in the Chinese stock market in the summer of 2015 and again in January 2016 raised worries in China and around the world that the party, under Xi, will fail to make this structurally difficult transition. These concerns are compounded by widespread distrust of official statistics and the belief of some economists that a hard landing may already be under way. At the peak of the crisis, the market decline wiped out trillions of dollars in wealth and temporarily reversed many of the gains of the preceding year. This was a considerable setback, but it is important not to overstate its significance for the finances of most Chinese citizens and the state of the economy. Less than a fifth of household wealth is in stocks, and much more of it is invested in a property market that has remained stable throughout the stock market’s recent swings. Moreover, the stock market has a tradeable value less than a third of China’s economy, compared with more than 100 percent in developed countries.23 The real risk to China’s economy, and to Xi’s fortunes, comes not from the stock market’s raw economic impact but from the damage done to the government’s credibility. Xi’s strongman image suffered in the wake of the market collapse. His government had vocally encouraged average Chinese citizens to enter the country’s stock market under the premise that good returns would incentivize higher spending, and was embarrassed when those investors were singed by the crash.24 The government then publicly staked its credibility on a commitment to arrest the stock market decline, but its ill-conceived market manipulations and hasty currency devaluations were of limited effectiveness. Eventually, China was able to reverse the declines, but similar or repeated episodes will undermine the party’s legitimacy.

### 2ac – at: relations

#### Single-Issue Engagement can’t resolve US-Sino relations

Friedberg, 12 - (Aaron L., Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and the author of A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, “Bucking Beijing," Foreign Affairs, International Institutions and Global Governance Program, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2012-08-18/bucking-beijing,//BR/)

WHY WE CAN'T ALL JUST GET ALONG Today, China's ruling elites are both arrogant and insecure. In their view, continued rule by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is essential to China's stability, prosperity, and prestige; it is also, not coincidentally, vital to their own safety and comfort. Although they have largely accepted some form of capitalism in the economic sphere, they remain committed to preserving their hold on political power. The CCP's determination to maintain control informs the regime's threat perceptions, goals, and policies. Anxious about their legitimacy, China's rulers are eager to portray themselves as defenders of the national honor. Although they believe China is on track to become a world power on par with the United States, they remain deeply fearful of encirclement and ideological subversion. And despite Washington's attempts to reassure them of its benign intentions, Chinese leaders are convinced that the United States aims to block China's rise and, ultimately, undermine its one-party system of government. Like the United States, since the end of the Cold War, China has pursued an essentially constant approach toward its greatest external challenger. For the most part, Beijing has sought to avoid outright confrontation with the United States while pursuing economic growth and building up all the elements of its "comprehensive national power," a Chinese strategic concept that encompasses military strength, technological prowess, and diplomatic influence. Even as they remain on the defensive, however, Chinese officials have not been content to remain passive. They have sought incremental advances, slowly expanding China's sphere of influence and strengthening its position in Asia while working quietly to erode that of the United States. Although they are careful never to say so directly, they seek to have China displace the United States in the long run and to restore China to what they regard as its rightful place as the preponderant regional power. Chinese strategists do not believe that they can achieve this objective quickly or through a frontal assault. Instead, they seek to reassure their neighbors, relying on the attractive force of China's massive economy to counter nascent balancing efforts against it. Following the advice of the ancient military strategist Sun-tzu, Beijing aims to "win without fighting," gradually creating a situation in which overt resistance to its wishes will appear futile. The failure to date to achieve a genuine entente between the United States and China is the result not of a lack of effort but of a fundamental divergence of interests. Although limited cooperation on specific issues might be possible, the ideological gap between the two nations is simply too great, and the level of trust between them too low, to permit a stable modus vivendi. What China's current leaders ultimately want -- regional hegemony -- is not something their counterparts in Washington are willing to give. That would run counter to an axiomatic goal of U.S. grand strategy, which has remained constant for decades: to prevent the domination of either end of the Eurasian landmass by one or more potentially hostile powers. The reasons for this goal involve a mix of strategic, economic, and ideological considerations that will continue to be valid into the foreseeable future. A China unchecked by a U.S. presence in the region might not engage in outright conquest, but it would be well situated to enforce claims over disputed territories and resources. Freed from having to defend against perceived threats along its maritime periphery, China could project military power further afield to advance its interests in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, and Africa. Within China's expanding sphere of influence, U.S. firms could find their access to markets, products, and natural resources constricted by trade arrangements dictated by Beijing. The prospects for political reform in the countries along China's periphery would also be diminished as long as the CCP remained in control. And from its secure Asian base, Beijing could offer aid and comfort to authoritarian regimes in other regions. Even if China does undergo a political transformation, however, this would not suddenly erase all tensions with Washington. If history is any guide, the process of liberalization might be accompanied by internal turmoil and an increased risk of conflict with other nations. A democratic China would no doubt seek a stronger voice in regional affairs, and its aims would not always align with those of the United States. In the longer run, however, the prospects for U.S.-Chinese cooperation would be greatly enhanced. A government confident of its legitimacy would have no reason to fear encirclement and subversion by the world's democracies. Meanwhile, with other countries less likely to see China as a threat, Beijing would find it easier to reach mutually acceptable settlements with its neighbors, including Taiwan.

### 2ac – at: ccp collapse

#### CCP collapse won’t occur – economic structure guarantees the people are strongly dependent on the state.

Jones 14 (David Martin Jones, Reader in the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland and a fellow of the Australian Institute for Progress and the Institute of Public Affairs, “Managing the China Dream: Communist Party politics after the Tiananmen incident,” Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49 No. 1, 2014, \**fc*)

New Chinese companies, such as Huawei, the telecoms giant, Ping’an, one of China’s largest financial institutions, and Haier, the whitegoods manufacturer, describe themselves as collectives (minyang, meaning run by the people), rather than privately run (siyang). The bigger a company becomes, the more important are strong ties to the party and ‘the greater the benefits that flow from a good political relationship’ (McGregor: 219). Modern China is very much, therefore, a political, or managed, economy. Despite the influence exerted from the centre, the model is suffi- ciently flexible to permit local initiative. China, as Jacques observes, has adopted many features from other models of Asian economic success. Yet, it is also driven by a distinctively Chinese feature of ‘Darwinian internal competition that pits localities against each other’ (McGregor: 175). McGregor shows that Chinese cities, provinces, counties and villages compete fiercely for economic advantage. At the heart of the China model, as Jacques concludes, is a ‘hyperactive and omnipresent state, which enjoys a close relationship with a powerful body of State Owned Enterprises, a web of connections with the major firms in the private sector, [and which] has masterminded China’s economic transformation’ (615). Moreover, the party’s successful creation of a middle class that is dependent on the state ensures that despite the lack of representative democratic structures, it enjoys a high level of support. Jacques argues, citing a survey conducted by Harvard sinologist Tony Saich in 2009, that 95.9 per cent of Chinese were relatively or highly satisfied with the central government (617). A 2008 Pew Centre survey, cited by Brady, found that 86 per cent of Chinese people were ‘satisfied with their country’s development’, while in 2004, only 42 per cent had agreed with this sentiment. Brady notes that ‘Despite facing multiple troubles, China’s party-in-power, the CCP, has regained public support for its continued rule’ (29). Jacques states that this high level of satisfaction demonstrates that ‘the legitimacy or otherwise of the ruling party cannot be reduced to the absence of democracy’ (617). Indeed, he claims that ‘the Chinese state enjoys greater legitimacy than any Western state even though Western-style democracy is entirely absent’ (618). This view may have some validity, but it does not reflect the full picture. As Brady, Callick and McGregor show, there is also a darker side to the new China model.

### AT: Shambaugh

#### Crackup and economic collapse aren’t inevitable – CCP flexibility prevents it

**Kroeber 15** [Arthur - managing Director of GaveKal Dragonomics, an independent global economic research firm, and Editor of its journal, China Economic Quarterly. He is a non-resident senior fellow of the Brookings-Tsinghua Center, where his research focuses on China’s engagement with global economic institutions. Mr Kroeber is based in Beijing, where he has lived since 2002. “Is China Really Cracking Up?”, ChinaFile, March 11, 2015, <http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/china-really-cracking>] bjs

I disagree with David Shambaugh. Neither China nor its Communist Party is cracking up. I have three reasons for this judgment. First, none of the factors Shambaugh cites strongly supports the crack-up case. Second, the balance of evidence suggests that Xi Jinping's government is not weak and desperate, but forceful and adaptable. Third, the forces that might push for systemic political change are far weaker than the Party. Shambaugh thinks the system is on its last legs because rich people are moving assets abroad, Xi is cracking down on the media and academia, officials look bored in meetings, corruption is rife, and the economy is at an impasse. This is not a persuasive case. True, many rich Chinese are moving money abroad, both to find safe havens and to diversify their portfolios as China’s growth slows. But in aggregate, capital outflows are modest, and plenty of rich Chinese are still investing in their own economy. Following an easing of rules, new private business registrations rose 45% last year—scarcely a sign that the entrepreneurial class has given up hope. The crackdown on free expression and civil society is deeply distressing, but not necessarily a sign of weakness. It could equally be seen as an assertion of confidence in the success of China’s authoritarian-capitalist model, and a rejection of the idea that China needs to make concessions to liberal-democratic ideas to keep on going. It is also related to the crackdown on corruption, which Shambaugh wrongly dismisses as a cynical power play. Corruption at the end of the Hu/Wen era had got out of control, and posed a real risk of bringing down the regime. A relentless drive to limit corruption was essential to stabilize the system, and this is precisely what Xi has delivered. It cannot work unless Xi can demonstrate complete control over all aspects of the political system, including ideology. As to the economy and the reform program, it is first worth pointing out that despite its severe slowdown, China's economy continues to grow faster than that of any other major country in the world. And claims that the reform program is sputtering simply do not square with the facts. Last year saw the start of a crucial program to revamp the fiscal system (which has led to the start of restructuring local government debt), first steps to liberalize the one-child policy and hukou system (discussed for years but never achieved by previous governments), important changes in energy pricing, and linkage of the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock markets. News reports suggest that we will soon see a program to reorganize big state owned enterprises (SOEs) under Temasek-like holding companies that will focus on improving their flagging financial returns. These are all material achievements and compare favorably to, for instance, the utter failure of Shinzo Abe to progress on any of the reform agenda for Japan he outlined two years ago. Finally, there is no evidence that the biggest and most important political constituency in China—the rising urban bourgeoisie—has much interest in changing the system. In my conversations with members of this class, I hear many complaints, but more generally a satisfaction with the material progress China has made in the last two decades. Except for a tiny group of brave dissidents, this group in general displays little interest in political reform and none in democracy. One reason may be that they find uninspiring the record of democratic governance in other big Asian countries, such as India. More important is probably the fear that in a representative system, the interests of the urban bourgeoisie (at most 25% of the population) would lose out to those of the rural masses. The Party may well be somewhat insecure, but the only force that might plausibly unseat it is more insecure still. Predictions of Chinese political collapse have a long and futile history. Their persistent failure stems from a basic conceptual fault. Instead of facing the Chinese system on its own terms and understanding why it works—which could create insights into why it might stop working—critics judge the system against what they would like it to be, and find it wanting. This embeds an assumption of fragility that makes every societal problem look like an existential crisis. As a long-term resident of China, I would love the government to become more open, pluralistic and tolerant of creativity. The fact that it refuses to do so is disappointing to me and many others, but offers no grounds for a judgment of its weakness. Seven years ago, in his excellent book China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, Shambaugh described the Party as "a reasonably strong and resilient institution....To be sure, it has its problems and challenges, but none present the real possibility of systemic collapse." That was a good judgment then, and it remains a good judgment now. — Arthur Kroeber

#### Shembaugh makes hasty generalizations – reform can fix China’s ailments

**Weihua 15** [Chen - a columnist and chief Washington correspondent for China Daily and the Deputy Editor of China Daily USA. He was a Knight Fellow at Stanford University from 2004 to 2005, “Is China Really Cracking Up?”, ChinaFile, March 11, 2015, <http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/china-really-cracking>] bjs

In the 1990s, some American scholars and journalists indulged themselves in forecasting a China collapse into several republics, like the Soviet Union. Some based their arguments on the growing regionalism in the country, others bet on the passing away of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. To their disappointment, China has not disintegrated into six or seven republics. Instead it has become the world’s second-largest economy and it is well on its way to being No 1. Yet the rise of China has not discouraged some in the United States from continuing to fantasize about the breakup of China. In his Wall Street Journal article "The Coming Chinese Crackup," on March 7, David Shambaugh, a China scholar at George Washington University, pronounced that the "endgame of Communist rule" in China has begun. But his article is based on some random and superficial facts, and his arguments can best be summarized as yipian gaiquan (hasty generalization), or with the English idiom, "One swallow does not make a summer." Shambaugh is right that no campaign can eliminate the problem of corruption. But no one should be so naive as to believe that corruption can be completely uprooted, either in China or in the U.S., where President Barack Obama has repeatedly complained about money in politics. Shambaugh’s deep flaw is that he looked at China with a bias, completely ignoring the positive aspects. For example, the anti-corruption campaign launched by President Xi Jinping has raised hope for many Chinese that the thorny issue is being tackled. The campaign has been popular both at home and abroad, including winning support from senior Obama administration officials and many China scholars in Washington. In the past days, U.S. scholars, both on the right and left, have questioned Shambaugh’s logic. I believe Xi and many Chinese know that fighting the war on corruption is really hard. Yet Shambaugh seems to suggest that doing nothing is probably a better way forward.

#### Even if Shambaugh is right about issues plaguing china he underestimates Xi’s ability to strong-arm reforms

**Zhao 15** [Suisheng - Professor and Director of the Center for China-U.S. Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. He was a Campbell National Fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Washington College in Maryland, an Associate Professor of Government and East Asian Politics at Colby College in Maine, and a visiting Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS) at the University of California, San Diego. “Is China Really Cracking Up?”, ChinaFile, March 11, 2015, <http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/china-really-cracking>] bjs

I agree with Shambaugh to the extent that the C.C.P. regime is in crisis. But the regime has muddled through one crisis after another, including the catastrophes of the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen crackdown, by tackling its symptoms. It is too difficult to predict the arrival of the cracking up moment now. The current crisis came after more than three decades of market-oriented economic reform under the one-party rule that has produced a corruptive state capitalism in which power and money forge an alliance. The government officials and senior managers in state-owned enterprises have formed strong and exclusive interest groups to pursue economic gains. China ranks among the countries of the highest income inequality in the world at a time when China has dismantled its social welfare state, leaving hundreds of millions of citizens without any or adequate provision of healthcare, unemployment insurance, cost of education, and a variety of other social services. In the meantime, China has become one of the world’s most polluted countries. The crisis has worsened as China’s economic growth is slowing down and could come to a pause or even enter a downturn. The huge social, economic, and environmental costs China has paid for its rapid economic growth could eventually derail China from its growth path. As the worsening economic, social, and environmental problems cause deep discontent across society and lead many people to take to the streets in protest, China has entered a period of deepening social tensions. Apparently, the Chinese government is frightened and has relied more and more on coercive forces. The cracking up moment could ultimately come when the economic growth has significantly slowed down and the government is unable to sustain the regime’s legitimacy with its economic performance. While scholars such as Shambaugh are warning the coming of cracking up, President Xi Jinping is unlikely unaware of the danger of possible collapse and has been doing his part to prevent it from happening. Opposite from the prescription by liberal scholars and Western leaders, Xi has seen that the key to keeping the C.C.P. in power is to further empower the authoritarian state led by the Communist Party, reflecting the long struggle of the Chinese political elites in building and maintaining a powerful state to lead China’s modernization. Lucian Pye famously observed that China suffered a “crisis of authority” in a deep craving for the decisive power of “truly effective authority” ever since the collapse of the Chinese empire in the 19th century. Chinese elite attributed China’s modern decline partially to the weakening of the state authority. The authority crisis called for the creation of an authoritarian state through revolution and nationalism. The Chinese communist revolution was a collective assertion for the new form of authority and a strong state to build a prosperous Chinese nation. The very essence of the C.C.P. legitimacy for the founding of the P.R.C. was partly based upon its ability to establish a powerful state as an organizing and mobilizing force to defend the national independence and launch modernization programs. To rectify his predecessors’ overemphasis on the transformation of China through decentralization reforms that weakened the state’s authority and the C.C.P. central leadership, President Xi has made concentrated efforts to over-empower the authoritarian state. Repeatedly warning against “Westernization,” Xi emphasizes a unified national ideal of the “China Dream” and has allowed the security/propaganda axis to tighten up controls on expression of different political ideologies and opinions. Taking strong measures to strengthen central Party and government authority, he set up new and powerful small leadership groups, such as the Central National Security Commission and the Comprehensive Deepening Economic Reform Small Group, with himself as the head. Looking to Mao Zedong for inspiration to manage the country, he launched the largest rectification and mass line campaigns in decades to fight corruption. Describing Mao as “a great figure who changed the face of the nation and led the Chinese people to a new destiny,” Xi has emerged as a champion of the party-state power, with himself at the top as a strongman. Whether or not empowering the authoritarian state is a long-term solution to the current crisis, it seems to have targeted some of its symptoms and temporarily silenced its liberal critics inside China. As a result, it may help postpone the arrival of a cracking up moment at least for now

#### He is wrong – 5 reasons

**Harner 15** [Stephen - 12 years in the eighties and nineties, in Osaka, Nagoya and Tokyo with the U. S. State Department, Citibank and Merrill Lynch. “Why David Shambaugh's 'Coming Chinese Crackup' Case Is Wrong”, Forbes Asia, March 10, 2015, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2015/03/10/why-david-shambaughs-coming-chinese-crackup-case-is-wrong/#789987f92b81>] bjs

David Shambaugh, professor of international affairs and director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, is one of a group of several dozen academics and think tank scholars, who, together with officials serving in the U.S. Department of Defense, CIA, State Department, and National Security Council, make U.S. policy toward Asia, and particularly toward China. For this reason alone, we should be reading and interpreting with alarm Shambaugh’s essay in the March 6 Wall Street Journal entitled “The Coming Chinese Crackup.” In this essay, Shambaugh presents a veritable “end of days” thesis, presaging—if not predicting (“predicting the demise of authoritarian regimes is risky business”)—a collapse of political authority and administrative control in China and hinting at subsequent domestic and international turmoil. “The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun, I believe,” he declares, “and it has progressed further than many think…Its demise is likely to be protracted, messy and violent. I wouldn’t rule out the possibility that Mr. Xi will be deposed in a power struggle or coup d’état.” What has Shambaugh announcing doom? It is Xi Jinping’s seemingly ever deepening and broadening anticorruption campaign in which, avers Shambaugh, “he is overplaying a weak hand and deeply aggravating key party, state, military and commercial constituencies.” Let me say here. Anyone who visits for long intervals or lives in China, and, especially, who reads Chinese publications and listens to Chinese broadcasts—as I do, did for 20 years, and do daily—knows that a sense of dramatic, almost revolutionary, change now permeates the air. There can be no doubt that Xi’s anticorruption campaign is shaking the very foundations of many institutions, breaking many “rice bowls,” and not just threatening but actually attacking deeply vested interests in all the institutions mentioned by Shambaugh. I nevertheless absolutely reject his conclusion which I find astonishingly ill-informed. The pervasive sense of dramatic change is, I have found, combined in almost all Chinese minds with satisfaction and confidence that the change is urgently needed–indeed long overdue—and in the right direction. Kerry and Xi For this reason alone, the most likely outcome of which is a much stronger, more legitimate, and more effective CCP and government at all levels. Shambaugh presents five “telling indications of the regime’s vulnerability and the party’s systematic weaknesses.” They are all easy to dismiss. First, he says, “China’s economic elites have one foot out the door, and …are ready to flee.” But hasn’t this “hedging” behavior been characteristic for generations of rich Chinese families wherever they have had an opportunity, and particularly when that opportunity was the U.S.? Shambaugh cites “birth tourism” in Southern California where pregnant Chinese women stay a few months, give birth, and return to China with a U.S. passport-carrying child. Why is this an indication of doubt about prospects in China rather than a specular risk free investment that will yield free American education, subsidized or free health care for elderly parents, and the rest of the virtually unmatchable benefits of American residence for any family? Second is that “since taking office in 2012, Mr. Xi has greatly intensified the political repression that has blanketed China since 2009.” Shambaugh lists as targets of the repression “the press, social media, film, arts and literature, religious groups, the Internet, intellectuals, Tibetans and Uighurs, dissidents, lawyers, NGOs, university students and textbooks.” He condemns, in particular, the Central Committee’s Document No. 9 that enjoins party members to do battle with “universal values” that challenge the system. Shambaugh is arguing that all of this is “a symptom of the party leadership’s anxiety and insecurity.” I would reply that there is much less “repression” (and for actually repressive actions, much public support) in what Xi and the party apparatus is doing and much more of traditional, Confucian-style moral and philosophical exhortations, including renewed reverence for Confucianism (which contains many “repressive” elements) itself. The paramount priority for virtually all Chinese is social and political stability. This sensibility is particularly acute now as Chinese society is being stressed by a “new normal” of slower-growth economy. At the same time, Xi is pressing forward with structural systematic reforms with a determination unseen in at least twenty years. In this sense, it is rational and responsible statecraft and leadership, firmly in China’s political tradition, to enforce a certain focus on messages and themes that positively advance the reform agenda. The third point is that party members are seemingly uninspired by much in Xi’s positive agenda, like his “China Dream” concept or his exhortation to follow the “mass line.” I have spoken with a number of CCP cadres who have, with unfeigned sincerity, expressed profound appreciation and understanding toward this agenda. I believe their sincere support to be prevalent within the party. They see Xi’s agenda and approach as a critically needed return to principles for the party. Fourth, writes Shambaugh, “the corruption that riddles the party-state and the military also pervades Chinese society as a whole.” He asserts that corruption is “stubbornly rooted in the single-party system, patron-client networks, an economy utterly lacking in transparency, a state-controlled media and the absence of the rule of law.” This statement reveals an astonishing naiveté about how things work in China. Yes, corruption is part of daily life, in the sense that no one seems to work only for their salary if they have an opportunity to negotiate something more on the side. But the economy and society have developed and hundreds of millions of people prospered within this system. Indeed, it is almost impossible to imagine—given Chinese culture and tradition—a different system. And, to judge by examples in Taiwan, elsewhere in Asia and, indeed, in the United States, it is highly doubtful that the accoutrements of a democratic pluralism that he cites would make any material difference. Shambaugh’s fifth indicator is China’s economy which “is stuck in a series of systematic traps from which there is no easy exit.” I have a prediction: For the remaining eight years of the leadership of Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and the rest of the CPP Politburo Standing Committee, China will successfully “exit” or at least avoid the “systematic traps” it is economic development path, and will emerge stronger, more prosperous, and more globally engaged and competitive. This success will have much to owe to the resolute, focused approach being taken by Xi to break down the greatest barrier to development, which is a CCP debilitated by internal corruption and a loss of ideological purpose and vision.

### I/L D --- Can’t Predict

#### It’s impossible to predict Xi’s reform plans – only hindsight analysis is possible

Naughton 15, Chair of Chinese International Affairs at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, (Barry, 2015, Is There a “Xi Model” of Economic Reform? Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014, http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46bn.pdf)//kap

There is no reform blueprint. Instead, there is a centrally designed set of institutions and processes that produce reform outcomes. This second point may be surprising, given that even before his accession to power, Xi endorsed the idea that there should be a “top-level design” for economic reform, and the Third Plenum proclaimed that its overall reform program would be completed by 2020. However, the vision that is to be realized by 2020 remains extremely murky (for example, with respect to state-enterprise reform) and different groups within Chinese society have very different ideas about what it incorporates. To a certain extent, the absence of a reform blueprint follows from the top-down and authoritarian nature of the reform project. A clear reform blueprint would constrain the leader’s options, and this would not be consistent with Xi’s emphasis on maintaining initiative and discretion at the top. Instead of committing to a blueprint, Xi has established new organizations—headed by himself—that retain discretionary authority over reforms. The most important of these is the Comprehensively Deepen Reform Leadership Small Group (LSG), described Naughton, China Leadership Monitor, no. 46 10 in the previous issue of the Monitor. This group provides an institutional mechanism that ensures that political pressure is sustained and pushes reforms forward on multiple fronts. However, this leadership group doesn’t publish, and probably doesn’t possess, clear objectives for the final state of reform they envision. Instead, reforms are adopted “as they mature,” according to procedures and criteria set in place by the top leadership. Thus, in an area like state-enterprise reform, which everybody agrees is important, but where there is no consensus about the objective, every indication is that it has been quite frustrating to the reform leadership. The fact that there is no “top-level design” for reform is reflected in the fact that while the term itself continues to be used, it has inevitably been redefined. For example, Han Jun, a rural economy specialist recently elevated to be vice-head of the office of the Comprehensive Reform LSG recently declared that “a series of top-level design policies have already been announced in succession” (一些顶层改革的方案也已经陆续来发布), a conception which completely subverts the original idea of having a single top-level design for reform as a whole.24 3. Specific reform initiatives are likely to be uneven, abrupt, sometimes hasty, and unpredictable. Progress in reform is likely to be surprisingly thorough and rapid in certain areas, because the foundation has now been laid for rapid movement. Clusters of achievement will emerge when complementarities among policies become evident (as is likely with financial opening and reform); when technocrats are allowed to take the lead, building upon earlier achievements; and in areas where the political commitment of top leaders, especially Xi, is concentrated on an area considered important for national prestige. Moreover, Xi’s span of control is essentially unlimited: decisions of enormous complexity are being presented to him for final disposition on a daily basis. In this situation he will inevitably give preference to clear and quick decisions, which will sometimes be rushed. Conversely, difficult to predict economic shocks may shake the policy commitment to reform, if reforms are seen as risky or threatening to China’s security. The unpredictability of economic reform stems from the fact that it is just one element in Xi’s ambitious bundle of policy changes. Without doubt, in the long run, China cannot hope to be a great power without further economic reforms; in the short run, though, Xi Jinping has many other goals and will constantly be tempted to sacrifice economic reforms for competing objectives.

### I/L D --- Not Perceived

#### The public doesn’t perceive critical components of Xi’s reforms

Naughton 15, Chair of Chinese International Affairs at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, (Barry, 2015, Is There a “Xi Model” of Economic Reform? Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014, http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46bn.pdf)//kap

Important elements of the reform program will likely “fly under the radar.” Of the three areas discussed here, two have been discreetly underplayed by policymakers. They don’t make much of an appearance on the Third Plenum’s declaration, and they haven’t made much of a splash in the domestic or international media. Since these policies can be implemented top-down by technocrats, there is no need for the administration to mobilize popular support for them, and it may be easier to sidestep controversy and undercut opposition.

### 2ac – at: u.s.-china war

#### Conflict won’t escalate

**Rudd, 15** – Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Former Prime Minister of Australia (Kevin, Belfer Center, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping”, April 2015, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf>, //11)

Xi Jinping is a nationalist. And China, both the U.S. and China’s neighbors have concluded, is displaying newfound assertiveness in pursuing its hard security interests in the region. But there is, nonetheless, a very low risk of any form of direct conflict involving the armed forces of China and the U.S. over the next decade. It is not in the national interests of either country for any such conflict to occur; and it would be disastrous for both, not to mention for the rest of the world. Despite the deep difficulties in the relationship, no Cold War standoff between them yet exists, only a strategic chill. In fact, there is a high level of economic inter-dependency in the relationship, which some international relations scholars think puts a fundamental brake on the possibility of any open hostilities. Although it should be noted the U.S. is no longer as important to the Chinese economy as it once was.

However, armed conflict could feasibly arise through one of two scenarios:

• Either an accidental collision between U.S. and Chinese aircraft or naval vessels followed by a badly managed crisis; or

• Through a collision (accidental or deliberate) between Chinese military assets and those of a regional U.S. ally, most obviously Japan or the Philippines.

In the case of Japan, the report argues that, after bilateral tensions reached unprecedented heights during 2013-14, Beijing and Tokyo took steps in late 2014 to de-escalate their standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Hotlines between the two militaries are now being established, reducing the possibility of accidental conflict escalation. However, the same cannot be said of the South China Sea, where China continues its large-scale land reclamation efforts, where tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines remain high, and where mil-to-mil protocols are undeveloped. Xi Jinping has neither the interest, room for maneuver or personal predisposition to refrain from an assertive defense of these territorial claims, or to submit them to any form of external arbitration.

More remote contingencies remain for conflict between the U.S. and China, notably on the Korean Peninsula and over Taiwan. On North Korea, this is improbable in the extreme given Xi Jinping’s dissatisfaction with Kim Jong-Un over his continuing nuclear program, and his concern that a nuclear crisis on the Peninsula would fundamentally derail China’s economic transformation. Under Xi, U.S.-China strategic dialogue on North Korea is deepening, but anything is always possible on the part of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime, as are the consequences for regional stability. As for Taiwan, the period of six years of political and economic engagement between Beijing and Taipei under Ma Ying-jeou ‘s (Ma Yingjiu 马英九) administration may be coming to an end. If the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) wins the Taiwanese Presidential elections in 2016, and if it were to flirt again with the idea of a referendum on independence, Xi would likely take a harder line than his predecessors. And for the U.S., the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act have not changed.

Of course, Xi Jinping has no interest in triggering armed conflict with the U.S., a nightmare scenario that would fundamentally undermine China’s economic rise. Furthermore, there are few, if any, credible military scenarios in the immediate period ahead in which China could militarily prevail in a direct conflict with the U.S. This explains Xi’s determination to oversee the professionalization and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a credible, war-fighting and war-winning machine. Xi Jinping is an intelligent consumer of strategic literature and would have concluded that risking any premature military engagement with the U.S. would be foolish. Traditional Chinese strategic thinking is unequivocal in its advice not to engage an enemy unless you are in a position of overwhelming strength. Under Xi, the ultimate purpose of China’s military expansion and modernization is not to inflict defeat on the U.S., but to deter the U.S. Navy from intervening in China’s immediate periphery by creating sufficient doubt in the minds of American strategists as to their ability to prevail.